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Foreword 
 
When I started doing research, I had worked in development cooperation during ten years. I 
worked as a senior advisor in higher education for the Centre for International Cooperation 
(CIS) at VU University Amsterdam. It was great, interesting and adventurous to travel to all 
these far-away countries and work with the local people in their professional environments 
and different contexts. I learnt a lot about different contexts and cultures, and my hunger for 
more experience and more knowledge seemed endless.  
 
After some five years, however, I became more critical about development cooperation and 
my own work as a consultant. I had been involved in many projects abroad, but certainly not 
always with good results. I started to ask myself questions such as: ‘How can we be more 
successful?’ and ‘What are we actually doing?’ This was actually the start of a personal 
development process in which I wished to gain more in-depth knowledge and a better 
understanding of my work and my personal role in it.  
 
I developed a vague idea for doing PhD research and discussed it with academic colleagues 
in the Faculty of Social Sciences, who appeared to be very enthusiastic (some were even 
more enthusiastic than I was). However, at that time, we couldn’t work it out financially. 
Several years later, in 2009, I discussed my idea with Frank Derksen from the Faculty of 
Economics & Business Administration, and with my immediate supervisor Tineke Melis 
from CIS, and we came to an agreement. My gratitude to them is beyond measure, for 
making this possible. Frank has supported me (almost) unconditionally from the very 
beginning to the very end, financially and mentally, in good faith of my capacity to complete 
the PhD research successfully. This has really motivated me throughout the process. A 
million thanks to Frank! Tineke has always encouraged professional development, also with 
regards to my PhD, and I am really grateful for her support. It is very sad and unfortunate that 
she died in August 2015. I would have loved to show her the end product of my study. I also 
wish to thank Enno Masurel, who strongly supported my research initiative from the 
beginning and immediately provided office space where I could start my academic work. I 
really enjoyed working there, among other PhD researchers from Zambia, Ethiopia, Rwanda 
and Tanzania.  
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Between 2010 and 2015 a lot has happened in my personal life, which had serious 
repercussions for work, certainly in 2011 and 2012. However, with the ongoing support from 
my immediate family and good friends, I managed to get back on track. Where would I have 
been without them? My gratitude to them is huge.  
 
I also wish to express my gratitude to all my informants at CBU in Kitwe, Zambia. I have 
always been well received there by everyone, and it has been my pleasure to do my research 
work there. A special thanks for Alan Ilunga, the registrar, with whom I coordinated my 
research work every time I went there. He also used to take care of the necessary practical 
arrangements. Unfortunately and unexpectedly, he passed away in December 2014. May he 
rest in peace and be well remembered at CBU. I also wish to dedicate a great word of thanks 
to Mwansa Chabala, Progress Choongo and Mike Mwale, who helped me in organizing the 
interviews and many other practicalities; something I could never have done on my own. 
Every time, it was very nice to meet them on campus in Zambia and also outside campus in 
the evenings […]. Last but not least, I wish to thank the transport officer at CBU, who 
arranged transport for me every time I needed it – much appreciated!  
 
I wish to thank my academic supervisors Paul Jansen and Leon de Caluwé for all the 
guidance and support that they have provided. They remained positive and patient throughout 
the research process – also during the most difficult times – and always provided constructive 
and positive feedback. I also wish to thank colleagues at the Faculty of Economics & 
Business Administration and the Faculty of Social Sciences for the instant and often ad hoc 
support that they gave me throughout the process. Last but not least, I wish to thank the 
members of the reading committee for their suggestions in order to improve the final version 
of this dissertation.  
 
This thesis is dedicated to my children Merel and Jasper – my future. They have been (and 
continue to be!) a source of inspiration for me, just as much as I hope to inspire them. One 
day, I’ll take them with me on a trip to Africa…  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The pace of global, economic, and technological development makes change an inevitable 
feature of organizational life (Cummings & Worley, 2008). Change is omnipresent and an 
organizations’ capability to change is often considered as a key to success. The world is 
changing and globalizing, imposing great challenges onto modern organizations that need to 
adapt to the changing circumstances that surround them. Also in developing countries, 
change has become acknowledged as key to achieving higher organizational effectiveness 
and efficiency. Large parts of Asia, Latin America and (to a lesser extent) of Africa have 
increasingly become part of the globalized economy, largely driven by economic forces and 
facilitated by technological possibilities (Hopper, 2012). This means that change is a feature 
of organizations in lesser developed countries too.  
 
For a long time I am fascinated by organizational change, especially the human side of 
change: how and why do people change? What triggers change and what constrains change? 
How do people think, and what are their ideas, assumptions, convictions and expectations 
about change? These questions are fascinating, especially across cultures, because the 
situation and circumstances are often completely different. In this study, I will focus on 
dominant mental models of the staff on organizational change at a higher education 
institution in sub-Saharan Africa: Copperbelt University (CBU) in Zambia.  
 
The study of dominant mental models on organizational change at CBU is an account of 
recent history, the data in this study have been collected in the period 2010 – 2014. The data 
are largely retrospective in character; I have asked staff members at CBU about their 
experiences in the recent past (say from 2005 up to 2014), developments and changes that 
have taken place, how those changes came about, what their role was in the change process, 
what they think of it, what their assumptions and ideas are, how it should have been done, 
etc. There are also prospective elements in the study, for instance, I asked how things should 
be, what should be done and how that could be achieved. Altogether their answers have 
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provided me the input needed to reconstruct the dominant mental models on organizational 
change at CBU.  
 
 
1.1.  Background of the study  
 
This study has emerged from my advisory work as a consultant in higher education in 
developing countries since 2001. This consultancy took place within the framework of 
development cooperation, in numerous projects financed by the Dutch government2. I used to 
work at the Centre for International Cooperation3 of VU University, which has been quite 
successful in the acquisition and implementation of development projects around the world. 
CIS aims at making VU University’s knowledge, experience and expertise accessible to 
institutions and individuals in developing countries and countries in transition. As such, CIS 
provides a broad range of services to universities, polytechnics and education ministries, in 
the fields of education (curriculum development, teacher training, etc.), research 
(development of research programs, research training, etc.), ICT (networks, systems and 
applications), natural resource management (sustainable land management, farmer 
innovation, etc.), staff development (masters, PhDs and other courses) and institutional 
management and organization (strategic planning, university structuring, leadership and 
management development, etc.). I used to work in the latter field.  
   
I travelled a lot to - and within - a large number of developing countries around the world. 
During the first few years in the field, I mainly worked in Latin American countries, such as 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Colombia. Following the changing flows of development 
funds coming from the Netherlands, I increasingly started working in sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries, such as South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia and Ethiopia. 
I have also worked in a few Asian countries, such as Indonesia and Bhutan. In these 
countries, I have visited many higher education institutions (HEIs), where I worked together 
with leaders, deans, directors, heads of departments (HoDs), academic and administrative 
staff members. Sometimes I travelled on my own, but mostly together with other colleagues 
                                                          
2 In various programs for post-secondary education in developing countries, provided by Nuffic in the 
Netherlands.  
3 In Dutch: Centrum voor Internationale Samenwerking (CIS). In 2012, CIS has been incorporated by the VU 
International Office.  
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from the Netherlands. We provided tailor-made training, workshops and conferences, always 
in close consultation with the client HEI, and often with the support of local consultants. 
Recurrent topics in the various development projects were for instance decentralization, 
accountability, performance appraisal, strategic planning & implementation, organizational 
(re-) structuring, decision-making processes, leadership and management development, etc. A 
strive for improving organizational effectiveness and efficiency was always on top of the 
agenda.  
 
I think that it’s legitimate to say the majority of the HEIs where I worked can be labeled as 
traditional institutions, in the sense that they were mainly teaching universities (not research 
oriented), often highly centralized and bureaucratic, struggling with a limited infrastructure 
and facilities, weak administrative support, overstaffed but at the same time with a severe 
underutilization of staff. The HEIs where I worked were often located in quite remote country 
towns (not just the capital cities), with visible poverty in the immediate surroundings, a small 
formal business sector and a flourishing informal sector, agricultural lands, badly maintained 
roads, chaotic traffic, and a lot of dust (…). 
 
Over the years, I became fascinated by the ways in which HEIs change, and how local staff 
members think and act in processes of organizational change. This was even more so when I 
had the opportunity to visit the same HEI periodically during a number of subsequent years. 
However, I should say that, to a large extent, my understanding of these things remained 
limited for a long time. This is mainly due to the fact that I was usually not around, and my 
visits to these HEIs were usually short (mostly 5 - 12 days). As a consequence, I had little 
opportunity to explore the ins and outs of the local context, culture and the people. For 
instance, I was not involved in the day-to-day practices on campus, I was not there when 
critical incidents took place, and I was not there when important decisions were being made. 
So, although I saw (and heard and read about) things happening and changing in the HEIs 
that I visited, I knew very little about what was behind it, how local staff members (really) 
thought about organizational change, what their underlying reasoning was, including 
perceptions of how things had come about (or not). This is what fascinated me more and 
more, I wanted to learn more about this, and in fact, this is how my personal fascination for 
this research project emerged.  
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Since I had worked in so many different countries and HEIs, I had to choose and limit my 
research to a few countries and/or HEIs. I originally wanted to include two countries with two 
HEIs, but (mainly due to time constraints) I chose to select one country and one HEI: 
Copperbelt University (CBU) in Zambia. I had worked in Zambia several times in different 
organizations and projects, but my understanding of Zambian organizations and its people 
was very little. In 2010 I became involved in a project at CBU (and UNZA), which gave me 
the opportunity to learn more about organizational change at CBU, of which I knew that 
efforts to implement several organizational changes were being undertaken. I was fascinated 
by the ideas, assumptions and expectations of the staff, and I decided to study the dominant 
mental models of the staff on organizational change at CBU. I was triggered by experiences 
in Zambia at the Ministry of Science & Technology and Vocational Training (MSTVT) a few 
years earlier, and now I had the opportunity to focus on the interesting case of CBU: What 
are the ideas and assumptions about organizational change among the various categories of 
staff? I want to learn more about perceptions and interpretations of work mentality, 
leadership, collegial relations, accountability and cultural issues affecting organizational 
behavior (and thus, organizational change). I will explore the dominant mental models of the 
staff on organizational change, which have largely remained unknown to me during project 
interventions as a consultant. By focusing on the case of CBU, I will enhance my 
understanding of the mental models on the following organizational change processes:   
 
x Decentralization;  
x Performance appraisal; 
x Strategic planning & implementation.  
 
At CBU, these organizational changes have dominated discussions about leadership, 
management and organizational change during the last five years, in discussions, 
management meetings and on other occasions. By exploring the dominant mental models of 
CBU staff, I will be able to learn how organizational change at CBU is being perceived and 
interpreted, including perceptions and interpretations of leadership and management, 
decision-making, hierarchical and collegial relations, cultural issues, organizational culture, 
etc. In January 2010, I started my PhD research, and towards the end of the same year, I had 
developed a research proposal for the VU Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
(FEWEB).  
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1.2. Objective and research question 
 
1.2.1. Objective of the study 
My personal goal is to enhance my understanding of mental models on organizational change 
at CBU in Zambia. In doing so, I hope to contribute to the existing literature about 
organizational change in SSA. Literature about organizational change in SSA is little 
developed or nascent (Edmondson & McManus, 2007), and literature about associated mental 
models of staff is virtually inexistent. Empirical studies on organization, management and 
organizational change in SSA are relatively uncommon, dispersed and often quantitative. I 
came across a number of relevant publications where authors simply replicated each other’s 
logic without a critical note or bringing in new empirical data. Often, reference is made to 
publications that are quite outdated, as if nothing has changed ever since. Many cross-cultural 
management studies build forward on the large scale culture studies undertaken by Hofstede 
(1980, 2001) and his followers (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Schwartz, 
1999; Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). In many 
of these studies, generalizations about culture, management and organizational change in 
SSA are numerous. With this qualitative case study, I hope to go beyond these 
generalizations and contribute to theory development about management and organizational 
change in African higher education, based on empirical research at CBU in Zambia. For this 
purpose, I will use a grounded theory approach (Suddaby, 2004; Gephart, 2006). This way of 
doing research is supported by Eisenhardt (1989) and Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007).  
 
In addition, I hope to be able to distil some implications for consultants international 
cooperation. The underlying idea here is twofold:  
 
1. When we know and understand the dominant mental models on organizational change 
at CBU, we can make use of these insights in (new) forms of international 
collaboration. As such, my work can be useful for donor agencies, non-governmental 
development organizations and development practitioners;  
 
2. The insights from CBU can be relevant for other HEIs in the country, to other public 
institutions in Zambia, possibly even for public institutions in the region. 
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These two considerations have emerged from my professional background as a consultant in 
international cooperation. They reveal my personal hope that my academic work will have 
some practical relevance as well.  
 
1.2.2. Research questions 
Since I have always been interested in the human side of organizational change, I decided to 
focus on the (implicit) ideas and assumptions of staff concerning organizational change, 
captured by their mental models (Senge, 1990). Theory about mental models builds forward 
on the insights from Argyris and Schön (1974) about theories of action and organizational 
learning. Theories of action can be divided into ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories-in-action’; 
the former indicating ‘what people say’ and the latter indicating ‘what people do’ (Argyris & 
Schön, 1974). However, from the beginning of my research, I realized that I would never be 
able to tell (for sure) whether my informants were providing me with socially desirable 
answers (espoused theories) or not, so I decided to work with mental models, leaving aside 
the potential differences that might exist between ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories-in-use’.  
 
I do not enter the field as a ‘tabula rasa’, free from experience and theoretical knowledge. 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) point out that the personal and theoretical experiences which the 
researcher may bring to the task, can serve as material for the generation of categories. In 
addition, Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) argue that pre-existing knowledge and experience 
will prevent me from reinventing the wheel, by giving new names to old concepts. 
Eventually, I want to relate the emerged mental models to existing theoretical insights on 
organizational change in SSA, in order to be able to contribute to theory development. My 
main research question is formulated as follows:  
 
What are the dominant mental models on organizational change at Copperbelt 
University in Zambia, and how do they relate to existing theoretical insights about 
organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
In order to answer the main research question, I have developed the following sub questions:  
 
1. What are the dominant mental models of the local staff on organizational change at CBU 
in Zambia?  
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2. What theoretical insights does the existing academic literature provide about 
organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa?  
3. What are the general implications of the findings for consultants in international 
cooperation?  
 
The first sub question deals with the core of this study: What are the dominant mental models 
of the staff on organizational change? By focusing on three organizational changes4, I hope to 
learn to understand the different perceptions and interpretations of organizational change in 
the (recent) past, and which ideas, assumptions and convictions exist about organizational 
change in the future. This is in line with the focus from Glaser & Strauss (1967) on the 
interpretation of meaning by social actors and the construction of meaning out of 
intersubjective experience (Suddaby, 2006). Eventually, as a next step in my analysis, I will 
try to distract dominant mental models by observing patterns within the systematically 
collected empirical data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This sub question will be answered 
in the chapters 7, 8 and 9, and further discussed in chapter 11.  
 
The second sub question explores the nascent literature about organizational change in SSA 
that exists and can therefore not be ignored. These theoretical insights will be used as 
reference materials for the dominant mental models that emerge from the empirical data, in 
order to be able to contribute to theory development. In the final chapter of this dissertation 
(discussion and conclusions), I will try to relate the dominant mental models to these 
theoretical insights. This involves iterating between (and comparing) theory and data during 
the analysis of my empirical data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The theoretical exploration 
in chapter three will include insights about leadership, HRM, management and organization 
in SSA, because all these insights are in many ways related to organizational change. What 
does the academic literature say about organizational change and related subjects in SSA? 
There is some literature to be found, but as I have argued earlier, empirical studies are 
relatively uncommon, dispersed, often outdated and quantitative. This sub question will be 
answered in chapter 3 and further discussed in chapter 11.  
 
The third sub question tries to distil general implications of the research findings for 
consultants in international cooperation (e.g. development cooperation). Based on the 
                                                          
4 Decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation.  
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answers to the previous sub questions I will try to formulate some implications for ‘Western’ 
management consultants working at CBU and in other organizations in the Zambian higher 
education sector. The findings of this study may (to some extent) be relevant for other public 
sector organizations in SSA. For this purpose, it is necessary to include theoretical insights 
about organizational change in ‘Western’ HE. These insights will be provided in chapter 3, in 
order to be further discussed in chapter 11.  
 
 
1.3. Prior knowledge and experience 
 
As argued earlier, I did not start my research at CBU without prior knowledge and 
experience. I had already worked at HEIs in various developing countries all over the world, 
and I carried this ‘bag of experience’ with me when I started my research at CBU. I will 
describe and briefly explain some of my observations and experiences with organizational 
change in the context of development. I consider this relevant, since these experiences have 
(at least partly) shaped my outlook on and understanding of HEIs in developing countries, 
including Zambia. In fact, this section on prior knowledge and experience contributes to 
reflexivity on my role as a researcher (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), 
which is especially important when doing grounded theory research (Suddaby, 2006). Since 
my research deals with mental models on organizational change in Zambia, I will only 
include experiences in SSA (thereby excluding experiences in other parts of the world).  
 
Formerly disadvantaged universities in South Africa 
My first visits to SSA were in South Africa (2001 - 2002), where VUA had long-standing 
relationships with – what is nowadays called – formerly disadvantaged universities (e.g. 
black universities): there were no white people working or studying there, apart from a few 
expatriates. The Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUA) had long-standing relationships with 
South African HEIs and provided assistance in efforts to strengthen university management 
in terms of its administrative and academic functions. Two of these formerly disadvantaged 
universities (then called the University of the North-West and the University of the North) 
were generally weak in terms of its academic and administrative systems and functions, 
highly centralized, poor leadership and management, and suffered a lot from regular strikes 
by staff and students. Both universities were very politicized in terms of in-/out groups, 
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mainly along tribal lines, which were severely affecting normal university life on campus. I 
learnt how these HEIs struggled with financial deficits, scarcity of qualified staff and 
inefficiency. At both universities, they did not have a system for performance management in 
place. I was told that motivation and commitment of staff was generally low, and I learnt that 
productivity was perceived much less important than being associated with the university, 
which appeared to be an end in itself. Both universities were expected to have a regional 
development function in addition to educating students - at least in the eyes of the 
neighboring communities; the universities were frequently asked to contribute to various 
local initiatives and events, including festivities. When the new top management of the 
University of the North refused, strikes and riots broke out. In contrast, the former ‘white’ 
universities that I visited in South Africa (in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Potchefstroom) were 
very much like the universities in the Netherlands; modern infrastructures, good facilities, 
and strong academic and administrative functions. The South African government initiated a 
reform process aimed at breaking down remaining racial divides and modernizing the higher 
education sector. As a consequence, the University of the North-West was supposed to merge 
with the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education and Vaal Triangle in 
Gauteng; the University of the North had to merge with the Medical University of Southern 
Africa (Medunsa) in Pretoria5. Medunsa aimed to address both the underrepresentation of 
blacks in the health professions and the lack of good health care in the homelands (Haynes, 
1995). Although I have not been involved in these mergers, I could tell that the apparent 
differences between these universities were huge, imposing giant challenges onto university 
administration.  
 
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique 
My next experiences in SSA took place in Mozambique (2001 – 2004), at the Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) in Maputo. The project in which I was involved tried to assist the 
university in the process of decentralization, strategic planning and HRM. This relatively 
large university was highly centralized, bureaucratic, and lead by very authoritarian (if not 
dictatorial) leadership. The rector (the highest in rank) was much feared by his staff, which I 
could clearly notice during the few meetings that I had with him. This resulted in favoritism 
and corruption, indicating the importance of maintaining good working relations with 
                                                          
5 This merger is made undone; since 2015, Medunsa is incorporated by the new Sefako Makgatho Health 
Sciences University. 
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immediate superiors and top management, but also a lot of distrust. Decentralization became 
a ‘mission impossible’ at UEM. Strategic planning appeared to be a mainly academic exercise 
(to please international donor agencies?), without much implementation, but in the field of 
HRM some positive results were achieved. I did not notice major ethnic or tribal differences 
(as in South Africa), but UEM was also weak in its academic and administrative 
performance, struggling with financial deficits, scarcity of qualified staff, inefficiency, lack 
of transparency, without proper systems in place for finance and HRM.  
 
Ministry of Science & Technology and Vocational Training in Zambia 
In Zambia (2004 - 2007), I worked in a project at the Ministry of Science & Technology and 
Vocational Training (MSTVT) in Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia. In this project, I advised 
on the introduction of a system for performance appraisal, and I facilitated a number of 
workshops about organizational change in relation to behavior, attitudes and interactions. It 
was fascinating to work on these issues with the directors and HoDs, and good fun too, given 
the ever-friendly work climate at MSTVT. But after a while, it became frustrating too; it 
seemed that - despite numerous efforts –  not much happened or changed for the better, even 
after several years. I remember vividly that I was struck by the fact that, although project 
activities were well defined, agreed and planned, including monitoring and reporting, 
implementation was lacking. In fact, implementation became the most important issue on the 
agenda. Possibly, there were underlying psychological, social or political mechanisms 
(unknown to me) preventing them from taking action in the agreed direction. I found it 
frustrating, but the staff at MSTVT didn’t seem to care very much. In 2007, my involvement 
in the project came to an end, which meant that I could not further improve my understanding 
of the organization and its people, ‘how things really work at MSTVT’. I wondered how a 
ministry like this could survive, and what the staff members were actually thinking about 
their employer, their work, their colleagues and their own performance – all this remained a 
mystery to me.  
 
Polytechnics in Ghana 
In Ghana (2004 – 2008), I worked in a project in the higher vocational training sector, 
involving the University of Cape Coast and ten polytechnics around the country. The project 
aimed at strengthening the leadership and management capacity of the HEIs, and involved a 
lot of capacity building and workshops. The polytechnics (formerly technical colleges) can be 
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characterized by limited infrastructures and basic facilities, and centralized and hierarchical 
leadership. I was struck by the lack of leadership and management skills at the middle and 
higher levels; there were many staff members who were not prepared for the job in terms of 
experience and job orientation. Seniority and qualifications were valid criteria for promotion. 
Performance in administration was rather weak, despite the fact that there were many more 
administrators than academics. There were no systems in place for performance management, 
resulting in a sort of inertia, not conducive for organizational change. I noticed that there was 
a strong tendency to shift the blame, to make up easy excuses, not to feel responsible and/or 
not to undertake (or postpone) adequate action when required (apparently they were used to 
get away with it). The overall performance of polytechnics caused dissatisfaction and 
frustration among students, resulting in regular student riots. Leadership was generally 
authoritarian, but principals (the highest in rank) were accessible for the staff, leaving some 
room for subordinate consultation. Planning and implementation of change agendas proved to 
be difficult, but was more successful when the principal was directly involved (Maassen & 
Azigwe, 2009). I also learnt that organizational change in Ghana mainly concerned expansion 
in terms of new infrastructure, facilities, new programs and more students. Little reference 
was made to organizational structuring, performance management, decentralization, 
accountability or behavioral change. Tribal and religious differences were more prominent in 
the North of the country than in the South, and they did affect university life to some extent 
(rivalry for higher positions, for instance).  
 
Mzumbe University in Tanzania 
In Tanzania (2005 – 2011), I have been involved as a project manager in two projects with 
Mzumbe University, aimed at strengthening business education and research. Mzumbe 
University (MU) was a medium-sized university in Morogoro with a limited infrastructure 
and weak facilities, combined with a shortage of qualified lecturers and fast growing student 
numbers. MU was not as centralized and hierarchical as elsewhere in SSA, and leadership 
was not very authoritarian, leaving some room for subordinate consultation. There was no 
system in place for performance management. Commitment of staff was limited; outside 
teaching hours lecturers were free to spend their time on research and consultancies outside 
the campus, where they had their own small businesses and other assignments. Additional 
tasks (requests by the supervisor) were not easily accepted unless extra money was paid, 
which made it difficult to implement desirable changes. It turned out that, to a large extent, 
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local ownership in the project was limited to those elements that corresponded directly with 
the priorities of the individual staff members who were involved (Van den Heuvel & 
Maassen, 2009). Lecturers generally had little or no experience in the business sector, and 
institutional collaboration projects with stakeholders in the private sector were lacking. The 
stakeholder concept was not well developed, in the sense that there were hardly any external 
pressure groups that pushed for change and innovation at MU (Van den Heuvel & Maassen, 
2009). As a project manager, I noticed that (even the VC and DVC) found it difficult to deal 
with conflict; conflicts were avoided as much as possible.  
 
1.3.1. Overview of frequently encountered problems and examples  
In the table below, I have made a (non-exhaustive) overview of problems from practice that I 
frequently encountered in HEIs in SSA, with examples from practice.  
 
Frequently observed organizational  
problems 
Examples from practice 
Financial deficits  - Salaries cannot be paid  
- Limited infrastructure, weak facilities  
Centralization of power  - Top management has to sign for everything  
- Lack of  transparency, little information sharing 
Authoritarianism  - Nothing happens when the ‘big boss’ is not around  
- Hierarchical, top down 
Dominance of administrative affairs over 
academic affairs 
- Better administrative facilities than academic facilities 
- Too many administrators 
Weak administrative support  - Weak customer orientation  
- Not responsive to the needs of the faculties/schools 
Weak strategic planning & implementation  - Academic exercise, wish list 
- Little implementation  
Committee system for decision-making - Slow, time consuming, procedural  
- Too many committees 
Low commitment of staff  - Constantly asking for additional emoluments, sitting 
allowances, etc.  
- Personal interests prevail over institutional interests  
Weak relations with stakeholders  - Little pressure from other stakeholders than government  
- Little collaboration with private sector  
Weak performance management  - Underutilization of staff  
- Conflict avoiding behavior  
Role of ethnicity  - Tribal issues affecting organizational behavior and 
communication  
- Tribal rivalry for strategic positions  
Quality of education goes down - Growing student numbers  
- Scarcity of qualified staff  
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Frequent strikes of staff or students  - Disruption of university operations  
- Discontent, frustration 
Table 1.1: Problems and examples from practice that I encountered frequently in HEIs in SSA.  
 
Up to this point, I have summarized (a substantial part of) my experience in HEIs in SSA 
before I came to the University of Zambia (UNZA) and CBU in 2010. Together with all my 
other experiences (also in Latin America and Asia), these experiences accumulated in a 
collection of images, ideas and assumptions about HEIs in developing countries, and about 
HEIs in SSA in particular. A lot of the problems and examples in table 1.1 are also 
acknowledged and described in tender documents provided by the Dutch donor agency 
Nuffic. As such, it can be argued that by reading these reports in advance, I became biased 
even before I had visited the HEIs myself. On the other hand, it is true that many of the 
problems and examples mentioned in table 1.1 are – to some extent – recognizable and 
comparable throughout SSA, as far as my experience is concerned. These similarities are 
acknowledged and described by Teferra & Altbach (2004), which will be further explained in 
chapter 3.  
 
1.3.2. First encounters with UNZA and CBU in Zambia 
In 2010, I became involved in a project at both UNZA in Lusaka and CBU in Kitwe, a 
country town in the main copper mining area of Zambia6. In this project, I worked together 
with a colleague from VUA who had already worked with UNZA and CBU since 2007 on 
different areas of university management. At that time, I was developing my proposal for 
PhD research, so it is legitimate to say that I was working at UNZA and CBU both in the 
capacity as a consultant as well as a researcher.  I have been at UNZA only once (1 week), at 
CBU I have been twice (2 x 1 week) in the capacity of a consultant. At UNZA and CBU I 
touched the same issues that I remembered from my experience at MSTVT, which triggered 
my fascination about organizational change in relation to behavior, attitudes and interactions. 
 
At both universities several workshops were conducted, including preparatory and follow-up 
discussions with principal officers (PO’s) and other staff involved in the project. We worked 
on university governance, including decentralization (empowering the schools), and we also 
discussed issues like responsibility, accountability, performance appraisal and leadership. 
                                                          
6 For more detailed information about UNZA and CBU, see chapter 4.  
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UNZA is a relatively large university, the atmosphere was good, although it appeared to be 
more tense and political than at CBU. CBU is a much smaller university, and the atmosphere 
was very nice and friendly, just like I remembered from MSTVT several years earlier (see 
above). At both universities there appeared to be a strong ‘us and them’ mentality, where top 
management (and central admin – to some extent) had its own interests and the schools had 
theirs (comparable with tensions between central administration and faculties worldwide). In 
addition, there was a lot of organizational politics going on accompanied by distrust. At both 
universities, the intended meetings, discussions and workshops did not work out as planned 
well in advance, which seemed to be a completely normal feature of university life in 
Zambia. People were not in the office because of (sudden) other obligations or other reasons, 
amidst of other competing priorities, such as committee meetings and urgent ad hoc- 
meetings (which sometimes require the simultaneous participation of one and the same 
person), but also private businesses and family issues. Planned activities could always 
change, be cancelled or postponed due to unexpected events. Even during meetings and 
workshops, staff could come in late, leave early, answer phone calls, and secretaries could 
come in to pass on a message to their manager, or because a letter had to be signed urgently. I 
noticed that the government can demand immediate action from the PO’s, which might (for 
instance) involve a report that had to be prepared urgently or that they had to go to Lusaka 
suddenly. PO’s at their turn could demand immediate action from their subordinates and 
disturb the normal order of things of in central admin and in the schools. This gave me and 
my colleague the impression that university life in Zambia could be quite hectic and chaotic, 
and that it was difficult to plan, organize and manage things at UNZA and CBU. 
 
At UNZA and CBU we had a number of discussions with the DVC, deputy registrars, 
assistant registrars, deans and HoDs, and we organized several workshops especially for 
HoDs. This was done as a consequence of an agreed bottom-up approach, where the HoDs 
would be involved in the selection of priority areas for decentralization. The HoDs (from a 
variety of departments and schools) selected the following priority areas for decentralization: 
 
- Authority to make expenditures within the approved budget; 
- Control over self-generated income; 
- Authority to recruit staff.  
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The selection of these three areas was not coincidental; they represented areas of frustration 
on the part of the schools, and concerned issues of power and authority. Budgets were fully 
controlled by central admin, also the income that had been generated by the schools 
themselves, while financial management was not transparent (lack of information). Although 
it was argued (by the PO’s) that the deans were (formally) in control of the approved budget, 
expenditures could usually not be made due to a lack of funds (for instance, when 
government grants had not arrived). Staff recruitment procedures were lengthy and 
bureaucratic; schools wanted to be more in charge of the recruitment and selection process. 
For every priority area, a local team was appointed to analyze the current policies and 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) and to come up with suggestions to make the schools 
more in charge of their own operations.  
 
At CBU, it appeared that the implementation of the strategic plan was lacking and that – 
although everybody had agreed on the path towards decentralization – ‘nothing’ was 
happening in practice, much to the frustration of the deans. A quick inventory of relevant 
problems (by the participants) made clear that budget limitations, the elective system of 
deans, lack of management skills, weak accountability and frequent absence of the VC 
imposed major challenges on the  implementation of the strategic plan and decentralization. 
In a workshop with PO’s, deans and directors, the VC and the DVC stressed the importance 
of open discussions where everyone should speak out frankly and freely. Nine statements 
about decentralization were presented for discussion, for instance: ‘Decentralization requires 
appointed (instead of elected) deans’. It appeared that PO’s and deans and directors had 
similar ideas about nearly all statements. Both groups stressed the importance of statements 
such as ‘Decentralization requires mutual trust’, ‘In decentralization, accountability and 
feedback mechanisms are important’ and ‘Decentralization requires a shared vision and the 
willingness to buy into that vision’. Then a discussion arose about implementation, and 
questions were asked: ‘Why is nothing happening?’ ‘Are we afraid of implementation?’ ‘Is it 
more comfortable to keep things as they are?’ ‘Is it easier to blame each other than to take 
action ourselves?’ It came out that the deans were waiting for memos from top management 
and that the PO’s were waiting for initiatives taken by the schools. Deans and directors 
emphasized the importance of having a framework and clear directions for decentralization, 
which was an indication of uncertainty and fear for punishment (when things would go 
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wrong). At the end of the week, a work plan was drawn up for further action, including 
project interventions – but without my further involvement.  
 
1.3.3 Reflection on prior knowledge and experience 
So far, I have accounted for my prior knowledge and experience in HE in SSA, also at UNZA 
and CBU. I think that it is my duty to do so, especially in the light of doing qualitative 
research. I try to be open about these experiences so that the reader can judge any personal 
bias in this academic undertaking. This bias can be further extended with my educational 
record in the field of culture, organization and (change) management, and other working 
experience. According to Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000), such a bias influences researchers’ 
interpretations of what they think they are seeing, in light of their own frames of reference 
and pre-scientific categories of common-sense thinking. However, from a phenomenological 
point of view, a certain level of subjectivity is unavoidable and even necessary, while 
sustaining a ‘critical consciousness’ with regard to the topic of research (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 2005). Due to prior knowledge and experience, I have learnt to look beyond the 
obvious structures, strategies, policies, systems and procedures in organizations, in order to 
see and understand the cultural, psychological and social issues that affect employees as 
human beings. My empathy for – and understanding of – people in different contexts, 
cultures and organizations has grown substantially over the years. This has helped me to gain 
an emic perspective of organizational change at CBU (through the mental models of staff), 
and to suspend early judgments.  
 
When I embarked on academic research, I was really starting up something completely new, 
which, at least for me, generated a different outlook on organizational change in higher 
education (HE). The research required different knowledge and skills, which I gained by 
scanning the available relevant literature (which appeared to be quite nascent), by using an 
appropriate research methodology, and by using adequate research methods for data 
collection and data analysis.  
 
Prior knowledge does not only refer to knowledge and experience in practice, but also 
includes knowledge of relevant theoretical insights before embarking on empirical research. 
Some theoretical insights will be described in chapter three. Other relevant theoretical 
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insights that I came across during data collection and data analysis, will be presented and 
used in chapter 11 (discussion and conclusions).  
 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
 
After this introductory chapter, I will describe and explain the research methodology and the 
research design with regards to researching mental models at CBU (chapter two). I will 
highlight the grounded theory approach in data collection and data analysis, and I will explain 
how this approach should be understood next to an exploration of nascent theoretical insights. 
I provide examples from practice to illustrate theoretical sampling and constant comparison. 
A separate paragraph is dedicated to self-reflexivity. 
 
In chapter three I will provide an initial exploration of relevant theory. As argued earlier, 
these theoretical insights will be used as reference materials for the dominant mental models 
that have emerged from the empirical data. In the final chapter of this dissertation (discussion 
and conclusions), I will relate the dominant mental models to these theoretical insights. This 
is necessary in order to be able to contribute to theory development. Theoretical insights 
about organizational change, culture (also involving the large scale culture studies) and HE 
will be described, in SSA as well as in the ‘Western’ world. I also provide an overview of 
other potentially relevant literature about management and organizational change in SSA, 
which may be used later on. A typology from Jackson (2004) will be used to explain the 
variety of organizational management systems in Africa.  
 
Chapter four describes the research setting. I will provide (mainly factual) information to 
introduce the reader in SSA, in Zambia (population, economy, politics), in the Zambian 
higher education sector and finally in CBU. Its (recent) history, organizational and 
management structure will be described and explained, including information about 
expansion and organizational change. 
 
The chapters five up to nine are empirical chapters. Chapter five describes the preparatory 
pilot study which was undertaken in 2010 and 2011. Pilot research is partly done by master 
students from VU University Amsterdam at CBU and UNZA in Zambia. Chapter six 
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provides an insiders’ perspective on leadership, management and organizational change at 
CBU in the recent past. This results in a thick description of constraining and enabling factors 
in organizational change, and new developments that have occurred over time. Chapters 
seven, eight and nine are dedicated to the organizational changes under study: chapter seven 
describes the dominant mental models on decentralization, chapter eight describes the 
dominant mental models on performance management, and chapter nine describes the 
dominant mental models on strategic planning & implementation. At the end of each of these 
chapters, a convergent and a divergent model will be presented.  
 
Chapter ten provides an integration of the research findings, overviewing the three 
organizational changes under study. This chapter includes competing views on organizational 
change between different informant groups, coping strategies, an overview of the three 
organizational changes under study, and an assessment of the importance and relevance of the 
various constraints for each of the changes.  
 
In chapter eleven I will provide a theoretical discussion and conclusions. I refer back to the 
main research question and sub questions, and present my contributions to theory 
development. I will indicate several limitations of my research and provide suggestions for 
further research. I will also make clear what my research findings imply for consultants in 
international cooperation, and I provide some practical recommendations for CBU.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Research methodology 
 
In this chapter I will explain the chosen research methodology for this study, the research 
design and the chosen methods for data collection and analysis. The next paragraph (2.1) 
describes the scope of this study. Paragraph 2.2 is dedicated to researching mental models, 
and explains especially how I did this. In paragraph 2.3 I describe and explain the chosen 
research methodology, followed by an explanation of the research design in paragraph 2.4. In 
paragraph 2.5 I elaborate on data collection, including descriptions of the various data 
collection methods and activities. Paragraph 2.6 I describe the data analysis, including open 
coding, axial coding and selective coding, validation and trustworthiness. In paragraph 2.5 
and 2.6, I include examples and quotes from informants to illustrate the steps taken in the 
research process. I have dedicated a separate paragraph to self-reflexivity at the end of this 
chapter (paragraph 2.7). 
 
 
2.1 Scope of this study 
 
There is a lot of mature (mainly Western) theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) about 
change management and organizational change, but there is hardly any theory about 
organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). As will become clear in the theoretical 
exploration (chapter 3), there are only a few researchers (for instance Jackson, 2004; 
Sulamoyo, 2012) who have written substantially about organizational change in SSA. A lot 
of insights briefly touch upon related topics, such as leadership and HRM in SSA, often 
informed by large scale culture studies. Some of these insights are outdated although still 
cited and quoted by many (see for instance Leonard, 1987; Montgomery, 1987). We do not 
know much about perceptions and interpretations of organizational change in SSA. There is 
only nascent theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) available, indicating that there is some 
sort of theory gap. This being the case, it is easy to come up with research questions that have 
not yet been academically investigated. For instance, how do the people in Zambia look at 
20 
 
organizational change? What does organizational change mean to them? What are their ideas 
and assumptions (mental models) about organizational change at CBU?  
 
First of all, I am interested in the dominant mental models of the staff at CBU on 
organizational change. Secondly, in order to be able to contribute to theory development, I 
want to find out how these mental models relate to the available theory about organizational 
change in SSA. I am also interested in the possible implications of my research findings for 
international cooperation (e.g. ‘Western’ consultants who work with CBU or other HEIs in 
Zambia). Therefore, I need to find out how the dominant mental models relate to ‘Western’ 
theories about organizational change. 
 
The topic of organizational change is too broad and has therefore been pinned down to the 
study of mental models on three organizational changes:  
 
x Decentralization 
x Performance appraisal 
x Strategic planning & implementation  
 
These organizational changes are relevant to CBU since they have dominated discussions 
about leadership, management and change during the last five years, in workshops, 
management meetings and on other occasions. In all three organizational change processes, 
management decisions have been made and several activities have been implemented. These 
change processes have caused a lot of debate and discussion among the staff, because they 
involve decision-making power, which was – according to my informants – heavily 
centralized and therefore unequally distributed.  
 
By exploring and studying the dominant mental models of the local staff on organizational 
change at CBU, I try to understand how organizational change unfolds at CBU (in the recent 
past and present), in the eyes of the informants. This information can be valuable and useful 
for consultants and management trainers who work with CBU in the framework of 
international cooperation or any other form of cross-cultural collaboration. My research 
findings may not only be relevant for CBU, but also for other HEIs and public institutions in 
Zambia, and perhaps even beyond. A wider applicability of my research findings may be 
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expected due to similar cultural patterns that have been found across SSA (see for instance 
Malunga, 2009; Sulamoyo, 2012), which do affect human and organizational behavior in 
many ways, such as work motivation and performance appraisal (Beugré & Offodile, 2001), 
leadership and management (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Hofstede, 1993; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998), and governance (Munene et al., 2000; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 
2001). It is suggested that cultural issues are very important and relevant for organizational 
change, and thus for decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & 
implementation.  
 
 
2.2 Researching mental models  
 
Since I am mainly interested in the dominant mental models of the local staff at CBU on 
organizational change, I first need to explain what a mental model is. The concept of mental 
models is borrowed from Senge (1990). Mental models are based on the insights from 
Argyris & Schön (1974) about espoused theories and theories-in-use, similar to belief 
systems (Gilbert, 1993), causal maps (Weick, 1995), schemas (Balogun, 2007; Labianca et 
al., 2000) and frames (Benford & Snow, 2000). I have chosen to work with mental models, as 
this concept has been used and described extensively in relation to organizational change, and 
it is more recent than the espoused theories and theories-in-use from Argyris & Schön (1974). 
In addition, in my research, it will be very difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish between 
espoused theories and theories-in-use. For instance, an informant may claim that he speaks up 
against the vice-chancellor, but does he really dare to do so in reality? The insights from 
Gilbert (1993) are interesting but general and deal with mental states and mental control, 
which is less relevant for my study. The causal maps from Weick (1995) are also interesting, 
especially for those with a focus on sensemaking, which is not what I am primarily aiming at. 
Nevertheless, I expect that elements of sensemaking will become apparent during data 
analysis. The work by Balogun (2007) and Labianca et al (2000) is basically about mental 
models, although they prefer to use the term ‘schemas’.  
 
Senge (1990) basically defines a mental model as deeply held (tacit) assumptions about how 
the world works and how the world should be understood. Mental models determine not only 
how we make sense of the world, but also how we (should) take action. Senge argues that 
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problems with mental models occur when they become implicit, when they exist below the 
level of our awareness (Senge, 1990). In the academic literature, however, there is no format 
available that prescribes how a mental model should look like and what should be included. 
Consequently, I had to create my own format (see figure 2.1). In my research, a mental model 
consists of the following elements:  
 
x The current situation concerning (a specific) organizational change, including the 
management actions that are currently being undertaken; 
x New developments since the appointment of the new VC/DVC; 
x The desired situation concerning (a specific) organizational change; 
x Ideas, opinions and suggested interventions to achieve the desired situation concerning 
(a specific) organizational change;  
x Constraining factors that hamper organizational change, based on perceptions and 
interpretations of organizational change, leadership and management in the recent past;  
x Enabling factors that support organizational change, based on perceptions and 
interpretations of organizational change, leadership and management in the recent past.7 
 
Schematically, my format for a mental model looks as follows: 
 
Figure 2.1: My descriptive format for a mental model on organizational change.  
                                                          
7 It should be clear that my descriptive format for a mental model represents what my informants think, say 
and do, as captured in observations, interviews and documents. 
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In my descriptive format of a mental model, there is room for individual assessment. 
Informants will be asked to make an assessment of organizational changes in the recent past, 
and I will also ask them to make an assessment of the current situation and of the 
management actions that are currently being undertaken. These assessments may involve 
judgments, opinions, statements, outcries, frustrations, etc., and are therefore highly 
subjective of perception. In doing so, I try to understand organizational change from their 
personal point of view (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Suddaby, 2006).  
 
The constraining and enabling factors are based on individual perceptions and interpretations 
of experiences with organizational change in the recent past, that actually ‘live’ as vivid 
memories in the heads of my informants. This focus can be considered as an 
ethnomethodological perspective, as it focuses on experiences and the ‘lifeworlds’ at actor 
level that generate the common-sense knowledge of the informants (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2000). It is through these experiences that my informants understand what has supported or 
hampered organizational change, and why certain changes went well or wrong.  
 
A key element in this format is the focus on the differences between the current and the 
desired situation (‘ist’ versus ‘soll’), and the ideas (from informants) about the various ways 
to achieve the desired situation (ideas, opinions and suggested interventions). I also include 
examples (i.e. critical incidents) of organizational change in the recent past, since they may 
shine a different light on what might happen in the future. My descriptive format of a mental 
model emerged from the first interviews during data collection. When I asked informants 
about their experiences with (and opinions about) decentralization, performance appraisal and 
strategic planning & implementation, many informants immediately started to express their 
dissatisfaction and frustration about the recent past and the current situation. Constraining 
factors (and to a lesser extent, enabling factors) emerged when I asked ‘How come…’ and 
‘Why’ questions, in order to enhance my understanding of what they were telling me. Then, 
they almost automatically (without me providing much direction), started telling me how they 
would like things to be in the future – as opposed to the current situation. Subsequently, they 
didn’t need much encouragement to provide their ideas, opinions and suggested interventions 
in order to achieve the desired situation. Much later I managed to position constraining and 
enabling factors in my descriptive format. 
 
24 
 
My descriptive format provides guidance for data collection but leaves room for the 
informants to put in whatever they consider relevant and important. Since organizational 
change involves many different things (such as leadership, organization, HRM, finance, 
accountability, organizational culture, etc.) a mental model can be about almost anything, as 
long as the informant believes that it is relevant and important for the specific organizational 
change under study.  
 
The basic components of my mental model converge with two framing processes identified 
by Benford & Snow (2000) in their study of social movements. The assessment of the current 
situation converges with diagnostic framing; the description of the desired situation, 
including the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions to achieve the desired situation, 
converge with prognostic framing. Diagnostic framing addresses the problem and assigns 
responsibility or blame to a person or an institution, while prognostic framing involves the 
articulation of a proposed solution to the problem (Benford & Snow, 2000), and suggests 
ways of addressing the problem with specific strategies and tactics (Cornelissen & Werner, 
2014). It is interesting to view mental models as framing processes, because it makes clear 
that the mental models do not (only) consist of cognitive or clinical ideas, but also reflect the 
(political, personal) interests of the informants themselves. Informants try to create a world 
view that suits their own needs and makes them look good to outsiders (often at the cost of 
others). In addition, framing is often used strategically in efforts to win over others in the 
organization to support a strategic direction or change. They may also intend to influence 
sensemaking of other organizational members (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014).  
 
 
2.3 Research methodology  
 
My research aims to contribute to theory development in the area of organizational change in 
SSA. In order to answer the key research question, I conduct qualitative and interpretative 
research. The informants provide narratives of their views on reality which rely on words and 
talk that result in texts. My work is highly descriptive and often recounts who said what to 
whom as well as how, when and why (Gephart, 2004). This is based on the belief that a 
deeper understanding of a phenomenon is only possible through understanding the 
interpretations of that phenomenon from those experiencing it (Shah & Corley, 2006).  
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I use grounded theory as a research methodology and employ qualitative methods for data 
collection (open interviews, participative observations, studying archival data), as it is most 
suited to efforts to understand the process by which actors construct meaning out of inter 
subjective experience (Suddaby, 2006). Through the use of participative observations and 
open interviews, I hope to obtain a deep understanding of the ideas, assumptions and beliefs 
(mental models) of the informants on organizational change. This is in line with the focus 
from Glaser & Strauss (1967) on the interpretation of meaning by social actors. Eventually, 
as a next step in my analysis, I will try to distract dominant mental models by observing 
patterns within the systematically collected empirical data. This involves iterating between 
(and comparing) theory and data during the analysis of my empirical data (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). 
 
A common misconception about grounded theory is that it requires a researcher to enter the 
field without any knowledge or prior research (Shah & Corley, 2006; Suddaby, 2006). In fact, 
this would disqualify most researchers to use the grounded theory approach at all. As I have 
already argued in chapter one, I did not enter the field as a ‘tabula rasa’, free from 
experience and theoretical knowledge. When I started my research at CBU, I did have some 
pre-existing knowledge and experience. This refers to earlier experience with organizational 
change in HEIs in developing countries, including CBU in Zambia. I didn’t know anything 
about the mental models of the staff on organizational change at CBU, but I did have some 
basic knowledge about the institution, its organizational structure, and some of the challenges 
and difficulties that the management was facing. For instance, I knew that government 
funding was problematic (irregular and insufficient), and that there was no standard system 
for performance appraisal in place. I also knew that strategic planning and implementation 
had not been overly successful, but I did not know why. And there were talks about 
decentralization, but not much had been done in that respect.  
 
Prior experience and theoretical knowledge causes bias which has advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand, Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) argue that a bias influences 
researchers’ interpretations of what they think they are seeing, in light of their own frames of 
reference and pre-scientific categories of common-sense thinking. Similarly, Strauss & 
Corbin (1990, 2008) argue that a researcher cannot enter an investigation with a list of 
preconceived concepts, a guiding theoretical framework, or a well thought out design. On the 
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other hand, Glaser & Strauss (1967) argue that the personal and theoretical experiences which 
the researcher may bring to the task, can serve as material for the generation of categories. In 
addition, Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) argue that pre-existing knowledge and experience 
will prevent the researcher from reinventing the wheel, by giving new names to old concepts. 
As a way out, the latter authors suggest the following practical tip:  
 
Do not read too much about the technical area, so that you can maintain your fresh 
gaze. (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000) 
 
Of course, this is very vague and subject to multiple interpretations. Bowen (2006) 
satisfactorily describes and explains how to use sensitizing (theoretical) concepts in 
combination with a grounded theory approach. He quotes Charmaz (2003) who refers to 
sensitizing concepts as background ideas that inform the overall research problem that can be 
used as points of departure from which to study the data (Charmaz, 2003). The reality of 
grounded theory research is always one of trying to achieve a practical middle ground 
between a theory-laden view of the world and an unfettered empiricism (Suddaby, 2006). 
Since there isn’t much theory about organizational change in SSA available anyway, I don’t 
think that I have crossed any lines here. As a result of the above, however, my study cannot 
be considered as purely inductive, but should be viewed as abductive research, where data 
and existing theory are being considered in tandem (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012).   
 
Grounded theory is built on two key concepts: ‘constant comparison’ in which data are 
collected and analyzed simultaneously, and ‘theoretical sampling’ in which decisions about 
which data should be collected next are determined by the theory that is being constructed 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). With regards to constant comparison, data collection and analysis 
have been strongly interrelated processes: each code and category has earned its way into the 
theory by repeatedly being present in interviews, documents and observations in one form or 
another – or by being significantly absent. This has eventually resulted in the empirical 
chapters (6, 7, 8 and 9) and a number of annexes in this thesis. Codes are the basic units of 
analysis: the incidents, events, and happenings are taken as potential indicators of 
phenomena, which have been given conceptual labels. Subsequently, categories have been 
developed and related: to achieve the status of a category, a more abstract concept has been 
developed in terms of its properties and dimensions of the phenomenon it represents, 
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conditions which give rise to it, the action/interaction by which it is expressed, and the 
consequences it produces (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Throughout this study, I have constantly 
compared the collected data, during and in-between different rounds of data collection. In 
practice, this meant that I was moving back and forth through the data all the time, while I 
was developing a theory as it emerged. This will be further explained in paragraph 2.4 (see 
below).  
 
I distinguish theoretical sampling from selective sampling. Whereas theoretical sampling is 
guided by emerging theory, selective sampling is the identification of populations and 
settings prior to data collection (Draucker, Martsolf, Ross, & Rusk, 2007). As such, sampling 
in grounded theory is thus sequential, beginning with selective sampling and moving into 
theoretical sampling when concepts begin to emerge. In this study, I have selected CBU in 
Zambia as a sample for my case study, because of the following reasons:  
 
- Three major organizational changes at CBU were (and still are) taking place (or at least 
being discussed) at CBU, which are decentralization, performance appraisal and 
strategic planning & implementation. These change processes are ongoing, and 
therefore CBU appears to be an interesting research ground;  
- These organizational changes are typically sensitive to cultural influences - whether 
stemming from national, regional, local or organizational culture. For instance, in 
decentralization processes, power and leadership issues come into play, which are often 
largely culturally determined (Hofstede, 1980, 1993; House et al., 2004). The 
introduction of a system for performance appraisal is related to work centrality, job 
orientation, human nature and human relationships, which are heavily colored by 
culture (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Jackson, 2002; Schein, 2004). Strategic planning & 
implementation is also susceptible to cultural influences, in terms of time orientation 
and the nature of human activity (Hofstede, 1980; Schein, 2004); 
- There are hardly (if any) theoretical insights available specifically about organizational 
change  in Zambia, but some literature about organizational change in SSA can be 
found (Jackson, 2004; Sulamoyo, 2012), which represents a good opportunity for 
theory development; 
- CBU is located in Zambia, which is a country that scores much higher on cultural 
dimensions like collectivism and power distance than many Western countries 
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(Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-
Turner, 1998), which makes my research interesting from a cross-cultural point of 
view.  
- I am personally fascinated by Zambian culture, since my understanding of culture and 
organization in Zambia is very limited; I want to learn how organizations operate in 
Zambia, how organizational change evolves and what people’s mental models are (see 
also the introduction in chapter 1); 
- Access to data, due to former project involvement (until 2010) and ongoing projects 
between CBU and VU University (up to 2015); 
- The national language in Zambia is English, next to a number (70) of local/tribal 
languages and dialects8. Everybody at CBU speaks proper English, so no language 
barriers were to be expected.   
 
Theoretical sampling started immediately after collecting the first data, and continued until 
theoretical saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) was reached. Theoretical sampling will be 
further explained and elaborated in the next paragraph.  
 
 
2.4 Research design 
 
I have designed this study as a single case study (Yin, 2009) combined with grounded theory 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Locke, 2001). The 
aim of the study is to contribute to theory development about organizational change in SSA. I 
started my research with a pilot study (chapter 5), in order to enhance my understanding of 
organizational change at CBU, to further guide and focus my research, and to improve my 
interview questions and interview skills. The pilot study consisted of two pilot interviews and 
thesis research by three VU master students. Two students did their thesis research at CBU, 
and the third one conducted her research at UNZA, which is a different institution than CBU. 
Nevertheless, her findings are still relevant for my research, since she focused on cultural 
issues in university management and administration, which are – at least to some extent – 
also relevant for CBU.  
                                                          
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_Zambia.  
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After analysis of the preparatory pilot study, the main study took off. I conducted two 
sessions of participative observation and three rounds of interviews, each one building 
forward on the analysis of previous interview rounds. In line with the grounded theory 
methodology, data collection and analysis have occurred in alternating sequences. Analysis 
began with the first interviews and observations, which lead to the next interview or 
observation, followed by more analysis, more interviews and so on (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
This is reflected in figure 2.2.  
 
The blue circles with the bended arrows indicate that the processes of data collection and data 
analysis have been executed in a reiterative way (constant comparison). The analysis of the 
data gathered during the first round of data collection has influenced and guided the second 
round of data collection; the analysis of the data gathered during the second round of data 
collection has influenced and guided the third round of data collection, and so forth. For 
instance, during the pilot interviews some negativity had been expressed about work 
mentality and ethics. This made me more sensitive to these issues, so I decided to ask for 
more specific information about work mentality and ethics in the next round of data 
collection: what do the informants mean by negative work mentality and ethics? What 
examples can they provide? What are the most important issues in their eyes, and what are 
the causes? Does negative work mentality and ethics apply to all categories of staff? 
Eventually, my understanding of work mentality and ethics has increased and improved a lot, 
which, as will become clear in subsequent chapters, proves to be very important in relation to 
organizational change at CBU.  
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The reversed arrows (pointing back to previous rounds of data collection) are also important 
to highlight here. The analysis of the data gathered during the second round of data collection 
influenced my understanding of the data gathered during the first round of data collection; the 
analysis of the data gathered during the third round of data collection influenced my 
understanding of the data gathered during the second round of data collection, and so forth 
(constant comparison). This means that, while I was moving further on the path of data 
collection and analysis, my understanding of the bigger picture increased, including my 
understanding of how things relate to each other. As a result, I decided (for instance) to 
rename certain codes, split certain codes and merge others. For instance, during the initial 
rounds of data collection, many informants said things like ‘I want to be consulted’, ‘we want 
to be informed’ and ‘I want to be involved’. Initially, I coded each of these quotes separately. 
Later in the process of data collection and analysis, it became clear to me that these 
complaints actually refer to the one and the same phenomenon: a strong strive for consensus, 
inclusiveness and buy-in, which proved to be quite strong and prominent at CBU. As a result, 
I merged some of the initial codes under the new common denominator.  
 
Since data collection has been spread out over a period of three years, there is a clear 
longitudinal element in my study. This is mainly due to the fact that every round of data 
collection required time for processing, analyzing and interpreting the data. During the rather 
lengthy period of data collection, some changes have occurred in the various mental models 
of staff over time. I noticed significant changes in the mental models of the staff about (at 
least two of the) three organizational changes at CBU. For instance, considering the 
introduction of a system for performance appraisal (PMS), a lot of fear and doubts that 
emerged from the first rounds of data collection (in 2011 and 2012) seemed to have 
evaporated towards the end of 2013. The reason for this mental model change is basically due 
to a change of CBU top management (e.g. new VC and DVC) in 2012, and the involvement 
of the unions in efforts to obtain acceptance and buy-in concerning PMS from the staff. 
Another mental model change has occurred with regards to strategic planning & 
implementation; whereas a lot of informants felt excluded from the development of the 
previous strategic plan, informants felt more involved and included during the development 
of the new strategic plan (2014 – 2018). Considering decentralization, however, I haven’t 
noticed significant mental model changes during the three year period of data collection. This 
will be further explained in the empirical chapters.  
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Theoretical sampling  
Throughout data collection and analysis, samples have been selected in a conscious and well-
considered way, in efforts to develop and refine the codes and categories that emerged 
(Locke, 2001). Based on the findings of the preparatory pilot study and the related questions 
that had emerged, I further developed and improved the interview protocol. I included in-
depth questions about phenomena that needed to be investigated further (see chapter 5). This 
has been an ongoing process throughout data collection; almost every interview resulted in 
(yet again) new questions that I had to ask in order to further enhance my understanding of 
the topic at hand. This has not only guided the in-depth questions to be asked in subsequent 
interviews, but also the selection of next informants. At the end of every interview, I asked 
the informant whom they would recommend for a subsequent interview, if I wanted to learn 
more about a particular topic. I enjoyed very much the practical help of the Zambian PhD 
researchers (and others on campus), and the flexibility of CBU staff who made it possible for 
me to organize my interviews in this (ad hoc) way. Sometimes it was not possible to have an 
interview with a particular informant in the period that I was at CBU; in such cases, I tried to 
arrange an interview with this person during the next round of interviews. Examples of 
theoretical sampling will be provided in the next paragraph on data collection (2.5). 
 
When I was conducting interviews, I noticed that it wasn’t always equally exciting to ask the 
same questions to different informants. Especially when informants came from the same 
category of staff, I often heard the same (or similar) stories. Informants from other categories 
of staff often had different views, and provided new insights that I hadn’t come across earlier. 
Informants vary in hierarchical level (top-, middle- and lower management), position 
(function) and area (academic or administrative). People in different groups, functional areas 
or hierarchical or status levels often see what is apparently the same event very differently 
(Labianca et al., 2000). Based on these considerations, I managed to distinguish four 
informant comparison groups (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001):  
 
- Top management 
- Deans and directors 
- Central admin staff 
- Academics from schools 
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These groups are considered as the ‘owners’ of the dominant mental models at CBU 
regarding the three organizational changes. Top management comprises of the principal 
officers (PO’s); they are the VC, the DVC, the registrar and the bursar. Deans and directors 
represent the middle management at CBU; they are deans of schools and directors of 
academic directorates or administrative services. Central admin comprises of lower and 
middle level administrators from the registry, finance and the library (such as assistant 
registrars, deputy registrars, accountants, administrative assistants and other support staff). 
Academics are the lecturers, senior lecturers and professors in the schools, including HoDs.  
 
To be more specific, I have included six principal officers, three deans of schools, three 
directors, four deputy registrars, two assistant registrars, three financial administrators, three 
general administrators, six HoDs, one professor, seven senior lecturers, one representative 
from the academic union, and two staff members from the library. From these informants, 
only five are women. My informants have worked at CBU for (at least) a number of years, 
some even up to several decades. They are all local staff members – no expatriates were 
involved.    
 
A final note on the role of students in my research: I have not incorporated students as 
informants in this study, since they do not play a significant role in organizational change. I 
think that they should, but in reality they don’t. Although they are formally represented in the 
university council, senate and boards of studies, their role and influence in organizational 
change (as operationalized in this study) is less than minimal. This has been confirmed 
repeatedly during informal meetings with students on- and outside campus, and also during a 
meeting with representatives of the student union.  
 
 
2.5 Data collection  
 
Before, during and after data collection I have received different kinds of support from three 
CBU staff members, both in Amsterdam and in Kitwe (Zambia). Two staff members were 
doing their PhD research at VU University, partly working in Amsterdam and partly working 
in Kitwe. As a matter of fact, we shared a room during several years. I have consulted them 
every time before and after I went to CBU for data collection, and also during data analysis. 
34 
 
In addition, they helped me to organize the first and second round of interviews with CBU 
staff members on campus in Kitwe. The other CBU staff member helped me to organize the 
third round of interviews. This practical support proved to be very helpful; it was very 
difficult (if not impossible) to organize a series of interviews with CBU staff members 
(including adequate interview rooms) from the Netherlands. I involved the Zambian PhD 
researchers when I developed or improved the interview questionnaire, not only in 
formulating the right questions, but also in choosing the right cases for the think-aloud 
protocols (see further down, under interviews).  
 
When I planned a trip to CBU for data collection I always consulted top management first. I 
knew the registrar and the DVC from previous consultancies (in Nuffic projects). VCs and 
DVCs had visited VU University a few times, and in 2010 I presented my research plans to 
them. My intentions were well received with a sincere interest in the outcomes. I had easy 
access to them through telephone, SMS and mail. I discussed whether the intended period of 
data collection was convenient for CBU – in terms of ongoing classes, public holidays and 
other festivities. The registrar also provided transport, not only an airport pick-up but also 
daily transport between the hotel and CBU. Once I was on campus, I always went to see the 
registrar and the DVC in their offices for courtesy visits.  
 
In this study, I use triangulation of data, which means that data collection relies on multiple 
sources (Locke, 2001), e.g. archival sources, participative observations and in-depth 
interviews.  
 
2.5.1 Collection of documents  
Due to my previous involvement in a Nuffic project at CBU as a consultant, I had access to 
tender documents, project reports (such as mission reports, annual reports and evaluation 
reports), and many other documents (such as annual reports from CBU, the strategic plan 
2009 – 2013, HRM policies, financial regulations, minutes from [management] meetings, 
university council resolutions, etc.). During data collection for my research, CBU 
management (usually in the person of the registrar) was quite helpful in providing any 
requested documents.  
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I found it interesting to notice that minutes of (management) meetings at CBU were usually 
very short and little informative. Minutes were often factual, referred to certain other 
documents, and indicated whether a decision had been made or not. In the minutes, hardly 
any information was found about the discussion that had preceded the decision, neither about 
the different viewpoints, conflicts of interest or other issues at hand. In addition, certain 
policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs) were not easy to retrieve, for instance the 
financial regulations and several HRM procedures. For instance, it came out that the financial 
regulations had been revised but they were still kept as draft (for several years). Also, the 
SOP for recruitment and selection of new staff was there but the latest version could not be 
found easily. I wondered how I should understand this, what it actually meant in terms of 
compliance. Therefore, I included questions about compliance in the interview protocol.  
 
Some documents proved to be very informative. For instance, tender documents (published 
by Nuffic) contain interesting and relevant background information about the general context 
(political, socio-economical) of Zambia and the post-secondary education sector. With 
regards to the universities, one document says:  
 
The major obstacles that universities are facing are inadequate learning facilities 
such as libraries, laboratories, computer services, equipment, lecture rooms, poor 
infrastructure and poor funding by the government. (Nuffic, 2005) 
 
Tender documents also provide specific information about the organizational structure of 
CBU, institutional strengths and weaknesses, etc. Nuffic projects deal with a range of issues, 
such as the library system, financial auditing, staff development, curriculum development, 
research, the ICT network, ICT applications and university management issues. From one of 
the tender documents (Nuffic, 2005) I understood, for instance, that CBU had a backlog in 
financial auditing for several years, which had become a serious problem for CBU in relation 
to the Zambian government and other stakeholders. This problem has been solved with the 
support of a Nuffic project. I also understood that CBU did not have system in place for 
performance appraisal of both academics and administrative staff. From another document 
(Nuffic, 2009), I learnt that there had been no strategic plan in place for the period 2004 – 
2008, while they did have a strategic plan during the preceding period. With the support of 
the project, a new strategic plan had been developed for the period 2009 – 2013.  
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In addition, I had access to mission reports, annual work plans and annual progress reports 
produced by VU University in collaboration with CBU. These reports described the results of 
project activities and progress (or the lack of it) in the various projects that had been 
implemented at CBU (or were still being implemented). For example, in one of the mission 
reports I found the following striking statement about a workshop with deans and directors:  
 
The workshop started 40 minutes late because participants were not on time. It was 
stated that this appears to be a systemic problem at CBU. (VU-CIS, 2007) 
 
Of course, this triggered me to include specific questions about time management in the 
interview protocol. From another mission report I learnt that the principle of elected deans 
was causing problems, at least in the eyes of the VC:  
 
For elected deans, HRM issues are challenging because they don’t like to make 
unpopular decisions, but prefer to blame the VC instead. For instance, they approve 
leave days although the person in question does not have leave days anymore, and 
leave it up to the VC to solve the problem. (VU-CIS, 2009) 
 
This ‘upwards delegation’ from deans to the VC made me wonder how deans perceive their 
job and responsibility, so I decided to include some questions about their role in the interview 
protocol. Nuffic also conducted mid-term reviews and evaluations of its programs and 
projects, which contained also valuable information. One conclusion drawn from an 
evaluation of the entire NPT program (including a project at CBU) is that:  
 
It should be noted that student enrolment at CBU grows rapidly, having doubled 
since 2003. Likewise, the number of programs offered by the university equally 
undergoes rapid growth. (Nuffic, 2008) 
 
Another conclusion of the same NPT program evaluation concerns the sustainability of all its 
projects:  
 
Sustainability is a highly problematic issue in Zambia. (Nuffic, 2008)  
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Sustainability is a big problem in Zambian post-secondary education sector due to high staff 
turnover, dependence on limited government funds and little income generating activities. I 
wondered how CBU managed limited funding, and why there were not many income 
generating activities, while the university is located in the middle of the copper mining 
region. Therefore, I decided to ask for further explanations during the interviews. These are 
just examples taken from tender documents, mission reports and evaluations, but of course, I 
have been able to get much more information from them than presented here. However, most 
of the information retrieved through the analysis of project documents should be considered 
as background information material, and not all documents were useful for the purpose of this 
study.  
 
2.5.2  Participant observation 
Participant observation is a common but demanding data collection method widely used in 
ethnographic research which requires that the researcher becomes a participant in the culture 
or context being observed (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). I have included two sessions of 
participative observation in this study. The first session was in 2011, during a one-week 
management workshop in Ndola (Zambia), where all the PO’s, deans, directors and HoDs 
were present (about 50 people). The second session was in 2012, during a project 
management workshop at VU University in the Netherlands, where several PO’s and 
directors from UNZA and CBU were present. During this meeting, overall progress in a 
Nuffic project was discussed.  
 
I approached both sessions with an open mind and attitude, aiming at a deeper understanding 
of organizational change at CBU. I was especially interested in what was going to be said and 
done, about what exactly, in what way, and by whom, including reactions from others. I also 
wanted to grasp the general atmosphere during the sessions, including the changing workshop 
dynamics as they further developed. It was also interesting to grasp non-verbal expressions 
on the faces of the participants, in order to be able to make further inquiries later on. Last but 
not least, I captured things that did not happen – perhaps mainly because I expected otherwise 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
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The management workshop in Ndola 
The management workshop in Ndola proved to be an excellent opportunity for participative 
observation, and it resulted in very interesting and relevant data. I remember vividly how the 
management workshop began: later than planned, chaotic, with various versions of the 
program still circulating, people moving in and out of the workshop room, etc. But the 
general atmosphere was very nice and lively throughout the week. It occurred to me that an 
important function of the management workshop was to have some informal time together. 
 
My role was limited to be a participative observer, which was very different from other 
(previous) occasions where I used to be the organizer and/or facilitator of such events. So this 
was a new situation for me, in which I felt a little bit uneasy in the beginning. I promised 
myself not to speak too much, but to listen and to watch what happened and how things were 
happening. I was allowed to ask questions and to give advice, which I sometimes did. I have 
to admit that I sometimes had to force myself not to intervene, but to leave workshop 
dynamics as they were. 
 
In addition to the simple enjoyment of jokes, it seemed that fun and laughter actually played 
an important role; when difficult issues arrived on the table, and no immediate answers or 
solutions were available, they made jokes and laughed. The issue at hand was not solved, 
however, but then at least they had some fun about it. I have seen this happening quite a 
number of times. And it was not just the lower managers that did this; also the VC, DVC and 
Registrar were very capable of making jokes and creating fun. For instance, one participant 
argued that compliance was a big problem at CBU; apparently, people do not always comply 
with the rules and regulations. The rules are not reinforced by the HoDs and the Deans, as 
one participant clearly stated:  
 
“In the end no-one is being held accountable.” (Observation during the management 
workshop in Ndola, 2011)  
 
This was a pretty bold but strong statement, which caused hilarity, loud comments, and a lot 
of laughter. It came to my mind that I had witnessed this behavior on earlier events: When 
sensitive confrontational issues come to the table, they start laughing, as if it is their standard 
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way to deal with them. But in fact, they didn’t deal with them at all! As soon as the laughter 
faded away, a new subject was brought in for discussion.  
 
During the management workshop, the three organizational changes were discussed. 
Concerning performance appraisal, it became clear that there were a lot of doubts and fears 
about PMS. For instance, people said that they were afraid of victimization and subjectivity. 
With regards to decentralization, some preparatory work had been done. Three specific areas 
of management (recruitment and selection, control over self-generated income and spending 
power to make expenditures within the approved budget) had been analyzed and their 
findings were presented, with suggestions to make schools more in charge of operations. 
Interestingly, the analysis showed that certain policies and SOPs had been very difficult to 
find, and were kept as drafts. Nobody seemed to have the last version of these documents, 
and they had not been disseminated to the university community. Concerning the 
implementation of the strategic plan, there was a lot of dissatisfaction. Very little was being 
done, due to various causes. It was argued that scarcity of funds was the biggest problem, and 
therefore people seemed to have lost their belief in strategic planning. Implementation 
committees had not been established or they had disappeared soon after their emergence, and 
the central committee for monitoring & evaluation was not on top of things.  
 
There was also attention for other issues like attitude towards work, compliance, financial 
management, procurement, and the role of institutional committees. I was struck by the 
amount of committees, and the amount of time and money being invested in them. But I also 
understood that the committee system provides opportunities for involving the staff who 
would otherwise be excluded from decision-making.  
 
The project management workshop in Amsterdam 
During this workshop at VU University in Amsterdam in July 2012, overall progress in a 
Nuffic project was discussed between project managers from the Netherlands and several 
PO’s and directors from CBU and UNZA. It started as a rather formal meeting, where I was 
present as an observer. Several interesting issues came up, such as the strong tendency to 
comply with Nuffic demands: “Let’s do what they want us to do, let’s not oppose Nuffic.” 
Although there was agreement that several things (in the project) could have been done 
better, the Zambians preferred not to talk about this, but to look at the future. As such, they 
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avoided a (perhaps confrontational) discussion on what could have been done better, and 
how.  
 
Several issues of hierarchy came up during the meeting. For instance, the seat next to the 
DVC of UNZA remained empty, as if nobody dared to sit next to him. When one of the PO’s 
spoke, other participants were absolutely silent, which was certainly not the case when other 
participants wanted to make a point. And it was argued that accountability towards a registrar 
is stronger than towards a deputy registrar.  
 
The issue of autonomous decision-making by CBU and UNZA caused hilarity and a lot of 
laughter among the participants, which can only be understood in the Zambian context where 
the government is omnipresent in virtually all university affairs. In addition, there was 
consensus about the need to involve other stakeholders in decision-making processes, in 
order to generate stakeholder buy-in.  
 
Many more observations triggered my fascination and interest, and provided good material 
for further questioning during the interviews, which is in line with the concept of theoretical 
sampling. I have written reports about the (participative) observations, which are uploaded in 
Atlas.ti for data analysis. This will be further described and explained in paragraph 2.6.  
 
2.5.3  Interviews  
Interviews represent the main source of data in this study. After the preparatory pilot study, I 
started further developing and improving the interview protocol. I decided to leave out certain 
questions, and to elaborate on other questions. From the pilot interviews I had learnt for 
instance that I had to focus more on issues like work mentality and ethics, organizational 
culture, frustration, job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction. I also further developed questions 
to enhance my understanding of decentralization, the introduction of a PMS and strategic 
planning & implementation. I elaborated the interview protocol in close collaboration with 
my academic supervisors, the Zambian PhD researchers in Amsterdam and several other 
colleagues at the VU faculty of economics & business administration. 
 
During the interviews, my biggest challenge would be to retrieve (elements of) their mental 
models about organizational change at CBU, but the question was: how to do this? I realized 
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that I could not ask ‘what is your mental model?’, or ‘what are your assumptions about 
organizational change?’, so I had to think of other ways to seduce informants to share their 
true and sincere ideas and assumptions about organizational change at CBU with me, instead 
of providing socially desirable answers or respond defensively. In order to prevent this from 
happening, I included several so-called think-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1985). 
Subjects are asked to perform a task and to verbalize whatever crosses their mind during the 
task performance (Jaaskelainen, 2010). Think-aloud protocols are often used in order to find 
out more about the deeper lying assumptions and opinions of informants about a certain 
phenomenon. The informant is requested to think aloud when reading the case, so that every 
thought and idea that comes to his/her mind can be captured directly (even the little thought-
through, not well considered and blunt responses), without giving the informant much chance 
to consider the appropriateness of his/her thoughts and ideas. To that end, I developed small 
hypothetical cases with several questions or a problem that needed to be solved. I deliberately 
chose for cases outside CBU but in similar university settings, in order to prevent any real life 
associations with their own role, position and function at CBU.  
 
I improved the interview protocol with support from the Zambian PhD researchers while they 
were working in Amsterdam. They helped me to improve the formulation of certain questions 
in order to avoid confusion. After all, they knew how my questions were going to be 
perceived and understood by CBU staff members. For the semi-structured interviews, I 
distinguished seven parts (A – H) in the interview protocol: 
 
A. General questions about the employee in relation to the university 
B. Open questions about decentralization 
C. Open questions about performance appraisal 
D. Open questions about strategic planning & implementation  
E. Open questions about leadership and management in general 
F. Open questions about motivation, commitment and work atmosphere 
G. Short case studies (think aloud protocols) 
H. Reflective questions   
 
Part A of the interview focuses on general aspects of the informant and his/her job, which 
may function as a sort of warming-up for subsequent sections. Parts B, C and D focus on 
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decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation; these are 
the key areas of this study. The questions in part B, C and D focus on the past (what has been 
done?), the present (what is being done?), the future (what needs to be done?) and also on the 
role of the individual informant. Part E focuses on leadership and power issues, which are 
obviously very important for the way organizational change unfolds. Part F focuses deals 
with issues like motivation, commitment and work atmosphere, which I also consider 
important and relevant for the study of organizational change; I believe that motivation, 
commitment and work atmosphere strongly influence (ideas about) the introduction of a 
performance appraisal system. Part G consists of five short case studies that will be presented 
one by one to the informant. The informant will be given time for quickly reading the case, 
and then (s)he will be asked to think aloud about how (s)he would approach the issue at hand. 
The cases deal with a variety of subjects, but they all imply some degree of organizational 
change. Part H consists of a number of reflective questions on cultural issues, contextual 
factors, the role of the government and other institutions. The interview protocol (including 
the think-aloud protocols) is included in annex 1. 
 
The interview protocol was rather lengthy and I knew that it could easily take more time than 
two hours to go through all the questions. But the protocol has been used flexibly and 
pragmatic, not as a rigid list of compulsory questions that all needed to be answered in detail. 
In addition, the interview protocol has been adjusted several times in the course of time, as 
other questions emerged during data collection. In grounded theory, flexible questioning is a 
normal practice (Shah & Corley, 2006). I quickly realized that every informant had his/her 
own topics that he or she wanted to talk about. So one informant wanted to talk a lot about 
decentralization but did not have much to say about performance appraisal. Another one 
wanted to talk a lot about leadership and strategic planning. Their preferences were often the 
result of their own personal involvement and experiences in the change processes. It worked 
out well, in the sense that, to a large extent, the informants were in the lead; they determined 
which topics to elaborate on, what to say and what to preserve silent.  
 
I conducted three rounds of interviews, each round comprising of 10 – 12 interviews. Each 
interview lasted between one and two hours. In total, I have interviewed 29 different CBU 
staff members, of which 12 staff members have been interviewed twice (thus resulting in 39 
individual interviews). All the interviews have been recorded, resulting in 65 hours of 
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interview. In addition to the interviews, I have conducted five validation workshops involving 
18 more informants. In total I have included the input from 47 informants in my research.  
 
I promised absolute confidentiality and discretion, so that informants didn’t have to worry 
about what to share and what not to share with me. Especially during the second and third 
round of data collection, it became clear to me how important this discretion actually is. As 
will become clear in the empirical chapters, staff members at CBU do not easily share their 
thoughts and ideas openly with others; they tend to keep quiet in order to prevent problems 
later on. But still, I have the impression that most informants were quite willing to talk openly 
(at least to me), once they knew that confidentiality and discretion was guaranteed. There are 
only two informants whose identities are almost impossible to conceal; the previous and the 
current VC. They occupy a lonely-at-the-top position with a lot of executive power, much 
more than the other members of top management. This makes the VC’s (and their behavior) 
very visible to everybody, also in my research.  
 
Sometimes it helped to start the interview with a little chat on things that had nothing to do 
with my research. On other occasions I helped informants in finding the right words to 
express their feelings. I sometimes provoked informants by making a bold statement, which 
resulted in immediate and valuable responses.  
 
I cannot claim to have evoked only ‘sincere’ and ‘honest’ answers from the informants; that 
would not be credible but pretentious. The information distracted during the interviews 
period is most probably a mixture of ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theories-in-use’ (Argyris & 
Schön, 1974). Since I cannot tell what is ‘espoused’ and what is ‘in-use’, I simply include all 
the gathered information in the dataset.  
 
First round of interviews (September 2012) 
For me, it was quite exciting to start with the interviews. Of course, I had done two pilot 
interviews, and I had learnt a lot from conducting them (see chapter 5). This time, however, it 
felt for real, nothing was supposed to go wrong. I knew that I would only have a limited 
number of interview rounds (due to financial constraints), so I felt somewhat under pressure. 
At the same, I realized that I could not become pushy in efforts to distract the desired 
information from my informants. Indeed, I was supposed to remain calm and patient, let them 
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do the talking, and limit myself to providing some guidance over the topics to be discussed, 
and ask further in-depth questions when further clarification was needed. Overall, it worked 
reasonably well, resulting in a lot of very interesting and relevant recordings.  
 
The Zambian PhD researchers (who were in Zambia by that time) helped me to organize all 
the interviews in a very efficient way, so that I managed to conduct 12 in-depth interviews in 
five days. I was given a room in the school of business to conduct the interviews, when the 
informants did not have an office of their own. During the week, I listened carefully to the 
stories of my informants, and after a few days several ‘images’ started to emerge, for instance 
about authoritarian leadership, the implications of excessive centralization, discontinuity, the 
committee system for decision-making, accountability, government influence, etc. It struck 
me that it wasn’t all that positive; in fact, I noticed a lot of negativity (dissatisfaction, 
frustration and fear) among the staff mainly concerning organizational change. Of course, 
these were relevant issues for my research, for instance the following quote about 
decentralization:  
 
“What we would love to see is actually… what we would like to see is 
decentralization, there is just too much power at the center, and units do not have 
much say especially when it comes to spending money, everything is controlled by 
the bosses up there.” (Informant 8)   
 
There was also hope and optimism for the better of CBU, and also job satisfaction with 
regards to their jobs, their colleagues and the broader work environment. According to some 
informants, nothing much was to be expected from the current top management (concerning 
decentralization), only a new management (new VC and DVC) would be able to make a 
difference.  
 
I noticed that many informants showed a strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in, 
which was unusually strong in my view. I wondered where this tendency came from; was this 
due to the lack of consultation under the previous university leadership, and/or the lack of 
information sharing by management at all levels? Or was this simply an indication of general 
‘African’ collectivism? When I asked in-depth questions about it, they mainly referred to the 
lack of consultation and involvement, and authoritarianism.  
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I also found out that absent top management was a major source of discontinuity, next to 
strikes (by staff and students) and irregular funding. Top management was often absent due to 
obligatory meetings with the ministry of education (or another governmental institution) in 
Lusaka (which is a four hour drive away from Kitwe):  
 
“Unfortunately, there is this discontinuity due to PO’s who are not on campus, 
which is very often, that is true… It relates to the way universities are run, most 
decisions…, critical information regarding the running of universities…,  you only 
receive that in Lusaka, and yes, you find the registrar, the bursar, the DVC and the 
VC tripping up and down to Lusaka.” (Informant 18) 
 
In addition to frequent trips to Lusaka, top management regularly went on foreign trips to 
neighboring African countries, Europe or Asia. I understood that when top management was 
not around, hardly any decisions (including expenditures) could be made. Transitional 
periods, in which an acting VC and DVC were not yet appointed officially as substantive 
officers, also proved to be a source of discontinuity. Sometimes these periods lasted quite 
long (more than six months), and consequently, important decisions had to be postponed.   
 
I managed to grasp differences between the accounts from central admin and the schools, 
mainly in terms of organizational culture. From central admin, I gathered the impression that 
a role-oriented culture was more prominent than in the schools, which was reflected in more 
traditional leadership styles, weaker feedback and accountability mechanisms and lower 
involvement of staff in departmental affairs. By contrast, academics in the schools enjoyed 
much more professional freedom, they were accountable to their students and they seemed to 
be more involved by their HoDs and deans in school affairs. When this occurred to me, I 
decided to ask further in-depth questions about its implications for organizational change at 
CBU.  
 
Second round of interviews (May 2013) 
The second round of interviews was planned earlier, but other (teaching) obligations on my 
part and inconvenience at CBU caused some delay. As a consequence, I had more time to 
analyze the data from the first interviews, so I could go back to CBU well prepared. During 
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the second round I interviewed twelve staff members in five days (again with the practical 
support of the Zambian PhD researchers who were working at CBU at that time).  
 
Before I arrived, the first series of interviews had been transcribed, processed and analyzed. I 
had developed a list of additional questions that had emerged from the initial analysis 
(theoretical sampling). The ‘images’ that had emerged during the first round of interviews 
had been further developed. Based on the preliminary analysis of the first round of 
interviews, I focused on specific areas that needed further clarification. For instance, during 
the preliminary analysis of the first round of interviews, it had become clear that ‘giving and 
receiving feedback’ is rather weakly developed at CBU. In Atlas.ti I had made a network 
view of all the codes under the category ‘weak feedback mechanisms’ and I asked several 
informants to have a close look at the network view, and to tell me everything that came to 
their minds respectively. This resulted in relevant comments and questions. This reflective 
exercise has sharpened and deepened my understanding of the topic.  
 
But there were also a lot of new questions which had to be included. For instance, I wanted to 
learn more about the effects of authoritarian leadership on university management and 
organizational change. The quote below gives an example of authoritarianism and its effect 
on accountability:  
 
“When you become too authoritative, you start taking over things from others, and 
as a result, they are no longer accountable, for instance, when you are supposed to 
discipline somebody, but the disciplinary action comes from the VC, then you are no 
longer accountable for that action, isn’t it?” (Informant 18)  
 
Earlier on, I had learnt that giving feedback to each other is limited, that people refrain from 
giving feedback because the other person might feel offended and pass on the information to 
someone else. But I didn’t understand why that was so important, why they prefer to stay 
quiet, or what could happen to them. When I asked more in-depth questions about this, many 
informants remarked that feedback can easily be perceived as embarrassing and offensive, 
which may harm the relationship with colleagues or immediate supervisors. Giving feedback 
to top management is also difficult, as the following quote clearly indicates:  
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“There is this belief that when you keep quiet, you may not lose your job. Nobody 
knows, there is no information about that… If you stay quiet, they can’t find 
anything negative, nothing bad you’ve written, so you’re a good boy. If you ask too 
much difficult questions, it is different. Top management may want to remove you 
from your office, and then you lose your emoluments and allowances.” (Informant 
38) 
 
I understood that staff members at CBU do not want to risk losing their emoluments and 
allowances (on top of their monthly salary), and they will go very far in efforts to retain them. 
As a consequence, they watch out carefully when giving feedback to top management. 
Another example is about compliance; it had come out that several standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and policies were unavailable or kept as drafts, so I wondered why. I was 
a bit surprised to hear a PO declaring the following:  
 
“At Mukuba [the management workshop in 2011], it came out that standard 
operating procedures concerning recruitment and finance could not be found, no 
one knew where they were, or they were kept as drafts, or they were not 
disseminated.” (Informant 17) 
 
According to this informant, it would not be fair to put the blame entirely on top management 
for weak compliance in these areas. For instance, some policies were kept as drafts due to 
interference by the national government, who aimed at harmonization of public sector 
policies for finance and personnel. So for some time, CBU could not go ahead. But also other 
reasons were given: management at CBU is challenging, and top management has to deal 
with many other (and often much) more urgent problems.  
 
Like in the first interview round, the strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in kept 
occurring every time and again. But I kept wondering what does this tell me about the 
informants themselves, who claim that they have not been involved or consulted? Could they 
have done more themselves in order to be informed and heard? Somehow, the strive for 
consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in) was convergent with codes like a lack of pro-activity 
and negative work mentality. In other words: would it be fair to blame top management 
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entirely for the lack of involvement? I still didn’t understand it properly, so next time, I had 
to look for deeper lying explanations.  
 
Third round of interviews (November 2013) 
The third round of interviews was different from the previous rounds; this time I went to back 
to the same informants I interviewed earlier. By that time I had already analyzed and 
interpreted a lot of data, and I wanted to verify whether my preliminary analyses and 
interpretations were correct in the eyes of the informants themselves.  
 
Before going to Zambia, I contacted the informants by email, and tried to bring several 
informants together in small workshops. When grouping them together, I consulted the PhD 
researchers from CBU at VU University and discussed which informants could be grouped 
together and which ones could not, due the different hierarchical levels, positions and 
relationships of the informants. On campus (in Zambia), I also received practical support 
from another acquainted staff member, who helped me to get things organized. This way, I 
managed to organize three small workshops: one workshop with three (lower level) 
informants from central admin, one workshop with two (higher level) informants from central 
admin, and one workshop with two informants (lecturers) from the schools. I had four 
individual sessions with informants that could not be grouped together (mainly due to 
practical reasons). In addition, I had two individual interviews with staff members that I had 
not interviewed before. One of them was the previous VC of CBU, who was working in 
Nairobi at that time. I went to visit him in Kenya, because I felt that, since he had been 
criticized heavily by so many other informants, he deserved a chance to share his views and 
his version of the story. The other informant belonged to the group of deans and directors. 
For the purpose of verification I developed a number of validation questions and statements. 
An example of a validation statement is:  
 
To some extent, I can understand the way the previous VC operated; it was the only 
way to get things done. 
 
An example of a validation question is:  
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What are the most important constraints hampering a) decentralization b) PMS and 
c) strategic planning & implementation according to you? 
 
The example validation statement mentioned above (to some extent, I can understand the way 
the previous VC operated; it was the only way to get things done at CBU), resulted in the 
following responses during a workshop with three informants: 
 
“This is extremely debatable… The way he operated was not the best way, there 
could be better ways. He operated as a person acting alone, a dictator, having all 
these powers, and he started abusing these powers, and yes, there were 
achievements. But a university works through committees, and consultation of staff 
is critical. You can achieve things, but that doesn’t mean that the committee system 
is no longer necessary. Achievements don’t make it right. There must be collective 
responsibility.” (Informant 20) 
 
“There are systems and procedures in place, and they are supposed to be used. If 
you are consulting, it gives you some self-esteem, appreciation, but if someone just 
shouts at you…”(Informant 26) 
 
“Collective responsibility is important. For instance, when the university has to 
close down due to student riots, then we should say ‘we decided to close the 
university’, and not ‘I decided to close the university, because I have the power to do 
so’. It gives pride and ownership when people are involved and consulted through 
committees. You should never dictate, you cannot say ‘the school of technology will 
be split because of some personal vendetta with the dean’, that is wrong.” 
(Informant 24) 
 
The quotes above indicate authoritarian leadership, and they also tell us that staff members at 
CBU want to be involved and consulted, as the committee system prescribes. Later on I learnt 
that the committee system itself should be considered as an expression of culture. Towards 
the end of the third round of interviews, I noticed that I didn’t hear much new information; in 
fact, much of what I was told I had already heard earlier on. The ‘images’ that had emerged 
during the first and second round of interviews could be further developed and strengthened.   
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Before traveling to Zambia, I wrote down the expected responses and answers, based on my 
preliminary analyses. This enabled me to verify whether my preliminary analyses and 
interpretations were more or less correct. During the workshops and individual sessions with 
informants, I presented the questions and statements by using Microsoft PowerPoint. I 
explicitly requested them to tell me anything that came to their minds, in accordance with the 
think-aloud protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1985). A table with validation questions and 
statements, including the expected and real answers is provided in annex 2.  
 
Validation workshops (July 2014) 
During the previous round of interviews, some informants had asked me ‘what’s actually in it 
for us?’, in other words, they showed an interest in the preliminary results of my research. 
Halfway 2014 I had written draft versions of the empirical chapters, and I went back to CBU 
in July 2014 to present my preliminary research findings, in line with Jackson’s suggestion to 
feed back the information to the informants (Jackson, 2011)9. With the support from the 
Zambian PhD researchers at VU University, I organized a number of workshops with the 
following objectives:  
 
- To inform CBU about my research findings; 
- To receive feedback for validation.  
 
Since qualitative research is not common at CBU, I decided to explain some basics of 
qualitative research, for instance about the importance of interpretation, induction, 
subjectivity, context and meaning. I also decided to present a brief selection of my research 
findings, because it was impossible to present everything. I included the findings that I would 
like them to respond to, and I prepared a number of related questions for them. Based on my 
interpretations of the data, I had also formulated a few practical recommendations for CBU.  
 
Before going to Zambia, I was a little nervous. After all, I was going to present my analyses 
and interpretations of the data, on which I had been working during several years! In 
addition, I realized that my findings were not overly positive for everyone at CBU. All this 
made me feel somewhat vulnerable. To what extent would they agree or disagree, deny 
                                                          
9 Also called stakeholder or member checks (Thomas, 2006).  
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certain findings or react defensively, like or dislike my findings? Which feedback could I 
expect? Were they going to give some feedback to me at all?  
 
I planned five workshops for different categories of staff (lower central admin staff, higher 
central admin staff, academics, deans and directors and top management). When I arrived on 
campus on Monday morning, I found out that a deputy registrar had been given the 
assignment to prepare a program of meetings for me (which he did, however, without 
informing me about it). In the meantime, I had already developed a draft program with 
colleagues from the school of business. We had to sit together to sort things out and avoid 
further confusion. As such, the Monday became a planning day which was needed to prepare 
for the workshops starting on Tuesday. It was not easy to get commitment from staff 
members to participate in the workshops, since they were off campus, too busy, or simply not 
interested. In the end, however, it all worked out well.   
 
In every workshop, I included informants that I had interviewed before, but I also included 
other staff members that had not been interviewed before. This way, I could test whether and 
to what extent these ‘new informants’ would agree or disagree with the findings, provide new 
insights and/or nuances to further fine-tune my findings. Discussions arose between 
participants, which proved to be very informative. For instance, two participants argued that 
concerning work mentality, recently something had changed for the better:  
 
“The culture and the work mentality have changed in the last few years. We no 
longer have pensionable employees, they all get contracts, which will not be 
renewed when they don’t perform. Nowadays most people get contracts for a fixed 
period of time. In terms of work culture and mentality, it has been a positive 
change.” (Informant 26 and 39) 
 
Examples like this one helped me to further increase and fine-tune my understanding of 
organizational change at CBU. Every workshop lasted approximately two hours. Like with 
interviews, everything is recorded, transcribed and uploaded in Atlas.ti for further analysis. 
The validation workshops have contributed to the trustworthiness and academic rigor of the 
study (Shah & Corley, 2006). 
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Field notes 
During the various rounds of data collection, I made many observations and I had many 
interesting conversations with numerous people at CBU who were not formally interviewed 
and have not been recorded. Nevertheless, I have captured most of these observations and 
conversations in field notes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), before processing them in Atlas.ti. 
Some of these things I would never have heard otherwise, and helped me to improve my 
understanding of the situation at CBU, in efforts to make sense of it all.  
 
During the first round of interviews (September 2012), I discussed several issues informally, 
during lunch and after work, with lecturers from various schools. This helped me to improve 
my understanding of (for instance) authoritarian leadership. Since the previous VC had left 
CBU, they dared to speak up, about how aggressive the VC could be, how he shouted at his 
staff and how much they feared him. I realized that this authoritarian leadership style would 
have had far reaching consequences for any type of organizational change at CBU. The 
lecturers also told me about the impact of HIV/AIDS on CBU; at its peak, until 2005, two to 
three staff members of CBU died of HIV/AIDS per month! Like never before in my life, I 
suddenly realized how enormous the impact of this disease had been. Since retroviral 
medicines are available in Kitwe, this number has decreased to almost zero.  
 
During the second round of interviews (May 2013), I heard several other interesting stories. 
For instance, I was told that schools were sometimes reluctant to attract outstanding 
academics from outside, because the new high performers might threaten personal privileges 
of deans and HoDs within the schools. Apparently, the VC knew that this was happening, and 
he sometimes forced schools to contract excellent academics from outside. I was also told 
that the VC contracted befriended senior lecturers from UNZA as professors at CBU, even 
though they did not qualify for such a position according to the CBU promotion criteria. This, 
of course, caused some apprehension among academics at CBU.  
 
During the third round of interviews (November 2013), I was told that within CBU there are 
a few family trees of colleagues who are actually family relatives. However, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that all these family members have become employees of CBU due to 
nepotism; you can be a family member but be recruited and selected properly. Nevertheless, 
it seemed that nepotism is still taking place, especially at the lower levels of central admin. 
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When I asked a few informants why it is happening, they explained that the people who 
appoint their relatives a) like to play ‘the big boss’ and b) want to get rid of the many claims 
from their extended families. Nepotism in central admin had already been mentioned in a few 
interviews, but I had not heard about nepotism taking place in the schools (in recent history).  
 
During (and in-between) the validation workshops in July 2014, it became clear to me that 
the leadership style of the new VC is also being perceived as authoritarian (perhaps slightly 
less than the previous one). But some informants (a few from higher central admin and one 
young academic from a school) argued that authoritarianism by the VC can perhaps be 
considered as a coping strategy of top management, in order to get things done. This unusual 
– and rarely heard – view on leadership has helped me to put (negative) perceptions and 
interpretations of many staff members (about leadership at CBU) in another perspective. I 
have further explored and discussed the issue with many other informants later on.  
 
These stories are just examples of what I wrote down in my field notes. They were interesting 
and valuable, in the sense that they triggered my interest and often led to more and new 
questions in order to improve my understanding of organizational change at CBU.  
 
 
2.6 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis started immediately after I had collected the first data (mid 2011), and lasted 
until mid-2014, when I was writing my thesis. It has been quite a puzzle, especially as I was 
moving back and forth through all the data collected. I have analyzed the data throughout 
data collection and even until long after the last round of interviews, by constantly comparing 
the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Shah & Corley, 2006; Suddaby, 2006).  
 
The first empirical data to be analyzed were the reports from the participative observations, 
which I had written myself. Fifty percent of the interview recordings has been transcribed by 
the company Transcription Star10; the other fifty percent I have transcribed myself. I decided 
to transcribe interviews myself when there was a lot of background noise in the recording, or 
                                                          
10 www.transcriptionstar.com  
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when the informant had a strong accent, which made it difficult to hear what was actually 
being said. Some informants spoke very soft which made it even more difficult to hear what 
they were saying. Because of my work experience in many African countries (including 
Zambia), I usually managed to understand their accents.  
 
I decided to use scientific software (Atlas.ti, version 7.0) for data processing, which is used 
by many qualitative researchers worldwide. In the beginning, I found working with Atlas.ti 
challenging and exciting, since I did not know the software at all. I have not done any course 
in Atlas.ti, but I did consult a number of colleagues in both the VU Faculty of Social Sciences 
and the VU Faculty of Economics & Business Administration. They showed me examples of 
their own research and helped me to make a start with uploading documents and coding texts 
from the participative observations, the transcripts of the interviews and field notes, as I went 
on collecting the data. With their support, the insights from the book Qualitative data 
analysis with Atlas.ti (Friese, 2012) and with the official Atlas.ti manual in hand11, I 
eventually became an auto didactical expert in Atlas.ti. Nevertheless, the use of Atlas.ti was 
not without problems; at some stage (and for unknown reasons) I lost access to half of my 
primary documents. This was a major drawback which delayed my analytical work for 
several months. Eventually the problem was solved by the Atlas.ti support team in Germany.  
 
2.6.1 Open coding 
I started the data analysis (first of the reports of the participative observations, later of the 
series of interviews) with open and axial coding, which are analytical processes that go hand 
in hand (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). During coding, I have regularly asked colleague 
researchers for advice concerning the methodology of open coding and establishing new 
categories, which was very helpful in the sense that I learnt about their arguments to merge 
codes and/or to establish new categories. I also involved two MSc students in open and axial 
coding, and let them code pieces of text from the collected data. This way, the inter-rater 
reliability improved (Thomas, 2006). I checked whether my codes and categories were (more 
or less) in line with theirs. It was interesting to discuss their ideas and impressions of certain 
texts, but no major deviations were found. 
 
                                                          
11 http://www.atlasti.com/uploads/media/atlasti_v7_manual_201312.pdf  
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At some stage, I had identified more than 650 codes (!). Not all these codes were equally 
important or relevant for my research, but still, there were many important and relevant codes 
left. The number of codes went up and down until I had completed the data collection and 
incorporated the latest data into the dataset. During the initial analysis immediately after 
completing a session of interviews, the number of codes went up. Once I had coded the last 
interviews, I started to reconsider the new codes as compared to the codes that I already had, 
and managed to condense the data and subsequently, the number of codes went down. 
Eventually, I have decreased the number of codes to less than 300.  
 
I struggled to diminish the number of codes, and I realized that, when a code becomes the 
common denominator of more and more quotes, the formulation of the code had to become 
more general. Initially I preferred to keep my codes quite specific in order to preserve the 
specific meaning of the code. But I have changed the names of many codes during the 
analytical process, and I have also merged a number of codes. Although I didn’t want to 
create new codes every time, I sometimes found it difficult to put a quote under a certain code 
that did not fully cover the contents of that quote. In a number of cases I changed the name of 
a code in order to cover more quotes. An advantage of this practice has been that the 
grounding (the recurrence of a certain code) of the codes increased. I have been struggling 
with the obvious tension that arose; higher grounding versus the specificity of codes, as is 
visualized below.  
 
 
 
 
When I wanted to put several quotes under the one and the same (general) code, the 
specificity of that code had to be compromised (to some extent). On the other hand, when I 
wanted to maintain a high specificity of a code, the grounding of that code went down 
(because less quotes would match with the specifics of that code. This tension is 
acknowledged by Saldaña (2012); he mentions ‘lumping’ and ‘splitting’ the data, where the 
former refers to bringing more data together under one and the same code, and the latter 
refers to splitting a code into more specific codes (Saldaña, 2012). I have come across 
numerous examples where I doubted whether to lump or split the data. For instance, I had 
coded a lot of examples referring to ‘authoritarianism’ separately, which resulted in more 
Grounding of codes Specificity of codes 
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than 10 different codes that referred to (more or less) the same phenomenon. The same can be 
said about other phenomena that emerged already during early data collection. For instance, I 
had identified many separate codes related to phenomena like ‘excessive centralization’, 
‘feedback’, ‘accountability’, ‘work mentality’, ‘information sharing’, ‘discontinuity’, etc. 
Later on, I managed to reduce the number of codes for these phenomena due to lumping. In 
doing so, the ‘groundedness’ of the dataset improved significantly.  
 
I came across a number of critical incidents, for which I used separate codes. For instance, 
one critical incident relates to the split-up of the (former) school of technology into the school 
of mines and mineral sciences and the school of engineering. This was a critical incident in 
the eyes of many, because of the (authoritarian) way it was done and the disturbing effects 
that it had on CBU management (growing distrust towards management, a loss of belief in 
decentralization, etc.). When analyzing other critical incidents, it occurred to me that most of 
them are actually examples of authoritarianism in combination with excessive centralization. 
Critical incidents will be further described in chapter 6.  
 
During data analysis I also came to realize that if I accommodated more quotes (which were 
previously classified as separate codes) in one code, the code started to obtain characteristics 
of a category, in terms of the level of abstraction and conceptual level. So here too, a tension 
arose between what should actually be accommodated in a code and what should be 
accommodated in a category.   
 
 
 
 
I can explain this tension with an example about distrust. Distrust was mentioned by many 
informants, so ‘distrust’ appeared as a code. Later on, I discovered that there were actually 
two different kinds of distrust: hierarchical distrust and out-group distrust. The former relates 
to distrust between staff members from different hierarchical levels (mainly between top 
management/central admin and the schools), the latter refers to distrust between staff 
members who do not belong to one’s network of colleagues, friends, relatives, tribe, etc. As a 
consequence, ‘hierarchical distrust’ and ‘out-group distrust’ became codes and ‘distrust’ 
became a category.  
Merging codes Creating a new category 
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Reexamining the transcripts and the recordings 
After coding all the transcripts of an interview round, I reexamined the transcripts again, in 
order to check my own open coding results. This took a lot of time, but it worked very well 
for the quality of my coding results. What happened is that, as I went on coding the various 
transcripts, my thinking about certain phenomena changed along the way, and it forced me to 
go back to already coded transcripts to review my earlier coding work. Throughout the 
process of data analysis, I kept track of my changing interpretations over time in ‘notes 
during analysis’.  
 
Listening to the recordings again has helped a lot to improve and deepen my understanding of 
certain issues. Especially emotional outcries, deep breaths, long silences, and expressions of 
irritation, frustration or fear put more weight on an informants’ statement. When I heard these 
exclamations, it helped me to understand the informants’ perspective from within, as I could 
almost feel their emotions at that time (Gephart, 2004; Shah & Corley, 2006).  
 
2.6.2 Axial coding 
As I went on coding the data, categories were further developed and related to their 
subcategories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). I also started to look at the density of the codes 
(Friese, 2012), which is determined by the number of links between a given code and other 
codes in Atlas.ti. I also created network views (Friese, 2012) of relationships between several 
important codes and categories, distinguishing between associative-, causal- and 
contradicting relationships. For instance, the code ‘tendency to refrain from feedback’ is 
associated with the codes ‘conflict avoidance’ and ‘communication – a culture of openness is 
needed’. Another example is that ‘lack of information/explanation’ is associated with 
‘transparency – lack of transparency’. According to associative relationships, the codes are 
(closely) related to each other, although they are not the same.  
 
An example of a causal relationship is between the code ‘tendency to refrain from feedback’ 
and the codes ‘national culture’ and ‘organizational culture – allegiances and favoritism’. 
The explanation is that the tendency to refrain from feedback is partly caused by elements of 
‘national’ culture (collectivism, in-group collectivism) and organizational culture 
(allegiances and favoritism). Another example of a causal relationship is between the codes 
‘lack of information sharing/explanation’ and ‘trust – lack of trust’. The explanation is that 
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due to a lack of information sharing and explanations, distrust increases. The distrust which is 
meant here refers to the hierarchical distrust between top management (PO’s) and middle 
management (deans and directors).  
 
An example of a contradicting relationship is between the code ‘decentralization – top 
management supports the idea’ and ‘decentralization – unclear whether top management is 
willing’. Obviously, some informants have a different (more positive) perception of the 
willingness by top management to decentralize than most others. Another interesting example 
of an apparently contradicting relationship is between the codes ‘management – involvement 
of deans and directors is crucial’ and ‘management meetings – irregular and little inclusive’. 
Some informants argue that deans and directors are supposed to be involved in management, 
while others argue that, in reality, they are not.  
 
I have repeated the process of linking different codes until the last data were collected and 
analyzed. As such, the dataset in Atlas.ti has become denser and better integrated. During 
axial coding I did get lost in the overload of data several times. I almost drowned in the data; 
I felt the need to take some distance, in order to facilitate abstraction and overview. At first, I 
wrote the most prominent and important codes on small, colored self-adhesive notes, which I 
distributed over a flip-over sheet. I grouped them together (as categories), based on their 
specific meaning and characteristics, and tried to make sense of the emerged ‘images’. This 
was a puzzle for quite some time. I have done this over and over again, and asked the 
Zambian PhD researchers to shed their light on the emerged images. They asked for 
clarification of certain issues, which helped me to formulate the exact meaning of codes, 
categories, including their dimensions and properties. Later on, I started to make graphic 
representations of codes and categories (and their relations) with Microsoft Visio. I managed 
to develop a data structure (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et al, 2012), clarifying different 
levels of abstraction, resulting in codes (evidence), categories (evidence based constructs) 
and aggregate dimensions (theory based constructs). An example to illustrate this refers to 
distrust: 
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In the text boxes on the left, you see codes that reflect the nature of the underlying quotes. 
The text boxes in the middle are categories and can be considered as abstractions of the codes 
on the left. This is often a common denominator that covers the contents of all involved 
codes. On the right is the aggregate dimension that covers the contents of both categories, 
which can eventually become an important theme in the emergent theory.  
 
It was not easy to do this properly. One of the problems I encountered is that I tended to mix 
up the various abstraction levels with cause-and-effect relations. For instance, I was tempted 
to include several other codes in the drawing that could be considered as causes of distrust. 
Another difficulty was that I tended to use several codes more than once, thus belonging to 
multiple categories. This is due to the complexity of the phenomena under study and the 
inextricable links between the codes and categories associated with these phenomena. I learnt 
that this should be avoided as much as possible (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et al, 2012). A 
full description and explanation of the most important codes, categories and aggregate 
dimensions will be provided in the empirical chapters (6, 7, 8 and 9).  
 
As a result of this analytical work, my thinking about organizational change at CBU further 
intensified. For instance, I came across a number of constraining factors that made (or would 
make) organizational change difficult at CBU, and a few enabling factors that (could) support 
organizational change. Later on, I managed to differentiate the constraining factors into 
cultural-, structural- and contextual constraints, and I noticed that many of these constraints 
were important and relevant for the three organizational changes (see chapter 6). 
Nevertheless, some constraints appeared to be more important than others (see chapter 10).  
 
x Top down decisions create distrust
x Lack of transparency by central admin
x Lack of transparency by the schools
x Little trust in supervisors
Hierarchical distrust
Distrust
x We don’t trust each other 
x We trust the people we know Out-group distrust
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Based on my initial work in Visio, I created tables for the three organizational changes, in 
order to make clear to what extent the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions from the 
four informant groups were converging, partially converging and diverging. For instance, 
informants from all informant groups have argued that CBU is a highly centralized institution 
(converging idea); deans and directors, academics and central admin  (but not top 
management) were of the opinion that CBU had become more centralized in recent years 
(partially converging); only top management argues that decentralization requires appointed 
deans (diverging). This way, I could clearly see which ideas were shared, partly shared and 
not shared.  
 
Interestingly, there seemed to be more converging ideas about strategic planning & 
implementation than about decentralization and performance appraisal. Based on these 
converging ideas I managed to make a schematic drawing of the strategic planning & 
implementation process at it was perceived by most informants. Strategic planning is 
different than the other two organizational changes, because strategic planning & 
implementation has already occurred in the recent past, unlike decentralization and 
performance appraisal. This will be further elaborated in the empirical chapters.  
 
Eventually, I managed to visualize the various dominant mental models for every 
organizational change under study, incorporating the views of the different informant groups. 
Atlas.ti enabled me to see what was said by whom, including the frequency of certain codes 
per informant group. Although this may sound easy, I can admit that I have spent an 
enormous amount of time on efforts to get it right, to come up with representative mental 
models. Since there are three organizational changes and four informant groups, I initially 
wanted to develop twelve mental models. For the sake of comparison, I put the mental 
models of two informant groups (for instance top management versus deans and directors) on 
one sheet (using different colors). This way, the different ideas from these two groups 
became immediately visible. Eventually, I have produced two different mental models for 
every organizational change under study; a convergent model (displaying only the issues 
which are shared among all informant groups) and a divergent model (displaying all the 
issues which are partially shared or not shared). These will be further described and explained 
in the empirical chapters (7, 8 and 9).  
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2.6.3 Selective coding  
After the analytical work done during open and axial coding, I tried to make sense of my 
research findings altogether, in terms of core categories with a lot of explanatory power 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In order to do this, I considered the three 
organizational changes separately. I looked at the most relevant codes, categories and 
aggregate dimensions in the dominant mental models about decentralization, performance 
appraisal and strategic planning & implementation.  
 
I had already noticed that nearly all cultural-, structural- and contextual constraints were 
relevant for every change type, although to slightly different extents. I also noticed that in all 
three organizational changes, ideas about the current situation and enabling ideas towards the 
desired situation were largely shared by all informant groups but top management. In other 
words, I have found most divergence between the mental models of top management and the 
mental models of the other informant groups (in all three changes). Especially with regards to 
decentralization, the mental models (between top management and the other informant 
groups) seemed to diverge significantly. On the other hand: concerning strategic planning & 
implementation and PMS, top management seemed to have similar ideas about the desired 
situation as the other informant groups. By analyzing the mental models this way, I enabled 
the emergent insights to be further developed. My analytical work came to an end when no 
new concepts came to my mind, and when no other relations between codes, categories and 
aggregate dimensions were found. This is when I had reached theoretical saturation (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Locke, 2001). At that time (early 2014), I had already started writing down 
parts of this thesis.  
 
2.6.4 Validation and trustworthiness  
Validation of the preliminary findings has taken place throughout the process of data 
collection. Early concepts that had emerged during the first round of data collection were 
validated during the second round of data collection, and so forth. In addition, I included a 
validation exercise in the study. Before I embarked on the third round of interviews, I had 
developed a list of validation questions and scenarios, and I went back to see a number of 
informants that I had already interviewed earlier (see also the section about interviews in 
paragraph 2.5). Using Atlas.ti, I could trace back who said what and when, so it was 
relatively easy to create a table with validation questions and statements, expected answers 
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and ‘real’ answers, as provided by the informants. I had provided the expected answers and 
responses – prior to the third round of interviews - based on my own preliminary analysis of 
the data. The validation exercise confirmed my analyses and preliminary interpretations to a 
large extent, without major deviations.  
 
I have adopted the trustworthiness criteria provided by Shah & Corley (2006) which are 
based on the traditional criteria provided by Lincoln & Guba (1985). Dependability (referring 
to the traditional criterion of reliability) has been assured by purposive and theoretical 
sampling, which is described and explained earlier in this chapter. I have protected my 
informants’ confidentiality not only during data collection, but also in this thesis. Credibility 
(referring to the traditional criterion of internal validity) is assured through triangulation of 
data types, my extended engagement with CBU, regular involvement of colleagues and 
master students from the VU Faculty of Economics & Business Administration, and member 
checks at CBU. Transferability (referring to the traditional criterion of external validity) is 
assured by detailed descriptions of codes, categories and aggregate dimensions in the 
empirical chapters, and confirmability (referring to the traditional criterion of objectivity) is 
assured through the explicit separation of 1st and 2nd order constructs, meticulous data 
management and recording, transcription of interviews, careful notes on observations and 
notes on methodological and theoretical decisions (Shah & Corley, 2006).  
 
 
2.7 Self-reflexivity 
 
In grounded theory, researchers must engage in ongoing self-reflection to ensure that they 
take personal biases, world-views, and assumptions into account while collecting, 
interpreting, and analyzing data (Suddaby, 2006). This is what I have tried to do throughout 
this study. The text on self-reflexivity below explains the situation in the beginning, when I 
started the research. In subsequent chapters, I will also include elements of self-reflexivity as 
a means to account for my interpretations and analyses.  
 
The drive to start this PhD research is one of engaged scholarship; I started this study 
primarily because I had become fascinated by mental models on organizational change in 
SSA. I wanted to learn and understand how organizational change in SSA is being perceived 
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and interpreted by the staff at CBU, and how they create meaning out of intersubjective 
experience (Suddaby, 2006). My interest in this is supported by two personal assumptions: 1) 
Local perceptions and interpretations of organizational change in the recent past and present 
have generated (or have contributed to) the mental models of the staff on organizational 
change at CBU, and 2) Mental models influence (at least to some extent) the attitudes and 
organizational behavior of the staff in processes of organizational change. As such, I hope to 
improve my understanding of organizational change at CBU through the perspective of its 
staff members. Of course, due to the ontological and epistemological foundations of 
qualitative research, an ‘all-encompassing truth’ about organizational change at CBU does 
not exist (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). But my focus on the dominant mental models has certainly 
helped me to understand as much as possible the different local perspectives ‘from within’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
 
Due to my educational background, as well as my experience with HEIs in developing 
countries, I was familiar with a number of organizational problems that HEIs in developing 
countries are generally facing. As such, I did have knowledge and some preconceived ideas 
about HEIs in SSA, and even in Zambia (see chapter 1). Before going to the field for data 
collection, I had explored the nascent literature related to management and change in Africa, 
often linked to the findings of several large scale culture studies (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; 
House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 
1998) and others. These personal and theoretical experiences do not disqualify the use of 
grounded theory, but give way to a more abductive approach (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). 
The exploration of relevant literature (next chapter) has helped me to frame and focus my 
research questions (Charmaz, 2003). In addition, it is my intention to move beyond the 
sensitizing concepts and contribute to theory development (Bowen, 2006). I should also say 
that – due to personal circumstances – data collection started not less than a year after I had 
explored the literature.  
 
Due to my former involvement in a Nuffic project at CBU, I was sometimes tempted to act as 
a consultant instead of a researcher. This happened to me several times during data collection. 
For instance, I did not only listen to what my informants had to say, but sometimes I also 
gave them advice on how to deal with certain issues. And when I went to pay a courtesy visit 
to the DVC or the registrar, I sometimes informed them about often heard complaints and 
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widely shared frustrations among the staff. Of course, I did this without compromising the 
informants.  
 
I expected contextual and cultural differences to be largely responsible for any deviant ideas 
and assumptions (mental models) on organizational change – that is, deviant from mine. As a 
consequence, I actively searched for contextual and cultural differences, and at times, 
especially in the beginning, I may have tried to explain elements of the dominant mental 
models in terms of these contextual and cultural differences. Interestingly, however, my 
academic supervisors were not impressed; they were thinking that my account of CBU 
resembled very much their perceptions of the situation at VU University in Amsterdam! Also 
in academic discussion groups12, it was not easy to convince others that the situation at CBU 
in Zambia was indeed very different from ours in the Netherlands. This was very refreshing, 
it made me aware of (and decreased) my own quest for solely ‘cultural’ explanations.  
 
As I moved from data collection to data analysis and to writing this thesis, I realized that 
anything I wrote down could be perceived as sensitive material, possibly even considered as 
inappropriate or undesirable by certain members of the university community at CBU. After 
all, informants had shared their ideas and opinions with me quite openly; something which is 
not commonly done with colleagues. In addition, my qualitative research is highly 
interpretive, which means that – at least in the eyes of many CBU staff members – the 
research findings are at least questionable. Academics at CBU are not familiar with 
qualitative research; in general, they prefer to do quantitative research, and capture the reality 
in (apparently) objective formulas, tables and numbers. At CBU, subjectivity is often 
regarded as something that should be avoided as much as possible, while in my qualitative 
research, subjectivity is a necessary condition for interpretation and analysis (Gephart, 2004; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I nevertheless felt that I had to comply with the rules and the 
procedures of grounded theory, and write down the findings as they had emerged, not as 
censored, socially desirable and acceptable outcomes. 
                                                          
12 For instance the VU research group ‘Vreugde in Promoveren’ and the research platform at SIOO (Stichting 
Inter-academische Opleiding Organisatiekunde). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Organizational change, Higher Education and Culture 
 
I do not enter the field as a ‘tabula rasa’, free from experience and theoretical knowledge. 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) point out that the personal and theoretical experiences which the 
researcher may bring to the task, can serve as material for the generation of categories. 
Bowen (2006) shows how sensitizing concepts can be used in combination with grounded 
theory. Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) even argue that without assumptions, concepts and 
theory, nothing at all emerges as meaningful data. These arguments legitimize an exploration 
of available theoretical insights that can simply not be ignored. Eventually, I want to relate 
the emerged mental models to existing theoretical insights about organizational change in 
SSA, in order to be able contribute to theory development. 
 
The main sensitizing concepts in this chapter relate to organizational change, higher 
education and culture. I consider the concepts of culture, organizational behavior and 
organizational change as interrelated, which is supported by many researchers (Adler, 1997; 
Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House et al., 2004; Munene, Schwartz, & Smith, 2000; Noorderhaven 
& Tidjani, 2001; Schwartz, 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 
1998). It is often argued and substantiated that culture – whether national, tribal, 
organizational or occupational - does affect the way people think about (and act in processes 
of) organizational change (Adler, 1997). This is illustrated in the figure below.  
 
Culture
Values
Attitudes
Behavior
 
 
Figure 3.1: Influence of culture on behavior, and behavior on culture (Adler, 1997). 
66 
 
Doing research and writing about organizational change in SSA is challenging for the 
following reasons:  
 
- There are many theoretical insights about organizational change in the ‘Western’ 
world but there are not many relevant insights about organizational change in SSA. in 
fact, SSA is a neglected and under-researched area (Jackson, 2004); 
- Some research about organizational change in SSA has been done by ‘Western’ 
scholars, and refer to theoretical insights that are also provided by ‘Western’ scholars;  
- Little research about organizational change in SSA has been done by African scholars; 
often these African scholars are educated in the US or Europe, and they tend to rely 
on ‘Western’ concepts and insights about organizational change.  
 
Of course, these challenges apply to me too. One may wonder whether truly ‘African’ 
insights about organizational change (and related disciplines) in SSA exist; in the end, most 
of them rely (to various extents) on theoretical insights that have been developed outside 
Africa. In fact, many cross-cultural researchers (including Africans) rely on or refer to large 
scale culture studies undertaken by Hofstede (1980) and others.  
 
Since my thesis is about mental models on organizational change, I will start (in paragraph 
3.1) with an elaboration on the concept of organizational change as it is being used in this 
study. In paragraph 3.2, I elaborate on organizational change in higher education. In 
paragraph 3.3 I introduce large scale- and other culture studies, since they emphasize the 
influence of culture on leadership, management and organizational change. Many theoretical 
insights about management and organizational change in SSA refer to the results of these 
large scale culture studies. I also include theoretical insights about culture and management in 
SSA, which provide some generalizations and recurring elements of ‘African’ culture and 
management. In paragraph 3.4, I describe and explain organizational change in SSA, (among 
other things) by using a typology from Jackson (2004) of organizational management systems 
in Africa. I do so because I will use this typology throughout this thesis. In paragraph 3.5 I 
describe and explain organizational change in HE in SSA. In paragraph 3.6 I provide a 
reflection on the theoretical insights provided in this chapter.  
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A note on ‘Western’ and ‘African’ countries, cultures and organizations 
Throughout this dissertation, I frequently refer to ‘Western’ and ‘African’ countries, cultures 
and organizations. I realize that these terms imply and suggest similarities within ‘Western’ 
and ‘African’ countries, cultures and organizations, which is heavily contested and subject to 
a lot of debate. For instance Jacob (2005) asserts that, although Germany and Austria may 
belong to the same (cultural) cluster, there are significant differences. Similarly, it is argued 
that there is a lot of diversity within the SSA region (Nkomo, 2006). I fully agree with their 
points of view. Nevertheless, the usage of the terms ‘Western’ and ‘African’ is widespread in 
numerous academic publications, not seldom used by the same researchers (including 
Africans) who criticize others for being ignorant of (for instance cultural) diversity. In my 
view, it is important to be aware of this diversity and to be careful when using 
generalizations. At the same time, it does not mean that we have to close our eyes for 
similarities that may exist across countries, cultures and organizations. Consequently, I write 
‘Western’ and ‘African’ between inverted commas, which means that these adjectives should 
be read and understood with some reservation.  
 
 
3.1  Organizational change   
 
The concept of organizational change provokes a variety of views and definitions depending 
on the perspective and focus (Ho, 2007). Cummings & Worley (2008) consider 
organizational change as a broader concept than organizational development; organizational 
change can apply to any kind of change, including technical and managerial innovations, 
organization decline, or the evolution of a system over time. Organizational development 
(OD) is primarily concerned with managing change in such a way that knowledge and skills 
are transferred to build the organization’s capability to achieve goals and solve problems 
(Cummings & Worley, 2008). According to them, organizational change is limited to the 
(technical, administrative, managerial) change itself, while OD emphasizes values such as 
human potential, participation, skills development and performance in the change process. 
Although the distinction between organizational change and OD may seem a bit artificial and 
far-fetched, other authors do not come up with more satisfactory definitions. Quattrone & 
Hopper (2001) even state that, due to confusion about the concept, definitions of 
organizational change are even avoided (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001). As a result, many 
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researchers prefer to talk about ‘change’ or ‘planned change’. All approaches to OD rely on 
some theory about planned change (Cummings & Worley, 2008). James (2004) argues that 
despite the fluidity and diversity of the concept of OD, there are a number of generally 
accepted core elements in OD, namely that OD is:  
 
x An approach that is systemic and holistic, based on building a picture of the 
organization as a whole, including the system of which it is part; 
x An approach that is people-centered, in that human issues of relationships between 
people, will to change, power, and capacity are at the center of the practice;  
x A participatory and process-led approach to change that emphasizes ownership of the 
need to change as well as the solutions to implement the change. (James, 2004) 
 
The relevance of these core elements of OD will be discussed in relation to the case study at 
CBU in the last chapter of this thesis.  
 
Weick & Quinn (1999) distinguish episodic change from continuous change. Episodic change 
is based on the Lewinian ‘unfreeze-change-refreeze’ model (Lewin, 1951), while continuous 
change is partly based on Confucian and Taoist change models, according to Marshak (1994). 
Both types of change are based on different assumptions (Marshak, 1994).  
 
Episodic change Continuous change 
Linear 
assumption 
Movement is from one state to 
another in a forward direction 
through time 
Cyclical 
assumption  
 
Patterns of ebb and flow repeat 
themselves 
Progressive 
assumption 
Movement is from a lesser state 
to a better state 
Processional 
assumption 
Movement involves an orderly 
sequence through a cycle and 
departures cause desequilibrium 
Goal 
assumption 
Movement is towards a specific 
end state 
Journey 
assumption 
There is no end state 
Disequilibrium 
assumption 
Movement requires 
disequilibrium 
Equilibrium 
assumption 
Interventions are to restore 
equilibrium and balance 
Separateness 
assumption 
Movement is planned and 
managed by people outside the 
system 
Appropriateness 
assumption 
Correct action maintains harmony 
Change 
assumption 
Everything is normally in a quasi 
stationary or static state 
Change 
assumption 
Nothing remains the same forever 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of episodic and continuous change (Marshak, 1994). 
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Burke (2013) argues that episodic change is similar to revolutionary or transformational 
change, and that continuous change is similar to evolutionary or transactional change. He 
further claims that more than 95% of organizational changes are evolutionary (Burke, 2013). 
It remains to be discovered, however, whether the organizational changes under study at 
CBU can be considered as examples of episodic or continuous change (or both). In line with 
evolutionary change, Tsoukas & Chia (2002) highlight the pervasiveness of change in 
organizations, and suggest to replace the concept of organizational change by organizational 
becoming. Drawing on the work of process-oriented philosophers and ethno-methodologists, 
they argue that change is the (constant, ongoing) reweaving of actors’ webs of beliefs and 
habits of action as a result of new experiences obtained through interaction (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002). This reweaving of webs of beliefs can be captured in the mental models under study, 
due to the longitudinal character of my study.  
 
Based on organizational change research over a period of thirty years, Armenakis & Harris 
(2009) identify six themes concerning individual motivations to support change efforts. The 
six themes are as follows:  
 
Theme 1. Five key beliefs. Discrepancy (refers to a significant gap between the current state 
of the organization and what it should be); Appropriateness (reflects the belief that a specific 
change designed to address a discrepancy is the correct one for the situation); Efficacy (refers 
to the belief that the change recipient and the organization can successfully implement a 
change); Principal support (the formal leaders and change agents are committed to the 
success of a change); Valence (reflects the belief that the change is beneficial to the change 
recipient).  
Theme 2. Emphasis on change recipient involvement and participation. This means allowing 
organizational members to participate in communicating the gaps works to enhance their 
sense of discrepancy and make it more likely that appropriate change are selected. Active 
participation in change efforts by change recipients also enhances valence by allowing them 
to participate in implementing difficulties they face and efficacy by allowing them to select 
changes they feel can accomplish.  
Theme 3. Effective organizational diagnosis. This means that change recipients should 
psychologically embrace a change, they must believe that a discrepancy exists, otherwise 
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proposed changes are interpreted as arbitrary and non-rational. Therefore, accurate and 
effective diagnosis is critical.  
Theme 4. Creating readiness for change. A proactive program must be planned to shape the 
five key beliefs and convince change recipients to buy into an organizational change 
(Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993).  
Theme 5. Managerial influence strategies. Active participation, persuasive communication, 
management of external / internal communication, formalization activities, human resource 
management practices, rites and ceremonies can help to shape the five key beliefs. Their 
influence is highly dependent of the credibility and other attributes of the change agents.  
Theme 6. Assessment of change. Qualitative and quantitative methods can be helpful to track 
the adoption and institutionalization process; the information obtained can provide useful 
information about why a change effort may not be proceeding as planned. (Armenakis & 
Harris, 2009) 
 
These key beliefs and themes can be considered as dominant ideas in the mental models of 
change recipients. Although it is not stated explicitly, the findings of Armenakis & Harris 
(2009) are based on research in ‘Western’ societies, predominantly the US and Europe. This 
limitation is also acknowledged by Boyacigiller & Adler (1991), who pledge for universally 
applicable and intercultural theories. The findings from Armenakis & Harris (2009) are 
convergent with the Lewinean assumptions about planned change (Marshak, 1994) and the 
ideas from Weick & Quinn (1999) about episodic change. It is questionable whether (and to 
what extent) these themes and key beliefs occur in the dominant mental models of local staff 
members at CBU about the organizational changes under study. This is especially relevant for 
my last sub question about international cooperation.  
 
Buchanan & Dawson (2007) consider organizational change as a multi-story process, offering 
conflicting accounts which serve personal purposes of sensemaking, impression management 
and the advance of political agendas. Multi-story analysis seeks to accommodate the 
ambiguities and contradictions that are part of the storytelling process and audience 
interpretations, as well as the feedback that not only evaluates accounts of change but also 
shapes change processes in the future (Buchanan & Dawson, 2007). This is relevant for my 
study, since it can accommodate the dominant mental models of staff about organizational 
change at CBU in Zambia. In addition, they suggest four different discourses of process 
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theory, of which the interpretative discourse is very relevant for my research: it exposes 
multiple realities of conflicting socially constructed accounts and individual sensemaking 
(Buchanan & Dawson, 2007).  
 
Interesting and relevant research is done by Labianca, Gray & Brass (2000) and by Balogun 
(2007) about schemas (mental models) in organizational change processes. Labianca et al 
(2000) write about schema change during empowerment in a university health center, and 
argue that people in different groups, functional areas, hierarchical or status levels often see 
(what is apparently) the same event very differently. Top management wanted to empower 
the lower levels of the organization, but their efforts were met with much skepticism and 
suspicion by the workers (they had never been consulted on anything before, and had real 
hesitations to speak up). The new schema was so radically dissonant with the schema-in-use 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974), that many workers had a difficult time making sense of it. Once 
schemas are established, they tend to endure and are resistant to change, even when 
disconfirming information is presented (Labianca et al., 2000). Balogun (2007) writes about 
schema change during a process of organizational restructuring, which requires – in addition 
to new structures, job roles and responsibilities – a cognitive reorientation of the staff 
involved. When neglected, the restructuring initiative may be less successful than anticipated 
(Balogun, 2007). These insights are relevant for my research, because they underline the 
importance of mental models in organizational change.  
 
 
3.2 Organizational change in higher education  
 
In this paragraph I will discuss theoretical insights about organizational change in HE. Before 
I do so, I will first provide some general insights about the HE sector.  
 
3.2.1 Higher Education13 
Universities are complex organizations, traditionally considered as professional bureaucracies 
(Mintzberg, 1993), loosely coupled systems (Orton & Weick, 1990) and organized anarchies 
(Cohen & March, 1986). Mintzberg (1993) considers HEIs as professional bureaucracies 
                                                          
13 In this thesis, I focus higher education on universities. The terms higher education institutions (HEIs) and 
universities are used as synonyms (Lazzeretti & Tavoletti, 2006).  
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because of the relative autonomy (and power) of the professionals at the operational level. 
Loosely coupled systems are (relatively) uncoordinated with significant differentiation 
among components, high degrees of specialization among workers, and a low predictability 
of future action (Orton & Weick, 1990). The idea of organized anarchy stems from multiple 
power and authority structures, ambiguous goals, unclear technology, fluid participation and 
non-linear development (Cohen & March, 1986).  
 
Universities have spread around the world with a great deal of isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) in aspiration and content (Meyer, Ramirez, Frank, & Schofer, 2008). In 
modern societies, universities have flourished as central public institutions that contribute to 
the public good (Enders & Jongbloed, 2007). Consensus exists on the core functions of 
universities – teaching, research and community service (Clark, 1986). Kezar (2001) 
summarizes the distinctive features of HEIs, such as the interdependency of academic 
communities (through disciplinary communities and accreditation), relative independence 
from environment (great degree of autonomy), unique culture of the academy (political 
consensus oriented), institutional status (serving long-standing missions, norms), multiple 
power and authority structures (academic and administrative), loosely coupled systems 
(differentiation combined with little coordination), organized anarchical decision-making 
(ambiguity), the coexistence of administrative and professional values (professional versus 
bureaucratic), shared governance (informal, networks of influence), employee commitment 
and tenure (low staff turnover), goal ambiguity (complexity, multifaceted), image and success 
(identity, prestige) (Kezar, 2001). According to Musselin (2006), organizational change 
should build on these specificities; the imposition of non-academic models should be avoided 
(Musselin, 2006). The distinctive features of HEIs are interesting and relevant for my 
research; it remains to be discovered if (and to what extent) they apply to CBU in Zambia.  
 
Birnbaum (1988) and Bergquist (1992) have examined existing models and cultures with 
HEIs, and just like Baldridge et al (1983), they found that the collegium and the political 
model are the most prevalent in ‘Western’ HE. The collegium stresses professional 
(academic) values of the faculty, while the political perspective focuses on the negotiation 
and clashing of different value sets (Kezar, 2001). However, it should be noted that there is a 
lot of variety within ‘Western’ HE. Lazzeretti & Tavoletti (2006) describe four different 
governance models: the ‘collegium’ model (for instance at Oxford and Cambridge), the 
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‘bureaucratic-oligarchic’ model (in continental Europe, for instance in Italy and Germany), 
the ‘market’ model (typical of the North-American tradition) and the ‘new managerialism’ 
model (prevalent in the UK, Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand). These different 
governance models have far-reaching effects on the internal organization, management and 
culture (Lazzeretti & Tavoletti, 2006). At the same time, universities worldwide are 
influenced by global economic, cultural and educational forces, and as increasingly global 
actors they become more similar across national boundaries (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). 
Each HEI reflects different combinations of cultures, not only in terms of academic versus 
administrative cultures, but also between academic cultures (Birnbaum, 1988). Strong 
subcultures (organizational sagas) can be powerful means of unity and loyalty in the formal 
workplace (Clark, 1972). Organizational change strategies seem to be successful if they are 
culturally coherent or aligned with these cultures. Where change strategies violate cultural 
norms, change is unlikely to occur (Kezar, 2005).  
 
3.2.2 Organizational change in higher education 
HEIs are often recognized as among the most stable and change resistant social institutions 
(Archer, 2005; Saint, 1993; Gornitzka, 1999). However, the HE landscape in Europe has 
changed dramatically since the 1980s, due to increasing globalization and internationalization 
(Enders, 2004; Vaira, 2004), massification and diversification (Teichler, 1998), technology 
(Bates & Poole, 2003), marketization and entrepreneurialism – as a response to declining 
budgets (Clark, 2001; Etzkowitz, 2003). Governance and accountability of universities also 
changed due to increasing pressure from outside authorities such as governments but also 
businesses, the industry and labor organizations (Altbach, Gumport, & Berdahl, 2011; 
Maassen & Cloete, 2006). This includes a shift of authority from centralized authority to 
decentralized state authority (van Vught, 1997), and the tendency to decentralize power and 
responsibilities to universities (Holtta, 1995), in return for higher demands on accountability. 
As a consequence of socio-economic and political developments, such as budget constraints, 
accountability for quality and massification, universities throughout Europe have adopted 
organizational strategies, structures, technologies, management instruments and values that 
are commonly found in the private sector (Deem, 1998). Recently, however, increasing 
external demands for accountability imply shifts in the university structure and supportive 
functions, towards centralization, standardization and formalization (Fumasoli, Gornitzka & 
Maassen, 2014). These developments have stretched, extended and modified the idea of an 
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HEI as a loosely coupled system and an organized anarchy (Fumasoli & Stensaker, 2013). 
New Public Management (NPM) and managerialism have led to considerable deliberate 
organizational and cultural change in public service organizations in the West (Deem & 
Brehony, 2005), including centralization, performance management and (to some extent) 
strategic planning. Managerialism is identified as the ‘silver bullet’ expected to solve all 
problems and challenges currently experienced by the HE sector (Todnem By, Diefenbach, & 
Klarner, 2008). Academics feel that NPM is shifting the balance of power away from them 
(Currie & Vidovich, 1998), and cope with managerialism through symbolic compliance, 
professional pragmatism and formal instrumentality (Teelken, 2012). These coping strategies 
are relevant for my research, since they indicate how organizational changes are being 
perceived and interpreted by the staff.  
 
Many studies on organizational change in HE have focused on the link between the state and 
HEIs, and the changes in governance modes (Fumasoli & Stensaker, 2013). Fewer studies 
have addressed the intra-organizational change dynamics of organizational change (Capano 
& Regini, 2014). Kezar (2001) describes several models of organizational change in HE, and 
concludes that organizational change (in Western countries) can best be explained and 
understood through political/dialectical-, social-cognition- and cultural models. Political 
processes such as persuasion, informal negotiation, mediation and coalition-building appear 
to be very powerful strategies for creating change. Social cognition models illustrate the 
importance of altering mental models, learning, constructed interaction and other processes 
for creating change. Cultural models demonstrate the importance of symbolism, history and 
traditions, and institutional culture for facilitating change on campus (Kezar, 2001; Kezar & 
Eckel, 2002). The various models for understanding change in HE are also relevant for my 
research; perhaps the same models apply to CBU as well, but it may also be the case that 
other change models are more adequate to explain and understand organizational change at 
CBU. This will be discussed in the discussion & conclusions chapter (chapter 11).  
 
Birnbaum (2000) identifies seven management fads in the world of HE, which originate from 
outside pressures to become more effective and efficient: Program planning budgeting, 
management by objectives, zero-base budgeting, strategic planning, benchmarking, total 
quality management and business process reengineering. These trends (fads) have entered HE 
and slowly faded away several years later (Birnbaum, 2000). Middlehurst (2004) identified 
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structural and cultural inhibitors of change: excessive hierarchy and over-heavy bureaucracy, 
the comfort of ingrained routines, strong vertical command structures and weak lateral and 
bottom-up communication, unbalanced and non-integrated authority across professional 
domains, conservatism and risk aversion, territoriality, defensiveness and insecurity 
(Middlehurst, 2004). Although her study concerns universities in the UK, it seems likely that 
these inhibitors constrain organizational change at universities worldwide.  
 
Decentralization 
Academic institutions are traditionally characterized by a relatively high level of 
decentralization, due to dispersed knowledge intensive production processes (Jongbloed, 
Maassen, & Neave, 1999). Public HE has enjoyed a trend of decentralization throughout the 
twentieth century, where governments and leaders within the institutions have allowed 
decision making authority to move from upper to lower levels of the institutional governance 
structure (McLendon & Hearn, 2009). The goal of decentralization is to allow various 
organizational units to have the freedom of action to attend to different demands that may be 
unique to different components or functions of the university (Riley, 2007). In order for 
decentralization to be successful, there must be political support for the proposed changes, 
and those involved must be capable of carrying them out (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). There are 
advantages and disadvantages of centralization and decentralization; therefore universities 
must continuously be urged to seek the ‘benefits of association’ (Clark, 1986). Reforms of 
governance in HEIs are rationalized by expected benefits in terms of organizational 
effectiveness and efficiency. But every university comprises of interest groups competing for 
power and resources. In practice, this means that power balances (mainly between top 
management, central administration and faculties) are constantly being questioned and 
adjusted. In a recent study on governance reforms and organizational dilemmas in European 
universities, Capano & Regini (2014) report a clear tendency towards centralization of 
powers and functions. Shared governance (Shattock, 2002) and guardianship (Jongbloed et 
al., 1999) try to find a balance in university governance.  
 
Performance management 
NPM and managerialism have stimulated the practice of monitoring individual staff 
performance. Deans and heads of department are expected to pursue poor performers more 
vigorously (Deem, 1998). The introduction of performance appraisal has been criticized as 
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unnecessary, counterproductive and failing to deliver what it promises (Simmons, 2002). A 
balance has to be achieved between the aims of ‘control’ and ‘commitment’. Traditional 
appraisal schemas (emphasizing control) are considered inappropriate for knowledge based 
organizations. Universities in the UK are looking for ways to emphasize a developmental 
approach aimed at improving motivation and commitment (Bendaraviciene, 2010). The 
insights from Simmons (2002) are relevant for my research, since they indicate how 
performance appraisal systems are being perceived and interpreted by the staff. Winstanley & 
StewartǦSmith (1996) suggest that key stakeholders of HEIs should be involved in the 
development of performance objectives and measures (Winstanley & Stuart-Smith, 1996).  
 
Strategic planning & implementation 
Strategic planning has entered HE in the 1980s; accreditors were touting strategic planning a 
s sine qua non of organizational effectiveness (Dooris, Kelley, & Trainer, 2004). 
Nevertheless, strategic planning in HEIs is usually heavily criticized for being out of line 
with the nature of HEIs and academic work (Baldridge et al., 1983). Birnbaum (2000) 
considers strategic planning as an unsuccessful management fad in HE, due to fundamental 
conflicts between the concept of planning and pluralistic democratic forms of decision-
making (Birnbaum, 2000). Strategic planning meets a lot of resistance, due to conservatism, 
disbelief or limited success in the past (Rowley & Sherman, 2004). Nowadays most authors 
prefer to write about strategic management instead of planning. Taylor & Machado (2006) 
argue that often, the goal is merely to produce an impressive document, rather than to realize 
meaningful outcomes. Many of these public relations documents end up being voluminous, 
tedious and thus unread by their intended audiences. HEIs tend to maintain the status quo, 
and crisis management modes are generated to respond to equilibrium-disrupting situations 
(Taylor & Machado, 2006). The insights above are relevant for my research, because they 
indicate how strategic planning & implementation is being perceived and interpreted by the 
staff in HEIs.  
 
In order to understand organizational change in HE in SSA, it is important to have an 
adequate understanding of culture, and its suggested influence on leadership, management 
and organizational change. Therefore, several large scale culture studies are incorporated in 
this study (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House et al., 2004; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001; 
Schwartz, 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). Also other 
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theoretical insights about ‘African’ culture and management will be described in the next 
paragraph.  
 
 
3.3 Culture studies 
 
For a long time, culture has been defined and studied in a mainly cultural anthropological 
sense, as a way to improve our understanding of non-Western societies and people, usually in 
far-away (often formerly colonized) countries. Very often (and for a long time) culture has 
been perceived and interpreted as something ‘shared’ or ‘collective’, which is not necessarily 
true. Instead, it may be better to consider culture as a complex of different mental and 
behavioral patterns that co-exist and influence each other in a certain setting – whether that is 
a group, an organization, a region or a country, which is in line with Martin’s differentiation 
perspective (Martin, 2002). I prefer to use the definition of culture which is provided by 
Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952):   
 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behavior, acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, 
including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
tradition…ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the 
one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditioning 
elements of future action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952) 
 
The notion that organizations as such have (or are) cultures started to emerge in the late 
1970s. The proposition that organizations have cultural properties, that they breed meanings, 
values and beliefs, that they nurture legends, myths and stories, and are festooned with rites, 
rituals and ceremonies, has been gaining in popularity (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). Pettigrew 
(1979) demonstrates in his article ‘On studying organizational cultures’ that originally 
anthropological constructs can also be useful for the analysis and understanding of 
organizations (Pettigrew, 1979). Deal & Kennedy (1982) and Peters & Waterman (1982) 
emphasize the importance of organizational culture (norms and values) and how it affects the 
overall performance of a company. In their thinking, culture can be managed, steered and 
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controlled in order to optimize organizational performance (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Peters & 
Waterman, 1982).  
 
Schein uncovers three levels of culture: (visible) artifacts such as structures, processes and 
behavior; espoused values such as strategies, goals and philosophies; and (unconscious) basic 
assumptions such as taken-for-granted beliefs and feelings. The levels of culture are often 
depicted as layers in a so-called onion model, which was originally provided by Hofstede 
(Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 1991). According to Schein (2004), the basic assumptions 
represent the core of the onion, or the deepest level of culture, followed by values and 
artifacts in the outer circle. Basis assumptions about reality, truth, time and space, human 
nature, activity and relationships are based on the value orientations in the classic 
comparative study of cultures done by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1952). To really understand 
a culture and to ascertain more completely the group’s values and overt behavior, it is 
imperative to delve into the underlying assumptions, which are typically unconscious but 
which actually determine how group members perceive, think and feel (Schein, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Levels of culture as layers of an onion according to Schein (2004).  
 
According to Schein, values are often quite ideological and intentional in nature; they can 
serve as a guide for human behavior and may predict what people say or what they would 
like in a variety of situations. What people say, however, may be out of line with what they 
Basic 
Assumptions 
Values 
Artifacts 
Norms 
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do - especially if those values are not based on prior learning. Such ideological values are 
often included in ‘espoused theories’ (Argyris & Schön, 1974). What people actually do is a 
different story; people are guided by their assumptions about how the world works and how 
certain things should be done. A solution to a certain problem becomes taken for granted (= 
basic assumption) when it proves to work repeatedly. These assumptions are included in so-
called ‘theories-in-use’ (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Senge (1990) uses the term ‘mental 
models’ and argues that mental models affect what we see, how we make sense of the world 
and how we take action (Senge, 1990). These mental models are at the core of my research, 
since they capture the underlying basic assumptions of staff about three different 
organizational changes14.  
 
Whereas culture is usually defined as that which is shared by its members, Martin (2002) 
explains in her book ‘Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain’ that (organizational) 
culture may include elements that are not fully shared, indicating that conflict and ambiguity 
should also be considered as parts of (organizational) culture. As a result, she argues that 
(organizational) culture should be studied from three perspectives simultaneously: 
integration, differentiation and fragmentation (Martin, 2002). Whereas the integration 
perspective focuses on harmony and homogeneity, the differentiation perspective focuses on 
inconsistencies, allowing subcultures to emerge. Sometimes, subculture differentiation 
proceeds along occupational lines, both horizontally and vertically. From a fragmentation 
perspective there are multiple views on most issues, and those views are constantly in flux. 
Fragmentation may include irreconcilable and uneasy tensions between opposites, sometimes 
described as ironies, paradoxes or contradictions (Martin, 2002).  
 
3.3.1 Large scale culture studies 
In 1980, Hofstede published his book ‘Culture’s consequences’, which is the most influential 
work to date in the study of cross cultural management. He initially identified four cultural 
dimensions, based on the ‘common human problems’ as identified by Inkeles & Levison 
(1969) in their study of national cultures. The cultural dimensions are: 1) 
Individualism/collectivism; 2) Power distance; 3) Femininity / masculinity; 4) Uncertainty 
                                                          
14 Decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation.  
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avoidance; and 5) Long / short term orientation15. Hofstede (1980) included eight SSA 
countries in his study. Due to limited sample numbers, he combined Sierra Leone, Nigeria 
and Ghana into a West African region, and he combined Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia and 
Kenya into an East African region. Black samples from South Africa have been considered 
separately. The country scores suggest that the people in East and West African regions score 
much higher on power distance and on masculinity than many ‘Western’ countries. On the 
other hand, people in East and West African regions score much lower on individualism than 
many ‘Western’ countries. Hofstede’s work (1980) inspired thousands of studies in different 
countries and in different work settings. Although criticized by many, Hofstede’s work has 
remained powerful and leading ever since.  
 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1996; 1998), Schwartz (2000; 1994, 1999; 2002) and 
House et al (2004) have come up with alternative sets of cultural dimensions and values, 
which are (to some extent) relevant for the study of organizational change across cultures. 
Whereas Hofstede’s work (1980) is based on a questionnaire originally designed to evaluate 
work values, the work by Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998) is based on questionnaires 
asking respondents for preferred behavior and underlying value orientations in a number of 
work and leisure situations. In their book ‘Riding the waves of culture’, Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner (1998) identify seven value orientations: 1) Universalism versus 
particularism; 2) Communitarianism versus individualism; 3) Achievement versus ascription; 
4) Diffuse versus specific; 5) Neutral versus emotional; 6) Human-Time relationship; and 7) 
Human-Nature relationship. They include four SSA countries in their study.16 
Universalism/particularism is about rules, regulations and compliance, in relation to 
friendship and kinship; communitarianism versus individualism is similar (although not 
identical) to Hofstede’s cultural dimension collectivism / individualism; achievement / 
ascription relates to the way status is achieved; diffuse/specific relates to the differentiation 
between work and family life; neutral/emotional is about the control of emotions and the 
acceptance of emotional expression; human/time relation refers to short/long term orientation 
and general time orientation; human/nature relationship refers to internal/external locus of 
control, i.e. the belief that people have (little or much) control over the future. Some of these 
                                                          
15 This dimension was added by Hofstede in 1991, but has not been used extensively by other researchers in 
studies on leadership, management and organizational change in SSA.  
16 South Africa (black sample), Nigeria, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso.  
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value orientations overlap with (or are implied by) Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. For 
instance, some of the suggested effects of achievement versus ascription and diffuse versus 
specific value orientation are captured by Hofstede’s collectivism/individualism. Similarly, 
achievement versus ascription appears to be linked to Hofstede’s power distance, and 
universalism versus particularism relates to Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance. Trompenaars 
& Hampden-Turner (1998) suggest that SSA countries are relatively particularistic, 
communitarian, ascriptive, diffuse, short term oriented and with a largely external locus of 
control (when compared with many ‘Western’ countries). Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 
(1998) use several value orientations that do not occur in the study by Hofstede. The 
diffuse/specific- value orientation converges with Hall’s classic study on high and low 
context cultures (1976). According to many researchers, developing countries (in general) 
tend to have high context cultures (Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998). Other value orientations added by Trompenaars are concerned with 
the time orientation and the human relationship with the environment. Time orientation 
converges with Hall’s study on polychronic and monochronic time (Hall, 1959)17.  
 
A different approach to studying cultural value differences has been taken by Schwartz 
(1999). He did not ask for preferred outcomes, but asked respondents to what extent they 
considered certain values as ‘guiding principles in one’s life’. Schwartz (1999) included five 
SSA countries in his study18. He identified three basic issues (values dimensions) with which 
societies must cope that underlie seven different cultural values. These three issues are: 1) 
Embeddedness (or conservatism) versus autonomy; 2) Hierarchy versus egalitarianism; and 
3) Mastery versus harmony. These three issues have resulted in seven different value types19. 
Munene, Schwartz & Smith (2000) have used the research data from Schwartz (1999) and 
compared the data from the five SSA countries with the data from Western European 
countries20. The study suggests that embeddedness, hierarchy and mastery are more important 
in SSA than in Western Europe, and egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy and harmony are 
                                                          
17 A number of cultural differences, such as a role / task orientation, high/low context and monochronic / 
polychronic time orientations have been incorporated in the individualism / collectivism dimension (Hofstede, 
1980, 2001; Jackson, 2004). Consequently, it is argued that collectivistic cultures tend to be role oriented, high 
context and have a polychronic time orientation.  
18 Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa (black sample). 
19 Conservatism (embeddedness), intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, 
mastery and harmony.  
20 They include student and teacher samples in all countries under study.  
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more important in Western Europe countries than in SSA. As such, Munene et al argue 
(2000) that SSA cultures stress maintenance of the status quo and restrain actions that might 
disrupt the group solidarity or traditional order, and legitimize a hierarchical system of 
ascribed roles assuring socially responsible behavior. Munene et al (2000) also suggest that 
managers in SSA rely heavily on guidance from their superiors and formal (written) rules 
before taking action (or a decision). The low socio-economic levels are conducive to valuing 
and legitimizing assertive exploitation of the natural and social environment (Munene et al., 
2000). Western European cultures tend to view persons as autonomous entities who find 
meaning in their own uniqueness, and as moral equals who share basic interests and seek 
cooperative and socially responsible modes of organizing productive activity. Although there 
is some variation in value importance among the African nations (…), this variation is small 
compared to the much larger variation between these sets of nations. According to the 
authors, this justifies viewing the African nations involved as broad cultural regions (Munene 
et al., 2000) or cultural clusters (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013).  
 
Smith et al (2002) have integrated the results from the large scale culture studies from 
Hofstede (2001), Schwartz (1999) and Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998), and linked 
the different cultural values to eight management events (such as the required appointment of 
a new subordinate, consistent bad job performance, the introduction of new work procedures, 
etc.) and sources of guidance. They include six SSA countries in their study21. Their results 
indicate that managers in SSA countries tend to rely much more on vertical sources of 
guidance, and much less on unwritten rules than in ‘Western’ countries. Reliance on superiors 
and written rules is associated not only with collectivism but also with cultural 
embeddedness, hierarchy, power distance, mastery and masculinity. Most SSA nations are 
especially high on these cultural dimensions (Smith et al., 2002). 
 
The GLOBE research project on culture, leadership and organizations (House et al., 2004) 
used nine cultural dimensions, which are partly similar to those used by Hofstede: 1) 
Uncertainty avoidance; 2) Power distance; 3) Institutional collectivism; 4) In-group 
collectivism; 5) Gender egalitarianism; 6) Assertiveness; 7) Future orientation; 8) 
Performance orientation; and 9) Human orientation. The GLOBE project distinguishes 
between values and practices; values refer to the way things should be, while practices refer 
                                                          
21 Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  
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to the way things are at society level (House et al., 2004). Five SSA countries were included 
in the GLOBE research project22. Their results reveal significant differences between values 
(should be) and practices (as is) among many cultural dimensions in both ‘Western’ and SSA 
countries. Practices of performance orientation and future orientation are generally higher in 
‘Western’ countries than in SSA countries. Practices of in-group collectivism, power distance 
and humane orientation are much stronger in SSA than in ‘Western’ countries. Concerning 
institutional collectivism, SSA countries do not score significantly higher than ‘Western’ 
countries. According to House et al (2004), humane oriented leader behaviors are perceived 
to be significantly more effective in the SSA countries. According to House et al (2004) 
Zambia scores higher on humane orientation practices than any other society in the world. 
House et al (2004) do not consider humane and performance orientation as opposing 
orientations, converging with role/task distinctions of culture (Handy, 1996). Concerning 
performance orientation, the statistics (House et al., 2004) show a significant difference 
between value and practice in Zambia, suggesting that implementation and achievement (in 
practice) are not as successful as desired. According to House this is a normal feature; 
societies that score lower on performance orientation practices tend to value performance 
orientation values higher, presumably because they want to catch up (House et al., 2004).  
 
In their explorative study on the relations between culture, governance and economic 
performance, Noorderhaven & Tidjani (2001) developed a new set of eight cultural 
dimensions. They argue that most cross-cultural studies suffer from a ‘Western’ bias, which 
they avoid by focusing on SSA and adopt an ‘African’ bias. The research instrument was 
developed by means of a Delphi study among African scholars, and resulted in 8 cultural 
dimensions: 1) Human goodness; 2 Rules & hierarchy; 3) Importance of religion; 4) 
Traditional wisdom; 5) Sharing; 6) Jealousy; 7) Collectivism; and 8) Social responsibility 
(Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001). They include six SSA countries in their study23. Striking 
differences between Western countries and SSA countries can be observed when looking at 
human goodness, rules & hierarchy and importance of religion. A low score on human 
goodness indicates a pessimistic view of human nature and a concomitant view of 
organizations. A high score on rules & hierarchy indicates that rules are seen as important, 
and subordinates are supposed to check with their superiors before taking action. Religious 
                                                          
22 Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, Nigeria and South Africa. 
23 Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon and South Africa (white sample). 
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values seem to be much more important in the SSA countries than in ‘Western’ countries. 
Traditional wisdom appears to be very important too, however, the difference with ‘Western’ 
countries is not huge. All SSA countries (except Zimbabwe) score above average on 
‘sharing’ and ‘collectivism’ dimensions. The other dimensions do not show clear tendencies 
among the SSA countries.  
 
3.3.2 What do the large scale culture studies suggest? 
Noorderhaven & Tidjani (2001) conclude that the dimension of individualism – collectivism 
seems to be fundamental and of great importance in relation to governance and economic 
performance in SSA (Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001). The individualism – collectivism 
dimension appears to be the most important one: 
 
 …Our analysis of the past four decades of literature on culture and cultural 
variations reveals that individualism-collectivism is the ‘deep structure’ of cultural 
differences among societies. (Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston, & Triandis, 2002) 
 
There are many researchers who support this statement, given the large numbers of cross-
cultural research that has been done using particularly this cultural dimension (Noorderhaven 
& Tidjani, 2001), or a variation of it, such as ‘communitarianism’ (Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998), ‘conservatism’ or ‘embeddedness’ (Munene et al., 2000; Schwartz, 
1994, 1999). Oyserman et al (2002) compare the scores on individualism and collectivism 
between the US/Canada and other regions and countries (within these regions). Not 
surprisingly, the African region (including Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana) scores 
much lower on individualism and much higher on collectivism than the US/Canada region. 
(Oyserman et al., 2002). Concerning individualism/collectivism, they do not come across 
major differences between countries within the African region. 
 
Power distance is also of great importance to SSA (Buelens & Devos, 2004; Noorderhaven & 
Tidjani, 2001). This cultural dimension is also supported by many other researchers using this 
dimension or a variation of it, such as ‘ascription versus achievement’ (Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998), ‘hierarchy versus egalitarianism’ (Schwartz, 1999), ‘rules and 
hierarchy’ (Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001). Many SSA countries have relatively high scores 
on this dimension. This conclusion is widely shared and has solid theoretical backing 
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(Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House et al., 2004; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001; Schwartz, 1999; 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). Power distance seems to be especially relevant and 
important if it includes elements of ascription, authoritarianism, rules and hierarchy. This 
conclusion is also shared by other researchers (Buelens & Devos, 2004; Hofstede, 1980, 
2001; House et al., 2004; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001; Schwartz, 1999; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998). Some researchers have suggested to include hierarchical or 
egalitarian aspects of social relationships in analyses of individualism and collectivism 
(Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).   
 
The cultural dimension masculinity/femininity of Hofstede is interesting, since it is suggested 
that countries in the East and West African regions are generally high on masculinity 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001). In combination with the low score of Zambia on gender 
egalitarianism in practice (House et al., 2004), it seems that the position of women in Zambia 
is not enviable. However, high masculinity seems to be at odds with a people orientation 
(Adeleye, 2011) and a weak organizational achievement orientation (Noorderhaven, 
Vunderink, & Lincoln, 1996). Somehow, the masculinity/femininity dimension is hardly 
being used in studies on leadership, management and change in SSA. Other cultural 
dimensions such as uncertainty avoidance and long/short term orientation do not come out 
strongly when overviewing the results of the various large scale culture studies.  
 
In many large scale culture studies, only very few SSA countries are incorporated. Zambia is 
only incorporated in the studies undertaken by Hofstede (1980) and House et al (2004). The 
findings of other large scale culture studies may still be valid and supportive, in the sense that 
the scores of other (neighboring) SSA countries may (to some extent) be comparable to the 
situation in Zambia, and support the conclusion from Munene et al (2000) that, although 
there is some variation in value importance among the African nations, this variation is small 
compared to the much larger variation between SSA and non-SSA countries (Munene et al., 
2000; Ronen & Shenkar, 2013). It remains to be seen what indications of collectivism and 
power distance (and possibly other dimensions) will be found in the empirical part of this 
study. It will be interesting to analyze the mental models of staff members at CBU in Zambia, 
and find out if, how and to what extent their mental models can be understood in terms of 
these cultural dimensions (and their suggested effects) that appear so dominant in SSA 
countries.  
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3.3.3 Critique and support of the large scale culture studies  
Despite the worldwide popularity of large scale culture studies they have been heavily and 
increasingly criticized, basically for being too reductionist (Adeleye, 2011; Baskerville, 2003; 
McSweeney, 2002), normative (Ailon, 2008), ignorant of context (Lytle, Brett, Barsness, 
Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995; Tsui & Nifadkar, 2007), ignorant of differences within countries 
(Earley, 2006), static (Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 1997; Horwitz, 2009), and 
of limited practical value (Jacob, 2005). Nevertheless, Kirkman et al (2006) undertook a 
review of empirical research incorporating Hofstede’s cultural values framework, and agree 
with Smith & Bond’s conclusion (1996) that large scale studies published since Hofstede’s 
work, including the Chinese Culture Connection (1987), Schwartz’ work on values (1994, 
1999), Trompenaars (1998) and Smith et al (1996) as examples, have sustained and amplified 
Hofstede’s conclusions rather than contradicted them (Kirkman et al., 2006). For me, this 
means that, despite all the critique, I don’t disqualify the large scale culture studies 
completely. Instead, I will use them as guiding concepts. Perhaps it is better to think of 
cultural standards for culturally determined patterns of behavior (Fink & Mayrhofer, 2009), 
which bring some local flavor into the picture (McSweeney, Smith & Fitzgerald, 2008). The 
relevance and usefulness of the large scale culture studies for the case study at CBU will be 
further discussed in the final discussion & conclusions chapter.  
 
3.3.4 Diversity in SSA 
In many large scale culture studies only a few African countries are incorporated, despite the 
enormous cultural diversity available on the continent. Generalizations frequently occur, as if 
African regions or countries share the same culture. Meanwhile, SSA countries are among the 
most diverse of any geographic region, as expressed by several authors: 
 
Africa is culturally diverse, not simply among black Africans and other minorities 
like Europeans and Asians, but also among the various black ethnic groups as well 
as between rural and urban Africans. (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998) 
 
This area has a vast diversity of ethnicity, religion, language and customs. (Littrell 
& Ramburuth, 2007) 
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While many authors pledge for particularism and uniqueness of national cultures, often broad 
generalizations prevail. This is particularly evident in reference to Africa: 
 
The cultural identity of a single country or a few countries is taken to represent the 
whole. The recent GLOBE study of 62 nations……also reflects this 
tendency……There is reference to the culture of ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ when only five 
countries are included in the study. (Nkomo, 2006)  
 
Yet the literature on management and organization in Africa mostly ignores cultural 
differences and interaction that may exist among African regions, among countries, 
and indeed within African countries. (Jackson, 2004)  
 
Surprisingly, this tendency to generalize across African countries is not restricted to 
‘Western’ researchers only. Indeed, Africans tend to make similar generalizations. While 
some ‘African’ scholars often point to the vast diversity of Africa, many others provide 
generalized descriptions of ‘African’ management. In many cases, ‘African’ is restricted to 
SSA, thereby excluding North Africa from further analysis, and more importantly, implying 
that SSA can be considered as a (culturally) homogeneous region, up to a certain extent. In a 
publication about managing human resources in Africa, Kamoche (1997) states:   
 
Though Africa is by no means homogenous culturally, politically, economically or 
otherwise, this paper makes a working assumption of a certain degree of uniformity 
in sub-Saharan Africa in respect of industrial development, the ethos of post-
independent imperatives for economic growth and the African thought system. 
(Kamoche, 1997) 
 
In a more recent publication, Kamoche states that there are underlying commonalities in 
cultural values that can inform the practice of leadership and management, such as deference 
to authority, paternalism, filial piety, an emphasis on harmony and a collective ethos 
(Kamoche, 2011). However, Kamoche is not the only one. Other African scholars argue 
along similar lines (see for instance Sulamoyo, 2012; Malunga, 2009) and a whole range of 
others, whose insights I describe below.  
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3.3.5 Generalizations about ‘African’ culture and management 
Several (African and Western) authors have written about ‘African’ culture (Binet, 1970; 
Nnadozie, 2001), often in relation to management (Iguisi, 1994; Nnadozie, 2001; Nzelibe, 
1986; Onwuejeogwu, 1995; Osuntokun, 2004; Waiguchu, Tiagha, & Mwaura, 1999), work 
attitudes (Abudu, 1986; Ahiauzu, 1986), management challenges (Edoho, 2001) and the 
psychology of management in African organizations (Onyemelukwe, 1983; Ugwuegbu, 
2001). This literature on management and organization in SSA mostly ignores cultural 
differences and interaction that may exist among African countries and within African 
countries (Jackson, 2004). Nevertheless, I will briefly highlight the main elements of their 
insights. The French researcher Binet (1970) provides a theory on African economic 
psychology, cited by Dia (1996) and Jackson (Managers’ perceptions of organization in 
Africa; unpublished). Key values can be summarized as follows:  
 
- Sharing: sharing is justified by a need for security in the face of hardship, and has 
provided a commitment to helping each other, based on a network of social 
obligations. Sharing also refers to the idea of Ubuntu, with trust and openness as 
important virtues; 
- Deference to rank: deference to rank is associated with power distance between 
employers and employees, supervisors and subordinates, the senior and the junior. 
This refers not only to deference to rank and seniority, but also to the senior person 
showing humility towards the younger person, and to the educated person not looking 
down on those less educated; 
- Sanctity of commitment: commitment stems from group pressures to meet one’s 
promises and to comply with social expectations; 
- Regard for compromise and consensus: this involves the maintenance of harmony 
within the social context, the desire for unanimity (win-win) even at the cost of 
seemingly interminable discussion; 
- Good social and personal relationships: this refers to the high value placed on group 
solidarity and socializing, and represents a humanistic orientation towards people. 
(Binet, 1970) 
 
Nnadozie (in: Edoho, 2001) offers a list of what he calls ‘Africa’s most common cultural 
characteristics’: 
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- High social inequality; 
- Respect for hierarchies, title and age; 
- Importance of personal connections and relationships; 
- The collectivist nature of African societies; 
- Male domination24; 
- The preference for harmony to conflict in dealing with uncertainty; 
- Time flexibility (African time); 
- Emphasis on tradition and honor; 
- Increasing corruption in some African countries; 
- Disregard for the law in some societies due to lack of enforcement; 
- The positive work ethic that goes along with low productivity. (Nnadozie, 2001)  
 
In ‘The evolution of African management thought’ (Nzelibe, 1986), several basic dimensions 
of ‘African’ management thought are described and explained, such as: 
 
- Traditionalism (adherence to accepted customs, beliefs and practices that determine 
accepted behavior, morality and the desired characteristics of the individual); 
- Communalism (the family as the basic unit of socialization, community consciousness 
and group belongingness); 
- Mythology (strong belief in man’s relation to nature, supernatural beings and his/her 
ancestors). (Nzelibe, 1986) 
 
In ‘The African thought system and the work behavior of the African industrial man’ 
(Ahiauzu, 1986), similar elements of the ‘African’ thought system are highlighted:  
 
- The African is cooperative, not egoistic or individualistic (we, and not I, is the law of 
African life); 
- A holistic view on human life (oneness, harmony); 
- Common sense derives from African preliterate social thought, which includes 
proverbs, legends and ballads (proverbs express traditional beliefs and truths); 
                                                          
24 Interestingly, Iguisi (1997) suggests the reverse, namely that ‘African’ cultures are traditionally more 
feminine than masculine.  
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- Mysticism (relate events to supernatural sources, particularly the spirits of their 
ancestors and the ghosts of their deceased relations). (Ahiauzu, 1986) 
 
Osuntokun (2004) has written about the traditional ‘African’ idea of management, and 
stresses similar ideas, such as the importance of consensus, communalism, humanism, 
collective wisdom, the role of spirituality and the historicity of knowledge – connecting the 
past with the present and the present with the future (Osuntokun, 2004). Abudu (1986) has 
written about ‘African’ work attitudes (with special reference to Nigeria), and acknowledges 
the gross inefficiency, incivility to customers, corruption, low commitment and a lack of 
punctuality among many workers in Africa. He argues that the role of unfair recruitment-, 
placement- and reward systems, lack of proper supervision and punishment – ‘a frustratingly 
slow disciplinary machinery’ – are largely responsible for poor discipline and habits. In his 
view, traditional values that anchored indigenous societies have eroded, while an modern 
industrial culture has not yet been developed:  
 
The worker therefore operates in a cultural milieu that is neither indigenous nor 
foreign, but a monstrosity of cultures, which is unable to instill a proper work ethic 
and motivate the worker to do his best. (Abudu, 1986) 
 
Iguisi (1997) argues along similar lines, by claiming that managers in Africa can be trained in 
a ‘Western’ country, but (when back) in Africa they continue to function according to 
‘African’ norms. Their primary loyalty is not to their employer but to their kinship group, 
whose respect they want to earn. Kinship members expect their powerful relative to provide 
them with financial benefits and preferential treatment in the assignment of jobs. He further 
points out that due to large power distances in Africa, subordinates cannot communicate 
independently and freely with superiors and act on their own initiative. As a consequence, 
‘Western’ models that encourage participation and consultation do not apply in Africa. 
Superiors are expected to make decisions and delegation is practically inexistent (Iguisi, 
1997). He provides several characteristics of ‘African’ management which largely converge 
with the ones from previous authors, but he adds some other elements as well:  
 
- Success is not due to one’s efforts or good deeds, but to the behavior of nature or the 
support of powerful patrons; lack of progress at work is attributable not to one’s own 
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actions, but to the behavior of nature, evil spirits or a conspiracy of powerful 
adversaries;  
- Truth depends on who’s telling it; strangers shall not be trusted; 
- Allegiance to powerful groups and or individuals; 
- Risk avoidance. (Iguisi, 1997) 
 
Munene et al (2000) paraphrases the work done by Onwuejeogwu (1995) and argues that 
Africans in their daily lives are guided by the following specific values and beliefs. One 
should: 
 
- View the world as an integrated whole in which all events are traceable to one source; 
- Ground practical / common-sense thinking in proverbs; 
- Root theoretical thinking in mysticism; 
- View truth as depending on one’s relationship with or the status of its source; 
- Fully trust relatives but not strangers; 
- Maintain order in life by avoiding unnecessary risks; 
- View wisdom as thought and behavior in harmony with one’s ancestors;  
- Define wisdom as making the best of available opportunities; 
- See success as dependent on help or hindrance by powerful others;  
- See advancement as dependent on allegiance to powerful groups or individuals. 
(Onwuejeogwu, 1995) 
 
These values and beliefs nicely summarize all the insights provided by other African scholars 
previously described. According to Munene et al (2000), these values and beliefs can easily 
be related to the value types identified in the large scale culture study undertaken by 
Schwartz (1999). Despite the acknowledged diversity within Africa, these (sometimes even 
contradictory) generalizations seem to make sense – at least to some people. There may 
perhaps be some truth in these generalizations after all. But can they also explain the different 
realities and practices at CBU? That remains to be discovered in this case study.  
 
3.3.6 Literature about management in Africa 
Several authors have written extensively about management in Africa. These management 
books on Africa are quite generalizing and often include Anglo-American management 
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theories, and see how they can be applied in the African context, for instance Blunt & Jones 
(1992), Waiguchu et al (1999), Ugwuegbu (2001) and Edoho (2001). Blunt & Jones (1992) 
have provided the book ‘Managing organizations in Africa’, which is often referred to by 
many other authors, since it was the first book of this kind. However, the general tone about 
African organizations is quite negative: Supposedly, African organizations are highly 
centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian, reflecting a post-colonial heritage. In their view, 
public sectors are too large, overstaffed but underutilized and reluctant to judge performance. 
African organizations lack a clear results and objectives orientation, and strategies emphasize 
inputs (particularly in the public sector, such as increasing expenditures on health, education 
and housing for the staff) rather than outputs (such as quality products and services, customer 
orientation, etc.). Top management is often overworked while reluctant to delegate, and 
management systems are not participative or decentralized. An emphasis on control 
mechanisms, rules and procedures prevails (indicating uncertainty avoidance and change 
resistance), which prevents initiatives from the staff. Blunt & Jones (1992) suggest that 
Africans have an instrumental view of organizations, aimed at the fulfillment of their 
personal and basic security needs (Blunt & Jones, 1992).  
 
Ugwuegbu (2001) writes about the psychology of management in African organizations, and 
argues that the traditional hierarchical structure of organizations with its autocratic and 
exclusive tendencies is inherited from European colonial powers. He refers to Onyemelukwe 
(1983) who argues that due to strong socialization mechanisms among African groups, 
individuals lack initiative, are without problem-solving orientation and do not accept 
individual responsibility. For the same reasons, managers find it difficult to delegate 
responsibility to subordinates. Ugwuegbu (2001) portrays African leaders as centralistic 
bureaucrats who are there to administer the rules and regulations rather than to develop and 
manage the organization. Nevertheless, employees tend to look up to their leaders, who are 
usually appointed by the government. Decision-making in Africa is usually highly 
centralized, chaotic and time consuming due to a lack of information and problems of 
organizational communication. Group decision-making (by committees) has become popular 
and increases participation of staff, but Ugwuegbu notices that the recommendations of such 
committees are often not acted upon. Many African organizations are overstaffed but without 
job descriptions (Ugwuegbu, 2001).  
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Edoho’s book ‘Management challenges for Africa in the 21st century’ (2001) states that 
public institutions are characterized by inefficiency and ineffectiveness, due to poor quality 
and incompetence of their managers and unrelenting corruption, nepotism and patronage. He 
is also critical about the virtual lack of transparency, accountability and ignorance of African 
governments (and their officials). He argues that an ‘African’ management philosophy is 
needed, based on African values, listed by Nnadozie (2001) and others (see above). 
Nevertheless, Edoho suggests to change the principle of age as a vital criterion for wisdom 
and to abolish the principle of hereditary leadership (Edoho, 2001). Supposedly, an adjusted 
‘African’ management philosophy can help to overcome problems of leadership and 
management in Africa. The book provided by Waiguchu et al (1999) is highly prescriptive 
and adds very little to the insights provided above25. 
 
3.4 Organizational change in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
As already argued, organizational change in SSA is little researched and described; only a 
few authors have written about the subject. In his book ‘Management and change in Africa’ 
(Jackson, 2004), the author emphasizes the cultural diversity within Africa and within 
African countries, and he uses the term ‘crossvergence’ to explain the hybridization of 
organizational forms and management systems (in Africa) through an admixture of different 
cultural influences. Jackson (2004) presents a typology of African management systems that 
incorporates the historical legacy, cultural diversity and contemporary developments in many 
African countries. The typology consists of three ‘ideal type’ management systems: A post-
colonial management system, a post-instrumental management system and third system 
which he calls African renaissance. In the table below (next page), a summary of these ‘ideal 
type’ management systems is presented. In reality, these ‘ideal type’ management systems 
occur simultaneously, and elements of each ‘ideal type’ can occur even within one single 
organization (Jackson, 2004). This typology is useful for my research, as it does provide 
some idea of the various leadership and management realities and practices that can be 
expected in SSA. Of course, it remains to be seen where and how CBU fits in this typology, 
and what that means for (mental models on) organizational change.  
 
                                                          
25 Their book relies mainly on Western management theories and contains very little reference to empirical 
research in Africa.  
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 Post-colonial Post-instrumental African renaissance 
Main 
principles 
Theory X  
Instrumental 
Theory Y 
Functionalist 
Humanistic 
Community collectivism 
Strategy Inputs and process orientation 
Lack of results and objectives 
Results and market oriented  
Clear objectives 
Stakeholder orientation 
 
Structure Hierarchical 
Centralized 
Flatter hierarchy 
Often decentralized 
Flatter hierarchy 
Decentralized and closer to 
stakeholders 
Governance 
and decision-
making 
Authoritarian 
Non-consultative 
Often consultative 
Increasing emphasis on 
empowerment 
Participative 
Consensus seeking (Indaba) 
Control Rule bound 
Outside influence or control  
Clear rules of action 
Government influence 
decreasing 
Kind rules of action 
Outside influence perceived as 
supportive  
Character Not very efficient 
Static 
Aims to be successful 
Change is a feature 
Stakeholder interests more 
important 
Success related to development 
and well begin of its people 
Internal 
policies 
Discriminatory 
Employee policies aimed at 
duties rather than rights 
Non-discriminatory 
Access to equal 
opportunities, policies aimed 
at duties and rights 
Stakeholder interests 
Access to equal opportunities 
Internal 
climate 
Employee alienation common 
Discourages diversity of 
opinions 
Promotion by ascription 
Emphasis on employee 
motivation 
Diverse opinions often 
encouraged 
Promotion based on 
achievement 
Motivation through 
participation 
Unions protect rights 
Everyone is able to state their 
opinions 
External 
policies 
Lack of customer/client policies 
Lack of results orientation 
Clear policies on 
customers/clients 
Results orientation 
A clear awareness of and 
articulation of stakeholder 
interests 
Management 
expertise 
Educated management elite 
with low managerial expertise 
High, results oriented 
managerial expertise is aimed 
for 
Management expertise based on 
people orientation 
People 
orientation 
Control orientation People and results orientation People and stakeholder 
orientation  
Table 3.2: ‘Ideal type’ management systems in Africa (Jackson, 2004).  
 
Sulamoyo (2012) has written a book ‘Creating opportunities for change and organizational 
development in Southern Africa’, aiming at an ‘indigenization’ of Western organizational 
development (OD) approaches and interventions. For that purpose, the author describes the 
influence of ‘African’ belief systems, political systems and leadership models on culture. He 
uses Jackson’s typology of management systems (2004), and considers the African 
renaissance as an idealistic concept that can be aligned with the values of OD (Sulamoyo, 
2012). Sulamoyo stresses the importance of spirituality for many (Southern) Africans, and 
illustrates how values such as collectivism and power distance are captured in several African 
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metaphors and proverbs. Some of these proverbs reject individualistic attributes within 
society. For instance, if individuals try to excel outside the context of the group or the 
community, they are pulled back by society, defined as the ‘pull down syndrome’ by Ali et al 
(2001). Another proverb – ‘Myang’ana Dzuwa Adasokera’ – means that those who don’t ask 
for guidance or advice for fear of getting embarrassed may find themselves in precarious 
situations. And ‘Tsoka Sasimba Koma Mwayi’ means that we should not persist in doing 
things we know could be detrimental to us. Both expressions seem to relate to uncertainty 
avoidance. The use of proverbs, metaphors and stories in OD in SSA is also supported by 
James (2004), who claims that cultural expressions can be used as powerful levers for 
change. Sulamoyo (2012) tries to link the key values from Binet (1970) with Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions (1980, 2001) and Ubuntu (Mangaliso & Damane, 2001). See the table 
below:  
 
Binet (1970) 
 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) Mangaliso & Damane (2001) 
Sharing Femininity Productivity, solidarity, social 
harmony 
Commitment 
 
Short-term orientation Time, infinite, healing 
Compromise & consensus 
 
Uncertainty avoidance Decision-making by consensus, 
harmony  
Social & personal relationships Collectivism Relationships with others are 
reciprocal, extended family 
Deference to rank 
 
Power distance Age & leadership, respect, wisdom  
Table 3.3: Comparing cultural models (taken from Sulamoyo, 2012).  
 
According to Sulamoyo (2012), Ubuntu can act as a cultural integrator of Western OD 
applications, and provides hope to Southern Africa that OD can be a highly successful 
concept when based on democratic, optimistic and humanistic principles (Sulamoyo, 2012). 
However, these are rather prophetic claims about Ubuntu with far-reaching consequences 
(van den Heuvel, Mangaliso & van de Bunt, 2006). Interestingly, Sulamoyo too suggests that, 
although his findings are mostly based on research done in Malawi, Malawi has cultural, 
economic and political attributes that are representative for Southern Africa. Whether this is 
also true for CBU in Zambia remains to be discovered.  
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3.4.1 Research about public sector reform in Africa 
Dia (1996), Wohlgemuth et al (1998) and Therkildsen (2001) have written about institutions 
and public sector (reform) in Africa26. Dia’s report ‘Africa’s management in the 1990s and 
beyond’ (1996) describes the institutional crisis in many African countries as a structural 
disconnect between formal institutions transplanted from outside and indigenous institutions 
born of traditional African culture. Formal institutions need to be adapted to the local context 
in order to build the legitimacy needed for local ownership, sustainability and enforceability. 
Indigenous institutions need to adapt to the changing outside world to maintain their 
relevance. A lack of congruence between corporate and societal cultures has resulted in 
distorted corporate governance and disconnected incentive systems. Regarding corporate 
governance in public enterprises, undue political interference by states has destroyed the 
balance between accountability and autonomy, and eroded the commitment and productivity 
of staff in modern enterprises. Dia (1996) argues that general managers of public enterprises 
are generally based on subjective criteria such as political loyalty or ethnic affiliation rather 
than competence. The report includes a survey of the Zambian civil service, which does not 
portray an energized bureaucracy: a reluctance to put in extra hours, a tendency to report for 
work late and leave work early, use office time to engage in side jobs, etc. Social obligations 
are viewed as an acceptable excuse for absenteeism. Almost 90 (!) percent of the respondents 
in the civil service found making excuses an acceptable strategy for addressing public 
complaints (e.g. ignorance of client needs). Not surprisingly, they are rarely held accountable 
for their performance. In the Zambian ministry of education, nearly 50% of the staff place 
personal interests above public service, and acknowledge bribery during enrollment. 
Allocation of resources in the education sector is mainly driven by power plays among 
bureaucrats and politicians, rather than by policy priorities. Decision-making processes are 
rigid, and should stress group harmony. Managers are reluctant to supervise the execution of 
commands too closely, and avoid confrontation. At the same time, many of them fear that 
delegated authority will be misused, combined with a reluctance to receive suggestions from 
subordinates (Dia, 1996).  
 
In the book by Wohlgemuth et al (1998), Carlsson (1998) argues that the most pronounced 
weakness of many public sector organizations in Africa is that the ideas and models 
underpinning colonial administration are still quite strong. As a result, many African 
                                                          
26 HEIs in Africa are often considered as public sector organizations. 
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organizations have a low propensity to deal with demands from the external environment. 
Other characteristics include uncertainly avoidance, conservatism and a short-term 
orientation of managers (Carlsson, 1998). When a public sector manager receives a directive 
from the political establishment (or from a high level manager), all other tasks will be put 
aside immediately. Since public sector organizations in Africa are highly centralized, no 
sustained development takes place unless the highest responsible officials participate and are 
perceived as assuming full responsibility for the change process and its outcome (Wallroth, 
Wohlgemuth, Carlsson, & Kifle, 1998). Informal structures (based on kinship and tribe) 
influence appointments of staff, decisions and access to information. Wohlgemuth et al 
(1998) refer to Dia (1996) and suggest that the post-colonial – ‘mechanical’ – model for 
public sector organizations should be replaced by open systems thinking. Recently, efforts to 
enhance education and training in public administration are reported from Ghana (Ohemeng, 
2014), Nigeria (Ewoh, 2014) and South Africa (Subban & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2014).  
 
Therkildsen (2001) explains that generally, public sector organizations in poor African 
countries perform badly, even considering the difficult circumstances in which they operate. 
To varying degrees, they suffer from inefficiency, centralization, fragmentation, poor 
leadership, lack of capacity, rent seeking, corruption and poor accountability and legitimacy. 
Many reforms today are inspired by New Public Management (NPM) and have produced 
mixed results, due to institutional problems (Dia, 1996) and problematic elements of 
‘African’ culture (Therkildsen, 2001). Some of these problems are still being reported in 
more recent studies (Hyden, 2013). Nevertheless, there are also good examples that can serve 
as role models for others, such as the public sector reforms in South Africa, Botswana, 
Namibia, Senegal, Mauritius and Kenya (Adamolekun & Olowu, 2015) and, to some extent, 
in Mozambique and Tanzania (Hyden, 2013).  
 
 
3.5 Organizational change in higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
In this paragraph I will discuss some theoretical insights about organizational change in 
higher education in SSA. Before I do so, however, it is important to provide general 
information about HE in SSA.  
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3.5.1 Higher education in SSA  
Widespread university education in SSA is mainly a post-colonial phenomenon (Sawyerr, 
2004), and Castells (2001) states that nearly all third world universities are rooted in a 
colonial past. Sherman (1990) argues that the African university is a product of the Western 
world, born as a stranger to its own traditional African environment. Nevertheless, the 
African university is crucial to the development of the African continent, and it must be 
shaped to meet the challenge of fostering regional, cultural development and achieving 
modernization, thereby interlinking the traditional African environment and the modern 
Western world (Sherman, 1990). HE is believed to contribute to economic development 
(Salmi, 2002), but enrollment rates in HE in SSA are by far the lowest in the world (Bloom, 
Canning, & Chan, 2005). This is partly due to financial problems. Teferra & Altbach (2004) 
summarize the sources of financial problems of HEIs in contemporary Africa:  
 
In virtually all African countries, demand for access to higher education is growing, 
straining the resources of higher education institutions. Academics everywhere, even 
in wealthy industrialized nations, faces fiscal problems, but the magnitude of these 
problems is greater in Africa than anywhere else. The causes include the pressures 
of expansion and ‘massification’; economic problems facing many African countries 
that make it difficult, if not impossible, to provide increased funding for higher 
education; a changed fiscal climate induced by multilateral lending agencies such 
as the World Bank and the IMF; the inability of students to afford the tuition rates 
necessary for fiscal stability and in some cases an inability to impose tuition fees 
due to political or other pressure; misallocation and poor prioritization of available 
financial resources, such as the tradition of providing free or highly subsidized 
accommodations and food to students and maintaining a large and cumbersome 
non-academic personnel and infrastructure, among others. (Teferra & Altbach, 
2004) 
 
Next to financial problems, Teferra & Albach (2004) describe other key elements of higher 
education in SSA. African universities suffer from poor, inefficient, and highly bureaucratic 
management systems. Poorly trained and poorly qualified personnel, inefficient, ineffective, 
and out-of-date management and administrative infrastructures and poorly remunerated staff 
are the norm throughout many systems. Research and publishing activities in Africa are in 
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critical condition (Atuahene, 2011), due to inadequate research training, lack of research 
funding and major off-campus distractions27 (Cloete, Bailey, Pillay, Bunting & Maassen, 
2011). The teaching and research staff in quite a large number of African institutions is 
smaller than the nonacademic/administrative staff. The administrative bureaucracy in African 
universities is disproportionately large (Teferra & Altbach, 2004). Some blame 
misappropriation of funds and poor prioritization as one of the factors for financial 
difficulties in the universities. Converging with the regional development role of African 
universities (Sherman, 1990), universities in SSA often provide enormous support for the 
provision of nonacademic activities and facilities, such as allowances, free accommodation, 
and catering. Such support is increasingly facing scrutiny in SSA, resulting in regular strikes 
by staff and students.  
 
In many HEIs in SSA, governmental involvement in public university affairs is the norm28. 
The current governance structure in most African universities reflects this legacy. Throughout 
much of Africa, the head of state holds the ultimate authority as the chancellor in appointing 
vice-chancellors and others down the administrative line; this is especially typical in 
Anglophone Africa, and this form of presidentialism (Lungu, 1983) occurs in Zambia too. 
Since most African governments are intolerant of dissent, criticism, nonconformity, and free 
expression of controversial, new, or unconventional ideas, academic freedom is often limited 
(Teferra & Altbach, 2004). Management is often authoritarian, is rigidly controlled by the 
state and is hamstrung by a decision-making structure that is too complex (Wohlgemuth et 
al., 1998). Public HEIs in SSA experience increasing competition from private universities. 
Most private institutions hire academic staff from public institutions. Characteristically, most 
of the academic staff continue to hold part-time positions in public HEIs. In some countries, 
the massive flow of academic staff from public institutions to newly established private 
institutions has seriously constrained certain departments in public universities. For many 
academic staff, however, these private teaching positions have become an important source of 
extra income (Teferra & Altbach, 2004). This contributes to the omnipresent ‘brain drain’ in 
public universities in Africa (Wamundila & Ngulube, 2011).  
 
                                                          
27 Such as consultancies for the government, donors and the industry, and private teaching opportunities.  
28 Wohlgemuth (1998) even argues that, as a rule, the university (in Africa) is a direct subordinate of the state, 
usually the minister of education. 
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3.5.2 Organizational change in higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Some research has been done on organizational change in HE in SSA, especially in South 
Africa. Studies on organizational change in South African HE are often centered around 
mergers of (formerly ‘white’ and ‘black’) HEIs, post-Apartheid issues, transformation and 
diversity management (including ethnic/tribal issues), which are less relevant for Zambia. In 
their article on global reform trends in higher education, Maassen & Cloete (2006) report 
about the inhibiting role of vested institutional interests in South Africa and the lack of an 
appropriate institutional infrastructure in Cameroon, which played a major role in the failure 
of their governments to implement HE reform policies. Bollag (2004) reports that in many 
HEIs in SSA, relentlessly expanding enrollments, coupled with decades of economic 
stagnation, poor pay and deplorable working conditions and have generated a sustained crisis 
in HE. But he also reports ‘things that work’ in university reforms at other HEIs in SSA29. 
University leaders stress the importance of finding and ‘owning’ its own solutions, together 
with long and deep consultations with stakeholders. Through consensus building, a 
supportive environment can be created for university reform (Ingalls, 1995; Saint, 1993). 
Other critical success factors include the development of strategic plans, dismissal of 
unnecessary staff, optimizing the use of (often scarce) resources, academic audits and 
curriculum review, outsourcing of non-academic services, strong leadership, devolution of 
management responsibilities to academic units, empowerment of deans, cost-sharing, 
entrepreneurship and a supportive government. Nevertheless, university reform in SSA is 
difficult and often challenged by striking staff and students (Bollag, 2004). Ingalls (1995) 
reports about university restructuring at the University of Botswana, which was supported by 
an external visiting committee. Typically, the committee found the VC sitting on too many 
committees and too involved in day-to-day activities, which resulted in an advice for 
delegation. Other recommendations deal with a new organizational structure, job descriptions 
and a system for performance appraisal. Important lessons from this change process include 
the importance of ownership, leadership and consensus building (Ingalls, 1995).  
 
At CBU, three organizational changes have been discussed extensively during the last few 
years: Decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation. 
Therefore, I will now introduce theoretical insights about these areas in SSA.  
                                                          
29 In Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Lesotho, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Senegal, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and several 
other SSA countries.  
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Decentralization 
Experiences with decentralization in HEIs in SSA are little researched, perhaps because HEIs  
are (like many public institutions in SSA) often highly centralized and reluctant to 
decentralize (Blunt, 1997; Fashoyin, 2005). Naidoo (2002) explains that attempts to 
dismantle centralized education bureaucracies in six SSA countries30 have produced mixed 
results. Devolution of power to lower levels of government and democratization seems to be 
more rhetoric than reality; core education decisions are hardly ever decentralized as a way to 
encourage local participation in decision-making. Some centralized systems are merely 
transformed into systems of ‘supervised or centralized decentralization’ in which the central 
government is omnipresent and has the final authority on important issues as well as day-to-
day administration (Naidoo, 2002). Ndegwa (2002) has conducted a stocktaking survey on 
decentralization in thirty SSA countries and his analysis reveals the continued dominance by 
central government, who appear to be decentralizing but consolidate their power in reality 
(Smoke, 2003). A frequent problem is that decision-making powers are often not 
accompanied by financial management powers (Cabral, 2011). Conyers (2007) argues that 
decentralization in SSA is hampered by a number of factors: 1) Inadequate devolution of 
power, particularly over finance and staff; 2) Vague and inappropriate systems and 
procedures; 3) Inadequately qualified, underpaid and unmotivated staff; 4) Political 
interference, corruption and abuse of power; 5) Lack of accountability (Conyers, 2007).  It 
remains to be discovered whether these factors also apply at CBU in Zambia.  
 
Performance management 
The use of formal performance appraisal systems is not a common practice in HEIs in SSA 
(Beugré & Offodile, 2001; Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999), but some theoretical 
insights have been provided. Beugré & Offodile (2001) argue that managers tend to appraise 
the subordinate’s performance based on non-job related criteria, such as ethnicity, tribalism 
and psychological distance. They also argue that nepotism and favoritism may render the 
existence of performance appraisal useless (Beugré & Offodile, 2001). In an authoritarian 
setting, an appraisal system is unavoidably one-sided (Waiguchu et al., 1999). Performance 
appraisal is often largely based on compliance rather than productivity (Thairu, 1999). The 
lack of job descriptions often contribute to a little developed job orientation, in which people 
just report for work. Reward systems are often inadequate (or only exist for junior staff) and 
                                                          
30 Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  
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generate more controversy, conflict, dissatisfaction and low morale than any other issue, 
mainly because of the unclear relationship between performance and reward (Ugwuegbu, 
2001).  
 
Strategic planning 
Sawyerr (2004) notes that university strategic plans have become popular in HEIs in SSA 
since the turn of the millennium, although they have produced mixed results. Many of these 
strategic plans consist of rather grand vision and mission statements and what accounts to a 
wish list of desirable activities and outcomes. In most instances, there is little relation to 
realistic estimates of available resources and delivery capacities (Sawyerr, 2004). Political 
and social pressures (to increase enrolment), limited resources and uncertainty about their 
availability lead to desperate coping strategies which culminate in systematic ‘short-termism’ 
in management (Sawyerr, 2004). The enormity of their problems, the magnitude of their 
needs, lack of experience and the difficult context in which they operate provide major 
challenges (Hayward, 2008). As a result, very few African organizations are successful in 
strategic planning (Waiguchu et al., 1999).  
 
 
3.6 Reflection on theoretical insights  
 
By providing these theoretical insights altogether, I describe a broad theoretical context that 
leaves room for further exploration and discovery in the empirical chapters. There is a lot to 
be explored, which is not (yet) properly researched or described. For instance: How do 
different staff members at CBU look at the university? How is the organization being 
perceived? What does organizational change mean to them? How have organizational 
changes in the recent past been perceived and interpreted? How have leadership and 
management roles been perceived in these change processes? How do they perceive their 
own role in organizational change? How would they like things to be, with regards to 
decentralization, performance management and strategic planning and implementation? What 
are their ideas, assumptions, convictions, and expectations towards organizational change? In 
fact, very little is known about mental models of the staff on organizational change in SSA. A 
relevant (unpublished) article is from Jackson called ‘Managers’ perceptions of organization 
in Africa: evidence from South Africa and Zimbabwe’. However, this article does not focus 
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on organizational change and it is based on quantitative research in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. There is only nascent theory available that deals with the questions raised above, 
indicating that there is some sort of theory gap. My empirical research aims to contribute to 
theory development in this area.  
 
The theoretical insights provided in this chapter are relevant and interesting, and good to keep 
in mind throughout the research. Eventually, they will be used as reference materials for 
discussing the dominant mental models that emerge from the empirical chapters. It is my 
intention to contribute to theory development about organizational change in SSA, so during 
data collection and data analysis, I will be searching for the discovery of new and different 
insights (emerging from the data) that provide added value to already existing theory about 
organizational change in SSA.  
 
Before I started data collection, I have read several other theoretical insights related to 
leadership, management and organizational change in SSA. For instance, the first 
publications about management in Africa have been provided by Leonard (1987) and 
Montgomery (1987). Some researchers have written about leadership in SSA, such as Blunt 
& Jones (1997), Littrell & Ramburuth (2007), Nkomo (2006), and Kuada (2010). Others have 
provided insights about HRM in SSA, such as Gbadamosi (2003), Arthur et al (1995), 
Kamoche (1997, 2002; 2004), Nyambegera (2002) and Jackson (2002). Some have written 
about Ubuntu, such as Mbigi (1997), Mangaliso & Damane (2001) and Van den Heuvel 
(2008). There are several other theoretical insights that will be discussed in the next chapter 
on the research setting. Other theoretical insights may be found during the process of data 
collection and data analysis. Such insights will be used as reference materials for the 
empirical findings in the final chapter of this thesis (discussion & conclusions, chapter 11).  
 
Before continuing to the next chapter, I wish to emphasize that my research has been a 
learning process during several years (2010 – 2015). I started by writing a research proposal 
(in 2010), for which I had to dive into the relevant literature. I was not familiar with the 
literature on organizational change, higher education and culture in SSA, and I was even less 
familiar with research methodologies, research methods and research designs, so this has 
taken considerable time. I also had to distance myself from my consultancy work in 
development, which used to be quite practical (not academic). In fact, I was more 
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experienced in professional consulting than in doing academic research. These start-up 
activities helped me to prepare for doing research in Zambia, and indicate that I did not start 
this study blank or unbiased, but with an open attitude towards the situation at CBU in 
Zambia.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Research setting 
 
In qualitative research, especially in grounded theory, it is important to describe the case 
study in its specific context. This is important in order to be able to understand social 
phenomena within the context of the participants' perspectives and experiences (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Merriam, 2002). Also the management literature on 
organizational change highlights the relevance and importance of context in which the 
changes under study take place (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001). Since my case 
study is located in the relatively unknown country of Zambia, I provide a description of the 
region and the country in detail. This allows the reader to understand the ins and outs of its 
context and culture, and it will help to better understand the research findings.  
 
In this chapter I will first briefly introduce the reader to the SSA region and Zambia 
(paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2), including descriptions of Zambian history, its population and 
culture, the colonial era, Zambian politics and the role of the state, the Zambian economy, 
and Zambia’s development in terms of the Millennium Development Goals. Paragraph 4.3 is 
about the HE sector in Zambia, followed by a description of CBU (paragraph 4.4). In 
paragraph 4.5 I will describe and explain foreign development projects at CBU, including 
projects funded by the Dutch government. Paragraph 4.6 is dedicated to organizational 
changes at CBU, followed by some concluding remarks (paragraph 4.7).  
 
 
4.1 Introduction to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Zambia is located in the South East Africa, as part of the much larger Sub-Saharan African 
region. South East Africa is an area where a concentration of least developed countries 
(LDCs) can be found, which are all facing enormous problems in terms of poverty, food 
insecurity, diseases, political instability and environmental decline (Hopper, 2012). Not 
surprisingly, most development donors and agencies focus their activities on this part of 
Africa. At the same time, however, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is well-known for its natural 
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beauty and its vast diversity in ethnicity, religion, language and customs (Littrell & 
Ramburuth, 2007). Although SSA does not have a good reputation in terms of socio-political 
development, the region is increasingly booming in business. Africa is the world’s second-
fastest growing economic region (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). As such, SSA is a region 
of contrasts in many ways, not only between countries but also within countries.  
 
Higher education in SSA 
The higher education sector in SSA faces unprecedented challenges (Teferra & Altbach, 
2004). Enrollment rates in higher education in SSA are by far the lowest in the world. 
Enrollment rate growth has been slow in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the absolute gap by which 
it lags behind other regions has increased rapidly (Bloom et al., 2005). The output of 
academic research in Africa also remains weak (Atuahene, 2011). The international 
development community has encouraged African governments’ relative neglect of higher 
education. The World Bank, which exercises significant influence over developing country 
governments, has long believed that primary and secondary schooling are more important 
than tertiary education for economic development. In recent years, the World Bank and major 
donor governments have conceded that tertiary schooling may have a positive impact on 
economic development after all (Bloom et al., 2005).  
 
 
4.2  Introduction to Zambia 
 
Zambia is the forgotten country of Africa. Celebrities don’t go there, nor, it seems, do foreign 
journalists or world leaders. This is a pity, because Zambia is both a beautiful and interesting 
country (Grant, 2009). The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country that derived its name 
from the Zambezi river which flows through the country. The Zambezi forms a natural 
riverine boundary with Zimbabwe. Its neighboring countries are the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the North, Tanzania to the North-East, Malawi to the East, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to the South, and Angola to the West. The capitol city is 
Lusaka, located in the South-Central part of the country. For Dutch standards, Zambia is a 
very big country, with an area of more than 750.000 square km, which is almost twenty times 
bigger than the Netherlands.  
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Zambian history 
Until around 200 AD, the area was inhabited by Khoisan hunter-gatherers. The region which 
compromises modern Zambia was colonized during the Bantu expansion of the 13th century 
(Akande, 2009). Among them, the Tonga people were the first to settle in Zambia and are 
believed to have come from the east near the ‘big sea’. The Nkova people also arrived early 
in the expansion, coming from the Luba-Lunda kingdoms located in the Southern parts of the 
modern Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Angola, followed by a much larger 
influx, especially between the last 12th and early 13th centuries. At the end of the 18th century 
some of the Mbunda migrated to Barotseland, Mongu, upon the migration of among others, 
the Civengele and the Aluyi. In the early 19th century, the Nsokolo people settled in the 
Mbale district of the Northern Province. During the 19th century, the Ngoni and Sotho 
peoples arrived from the South. By the late 19th century, most of the various peoples of 
Zambia were established in the areas they currently occupy31.  
 
                                                          
31 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zambia.  
Zambia is located in the Southern center of Africa (from www.lib.utexas.edu). My research has been 
done at Copperbelt University in Kitwe, near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo.   
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Zambian population and culture 
The population size was estimated at around 14 million people in 201232, concentrated 
mainly around Lusaka in the South and the Copperbelt province to the North-West. Zambia is 
one of the most highly urbanized countries in SSA (Musambachime, 2005). Almost 90% of 
Zambians belong to the nine main ethno-linguistic groups: the Nyanja-Chewa, Bemba, 
Tonga, Tumbuka, Lunda, Luvale, Kaonde, Nkoya and Lozi. Altogether, there are some 73 
ethno-linguistic groups in Zambia (Taylor, 2006). In the rural areas, each ethnic group is 
concentrated in a particular geographic region of the country and many groups are very small 
and not well-known. However, all the ethnic groups can be found in significant numbers in 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt. Tribalism in Zambia is not very strong if one compares with, for 
instance, Kenya, Ethiopia or South Africa. Politics in Zambia is, however, slowly becoming 
more ethnic (Hulterstrom, 2007). This is relevant and interesting for my research, since some 
informants have argued that ethnicity is becoming more important in the recruitment and 
selection and appointment of a new VC or DVC at CBU.  
 
If a ‘Zambian culture’ exists, it is often typified as largely collectivistic, among many other 
SSA countries (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001; 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). The traditional Zambian culture promotes the 
culture of respect, harmony and emphasizes people, human relationships and the family. 
Zambian communities apply the rule of allegiance and hostility to control the families and 
clans. Relationships with family and friends (in-groups) are almost sacred, and prescribe the 
need for smooth and pleasant social interactions (Akande, 2009). Conflicts are avoided or 
mediated in such a way that the relationship is not damaged or endangered. Zambians tend to 
apply different value standards to members of their in-groups and see members of out-groups 
as very different from themselves. Prestige and authority are accorded to elders and the 
deference and respect shown to the aged (Akande, 2009). Traditional culture has undergone 
many changes since the colonial period. As the Zambian writer Mwizenge Tembo puts it:  
 
Zambian traditional customs were challenged, the impact of Westernization and 
urbanization was incremental in weakening or destroying many aspects of 
traditional Zambian cultures. Most of us do not live in the traditional tribal villages 
anymore. The most serious challenge is a deep inferiority complex that we inherited 
                                                          
32 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx.  
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from the colonial days. We are constantly made to feel that our traditional cultures 
are primitive and inferior, shameful or useless. (Tembo, 2012) 
 
Culture in Zambia (as in other SSA countries) differs strongly when comparing urban with 
rural areas. Urban areas are relatively modern, with more industrial activity, banks and formal 
institutions, whereas rural areas are more traditional and can be characterized by chieftaincy 
and councils of elders, an agrarian form of living, lineage-based inheritance, ethnic identities 
and informal institutions (Zoogah, Peng & Woldu, 2015). Culture change in Zambia has to be 
understood in a context of globalization, neo-liberalism, democratization, modernization, 
urbanization and technological innovation. Tembo (2012) argues that there is a need to 
reclaim traditional culture and to create a meaningful sense of social identity. The need for a 
new meaningful social identity was also acknowledged by a group of young, educated 
cosmopolitan elites in the late 1990s, who initiated an online magazine (‘Chrysalis’). The 
group was inspired by the African renaissance in South Africa, and fed up with the ‘old 
African chief culture mentality’ and ‘old-style attributions of external blame’ that foster 
corruption and mismanagement (Ferguson, 2003). Due to economic disillusionment over the 
continuing crisis, ongoing corruption and the emigration of large numbers of Zambia’s 
educated middle-class, the magazine unfortunately ceased to exist in 1999.  
 
Zambia under colonial rule 
After visits by European explorers in the 18th century, Zambia became the British 
protectorate of Northern Rhodesia until the 1960s. For most of the colonial period, the 
country was governed by an administration appointed from London with the advice of the 
British South Africa Company. The British considered Northern Rhodesia as an ‘extractive 
colony’ (du Plessis, 2006), solely aimed at the extraction and export of copper, not the 
development of society through participatory and economic institutions. Colonialism has 
disrupted social continuity radically, assaulted cultural identity and transformed the social 
order in Zambia. Indigenous institutions collapsed and were replaced by the rule of British 
law, which has had devastating effects on the Zambian society (Chanock, 1985). The 
Northern Rhodesian colonial system as it developed in the first half of the 20th century, was 
oriented towards South Africa, and had continuing consequences for Zambia after 
independence, in terms of national politics and the economy. African protest against colonial 
rule began in the 1940s, and shaped the nationalist movement which emerged to oppose and 
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eventually overthrow it (Tordoff, 1974). On 24 October 1964, the country became 
independent of the United Kingdom and then Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda became the 
inaugural president. 
 
Zambian politics 
Kaunda's socialist United National Independence Party (UNIP) maintained power from 1964 
until 1991. From 1972 to 1991 Zambia was a single-party state with the UNIP as the sole-
legal political party, with the goal of uniting the nation under the banner of 'One Zambia, One 
Nation'. Nowadays, Zambian politics take place in a framework of a presidential 
representative democratic republic, whereby the president is both head of state and head of 
government in a pluralist multi-party system (Mthembu-Salter, 2010). Kaunda was succeeded 
by Frederick Chiluba of the social-democratic Movement for Multi-party Democracy in 
1991, during which the country saw a rise in social-economic growth and increased 
decentralization of government. Chiluba selected Levy Mwanawasa as his successor; 
Mwanawasa presided over the country from January 2002 until his death in August 2008, and 
is credited with initiating a campaign to reduce corruption and increase the standard of living. 
After Mwanawasa's death, Rupiah Banda presided as Acting President before being elected 
president in 2008. He is the shortest serving president, having held office for only three years. 
Patriotic Front party leader, Michael Chilufya Sata defeated Banda in the 2011 elections; he 
became Zambia’s president until he died in November 2014. Zambia is considered as a role 
model for SSA, but the development towards a truly functional and deep democracy is 
constrained by the disastrous economy and the legacy from the old regime, in terms 
personalism, corruption, weak state apparatus and administration (Wischmann, 2007).  
 
The role of the state 
Like in many neighboring countries, Zambia has been no exception to the problems of an 
unaccountable and unresponsive government until long after colonialism. Revelations of 
rampant corruption, tribalism, presidentialism, administrative inefficiency and general 
institutional ineffectiveness have been the steady companions of government and the public 
sector in the post-colonial era for a long time (Lungu, 1983). For a long time, the ideal of a 
democratically controlled administration through established institutions has been seriously 
undermined by presidentialism:  
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The president is the government. His responsibility for it is entire and undivided. 
The executive power is vested in him alone, and in the exercise of it he is bound by 
no one else’s advice. With him lies the ultimate responsibility for policy. (Nwabueze 
& De Smith, 1973) 
 
Decentralization programs initiated by the central government have been implemented since 
the late 1970’s. President Kaunda advocated decentralization in Zambia as a means of 
achieving ‘unity based on a frank and positive acceptance of the diversity of our peoples’ 
(Conyers, 1983). Decentralization resulted in devolution of power from the central 
government to legal bodies composed of a mixture of locally elected and centrally appointed 
representatives. The legal body to which powers are devolved cannot be described as 
autonomous and depend heavily on government funds (Conyers, 1983).  
 
State governance in Zambian society is generally weak, and can be characterized by 
significant shortfalls in institutional capacity, weak reporting and accountability, and 
pervasive political interference. Haglund (2008) describes these issues clearly in relation to 
regulatory bodies in the Zambian mining sector. A shortage of qualified and skilled personnel 
and chronic underfunding contribute to a weak institutional capacity of regulatory bodies. 
Government regulators prefer to consider their role as enabling agents for investment, 
conflict solvers and brokers, not necessarily as regulators. Together with a lack of common 
standards and reporting formats, accountability is usually not very strong. Centralized 
decision-making within government, combined with personal interventionism by Zambian 
presidents, who maintain direct links with the private sector, further undermine the 
effectiveness of already weak regulatory institutions (Haglund, 2008). These insights are 
relevant and interesting for my research, since several informants at CBU have argued that 
such governance issues at the national level usually trickle down to the local level of CBU, 
where such practices are copied and become the accepted norm.  
 
Zambian economy 
The economy of Zambia has always relied heavily on its natural resources, especially copper. 
Copper is the main source of income, contributing up to 90 per cent of foreign earnings of the 
country. The big profits, however, go to the foreign companies who exploit the mines. The 
role of the multinational corporations who run the mines is disputed due to tax evasion, the 
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environmental effects of their (at times illegal) operations, ignorance of the needs of the 
workforce, deepening pensioner poverty, lack of linkages to local businesses, and the failure 
to protect the social infrastructure (Fraser & Lungu, 2007). Other national sources of income 
are other metals (nickel, uranium and tin), agriculture and tourism.  
 
Zambia’s post-independence economic policies have followed two clearly distinct 
development paths. The first covering the period 1964 – 1991, was Kaunda’s socialist 
development strategy, which involved extensive nationalization of key industries, notably the 
mining sector. Although the government inherited a strong mono-product copper mining 
economy at independence, poor management and the inefficiencies of one-party rule soon led 
to deterioration of the economy over the next three decades. During the collapse of the copper 
prices in the 1970s and 1980s, Kaunda embarked on economic reform policies that generally 
failed to address the embedded structural weaknesses and poverty levels (Fashoyin, 2008).   
 
After nearly three decades of one-party state-controlled economy, the government of Zambia 
embarked on fundamental economic and political reforms. President Chiluba began with the 
intensification of a market-oriented economy, a structural adjustment program which focused 
on improving efficiency in both public and private sectors, with privatization as the 
cornerstone of policy. President Levy Mwanawasa placed less emphasis on privatization, 
since he acknowledged the disruptive effects on society. Instead, he opted for 
commercialization of enterprises that were considered strategic to the country’s development, 
particularly state-owned banks and energy companies. And he outlined a governance policy 
in order to create a favorable investment climate, including an anti-corruption agenda, 
targeted at influential people including the former president Chiluba (Fashoyin, 2008). Under 
the short rule of president Sata, Zambia has had a period of rapid economic growth. A 
combination of prudent macroeconomic management, market liberalization and privatization 
efforts, investments in the copper industry and related infrastructure, and steep increase in 
copper prices helped achieve an average annual growth of about 5.7%. In 2010, the World 
Bank named Zambia one of the world's fastest economically reformed countries. Zambia is 
now considered as a lower middle income country33.  
 
                                                          
33 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview.  
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Zambia’s economic growth has not translated into significant poverty reduction. In 2013, 
sixty percent of the population lived below the poverty line and 42% were considered to be in 
extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor has increased from about six million 
in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily due to population growth. Despite these high 
poverty rates, Zambia has managed to avoid violent political conflict. Social stability has 
engendered institutional development, while pervasive poverty continues to undermine the 
effectiveness of these institutions (Haglund, 2008).  
 
 
Zambia and the Millennium Development Goals 
Over the last decade, human development has been strengthened by national and international 
commitments to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals are 
essentially an agenda for targeted improvements in the core areas of human development, to 
be knowledgeable, to have access to essential resources and social services, to acquire a 
decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community. It is 
interesting to see how Zambia is performing with regards to the (eight) MDGs that were set 
by the UN in 2000. The information below originates from the Zambia Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2011). 
 
Concerning the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (MDG 1), Zambia achieved a 
modest reduction in extreme poverty of 7.5 percent between 1991 and 2006. Zambia needs to 
reduce the proportion of people who live in extreme poverty by 21.5 percent between 2006 
This picture shows a poor man 
trying to sell some yam, 
peanuts and oranges. A normal 
everyday phenomenon 
anywhere in Zambia (E. dan 
Hartog, 2008). 
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and 2015. By contrast, good progress has been made in reducing the national proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger; only a reduction of two percent is required to achieve the 
2015 target. 
 
In terms of achieving universal primary education (MDG 2), good progress was made 
towards the attainment of this goal. The number of pupils reaching grade seven grew steadily 
over the years, and the targets have been achieved. Adult literacy rates, however, declined 
between 1990 and 2004; no data are available to determine recent trends. Remaining 
challenges include the poor quality of education, and the loss of human capital, teachers in 
particular, due to HIV and AIDS. 
 
As far as promoting gender equality and empowering women is concerned (MDG 3), the 
results are mixed. Between 2005 and 2009, the ratio of girls to boys in primary school was 
fairly stable, at a level close to the target ratio of one to one. But the ratio of girls to boys in 
secondary school has undergone a notable decline. Important achievements include the 
adoption of the Gender-based Violence Act, a modest increase in the number of women with 
titles to land, and an increasing (albeit modest) proportion of women in leadership positions. 
The proportion of girls in tertiary education has increased, although with marked fluctuations. 
In terms of political representation, the country is far from reaching the Southern African 
Development Community standard of a minimum of 30 percent for women. 
 
Regarding the three MDGs that relate to health issues, there has been a sharp drop in infant 
mortality and under-five mortality rate, but still far from the target (MDG 4). Improved 
immunization between 1992 and 1996 appears to explain some of the decline in mortality 
rates. Progress in this area has remained stagnant at 84 percent of all one-year-old children 
since 2002. Concerning maternal health (MDG 5), there has been a reduction in the level of 
maternal mortality from 729 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2002 to 591 deaths per 100,000 
live births in 2007. The target is to reduce the maternal mortality ratio to 429 deaths per 
100,000 live births by 2015. For HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases (MDG 6), the 
targets seem to have been achieved. With the recorded decline in the prevalence of HIV, from 
16 percent in 2002 to 14.3 percent in 2007, the target of keeping prevalence under 16 percent 
has already been achieved. HIV incidence is estimated at 1.6 percent or 82,000 new 
infections annually (Government of the Republic of Zambia 2009). New malaria cases, which 
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had increased from 255 per 1,000 in 1990 to 412 per 1,000 in 2006, declined to 252 per 1,000 
in 2008. This is in line with the target of 255 by 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning environmental sustainability (MDG 7), it is required that Zambia integrates the 
principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs, and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources. Assessing performance on reversals is difficult because of 
the absence of reliable data. Available data show that the area covered by forests has declined 
from 59 percent in 1996 to 38 percent in 2010, while the population using solid fuels 
increased from 86 percent in 1990 to 88 percent in 2007. The consumption of ozone depleting 
products declined from 95.57 tons in 1996 to 43 tons in 2004, but a lack of data since 2005 
makes it difficult to assess recent trends. The proportion of Zambia’s population without 
access to improved water sources declined from 53 percent in 1996 to 43 percent in 1998, but 
has stagnated at around 40 percent in recent years. The percentage of the population without 
access to improved sanitation has increased since 1991, when it was at 26 percent, although it 
seems to have stagnated at around 36 percent since 1998. Contributing to this poor 
performance is the lack of overall investment in water supply and sanitation. 
 
Regarding the last MDG (# 8: develop a global partnership for global development), Zambia 
is doing very well. Official development assistance (ODA) increased from US $754 million 
in 2002 to US $918 million in 2009, and the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and 
Multilateral Debt Relief (MDR) initiatives reduced Zambia’s debt-servicing obligations. 
HIV/AIDS has been a huge 
problem for CBU until 
retroviral medicine 
became available for the 
staff and their families (E. 
Maassen, 2012).  
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External public debt dropped from US $6 billion in 1999 to US $934 million in 2006, but 
subsequently increased to US $1.5 billion in 2009. In 2010, Zambia was considered the sixth 
best country in Africa for doing business. Significant foreign direct investments have flowed 
in (UNDP, 2011). 
 
 
4.3 The Higher education sector in Zambia 
 
In Zambia, the education sector is governed by two different ministries: basically, all 
education institutions fall under the Ministry of Education (MoE), with the exception of 
higher vocational, technical and entrepreneurial education institutions (the so-called TEVET 
sector). TEVET institutions are governed by the Ministry of Science, Technology & 
Vocational Training (MSTVT). For some time, universities were also governed by MSTVT. 
Universities operate under the rules and regulations of the University Act (1999), which 
affords the minister sweeping powers, including the ability to bypass the university council 
and/or senate at will (Lulat, 2004). Despite vigorous opposition and legal action, the 
university community could not prevent it (Ng'ethe, Subotzky, & Afeti, 2008). The minister 
also appoints the vice-chancellor (which was previously done by the university council). This 
act has been replaced by a new one in 2013. This new Act also provides for the establishment 
of a Higher Education Authority (HEA), an advisory body of the minister of education 
concerning all higher education (MoE, 2013).  
 
The education sector has undergone significant reforms since 1995, under the Public Service 
Reform Program. In 2003, the MoE developed the Five Year Education Sector Plan in which 
goals are defined to increase access and equity, improve quality, financial management, 
administration and address HIV/AIDS (Nuffic, 2005). UNZA and CBU have experienced 
severe under-funding since the 1970s. This has led to overcrowding, dilapidation in 
infrastructure, high student lecturer ratios, lack of expansion in facilities, high levels of 
indebtedness, inadequate education materials and ICT. These low levels of funding to public 
universities have, over the years meant that the monthly grant received is solely used to cover 
recurrent expenditure, leaving no surplus for capital investment, staff development or 
research. Some of the major challenges facing the universities are: lack of curriculum 
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responsiveness and relevance to individual, community and national needs; and expansion of 
the facilities to increase equitable education to a greater number of students (Norad, 2007).  
 
There are several other policies that concern the (higher) education sector, such as the 
National Plan for Education (Educating our Future, since 1996), the National Implementation 
Framework (2008 - 2010) and the National Policy on Science & Technology (1996). All 
these policies operate under the Vision 2030 and the Fifth National Development Plan 
(NDP). According to the NDP, HEIs have an important contribution to make to national 
development of the country.  
 
Since 2008, Zambia has three public universities: the University of Zambia (UNZA), 
Copperbelt University (CBU) and Mulungushi University (MU). UNZA has been the only 
university in the country for a long time, from its inception in 1966 until 1987, when CBU 
was established. MU was established in 2008. In addition, at least five private universities 
have opened in Zambia since 2006. The public universities are facing similar challenges: 
increasing access demands, funding constraints, inadequately trained lecturers and research 
personnel, the use of ICT, local demands and economic imperatives (Nuffic, 2005, 2009). On 
top of this, Wamundila & Ngulube (2011) describe the challenges of knowledge retention at 
UNZA, and argue that:  
 
Without significant attention being paid to the retention, motivation and commitment 
of critical staff in the university, quality in the core functions of the university would 
be in jeopardy. (Wamundila & Ngulube, 2011) 
 
The research capacity at Zambian HEIs is underdeveloped and as a consequence, research 
output (both policy- and academic research) is low (Sikwibele, 2007). Any faculty member 
who can find a position at a university outside the country will most likely leave, as many 
have already done (Lulat, 2004). Lulat also describes the symptom of low faculty morale, due 
to low salaries, chronic underfunding of the university, heavy teaching loads, inefficient and 
corrupt administration34, and the feeling that the university is slowly being turned into a 
government department with all the negative implications that it entails (Lulat, 2004). 
                                                          
34 Top-level administrators have been accused of siphoning off or misspending thousands of dollars (Lulat, 
2004).  
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Altogether, one can say that the overall situation in the higher education sector in SSA and 
particularly in Zambia, is very challenging. 
 
 
4.4 Copperbelt University in Zambia 
 
CBU is located in Kitwe, in the heart of the Copperbelt region of Zambia, which is known for 
its copper mines. Due to heavy mining activities in the Copperbelt, the area is certainly not 
the most beautiful part of Zambia. When one enters the town of Kitwe from Ndola, a huge 
mountain of mining dirt (black sand and dust) appears in the middle of the town, with people 
living all around it (see the picture below). Although Kitwe is located in the heart of the 
copper mining region, Kitwe is a provincial country town, somewhat detached from the 
industrial activity around it. Kitwe and its inhabitants display a mix of rural (traditional, 
informal) and urban (modern, formal) cultural features, which, as we will see, can also be 
observed at CBU. 
 
  
Open pit mines and underground mines are everywhere around Kitwe, including adjacent 
industries and acid plants for concentrating, smelting and refining copper. From the air, some 
parts of the Copperbelt region resemble an industrial moon landscape.  
 
CBU has been established as a public university in 1987. Before then, the institution was a 
regional branch of UNZA in Ndola. In 1987 this regional branch of UNZA was reconstituted 
This picture shows the mountain of 
mining dirt in the middle of the town of 
Kitwe (E. den Hartog, 2008).  
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as CBU in Kitwe, and integrated the Zambian Institute of Technology (ZIT). In 2013, CBU 
consisted of the following schools: 
 
- School of engineering35 
- School of mines and mineral sciences  
- School of natural resources 
- School of mathematics & natural sciences  
- School of built environment 
- School of business 
- School of medicine 
- School of graduate studies  
 
 
CBU has embarked on the road to expansion. The number of schools has grown from four to 
eight schools in less than 10 years’ time. In addition, CBU has created a Directorate of 
Distance Education and Open Learning (DDEOL) in 2009, the Dag Hammarskjold Institute 
of Peace Studies in 2011 and the Centre for Academic Development in 2012 (CBU, 2010a).  
 
                                                          
35 The school of engineering and the school of mines and mineral sciences were created by splitting up the 
former school of technology in 2010.  
This picture shows the main 
entrance road of campus, 
surrounded by green fields 
and with several typical 
university buildings in the 
background (E. den Hartog, 
2006). 
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University staff  
Due to expansion, the numbers of academic and administrative staff have increased 
substantially over the years. The number of academics has grown faster than the number of 
non-academics. Whereas the academic : non-academic ratio was 1 : 2.6 in 2008, it became 1 : 
1.9 by 2013. It should be noted that non-academics include gardeners, sweepers, guards and 
other low level workers (of which there are many at CBU). When they are left out, the ratio is 
(much) more balanced.  
 
CBU Staff numbers 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Academic 305 270 240 223 198 163 
Non-academic 581 558 512 509 452 427 
Total 886 828 752 732 650 590 
Table 4.1: Staff numbers in recent years (deputy registry CBU, 2014). 
 
The number of professors and PhD holders is also on the rise. In 2009, there were only 6 full 
professors and 24 PhD holders. In 2012, there were 11 full professors and 43 PhD holders. 
CBU employs many more men than women, especially in the academic ranks (only 20% of 
the academics are female). Men are also much better represented in the higher ranks of the 
university (Nuffic, 2010). There are many different ethno-linguistic groups in Zambia (see 
paragraph 4.2), and CBU employs people from nearly all of them. However, ethno-linguistic 
groups have mixed a lot among each other, so many people do not exclusively belong to one 
of them.  
 
This picture shows the new 
building of the school of business 
(E. Maassen, 2013). 
121 
 
Management structure 
The organizational structure of CBU is very hierarchical, as is shown in the figure below. The 
chancellor is of CBU is usually not present on campus, nor is he involved in daily university 
matters. The chancellor is a symbolic figure who comes to CBU on graduation days and other 
ceremonial occasions. The university council at CBU is the legal body representing the 
university. As Conyers (1983) already outlined earlier, some council members are appointed 
by the central government, while others are locally elected.  
 
 
The organigram suggests that top management has no direct access to the schools but through 
Senate (and vice versa), however, in reality this is not the case. The number of institutional 
committees (both for the council and the senate) is striking, which involve large numbers of 
staff and require a lot of time for preparation, discussion and follow-up. According to the 
academic calendar 2010 – 2012 (CBU, 2010a), Principal Officers (PO’s) have a seat in 
almost all these committees. In daily life, the VC is ultimately held responsible for the well-
being of the entire university. According to the University Act (but also supported by 
examples from Zambian history and ascription by CBU employees), the VC has a lot of 
power; he can make a lot of decisions on his own. The DVC is the second-most important 
person in the university, but clearly under the leadership of the VC. The DVC replaces the 
VC when absent, and has a general top management position. The registrar has key 
administrative functions at CBU with many administrative responsibilities. The bursar is the 
financial top manager whose role it is to manage irregular and insufficient funds in such a 
way that the university can proceed and salaries can be paid, compliant with government 
regulations. The VC, the DVC, the registrar and the bursar represent the executive committee 
This picture shows two 
principal officers at CBU, the 
registrar (left, †) and the bursar 
(E. Maassen, 2012).  
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at CBU. Top management further comprises of the dean of students and the librarian. In 
2013, CBU had four deputy registries for council affairs, academic affairs, planning36 and 
HRM. In 2014, a fifth one has been installed in order to deal with the growing workloads of 
the registry.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Organizational structure of CBU (CBU, 2009a; Nuffic, 2010).  
 
Schools are led by deans, who are elected by the staff of the school for a period of four years. 
Academic departments are led by heads of departments (HoDs), who operate on a rotational 
basis for two years. Due to the elective system, a dean is basically accountable to his 
electorate, not to top management. When the staff of the school is satisfied about the dean’s 
performance, (s)he can be re-elected for one more term37. Academic affairs in the schools are 
discussed in the boards of studies meeting, where all staff members can participate. The 
boards of studies (from all the schools) submit their academic issues (such as exams, grades) 
to the Senate, which is the highest academic decision-making body at CBU.  
                                                          
36 The deputy registrar for planning formally operates under the office of the VC.  
37 The elective system for deans is being replaced by appointed deans.  
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CBU is a so-called grant-aided public institution, which relies almost exclusively on 
government grants. CBU experienced financial constraints, because budget submissions had 
not been adhered to (by the government) and funding was done on an ad-hoc basis. This has 
had an adverse impact on the institution’s ability to carry out its obligations (CBU, 2009b). In 
addition, student fees do not cover the cost of teaching & learning, which means that, due to 
the enormous growth in student numbers, the budget is even more under pressure. Student 
numbers at CBU have increased substantially, as is shown in the table below.  
 
Student numbers 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Enrolled students 10030 8978 8410 7253 6045 4825 
Table 4.2: Student numbers in recent years (deputy registry CBU, 2014). 
 
CBU tries to accommodate as many students as possible on campus, but their capacity is by 
far not enough to achieve this. Student hostels are quite run-down and students often share 
these basic facilities with more students than officially allowed.  
 
 
 
In six years’ time (2008 – 2013), student numbers have more than doubled. This has put the 
CBU budget, infrastructure and (especially academic) staff under great pressure. The 
expansion in terms of schools, staff and students is a good thing, considering the growing 
access demands, but at the same time, it imposes huge challenges on CBU in terms of 
education and research. As a result of low funding and other problems, CBU faces serious 
challenges. Some of these are summarized in a Nuffic tender document (2010): 
  
This picture shows a typical 
student hostel with laundry 
drying outside (E. Maassen, 
2012). 
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- Low curriculum responsiveness and relevance to individual, community and national 
needs; 
- Inadequate research and consultancy output relevant to current social and industrial 
problems; 
- Insufficient lecture rooms and teaching infrastructure; 
- Low interaction with different stakeholders such as the government, industry and society; 
- Expansion of ICT infrastructure for better connectivity and improved capacity to deliver 
distance education; 
- Low numbers of postgraduate programs (Nuffic, 2010).  
 
 
 
According to the ranking web of (African) universities, CBU appears at number 175 of 
African universities38, whereas UNZA appears at number 55. At another website39 of 100 top 
universities in Africa, CBU is not even mentioned, but UNZA appears at number 45. Despite 
all these difficulties and weaknesses, CBU is struggling forward. The new mission of the 
university is:  
 
To contribute to the development and sustenance of the well-being of the people of 
Zambia and the world (CBU, 2009b).  
 
Since 2010, the strategic vision of the university is:  
 
                                                          
38 http://www.webometrics.info/en/Ranking_africa.  
39 http://www.4icu.org/topAfrica.  
This picture shows a typical 
classroom at CBU (E. 
Maassen, 2013).  
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To be one of the most preferred oasis of knowledge and dynamic center of excellence 
in the provision of relevant and quality teaching and research and programs 
recognized amongst the best in Zambia, Africa and beyond. (Nuffic, 2010)  
 
In the new strategic plan (2014 – 2018), it is said that this vision has proved quite lofty and 
unachievable in the long run (CBU, 2014).  
 
 
4.5 Foreign development projects at CBU 
 
Linkages with foreign universities in SSA, Europe, US, India and Malaysia have helped the 
university in many ways. Over the years, CBU has received donor support from a number of 
European countries, the US, Japan and also from institutions like UNESCO, the World Bank 
and the Association of Commonwealth Universities (CBU, 2009b). The Netherlands have 
also supported post-secondary education in Zambia, both in the TEVET sector and in 
university education. Projects have been funded through Nuffic, the Netherlands organization 
for international cooperation in higher education.  
 
Nuffic projects  
The Dutch government supports higher education institutions in developing countries through 
special funding programs issued by the Ministry for Development Cooperation and 
administered by Nuffic. These programs focus on institutional strengthening and capacity 
building of HEIs in developing countries. Under the umbrella of these funding programs, 
specific projects are being set-up, implemented and evaluated with the professional support 
from (mainly) Dutch HEIs and other (sometimes private) organizations.   
 
Nuffic projects deal with institutional strengthening and capacity building in HEIs in 
developing countries,  and involve some sort of change, whether dealing with educational, 
technological or organizational issues. This is simply due to the nature of (Nuffic) projects: 
they always intend to ‘get certain things done’, according to an agreed and carefully planned 
scheme of project interventions and related budgets. Nuffic projects are demand-driven, in 
the sense that CBU outlines its needs and further develops the project in close collaboration 
with Nuffic.  
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Projects are always implemented in collaboration between the Dutch government 
(represented by Nuffic), the beneficiary HEI in the developing country and a service provider 
in the Netherlands. VU University (represented by the Centre for International Cooperation) 
has been the main service provider in three projects at CBU:  
 
- NPT/ZMB/157: Strengthening support systems at Zambian universities for finance, 
administration, management and ICT (Nuffic, 2005); 
- NPT/ZMB/303: Consolidating support systems at UNZA and CBU (Nuffic, 2009); 
- NICHE/ZMB/069: Capacity building for academic and research staff at CBU (Nuffic, 
2010). 
 
The first project (NPT/ZMB/157) supported (financially) the development of the 2009 – 2013 
strategic plan (Nuffic, 2009). The other two projects started later and have been implemented 
in line with the strategic objectives of the strategic plan. The NPT/ZMB/303 project can be 
considered as a continuation of the NPT/ZMB/157 project, as it was aimed at the further 
development, implementation and consolidation of the same administrative systems. One of 
the foci of the NPT/ZMB/303 project was to devolve decision-making power and the control 
over (financial) resources from central admin towards the schools and other units. The 
NICHE/ZMB/069 project was mainly set up as a means to strengthen education and research 
at CBU.  
 
 
4.6 Organizational change at CBU 
 
Annual reports (CBU, 2009a, 2010b), the CBU strategic plans (CBU, 2009b, 2014) and 
Nuffic tender documents (Nuffic, 2005, 2009, 2010) describe the expansion of CBU in terms 
of the number of schools, students and staff. But what organizational changes have occurred 
apart from this expansion? Since my research is about three organizational changes 
(decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation), I focus on 
the state of affairs and developments these three organizational changes, as they have been 
reported in the abovementioned documents.  
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4.6.1 Decentralization 
Decentralization has been a controversial topic at CBU since 2007, and caused frequent 
heated debates among management and staff. Deans and directors opted for decentralization, 
but top management has never been enthusiastic about it. Nevertheless, in the 2009 – 2013 
strategic plan, decentralization appears in two ways:  
 
1. Decentralize financial management to schools and units;  
2. Promote greater decentralization of decision-making in student admission and the 
management of research funds (CBU, 2009b).  
 
In the same year, decentralization is mentioned in the tender document for the NPT/ZMB/303 
project:  
 
Devolution of duties and authority especially in the finance and human resource 
areas was identified and the university is implementing these resolutions. (Nuffic, 
2009) 
 
According to this information, several things were changing in favor of decentralization 
towards the lower levels of management at CBU. Despite the good intentions, PO’s 
experienced difficulties with deans because they did not live up to their expectations. Several 
years earlier, a dean was given a budget and he spent it within three months – with no budget 
left for the remaining nine months of that year. Another dean had committed CBU to a 
contract where the school did not have budget for […]. Such experiences have not generated 
the necessary confidence of top management to decentralize, and urged for an incremental 
approach, accompanied by capacity building of deans and directors. Deans and directors were 
very much in favor of decentralization, and some of them showed their frustration because 
‘nothing is happening’. In 2010, three priority areas for decentralization were identified (see 
also chapter 1), and much to their own surprise, they found out that the ideas from top 
management about decentralizing HR and finance were not very different from the ideas of 
deans and directors. It was agreed that the management committee meetings (involving PO’s, 
deans and directors) had to be put back in place, since they had not taken place for some time. 
However, six months later it became clear that the management committee meetings had not 
taken place.  
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Also HoDs considered decentralization at the best way forward for CBU. They argued that 
top management didn’t share information which created suspicion and reinforced negative 
imaging. Priority setting at institutional level should be more in favor of the cores processes 
in the schools (top management bought expensive new vehicles instead of investing in 
teaching & learning facilities). Central admin was not aware of the existing resentment and 
distrust of HoDs towards top management and central admin. Top management stated that 
some centrally administered roles in finance and HR should be decentralized (CBU, 2010c). 
Decentralization continued to be a hot topic in subsequent years. Most staff members 
assessed CBU as highly centralized, indicated by bureaucracy and inefficiency, lack of power 
and ownership at the lower levels, and a lack of support for operations in the schools.  
 
4.6.2 Performance appraisal 
CBU never had a system for performance appraisal (PMS), except for junior workers. The 
lack of a PMS for assessing performance of both academic and administrative staff is 
mentioned as a major weakness in a tender document (NPT/ZMB 157) produced by Nuffic in 
collaboration with CBU (Nuffic, 2005). In a SWOT analysis carried out by CBU, non-
implementation of a PMS is also considered an institutional weakness (CBU, 2009b). As a 
result, PMS is incorporated in the 2009 – 2013 strategic plan. The strategic objectives were:  
 
1. Establishment of an effective academic and non-academic staff annual appraisal 
system;  
2. Establishment of suitable and transparent criteria for all categories of staff 
appointments.  
 
The need for improved accountability has been stressed in various documents produced by 
CBU and Nuffic, but the required structures were not in place; there were no frequent 
meetings between supervisors and subordinates, there was no appraisal system, no job 
descriptions, and management committee meetings were not taking place. CBU’s 
management resolutions (CBU, 2010c) stressed that job descriptions and a PMS should be in 
place. In the tender document for the NICHE/ZMB/069 project, it says that CBU is in the 
process of developing a staff appraisal system for optimum utilization of its human resources 
(Nuffic, 2010). In the minutes of evaluative management meetings in March and April 2013, 
it is stated that:  
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All deans, directors and HoDs were requested to complete the appraisal forms and 
submit them to the office of the VC by April 2013. The registrar would issue a 
roadmap for carrying out the evaluation of employees in their units. (CBU, 2013)  
 
A dean asked top management to visit the school to explain the implementation of the PMS, 
but that would not happen:  
 
The VC felt that there was no need for him or the registrar to do that as the deans in 
all schools were capable of doing that. The VC requested all deans to inform 
management for intervention where they faced problems. (CBU, 2013) 
 
Interestingly, the implementation of the PMS started not before 2013, and apparently, top 
management did not provide the requested support to the deans who asked for it. There are no 
monitoring reports that describe how performance appraisals have taken place, and how these 
appraisals have been perceived and interpreted by both superiors and their subordinates.  
 
4.6.3 Strategic planning & implementation 
The strategic plan 2009 – 2013 (CBU, 2009b) is well founded and situated amidst 
international and regional trends, national policies, and a review of previous strategic plans. It 
says that the experience of CBU has been that strategic plans were hardly implemented. 
Reasons for this include:  
 
- The dominant top-down approach prevented an alignment with the real day-to-day 
practices of the schools; the plans were not perceived as being helpful in addressing 
these practices; 
- The plans were never officially launched thereby setting the stage for operating in a 
new environment; 
- Funding from government was never in conformity with the activities in the plans.  
(CBU, 2009b). 
 
The first official strategic plan at CBU was made for the period 1998 – 2002, and followed 
the same objective as the 1997 ‘survival plan’: coping with budgetary obligations in the 
situation of reduced and delayed government funding in personnel emoluments, general and 
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capital expenditure (CBU, 2009b). The strategic plan for the period 2000 – 2004 was an 
adjustment of the first strategic plan. However, the plan was not implemented due to the 
continued decline in public funding without room for capital investment. This led to the 
adoption of the 2002 – 2007 ‘survival plan’ which focused on strategies for overcoming 
liquidity problems. Cost-saving measures were adopted and a new fee structure was 
implemented which enabled a smooth running of the university (CBU, 2009b).  
 
The new strategic plan for the period 2009 – 2013 had chosen a completely different 
approach. The theme of the five year strategic plan for the period 2009 – 2013 was: “Towards 
a culture of institutional accountability, academic excellence and stability” (CBU, 2009b). 
This strategic theme implicitly acknowledges deficiencies in institutional accountability, 
academic excellence and stability by the time of writing. The theme reflects the need to 
address a number of cultural attitudes and habits that have debilitated the institution in the 
past – in fact, a culture change is needed (CBU, 2009b). The strategic planning committee 
provided principles for implementation, criteria for priority setting, practical 
recommendations and key success indicators in order to make the implementation of the new 
strategic plan a success. Ten strategic objectives were formulated and operationalized in 
terms of activities, indicators, a global timeframe and responsibilities.  
 
The implementation of the strategic plan was only partially successful. Among the major 
achievements are the split of the school of technology into the school of mines and mineral 
sciences and the school of engineering, the establishment of the school of medicine, the 
directorate for distance education and open learning and an academic development center. 
New programs at MSc and MA level have been developed, and four thematic groups for 
research established. Enrolment of students has increased and more staff members have been 
recruited. Furthermore, library services have improved, internet connectivity is enhanced, and 
information systems are operational for student-, financial and HRM information. Some of 
the achievements have been realized with the support of Nuffic projects. Last but not least, a 
PMS has been developed and implemented (CBU, 2014). In the minutes of evaluative 
management meetings (considering the strategic plan) in March and April 2013, it is stated 
that:  
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Some of the objectives have been achieved while a good number of strategic 
objectives are still outstanding. It was not easy to achieve […] because of 
inadequate grants from the government. (CBU, 2013)  
 
It is somewhat surprising to read that the blame for the limited success is put entirely on 
insufficient government funding, when considering the following statement taken from the 
strategic plan itself:   
 
At this moment in time there can be no other conclusion that the majority of the 
implementation of the strategic plan should be budget neutral. Fortunately the 
strategic plan contains ample strategic objectives that require little or no funding at 
all. (CBU, 2009b)  
 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The general information about Zambia, the Zambian higher education sector and CBU results 
in an interesting research setting. CBU is a semi-autonomous institution which is governed by 
a university council that consists of locally elected members and centrally appointed 
members, and relies heavily on government funding (CBU, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b; Conyers, 
1983; Nuffic, 2005, 2010). It is clear that some national characteristics also occur at 
institutional level of CBU, such as centralized decision-making, chronic underfunding, 
administrative inefficiency, institutional ineffectiveness (Lungu, 1983), weak governance 
combined with political interference and weak accountability (Haglund, 2008). A lot of 
information about CBU as provided in documents from Nuffic and CBU itself is convergent 
with the weaknesses of many HEIs in SSA as provided by Teferra & Altbach (2004).   
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Chapter 5 
 
A preparatory pilot study 
 
In 2010 and 2011, three master students from VU University Amsterdam have done their 
thesis research at two public universities in Zambia. Two students (from the Faculty of 
Economics & Business Administration) have done their research at CBU in 2011. They did 
their research within the framework of my PhD research, with a focus on decentralization and 
performance appraisal. The third student (from the Faculty of Social Sciences) has done her 
research at UNZA in 2010, and she focused on formal/informal structure and organizational 
behavior. All three theses deal with (change-) management issues and cultural issues that are 
of great interest for my research. Their research findings have guided my research activities, 
including data collection. Therefore, these theses will be incorporated in this dissertation as 
parts of the pilot study. Apart from the thesis research by the master students, I conducted 
two pilot interviews in 2011, in order to test and to improve the initial interview protocol. The 
results of these research activities in this pilot study will be presented and discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
In the next paragraph (5.1), the results of the thesis research are presented. In paragraph 5.2, 
the results of the pilot interviews are presented and reflected upon, including some 
methodological considerations. In paragraph 5.3 I describe some conclusions from the pilot 
research.  
 
 
5.1 Master thesis research by VU students 
 
The two students from the Faculty of Economics & Business Administration had prepared 
their stay in Zambia as good as possible: accommodation had been arranged in one of the 
student hostels on campus, and they were promised to be picked up at the airport of Ndola 
(60 km away from the CBU campus). When they arrived in Ndola, however, there was 
nobody. They waited there for hours, and I had to involve a PO (the registrar) to make sure 
that a driver from CBU went there to pick them up and bring them to the campus. Later on, it 
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appeared that – despite the arrangements made earlier with the dean of students – the students 
could not be accommodated in the student hostel on campus. Another place to stay had to be 
found, which was challenging and involved extra unforeseen costs for the students. These 
examples seem to indicate that if you want to make reliable arrangements at CBU it is 
necessary to involve a top manager; arrangements with lower level managers can easily be 
ignored or neglected. The third student (at UNZA) managed to organize her things quite well, 
without major hiccups.  
 
5.1.1 Decentralization at CBU by Sabien Schipper (2011) 
Her research focuses on the differences between what people say and what people do with 
regards to decentralization at CBU. She relies on the theoretical distinction between espoused 
theory and theory-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1974)40, and she wants to find out what are the 
theories-in-use of the staff at CBU with regards to decentralization, and which factors 
influence these theories-in-use? In accordance with Argyris and Schön (1974), she 
differentiates between model I and model II theories-in-use and concludes that model I 
theories-in-use prevail, indicating a doubtful willingness to decentralize power and a desire to 
stay in control:  
 
“They still seem to believe that they have to hold on to their power… That is where I 
think that there is a problem… People do not want to decentralize… They want to 
make decisions and if that is not… As long as this is the case, nothing can move…” 
(Schipper, 2011). 
 
Consistent with this quote, it is argued that the higher management does not want to share 
control, but that they want to stay in control, and that, consequently, information is not shared 
or communicated with lower management levels within the university. Inquiry by the staff is 
even discouraged:  
 
“If you are here to attend a meeting, you can hear them [top management] say: Let 
go, because there are certain responsibilities that are not yours…” (Schipper, 
2011). 
                                                          
40 For more information about espoused theory and theory-in-use, see chapter 2. 
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The quote above indicates that top management wants to stay in control, without much 
involvement or interference from the staff. Schipper (2011) also discusses the power of the 
vice-chancellor, which is clearly demonstrated in the following quote:  
 
“… As a dean you can have your own vision on how the school needs to be run…But 
the VC has his own vision and at the end of the day it is his vision that you need to 
follow…” (Schipper, 2011). 
 
This is being perceived as an indication of authoritarianism, which seems to be a known and 
accepted phenomenon by everyone at CBU. As a result, Schipper (2011) notes that the staff 
does not seem to take action to change the situation. The attitude of staff is defensive; they 
accept the situation as it is. Apparently, there is nothing that can be done. Management and 
staff play a waiting game, sit on the fence (Schipper, 2011).  
 
Espoused theories about decentralization (how it should be according to the informants), 
seem to be highly influenced by ‘Western’ ideas, due to previous working experience, 
education, international exposure, age and history (Schipper, 2011). Theories-in-use, on the 
other hand, seem to influenced heavily by (national, regional or local) cultural and contextual 
factors.  
 
Schipper (2011) identified three cultural dimensions that influence the theories-in-use of local 
staff with regards to decentralization: power distance, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance 
(Hofstede, 1980). Her findings at CBU suggest a high degree of power distance 
(authoritarianism), collectivism, and a relatively high score on uncertainty avoidance, but the 
empirical evidence to support the two latter conclusions is not very strong.  
 
The image of CBU that has emerged during her thesis research brings her to the conclusion 
that the post-colonial management system as described by Jackson (2004) applies to CBU. A 
post-colonial management system can be characterized as hierarchical, centralized, 
authoritarian, conservative, with a focus on control, lack of information sharing, widespread 
distrust, etc.41 She refers to the thesis research done by Slooter (2011) and concludes that her 
findings do not seem to be limited to CBU; Slooter (2011) found similar results at UNZA, 
                                                          
41 For more information about the post-colonial management system, see chapter 3.  
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indicating that the research findings may apply to other public universities and possibly other 
public institutions in Zambia.  
 
5.1.2 Performance appraisal at CBU by Pieter Kraakman (2011) 
His research is centered around the question ‘what are the perceptions of CBU staff members 
concerning performance appraisal, and how do these perceptions relate to the Western 
concept of HRM and performance appraisal’? He is also interested in the motivations of staff 
in their work at CBU. He found that job security and individual career advancement are key 
motivators for many staff members at CBU, and that higher ranking officers [as compared to 
lower ranking officers] are also motivated to support a higher motive such as to make a 
difference in society (Kraakman, 2011).  
 
Kraakman (2011) indicates that there is a formal policy for annual performance appraisal for 
lower level administrative staff, however it is not enforced. For other categories of staff there 
does not seem to be anything in place. He also found that there is little trust in any 
performance appraisal system and in their superiors who are supposed to implement it, which 
is clearly illustrated by the quotes below:  
 
“Respondents indicated not to trust CBU’s current promotion practices, and that 
only ‘in-group’ members are eligible for promotion. Those respondents indicated 
that only friends, family and acquaintances of those who are in charge are eligible 
for any form of promotion” (Kraakman, 2011). 
 
“When present, it was found to be emphasizing mostly people’s weaknesses and 
neglecting good performance” (Kraakman, 2011). 
 
The first quote indicates a high level of in-group collectivism, while the focus on individual 
career advancement indicates a high level of individualism. Both tendencies seem to co-exist. 
The second quote indicates the low level of trust between supervisors and their subordinates. 
Kraakman (2011) indicates that many staff members at CBU have never been appraised 
themselves. The absence of such a PMS (and also the lack of job descriptions) is considered 
as a significant demotivating factor, where non-performers are not disciplined and high 
performers are not appreciated or promoted. Kraakman (2011) also points at the importance 
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of maintaining good working relations with ‘the right people’, especially the direct 
supervisor. This is important for receiving constructive feedback, job security, salary 
increments, promotion, etc.  
 
Another striking research finding concerns the current versus desired management systems: 
where most middle-level managers employees feel inspired by ‘Western’ management and 
motivational practices, [senior] people in higher management positions seem to want to keep 
the current post-colonial management system (Jackson, 2004) in place, which is illustrated by 
the following quote:  
 
“Once a person attains a position with power and status, a supervisor is unlikely to 
be receptive for change that could potentially diminish that power and status” 
(Kraakman, 2011). 
 
Although most informants indicated a desire for a more ‘Western’ approach to management 
in general and to performance appraisal in particular, none of the employees expected things 
to change (soon) and none of them wanted to be part of the realization of the desired changes. 
A sort of powerlessness prevails among many staff members, who have little faith in radical 
changes to be made by the current or future top management (Kraakman, 2011). This sense 
of powerlessness is convergent with the tendency to accept the situation as it is, and the 
unwillingness of the staff to take action, as found by Schipper (2011).  
 
5.1.3 People and their positions at UNZA by Jesca Slooter (2011) 
Her research is centered around the question ‘how do  administrative staff members enact and 
shape their day-to-day practices’? More precisely, Slooter studied how administrative staff 
members deal with the formal organizational structure, decision-making processes and formal 
positions in practice. She also relates her findings to two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, 
power distance and collectivism (Hofstede, 2001).  
 
Slooter (2011) describes UNZA as a bureaucratic, hierarchical and highly centralized system. 
She argues that the formal system creates a sense of distrust between different management 
levels, and hampers effectiveness and efficiency of all its operations. These features are 
similar to CBU, and she mentions more characteristics that resemble the organizational 
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practices at CBU, such as weak accountability and weak feedback mechanisms, numerous 
committees, widespread distrust, ascribed status of leaders and the importance of good 
relationships with immediate supervisors. Slooter (2011) argues that the relatively high score 
on power distance can be explained in terms of family tradition and local beliefs, where the 
roles of fathers, seniors and village chiefs have to be respected. The following quote indicates 
an element of local belief concerning power:  
 
 “We believe that power rests in a few individuals, and we believe that if certain 
functions are removed from us, then we will be seen to be less powerful than what 
our offices tell us to be. It’s more traditional than strategic. When you have more 
responsibilities, it’s a sign of power” (Slooter, 2011). 
 
Because subordinates show respect, obedience and dependence towards their superiors, the 
relationship is nurtured by both parties (Hofstede, 2001). It is argued that this might explain 
why PO’s find it difficult to shift some of their powers (responsibilities) to lower levels of 
management. Concerning collectivism, Slooter puts forward the concept of ‘extended family’, 
as an indication of collectivism:  
 
“We have this idea of extended family; it’s not a bad thing. Because of the extended 
family, you have to help everybody, your family in particular. And you tend to share 
what you have” (Slooter, 2011).  
 
According to her informants, staff members at UNZA used to be recruited (in the past) 
because of family relations or other in-group connections, not because of qualifications and 
experience (job applicants were not even subjected to an interview). Collectivism also affects 
performance management, in the sense that superiors are reluctant to apply disciplinary 
measures against their colleagues, because of the nature of the relationship between the 
superior and subordinate. It may also be that a bad performing staff member is a direct 
relative of a higher level officer, which makes it even more difficult to discipline that 
particular person. Another consequence of collectivism is that formal procedures are often 
avoided in order to arrange things (small favors) for in-group members (Slooter, 2011). This 
seems to indicate that non-compliance is often deliberate.  
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5.1.4 Conclusions from the thesis research 
Many findings in the thesis research are convergent with the literature about organizational 
change in SSA as described in chapter 3. A high score on power distance in sub-Saharan 
Africa has often resulted in hierarchical, centralized control systems and authoritarian leaders 
(Blunt & Jones, 1997; Blunt & Jones, 1992; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Kiggundu, 
1991; Kuada, 2006; Littrell & Ramburuth, 2007). This also implies the leaders’ desire to stay 
in control, and the importance of maintaining good working relations with the immediate 
supervisor (Kraakman, 2011; Schipper, 2011; Slooter, 2011). In the light of the above, it is 
questionable if and how decentralization at CBU will proceed. It will also be interesting to 
find out what the mental models of the staff are, including their ideas, expectations and 
assumptions about decentralization.  
 
According to the literature, a high score on collectivity in SSA has often resulted in nepotism, 
conflict avoidance and face-saving communication (Adeleye, 2011; Beugré & Offodile, 
2001; Hofstede, 2001; Nyambegera, 2002). Collectivism at CBU should be understood along 
the lines of in- and out-groups, defined by ethnicity, family relations and (academic or non-
academic) status (Kraakman, 2011; Slooter, 2011). As a consequence, a person may be 
collectivistic towards in-group members, but not to out-group members (Jackson, 2004). It is 
important to find out what this means for the development and the introduction of a PMS at 
CBU, including the mental models of the staff on performance appraisal.  
 
The lack of trust between different management levels (between supervisors and 
subordinates, also between deans and PO’s) is convergent with the insights provided by 
Beugré and Offodile (2001) and Jackson (2004). Distrust may be the result of in- and out-
group thinking, where McGregor’s Theory X applies to out-groups (Jackson, 2004). At CBU, 
the committee system provides a way of overcoming distrust; group decision-making 
neutralizes individual biases and is perceived as less subjective than executive decision-
making by individuals. Further research is required in order to find out where the distrust 
comes from and how it affects organizational change at CBU.  
 
The sense of powerlessness and passiveness of the staff which is described by Kraakman 
(2011) and Schipper (2011) may be understood as a response to authoritarianism and a lack 
of information sharing, where everything is decided by top management, leaving lower and 
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middle managers without much information and little room to do things on their own. 
Jackson (2004) argues that a lack of initiative may also be the result of low commitment and 
alienation from the organization, which happens when an organization is perceived as 
contrary to African culture. This is also argued in the ‘disconnect’ thesis by Dia (1996): 
 
“Formal institutions, not being rooted in local culture, generally fail to command 
society’s loyalty or to trigger local ownership, both of which are important catalysts 
for sustainability and enforceability” (Dia, 1996). 
 
Low commitment may also be related to an instrumental view towards work; a high 
expectation of benefits to the worker and family but low commitment and loyalty to the 
organization (Jones, 1986). It is yet unclear how the attitude of staff should be understood, 
but it is very important to understand this in the light of organizational change. I hope to find 
out what the underlying explanations are behind this apparent powerlessness and passiveness 
of the people.  
 
Thesis research also indicates change resistance, a limited willingness to change, or a 
tendency to maintain the status quo, especially when issues of power and status are at stake 
(Kraakman, 2011). This change resistance in African organizations is described by several 
authors (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Jackson, 2004; Jaeger & Kanungo, 1990), and often related to 
‘traditionalism’, which has a conservative effect on organizational change. The reasons 
behind change resistance at CBU are still largely unclear; I hope to find out how it should be 
understood.  
 
All in all, much of the characteristics of the post-colonial management system (Jackson, 
2004) are applicable at CBU. However, it is interesting to find out whether (and to what 
extent) CBU is modernizing and developing towards the post-instrumental management 
system, which can be characterized as less hierarchical, result-oriented, often decentralized, 
consultative and more inclusive (Jackson, 2004). I intend to find out what the situation is like 
at CBU.  
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5.2  Pilot interviews in Zambia 
 
In March 2011 I conducted two pilot interviews while I was in Zambia. The two pilot 
interviews were held in the evening, after office hours. One interview was with a male dean, 
the other with a female head of department. They were quite happy to participate. Each 
interview took about two hours. Although one can never know for sure, I had the impression 
that the informants spoke quite openly about management and change at their university.  
 
5.2.1 The results of the pilot interviews  
I provided a lot of free space during the interviews, giving the informants ample opportunity 
to talk about those things that they themselves preferred to talk about. As a result, one 
informant spoke mainly about organizational features and issues related to university 
governance and decentralization, while the other informant spoke a lot about people and 
issues related to work mentality. The highlights of the pilot interviews are described below.  
 
Interestingly, when I asked the informants about organizational change, both of them referred 
to the expansion of the university, in terms of schools, infrastructure, staff and student 
numbers. They also referred to changes in leadership, such as the appointment of a new VC 
and DVC. Much to my surprise, they did not refer to issues like decentralization, leadership 
& management, the introduction of a system for performance appraisal or the organizational 
structure (while attempts to implement a PMS were actually being made at CBU, the strategic 
plan was in its implementation phase, and decentralization was being discussed). When I 
asked about these types of organizational changes at CBU, one informant said:  
 
“Not much has changed… The system has remained more of less the same…” 
(informant 1) 
 
For many years, CBU is suffering from severe financial problems; grants from the 
government come too late (sometimes they don’t come at all), which means that salaries of 
staff cannot be paid for several months in a row. This has often resulted in strikes by the staff, 
but also students have regularly organized strikes and riots on campus, disrupting normal 
university life for short periods of time. National elections and the appointment of a new 
VC/DVC are also sources of discontinuity at CBU; usually, an acting VC and DVC are put in 
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place to bridge the period before a new VC and DVC can be officially appointed by the 
Zambian ministry of education. During those transition periods, important decisions cannot 
be made.  
 
Management at CBU is based on the so-called committee system. There are council 
committees, senate committees and administrative committees. The top decision-making 
bodies of CBU are the university council and the senate; nearly all institutional and 
administrative decisions are made by the university council, whereas academic decisions are 
made by the senate. The university council is not a distant governing body, but is formally the 
employer of all staff, and is heavily involved in day to day issues: 
 
“There is nothing that can be done in the university without approval by the 
council.” (informant 2) 
 
Deans and HoDs are elected by the staff in the school and the academic units, which has far-
reaching implications for management. It is argued that they are primarily accountable to 
their electorate in the schools and the units, instead of top management. Deans and HoDs are 
not in a good position to take unpopular measures and disciplinary decisions, because it will 
backfire at them later on; when new elections come up, (s)he will be voted out. Academic 
units and schools will always elect an HoD or a dean that stands up for the interests of the 
staff, not necessarily the interests of the school or the university at large.  
 
Decentralization is a hot topic at CBU. Schools (represented by the deans and the HoDs) 
want decentralization; they are in charge of the primary functions of the university, but they 
don’t have (decision-making power about) the resources that are required. The urgency of 
decentralization is mostly felt at the bottom, in the academic units. At the same time, they are 
not sure whether top management supports decentralization, if they are really prepared to 
devolve some of their decision-making power to lower levels of management. For instance, it 
is argued that schools used to have bank accounts, but according to the informants they have 
been centralized a few years ago. Central admin controls the money, and the schools are not 
comfortable with that. The schools want to be in charge of everything, including funds:  
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“Deans of schools really want to assume responsibility, and be in control of funds. 
Deans want everything to be decentralized, not partial decentralization, but full. 
They want to be in charge of their own operations, in terms of how much money do 
we generate, in terms of spending, etc.” (informant1)  
 
Both informants realize that decentralization requires accountability, transparency and 
responsibility. At the same time, they provide a lot of information indicating that 
accountability is weakly developed at CBU. There are no procedures in place; you only talk 
to your supervisor when there is an issue. Actually, people are not accountable in any way, 
and managers are not supposed to be ‘on somebody’s back’. Examples have been provided of 
academics abusing their professional autonomy, while nothing is being done about it. 
Malpractices are not corrected; there seems to a reluctance to make use of the disciplinary 
code towards staff members (not students). Tribal inclinations seem to play a role here, in the 
sense that they influence work ethics, the way people do their work and how they relate to 
others.  
 
Organizational behavior and job mentality haven’t changed or improved much since the 
olden days; personal interests clearly prevail over institutional interests, which is reflected in 
many examples provided. Although a CBU employee receives a monthly salary, (s)he may 
ask for additional emoluments to fulfill certain tasks that are a normal part of their job, or for 
being a member of a committee, and they want to retain 60% of the income that has been 
generated externally. It is also argued that especially younger staff members appear to behave 
more individualistic than the older generations. This mentality has far reaching consequences 
for organizational change:  
 
“As long as I don’t benefit, I don’t strive for that change. As long as I benefit from 
it, I will support the change. Why would an African struggle and advocate for a 
change when there is no personal benefit?” (informant 1) 
 
It goes a lot further, which is clearly illustrated by the quote below: 
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“There is a lot of laziness… Everybody wants to hide, they want to hide that they are 
not working, they don’t want to be seen while doing nothing. But whenever they feel 
like, they stay away from work, without consulting their superior.” (informant 1)  
 
The VC used to walk around and check whether people were actually working, giving 
classes, etc. In a way, he tried to fight the negative work mentality of staff. He used to come 
unexpectedly, which caused feelings of insecurity and fear among the staff. Leadership is 
considered very important by both informants. The VC brings in his vision, and tries to drag 
the institution in the right direction. It is believed that organizational change, for better or for 
worse, depends largely on the leadership by the VC. Nevertheless, it is also argued that the 
vision from the VC should eventually become a collective vision, people have to buy into the 
ideas of the VC. The following quote indicates this strive for collectiveness and involvement:  
 
“You don’t want people to be left out – people don’t want to be left out – you need 
everyone on board.” (informant 2) 
 
This ideas of ‘buying in’ and ‘everyone on board’ are indications of collectivity; a 
phenomenon that I need to investigate further.  
 
Strategic planning and implementation seems to be a source of frustration for many staff 
members, as is clearly illustrated by the following quote:  
 
“There is no implementation due to a lack of money. It becomes an academic 
operation, an exercise on paper, it frustrates everybody.” (informant 1) 
 
The strategic plan (2009 – 2013) has been developed with the support of many people at 
CBU, but implementation is hardly taking place. This made me wonder what this meant: Is 
there nothing that can be done and changed for the better, even when resources are scarce? Or 
is this an indication of fatalistic thinking, related to an external locus of control? Obviously, 
this requires further research.  
 
In terms of position, status and authority, it seems that qualifications are the most important. 
When someone goes for a MSc or a PhD abroad and comes back, (s)he wants to be regarded 
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as an authority, and (s)he is also regarded as such. A new qualification is often used as a basis 
for promotion to a higher position. Qualifications are considered more important than 
age/seniority. A senior officer is not necessarily senior in terms of age, but certainly in terms 
of qualifications (which is usually converging with age; the more qualifications someone 
gets, the older (s)he becomes). You need to be a senior officer in order to be eligible for a 
leadership position. Other interesting issues that were mentioned during the interviews, and 
require further research:  
 
- The VC wanted to stop supporting the medical scheme for staff, resulting in a strike by 
the staff;  
- Developments at CBU have not been very positive – there is a lot of negativity among 
staff members, things change very slowly;  
- University governance by the government;  
- Reports about malpractices in the schools are prepared and sent to the registry – but 
nothing happens with them (central admin/registry is not responsive to the situation in 
the schools);  
- The idea that the whole mindset must change.  
 
5.2.2 Reflecting on the results of the pilot interviews 
From the pilot interviews, I learnt a lot about conducting semi-structured interviews, also 
about my own role as an interviewer. When I listened to the interview recordings afterwards I 
noticed that I (sometimes) talked too much, that I interrupted the informants here and there, 
and that I occasionally made suggestive comments when open questions did not immediately 
result in a satisfying answer. I sometimes became a bit impatient as I was striving for clear 
cut answers. In fact, I was somewhat ashamed to hear myself employing these interview 
techniques in this way. On other occasions I forgot to dig deeper, in order to obtain more in-
depth information. The pilot interviews have made me much more conscious of my own 
influence as an interviewer, and how to prevent mistakes from happening again. 
 
After analyzing the pilot interviews several times, I realized that I had a identified a number 
of ‘leads’ that could guide further investigation. With regards to decentralization, it would be 
interesting to ask: How does decentralization take place? What do you think of the way it is 
being done? How should it be done according to you? What are the most challenging issues? 
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Such questions would provide me with a lot more valuable information than I had collected 
so far. And how should I understand the uncertainty about the willingness of PO’s to devolve 
powers to lower levels of management? Of course, I have to find out what is really going on. 
Accountability and responsibility also need further clarification, especially in relation to 
leadership & management, organizational culture and the mentality of staff. All the other 
issues mentioned in the interviews require a similar way of further in-depth questioning.  
 
I hadn’t really asked for informants’ opinions, judgments, assumptions, convictions, 
expectations and other ideas that one could have about different organizational changes. I 
realized that it was difficult to make informants talk about their mental models, since they 
might not want to do so (for all sorts of reasons), and they might not even be aware of some 
of their own assumptions and convictions. I realized that this was going to be a major 
challenge in subsequent interview sessions. There are a number of issues that seemed to have 
lost my attention completely, such as the PMS and the strategic plan implementation. The 
informants didn’t start about these issues themselves, and I forgot to draw their attention to 
them. Other issues that need further clarification are:  
 
- Collegial relations; 
- Motivation of staff; 
- Job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction; 
- Giving and receiving feedback; 
- Indicators of centralization;  
- The role of central admin (registry & finance);  
- Critical incidents;  
- Communication;  
- Compliance.  
 
These issues will be included more prominently in a revised interview protocol. I have to 
structure the interviews a little bit more, in order to obtain more in-depth information about 
these issues, since they are related to (all three focus areas) of organizational change in some 
way.  
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5.3 Conclusions from the pilot study 
 
Many of the insights gathered in this pilot study are relevant and contribute to a better 
understanding of organizational change at CBU. Some of the (more general) information 
collected by the students refers to Nuffic documents, which have also been used in the 
description of the research setting (chapter 4).  
 
The specific insights about decentralization (Schipper, 2011) and performance appraisal 
(Kraakman, 2011) at CBU and cultural issues at UNZA (Slooter, 2011), combined with the 
pilot interviews, provide an interesting picture of CBU in general, and of organizational 
change at CBU in particular. For the purpose of summary and overview, I have put the main 
research findings of the pilot study (and related questions for further research) in the table 
below (next page). Some of these findings converge with frequently observed organizational 
problems in HEIs in SSA as listed in table 1.1., but are now further specified in terms of 
follow-up questions.  
 
 Preliminary research findings Related questions (to be further investigated) 
1 Negligence (indifference?) towards lower levels of 
management  
Can other examples of this phenomenon to be 
found?  
2 Post-colonial management system 
Bureaucratic, hierarchical, highly centralized 
Are there indications of a shift towards post-
instrumentalism?  
3 Financial problems Are these problems hampering decentralization? 
Do financial problems result in centralization?  
4 Limited willingness to decentralize by top 
management 
PO’s want to stay in control 
Are PO’s really willing to decentralize or not? Is 
the VC in favor of decentralization?  
5 Authoritarian leadership by the VC 
Ascribed status of leaders, high power distance, VC 
checking on the people, VC determines the vision  
Can other indications of this be found? What 
about experiences with other VC’s at CBU and 
elsewhere? What about the influence of national 
leaders in Zambia?  
6 Incident with medical scheme for staff What was the role of the VC in this incident?  
7 Work mentality  
Passive attitude of staff, ‘wait and see’, 
powerlessness, a lot of negativity, laziness, hiding, 
staff staying away from work (not reporting for 
work), the whole mindset must change 
How does this relate to external locus of control? 
Responsibility? Pro-activity? Commitment? 
Personal interests prevail over institutional 
interests?  
8 Staff is mainly motivated by job security and 
individual career advancement 
How does individual career advancement relate to 
a high score on collectivity? 
9 Little trust in PMS development & implementation Fear of bias? Fear of job security?  
10 Little trust in management, weakly developed 
managerial skills 
Does management want to keep things as they 
are?  
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11 School bank accounts have been centralized Is this true? Why has central admin done this?  
12 High collectivity  
 
How does this relate to the importance of 
individual career advancement?  
13 Reluctance to apply disciplinary measures 
No enforcement of rules, malpractices are not 
corrected 
How does this relate to a high score on 
collectivity? 
14 Distrust between different management levels  Mainly between PO’s/central admin and the 
schools? Or between managers and subordinates 
in general? Or between in- and out-group 
members? 
15 Weak accountability 
Nobody is accountable  
Accountability is not enforced? Conflict 
avoidance? How does this relate to a high score on 
collectivity?  
16 Weak feedback mechanisms Face-saving communication?  
17 Importance of good relationship with direct 
supervisor 
Is this an indication of favoritism?  
18 Committee system (very many committees) Depersonalizing decision-making? How does this 
relate to trust/distrust? 
19 Avoidance of formal procedures  Non-compliance? 
20 Organizational change is understood as expansion of 
the university and changes in leadership, 
organizational change comes very slowly, 
developments have not been very positive 
Why is leadership so important? Why does change 
come so slow? What are the underlying reasons?  
 
21 Reports are sent to the registry, but nothing is being 
done with it 
Is central admin not responsive to the situation in 
the schools? Is central admin mainly interested in 
its own affairs?  
22 Discontinuity due to government elections and 
appointment of a new VC/DVC, problematic acting 
VC/DVC positions, strikes by staff and students 
How and to what extent do these sources of 
discontinuity affect university management?  
23 Involvement of university council in daily university 
life 
Does the council micro-manage CBU? 
24 Problematic position of elected deans & HoDs, they 
are primarily accountable to their electorate in the 
schools 
How does this affect university management and 
change? How does this affect collegial relations?  
25 Tribal issues  In what ways do these issues affect working 
relations with colleagues and supervisors?  
26 Personal interests prevail over institutional interests 
Ongoing demand for additional emoluments, staff 
wants 60% of externally generated income  
What does this mean for commitment and loyalty 
towards the university?  
27 Need for buy-in from the people, everybody must be 
on board  
Why is this so important? How does this relate to 
a high score on collectivity? 
28 No implementation of strategic plan  Only due to a lack of resources? Fatalistic 
thinking? External locus of control? 
29 Positions are mainly based on qualifications Where do performance and achievements come 
in?  
30 Qualifications are more important than age How do qualifications and age influence relations 
with colleagues and supervisors?  
31 University governance by the government 
The University act   
To what extent is university governance 
dependent and prescribed by the government?  
Table 5.1: Main preliminary research findings and questions at the end of the pilot study.  
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A number of intriguing and relevant topics have been discovered, but the underlying reasons, 
assumptions, implicit ideas, beliefs and expectations have remained largely unclear. 
Therefore, the most important conclusion is that a lot more in-depth questions (and answers!) 
are needed in order to grasp and to understand the mental models of the people at CBU, 
concerning the different organizational changes.  
 
There is always the risk that informants provide me with socially desirable answers (or 
espoused theory – in Argyris’ terms), instead of what they really think and do (theory-in-use 
– in Argyris’ terms). I struggled with the question how to tackle this general human tendency. 
In order to provoke informants to tell me things that they normally wouldn’t share easily with 
others, I decided to include small hypothetical cases in the interview protocol, referring to 
recognizable examples of university management elsewhere (outside CBU). These are called 
think-aloud protocols, a term borrowed from Ericsson & Simon (1985). More information 
about data collection (including interviews and the think-aloud protocols) can be found in 
chapter 2. The revised interview protocol can be found in annex 1. 
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 Chapter 6 
 
Leadership, management & organizational change at CBU 
 
After the preparatory pilot study, I ‘officially’ started data collection. This has eventually 
resulted in four empirical chapters. In this chapter I present the first part of the main research 
findings. The three subsequent chapters (7, 8 and 9) are dedicated to the specific 
organizational changes under study. This chapter starts with a general introduction about 
leadership, management & organizational change at CBU, based on perceptions and 
interpretations from the informants (paragraph 6.1). Then I will provide an elaboration of 
constraining factors in organizational change (paragraph 6.2), which is divided in three 
sections: cultural/behavioral constraints (6.2.1), structural/organizational constraints (6.2.2) 
and external/contextual constraints (6.2.3). Enabling factors are described in paragraph 6.3.  
 
Constraining and enabling factors refer to part A and part B of the mental model (see 
below)42.  
 
Figure 6.1: My descriptive format of a mental model.  
 
According to the majority of the informants, the constraining and enabling factors described 
in this chapter are (to various extents) relevant for the three organizational changes under 
                                                          
42 Parts C, D and E will be described in chapter 7 (decentralization), chapter 8 (the introduction of a PMS) and 
chapter 9 (strategic planning & implementation).  
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study. Critical incidents that have occurred in the recent past are described as part of the text 
on constraining and enabling factors (paragraph 6.2 and 6.3). As a result of my longitudinal 
approach, I have identified several developments in constraining and enabling factors over 
time. These developments have occurred since the appointment of a new VC/DVC in 2012, 
and are described in paragraph 6.4. In paragraph 6.5 I provide some concluding remarks.  
 
This chapter provides a lot of relevant information that helps to understand (recent) 
experiences with (informants’ perceptions and interpretations of) organizational change, and 
the context within which organizational change occurs. My research should be understood as 
an account of recent history at CBU, since most of my informants refer to experiences, 
perceptions and interpretations of activities and events in the period up to 2012, when a new 
VC and DVC were appointed. When I refer to the transitional period (during the process of 
having a new VC and DVC appointed) or the period thereafter, it will be explicitly 
mentioned.  
 
Based on all the data collected, several general images about leadership, management and 
organizational change at CBU have emerged and further developed during the iterative 
processes of data collection and data analysis. I will first describe a general introduction 
about leadership, management & organizational change at CBU.  
 
 
6.1 A general introduction about leadership, management & organizational 
change at CBU  
 
It is obvious that everything about CBU can only be understood in its specific context, 
culture and history. CBU is a relatively young university; it started off as a regional branch of 
UNZA, merged with the ZIT and transformed into a new public university in 198743. Since 
Zambia is among the poorest nations in the world, the institution is located in a context of 
structural poverty, which is visible in the immediate surroundings of CBU. As can be 
expected, this has far-reaching consequences for the overall functioning and performance of 
the university. One of the most important consequences is irregular and insufficient funding 
                                                          
43 See also chapter 4 (research setting).  
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by the Zambian government. As a result, CBU is highly indebted44, the physical 
infrastructure is dilapidated, teaching & learning facilities are extremely limited and 
equipment is hardly available (see also chapter 4). This is highly relevant for my research, 
since it does affect organizational change at CBU in many ways. This will be further 
explained in the course of this chapter.  
 
According to many informants, top management in general at CBU can be characterized as 
highly centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian. Indications of centralization and 
authoritarianism are overwhelming, much to the frustration of many informants. All power is 
at the top, and leadership is generally perceived as very authoritarian under the former VC in 
the period 2003 – 2012; the numerous examples that have been provided leave little room for 
any doubt in this respect. Interestingly, the new leadership has also been accused of 
authoritarian tendencies. Combined with a lack of transparency and information sharing by 
top management, and a lack of involvement of deans and directors in decision-making, this 
has resulted in deeply entrenched levels of distrust (mainly between top management on the 
one hand and the schools on the other). This distrust has provoked a counter reaction: a 
strong strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in among large numbers of staff 
throughout CBU; people want to be involved, informed and consulted – in other words: they 
want to be taken seriously.  
 
Middle management at CBU is diverse, as it is composed of directors, deputy registrars and 
deans who operate in completely different domains. Directors (from institutes and service 
departments) and deputy registrars are appointed by top management, while deans are elected 
by the schools. Lower management (involving HoDs) in the schools is rotational, which 
means that every lecturer can be a HoD for a number of years. Every dean has been a HoD 
before. The elective system (and its consequences) will be further explained in paragraph 
6.2.2 about structural constraints. 
 
For a number of reasons that we will further explore in this chapter, maintaining good 
relationships with supervisors and colleagues is very important for CBU employees, resulting 
in weak feedback- and accountability mechanisms. The positive side of this is that the overall 
work atmosphere among colleagues is good, filled with joy and laughter, friendliness and 
                                                          
44 Although the situation at CBU is not as bad as at UNZA.  
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helpfulness. At the general level, staff members are quite satisfied with their job and the work 
environment at CBU. But there is a negative side to this as well: staff tends to refrain from 
feedback and stay quiet, hide mistakes and protect each other, in efforts not to offend or harm 
the relationship with the other person. Often, malfunctioning staff is not reprimanded, while 
good performing staff is not rewarded. There are many indications of managers who are 
struggling with performance management, not knowing how to go about it, including a 
reluctance to use the disciplinary code. Conflicts are often avoided and neutralized instead of 
solved. This has contributed to a ‘laissez-faire’ atmosphere, indifference and even alienation 
(both in the academic and the administrative domain), negatively affecting the motivation of 
staff to perform.  
 
As already argued in chapter 4 (research setting), organizational change at CBU has mainly 
been about expansion in terms of programs, students, staff and infrastructure. The number of 
schools increased from four to seven, the Directorate of Distance Education and Open 
Learning and the Dag Hammarskjold Institute for Peace Studies were established. For the 
School of Business and the Directorate of Distance Education and Open Learning, new 
buildings were put up. Also, new student hostels were built. According to the previous top 
management, eleven new undergraduate programs and eight new postgraduate programs were 
introduced, resulting in an enormous increase of student numbers (CBU, 2012).  
 
According to many informants, however, organizational change at CBU has not been overly 
successful. As soon as I started asking questions about organizational change in the recent 
past (with regards to decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & 
implementation), informants quickly became a bit negative (often very negative), and started 
to express their dissatisfaction and frustration:   
 
“…The system has remained more or less the same…In terms of job performance 
and organizational behavior, things haven’t changed much. It has to do with the 
mentality …” (Informant 34) 
 
In fact, there was much more negativity than I had anticipated. I learnt much about the 
reasons why organizational change had been so unsuccessful, at least in the eyes of many 
informants. Based on their stories about leadership, management and organizational change 
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in the recent past, I have developed lists of constraining and enabling factors that will be 
described and explained in the next paragraphs. I will first elaborate on the constraining 
factors, and in paragraph 6.3 I will explain several enabling factors.  
 
 
6.2 Constraining factors in organizational change 
 
During data collection and analysis, I identified a number of constraining factors that were – 
in the eyes of many informants – largely responsible for the limited success of organizational 
change at CBU in recent years. Later on, I managed to distinguish these constraining factors 
into three categories:  
 
- Cultural/behavioral constraints; 
- Structural/organizational constraints; 
- Contextual/external constraints. 
 
In general, I can say that there is a lot of convergence (between the different informant 
groups) about the relevance and importance of most constraints for the organizational 
changes under study. However, not all constraints have been assessed equally important or 
relevant by all informant groups in all three organizational changes. For some informant 
groups, a specific constraint is more important and relevant than for another informant group. 
We will look at these differences in detail in chapter 10. Many of these constraining factors 
are related to each other and sometimes overlapping. However, for the sake of proper 
understanding, I have described them separately.  
 
6.2.1 Cultural / behavioral constraints 
Cultural constraints relate to thoughts and ideas, assumptions and convictions of informants, 
including the associated attitudes and behavior that negatively affect organizational change in 
several ways. As such, cultural constraints can also be viewed and understood as behavioral 
constraints. For the sake of overview, I first present a list of all the second order constructs 
found under the aggregate dimension ‘cultural/behavioral constraints’. Then I will describe 
and explain each cultural/behavioral constraint separately. 
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Second order construct      Aggregate dimension 
 
x Ambiguous role of VC/top management 
x Authoritarianism 
x Hierarchical distrust 
x Out-group distrust  
x Favoritism and allegiances       
x Tendency to refrain from feedback 
x Role culture 
x Perceptions of exclusion  
x Negative work mentality  
x Indifference/alienation  
 
Table 6.2.1: Overview of second order constructs under the aggregate dimension ‘cultural/behavioral 
constraints’.  
 
Ambiguous role of VC/top management 
In many instances, informants have complained about the ambiguous role of top 
management, in the sense that it was not clear to them what top management wanted to 
achieve, where they were going and what could be expected from them. Numerous examples 
have been provided of plans from top management that were never carried out despite earlier 
expressed commitments, strategic priorities that ended up under a pile of more urgent matters 
to attend to, and promises that were never heard of again. There are clearly perceived 
differences between what top management says and does.  
 
Within top management, the VC seems to have his own room for ambiguity: Since he has the 
most powerful position in the university, he can, to a large extent, determine and change 
priorities, act and intervene single-handedly, according to his own view and vision, even 
when they are not in line with the views of other PO’s (for instance, informants have reported 
serious clashes and conflicts between the former VC and the former DVC). With regards to 
decentralization, a number of informants think that, while other PO’s seemed to be more in 
favor of decentralization, the VC was not:  
 
“The VC is the one that really wanted centralization of the power to spend.”  
(Informant 9) 
Cultural/behavioral constraints 
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However, not everyone doubts the willingness of the VC to decentralize power at CBU. 
Some say that everyone, from the top to the bottom, supports the idea of decentralization, 
including top management:   
 
“All members of top management agreed on decentralization, there was consensus 
about it.” (Informant 37) 
 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity remains, partly due to a lack of transparency and the lack of 
information sharing with the deans and directors. It is an often heard criticism that top 
management is not accountable to middle management, that explanations for certain 
management decisions are not provided. The widely perceived ambiguity of top management 
towards decentralization is also due to a number of critical incidents involving the VC in a – 
according to various informants - very authoritarian way. A good example to illustrate this is 
the split of the (former) school of technology into the school of mines & mineral sciences and 
the school of engineering.  
 
“There were some actions that were actually the reverse of what certain policies 
indicated… The policy said that deans are in control of the budget, but then there 
was this incident with the school of technology which was split into a school of 
mines and a school of engineering, and by the way it happened, the school 
understood that at central admin there can never be a genuine desire for 
decentralization, because if this can happen, you will never take decentralization 
seriously.” (Informant 2) 
 
With regards to PMS, the situation has also been ambiguous: Although the implementation of 
a PMS was mentioned in the strategic plan (2009 – 2013), informants wondered why nothing 
was happening, why it took so long and why they didn’t hear about it anymore. There had 
been several workshops (facilitated by consultants from the Zambian Federation of 
Employers) about performance appraisal, working groups had done preparatory work, 
different PMS forms were being circulated, but seemingly, top management didn’t push 
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things forward for a long time45. Role ambiguity by top management has also been observed 
in strategic planning & implementation, in the sense that, according to many informants, top 
management did not take the lead in the implementation process:  
 
“We recommended that the central committee for strategic plan implementation 
would be chaired by someone from central admin, a PO. I suggested that it should 
be the VC, DVC or registrar doing it, but they said no, we have many other things to 
do.” (Informant 2) 
 
To me, this response from top management is remarkable: How can you, as top management, 
first produce a strategic plan for the university and then withdraw from taking the lead in the 
implementation process? Isn’t it top management’s most important task to push things 
forward along the strategic agenda of the institution? Much to my surprise, top management 
has acknowledged that they did not take the lead in the implementation process:  
 
“The role of top management was based on the misconception that if you let the top 
leadership stand aside, so that it is built from the bottom, to be overseen by the 
people who are the actors… Top management assumed that they did not have to 
lead the implementation of the strategic plan, they thought that the initiators [the 
ones who have composed and contributed to the strategic plan, e.g. the deans, 
directors and HoDs] should be able to implement what they said they wanted to do, 
and to evaluate, and to provide report, but it didn’t work like that…” (Informant 17) 
 
What made top management think that they should leave it up to the lower and middle 
management to implement the strategic plan by themselves? Is this an indication of limited 
awareness, limited management capacity or a lack of commitment at the highest level? Or are 
there other issues at play here? This will be further explored and described in chapter 8 and 9. 
Role ambiguity by top management has further increased due to questionable actions during 
implementation:  
 
                                                          
45 It has been argued that by 2011 the organizational climate at CBU was not conducive anymore for the 
implementation of a PMS, due to widespread polarization and distrust. In fact, it was not before a new 
substantive VC and DVC were appointed in 2012, when the implementation of PMS was boosted forward.  
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“Top management always decides what is going to be done, and then [at some 
stage] the strategic plan is no longer leading. Money is being diverted to other 
things that are not in the plan. We come to central admin to get money for things 
that are approved in the strategic plan, but they always tell us that there is no 
money.” (Informant 22) 
 
“Strategic planning involves money. But money issues are always shrouded in 
secrecy. There is no transparency about money. When there would be openness, it 
would be much easier to have open discussions about what to do, where to go and 
how. Money is misapplied, PO’s go on foreign trips to Denmark, South Africa, 
India, China… They just take the money which was earmarked for other approved 
activities, whether it is good for CBU or not…” (Informant 24) 
 
These are quite severe allegations, and they do not stand alone. Perceptions and 
interpretations like this have, in the eyes of many informants, not contributed to the idea that 
top management is committed to organizational change for the better of CBU. The 
descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Unclear whether top management is willing to decentralize 
x VC not in favor of decentralization  
x PMS has not been implemented despite plans and intentions 
x Top management did not take the lead in strategic plan  
implementation    
x Diversion of funds for non-strategic purposes 
 
Table 6.2.1.1: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘ambiguous role VC/top 
management’.  
 
Authoritarianism 
Whereas top management (together with central admin) can be characterized by 
centralization, leadership can be characterized by authoritarianism. To various extents, 
authoritarianism has been a recurrent leadership feature at CBU (as in many other institutions 
in Zambia).  
 
Ambiguous role VC/top management  
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“Almost all VC’s, when they stayed in power longer, they have developed dictatorial 
tendencies… Yielding wealth and power, they tend to become dictators, everything 
becomes autocratic. They will say that since I yielded so much power, whatever I say 
stands.” (Informant 20) 
 
This tendency towards authoritarianism has its roots in recent Zambian history and practices 
that have developed (and are reproduced) over time. Informants refer to leadership examples 
and practices at the national level, and how they trickle down to CBU:  
 
“What happens in institutions like this, is that you always see some kind of reflection 
of what is happening at the national level.” (Informant 10) 
 
Every new VC comes with a personal vision, which is leading for the institutional 
development in the period to come. This is a broadly accepted practice at CBU:  
 
“Every VC comes with a vision, he doesn’t have a job description, he has a vision 
and everyone has to follow that vision.” (Informant 6) 
 
According to the new University Act, the VC is the academic, financial and administrative 
head of the HEI (MoE, 2013). Many informants ascribe a lot of power to the VC, and 
consider him as the most powerful person at the university:  
 
“The VC is by far the most powerful person in top management. Very powerful, 
extremely powerful… What determines his power is the authority entrusted into him 
and his office.” (Informant 6) 
 
The former VC became the personification of a crusade against the apparent negative work 
mentality present at CBU (which will be explained later). In doing so, he interfered 
everywhere he could, bypassed his deans and directors, thereby creating a lot of apprehension 
and resistance:   
 
“If you were lacking, if you were behind with something, if there was a miss, and if 
he thought that something should have been done and it wasn’t done, he could really 
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go for it and people would fear him, there was a bit of terror, a good amount of fear, 
yes. And it was related to the work culture, because the work culture was a sort of 
laissez-faire type of arrangement, so when he came there was a sort of enforcement, 
each lecturer had to go to his lectures and he [the former VC] did no longer accept 
that laissez-faire type of attitude…” (Informant 18)  
 
The former VC has often been characterized as pushy, impatient, not consultative and results-
oriented. He did achieve results, but according to many informants, at a high cost:  
 
“He got things done, physical things, yes, but not in terms of understanding and 
support. In the end he was in conflict with everybody, he didn’t have people with 
him. I remember that one time he was on television, addressing the whole nation, he 
said:  ‘There are some people [at CBU] who are applying the PhD as ‘Pull Him 
Down’ syndrome, they want to pull me down, they cannot appreciate the things that 
have been done for the institution’. He reached that stage, although he had built the 
school of medicine, the school of business, hostels were built, but he had not 
developed report from the people he was working with. The people could see that 
several things had been done, yes, but in terms of human relations, cooperation, he 
had done absolutely nothing. So people distanced themselves from him and his 
achievements.” (Informant 10) 
 
Some informants claim that although he appeared to fight the negative work mentality of 
staff, he did not have the right mentality himself. Various claims of corruption and nepotism 
have been made, as the following examples indicate:  
 
“The former VC tried to fight the negative work mentality, but he didn’t have the 
right mentality himself. He used money for himself, and people knew that.” 
(Informant 10) 
 
“He appointed friends from UNZA as professors at CBU, even though they did not 
qualify for such positions, according to the regulations.” (Informant 7) 
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In efforts to achieve results, it seems that the former VC became more pushy and impatient 
during his second term at CBU. He started to act single-handedly, and apparently, he 
manipulated and dominated committee meetings in order to get things done:  
 
“You know, with the former VC, everybody thought that they were just 
rubberstamps. For instance, he would call for a meeting, which may sound as 
something consultative, but it was actually directive. He said: ‘this is what we’re 
going to do’, and the meeting ended there, nobody dared to say anything… Further 
on the VC said that we had a meeting and we agreed this and that, but in reality 
nobody had a chance to say anything… That is what you get, the consultation [of 
committee members] vanishes…” (Informant 18)  
 
“There was an urgent management meeting, with all the deans & directors. There 
was only one item on the agenda. The VC said: “From now on, the school of 
technology ceases to exist. Management has decided that we will now have a school 
of mines [and mineral sciences], and a school of engineering. The idea came from 
nowhere, normally this should have been discussed in academic meetings, in senate 
and so on, but this just came down just like that! So I said: ‘you called us for this 
meeting, because you think that we are important and have a role in the decision 
making process, and now you are saying that I am not allowed to say anything’?” 
(Informant 2) 
 
The second quote refers to the decision to split the school of technology, but there are also 
other examples, such as his attempt to abolish the medical scheme for CBU staff, which 
created a lot of resistance and anger among the staff. After all, the medical scheme had been 
very successful in the battle against HIV/AIDS, which had killed so many CBU staff 
members in previous years. Dissatisfaction, fear, anger and frustration had accumulated over 
the years, and CBU staff referred to the lack of consultation and involvement in every aspect 
of management:  
 
“There are procedures and systems, the committee system, these systems should be 
used. Now if you want to bulldoze everything because you have the 
power…[expression of frustration and disapproval]” (Informant 20)   
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The authoritarian leadership style of the former VC resulted in a climate of fear and distrust, 
which was certainly not conducive for any organizational change to take place:  
 
“In the end, you create a condition of fear… And I’ve heard stories from deans, that 
they advised each other just to stay quiet, even in meetings, just stay quiet, top 
management says what they want to say and it ends there. But I think this is a very 
dangerous situation, in a large university like CBU today. In meetings, they can’t 
say anything, because top management may get annoyed, so let the VC tell what he 
wants to tell, and stay quiet and go on with your business. There are people who sit 
in certain committees and they get an allowance for that work, and they want to keep 
that allowance, and they just sit there and agree with everything, keep the peace and 
go away with the money, even if the institution is not working effectively. They even 
tell others ‘just let top management do what they want and stay quiet’.” (Informant 
10) 
 
At the end of his second term (2010), he was given another last year as VC of CBU, in order 
to bridge the period of national elections and the appointment of his successor. But the staff 
at CBU was fed up with him:  
 
“Mubarak must go” (Informant 5) 
 
According to many informants, nothing much happened in this last year. When he had left 
(2012), people dared to speak up and relieve their feelings. Despite the widespread frustration 
and critique, however, there are also positive comments:  
 
“In the end, I think there must be some sanity in the university system, so I am quite 
happy with the changes that Musonda introduced.” (Informant 34) 
 
“The former VC was being perceived by some staff members as the man with the 
hammer, he came landing too hard on some of them, but people should see the 
difference between what he did and how he did it, they are two different things.” 
(Informant 17) 
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Informants from top management and (higher) central admin tend to question perceptions of 
authoritarianism, for instance by referring to the phenomenon ‘upwards delegation’ by the 
deans. Elected deans don’t want to take unpopular decisions, and leave it up to the VC to 
intervene and take responsibility. When the VC takes the decision, he is being accused of 
being authoritarian (which is then not considered as a fair judgment). On occasions like this, 
they argue, it seems that the staff wants authoritarian leadership. In addition, these informants 
also argue that the job of a VC is very challenging and demanding:  
 
“It is not an easy job, you have to be strong and fight to get things done, you have to 
push people here and there. You must have good linkages and relations with people 
in Lusaka. A VC has to be a political person, you have to know every office in 
government.” (Informant 13) 
 
When I interviewed the former VC in Kenya (November 2013), he said:  
 
“Well, maybe I was moving too fast while some people were very slowly, so maybe I 
was impatient, but I wanted results… Yes, I was pushing, I didn’t give people the 
time to voice their opinions… I apologize for the way I operated, but still, I believe 
that what I did was the best for the university as a whole.” (Informant 37) 
 
Interestingly, perceptions of authoritarianism (by the VC) have continued under the new top 
management, according to several informants. Although it appeared slightly better in the 
beginning, authoritarian tendencies became worse later on (towards the end of 2014). Some 
informants claim that the new VC is even more authoritarian than his predecessor. This will 
be further described and explained in paragraph 6.4. At UNZA, signs of authoritarianism 
exist, but not as strong as at CBU. Informants at UNZA refer to the VC as a powerful person 
with a lot of responsibilities (due to both prescription and ascription), and they show a kind of 
humbleness towards him (Slooter, 2011). In the description of the research setting (chapter 
4), this was already acknowledged by Akande (2009).  
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs: 
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First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Dictatorial tendencies 
x VC determines the vision 
x VC bypassing and interfering 
x VC acting single handedly       
x VC dominating and manipulating committee meetings  
x VC appointing friends from UNZA as professors 
 
Table 6.2.1.2: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘authoritarianism’.  
 
Hierarchical distrust   
In the light of the above, it is not difficult to imagine that hierarchical distrust is a significant 
feature that occurs between the top management on the one hand, and the middle- and lower 
management at CBU on the other hand. However, hierarchical distrust is not limited to 
distrust towards top management:  
 
“This distrust is two-sided; top management doesn’t trust the middle management, 
and the middle management doesn’t trust the top management.” (Informant 25) 
 
Distrust towards top management 
The distrust by middle management towards top management is clearly stimulated by a 
structural lack of transparency and a lack of information sharing46. It seems that top 
management (and central admin) is not accountable to middle management, rarely accounts 
for its decisions and prefers not to share information with deans and directors, which has 
resulted in a breeding ground for distrust: 
 
“When HoDs or Deans request information from Procurement or Finance, they 
often don’t receive any response, which contributes to the already existing distrust 
between the Schools and Central Admin.” (Presentation during management 
workshop, Mukuba 2011) 
 
“From the perspective of the Schools, financial management has not been handled 
in a transparent manner as there was no internal stakeholder committee to monitor 
                                                          
46 The lack of transparency and a lack of information sharing will be described under ‘structural constraints’ 
in paragraph 6.2.2. 
Authoritarianism  
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or control expenditure patterns. Furthermore, it was argued that revisions made to 
financial regulations (in 2006) have remained as draft documents (not formally 
approved or disseminated), which is not conducive to fostering trust between top 
management and the Schools.” (Presentation during management workshop, 
Mukuba 2011)  
 
“How can it be that you buy expensive vehicles while you buy nothing for the 
teaching laboratories? We had nothing in our teaching labs… We sent submission 
after submission, and in that same period top management bought some very 
expensive vehicles.” (Informant 28) 
 
Interestingly, this distrust towards top management is also acknowledged at UNZA (Slooter, 
2011). Other criticism relates to many ‘unnecessary’ international trips for top management, 
and other ‘extravagances’ (whatever that may be). Distrust towards top management has 
worsened and deepened over the years, and it has been said by a number of informants that in 
fact, every top-down decision creates distrust. Authoritarianism has contributed to 
hierarchical distrust (and fear). For instance, when top management wanted to implement a 
PMS, the staff was afraid, simply because it came from top management:  
 
“They thought that there was a trick behind it… They thought that the management 
was out to get them, get their jobs, reduce their earnings, or something like that...” 
(Informant 26)  
 
Distrust towards top management has resulted in sometimes bizarre suspicions and 
allegations related to corruption, nepotism and favoritism. According to several informants 
from the schools, the former top management used university funds for personal purposes. It 
has been suggested that lucrative deals were made with construction companies, and even 
that university funds were used for building a private house:  
 
“I understand the negativity here and there, and that is when suspicion begins. For 
instance, I have a mortgage to build a house. But at some stage, people started 
saying that I was misusing university funds to build my own house! And they sent a 
report saying that I was stealing money.” (Informant 37) 
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One story is about the new school of business. Heavy winds blew off the roof, but much to 
the surprise of several informants, the damage was not repaired by the construction company:  
 
“People said: ‘This is what corruption means, this is what it is’ and ‘you see, it is 
not done the right way, we were not involved or consulted in how this building 
should look like and how it should be built’. They blamed top management for it.” 
(Informant 10) 
 
Referring to the quote above, some informants suspect that top management agreed on a 
cheaper deal with the construction company than the budget (provided by the government) 
allowed, so that PO’s could share the rest of the money for their personal pockets.  
 
Distrust towards the schools 
As already said earlier, hierarchical distrust is two-sided; there is also distrust from top 
management (and central admin) towards the schools. Actually, there are two different kinds 
of distrust here. One is related to doubts about the honesty and integrity of the deans (and 
HoDs), and the other one is related to the lack of confidence about the management capacity 
of deans (and HoDs). An example of the first type of distrust is that, according to top 
management (and central admin), academics do not always report consultancies:   
 
“Academics have not been very transparent about their income generating 
activities, since they often do not report them to Central Admin.” (Observation 
during management workshop, Mukuba 2011) 
 
Sometimes academics make use of university equipment and facilities for these 
consultancies. Other presumptions include reporting too many (extra) teaching hours, 
teaching at other (private) universities, and working on private businesses during office hours 
at CBU. Informants from top management and central admin suspect that such practices can 
only take place with the approval of HoDs and deans. Another interesting example is about 
staff recruitment by the schools:  
 
“We had a situation in one of the schools, where applicant letters from good senior 
staff members, PhD holders, were thrown away, because the people at the school 
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didn’t want these competitors to come in. It was a very serious matter, and then we 
said: ‘These are good candidates, we need to build capacity, why are you hiding 
these applications?’ At school level, they want to maintain the balance which is 
there, and these senior people [from outside CBU] may be perceived as a threat to 
my deanship, or even my HoD ship, since they are very senior people…  It was very 
serious, and not only once, it had happened more often over time.” (Informant 17) 
 
The examples above have resulted in doubts about the honesty and integrity of the deans and 
HoDs. An example of the second kind of distrust (or lack of confidence) refers to doubts 
about the management capacity of deans and HoDs. Informants from top management, 
central admin and schools argue for instance, that for decentralization to be successful, well-
trained deans and HoDs are required:  
 
“There is a lack of confidence of top management about the schools, whether they 
can operate independently and efficiently. It’s all about capacity, management is not 
convinced that the schools have enough capacity.” (Informant 25)  
 
During a management workshop in Mukuba (2011), a PO referred to an example from 
several years ago. At that time, a dean had signed a contract with the (mining) industry, and 
when the university could not deliver, it implied huge costs for CBU. It is obvious that top 
management wishes to prevent such things from happening again. According to some, 
however, stories like this only serve to legitimize the practices of centralization. The usual 
interpretation from the deans is that top management ‘just wants to keep all the power to 
themselves’.   
 
Distrust towards supervisors 
Apart from distrust between top management and the schools, there is also distrust towards 
supervisors in general, especially at the lower levels of management:  
 
“Yes, they are afraid, there is fear and distrust, especially at the lower levels of 
management, not only in central admin, also in the schools.”  (Informant 22)  
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Many staff members at the lower levels claim that they are not regularly and properly 
informed by their immediate supervisors, especially in central admin. Relations with 
supervisors are often problematic; information is not always shared, and perceived levels of 
consultation and involvement are lower than in the schools. This may be related to ‘family 
trees’ in central admin and their relative proximity to top management (which causes fear and 
distrust). But also deans & directors are sometimes accused of not sharing information with 
the lower ranks. Sometimes this leads to communication breakdowns and distrust, where staff 
members are unable to access the right information:  
 
“Generally, staff at the lower levels are eager to get information [about current 
developments, outcomes of management meetings, staff development opportunities, 
etc.], but sometimes, when they go to their supervisor, they are unable to get the 
information satisfactorily. Now in the process they tend to have that suspicion 
developing between them, so even their trust goes away….” (Informant 21) 
 
In PMS, a lot of informants fear subjectivity and victimization by their supervisors:  
 
“If you don’t like me, you’ll be very subjective, and I’ll be victimized purely on the 
basis that you don’t like me… You may have a thousand and one reasons why you 
don’t like me, not necessarily because of my poor performance, but because of other 
reasons.” (Informant 2) 
 
Interestingly, at UNZA similar fears exist among staff members. Slooter (2011) argues that 
the relationship with the immediate supervisor is crucial:  
 
“The assessment of members at the lower levels seems to be more based on the 
relationship a member has with his [or her] superior than the work (s)he delivers.” 
(Slooter, 2011) 
 
Similar to relations with top management, there is distrust and fear for repercussions and 
subtle sanctions, that everyone wishes to avoid. The descriptions and explanations above 
result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
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First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Top management doesn’t trust middle management 
x Middle management doesn’t trust top management    
x Distrust towards supervisors  
x Fear for repercussions and backfires 
  
Table 6.2.1.3: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘hierarchical distrust’.  
 
Out-group distrust  
Out-group distrust means that 1) I trust people who belong to the same group(s) as I do, and 
2) I don’t trust people who belong to different group(s) than I do. If there is trust among in-
group members, usually other aspects of in-group collectivism come in (such as reciprocity, 
loyalty, etc.). In- and out-groups are defined along subtle lines and determined individually 
on the basis of diverse criteria:   
 
“Trust can be based on relationships that people have with each other outside the 
university, for instance when they live on the same compound, or go to the same 
church together.” (Informant 7)  
 
“I think we as a people maybe we don’t trust individuals… The issue of diversity 
comes in… We're diverse in terms of tribes, languages, cultures…” (Informant 4) 
 
The influence of ethnicity and tribalism on the definition of in- and out-groups does not seem 
to be very big, but tribal bonds are still believed to play a role in performance appraisal:  
 
“…Although tribal bonds are not very strong among Zambians anymore, they do 
still play a role in judging others. If a colleague is not performing well, or even bad, 
they will not easily hold him accountable for his failures, especially when he is from 
the same tribe or clan.” (Field notes, 2012) 
 
With reference to the situation in South Africa, Franks (2006) argues that the role of tribalism 
is often covert and even denied. To some extent, this may be the case at CBU too. Some 
informants believe that the importance of ethnicity and tribalism is increasing, especially in 
recruitment & selection processes at the higher management levels. Supposedly, this is 
Hierarchical distrust  
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influenced by national politics (Hulterstrom, 2007). The definition of in- and out-groups 
determines with whom certain information will be shared or not shared, and implies some 
sort of mutual loyalty and reciprocity (among other things). I have come to learn that in-
groups can be very heterogeneous and move across departments, schools, ranks, academic 
and administrative domains. Being ‘in’ or ‘out’ also depends on the ability to adapt to the 
existing culture and traditions at CBU:  
 
“You want to do things differently, but the people who are already there they say 
‘no, for us, this is what we do’. So you agree with the system or you are out. If you 
are out, you are isolated… They will not like you, and you won’t get the information 
that you want... So you have to adjust to the system...You can’t work alone, you have 
to work with the others... So you become part of the tradition and culture.” 
(Informant 26) 
 
The quote above shows that one has to adapt to the existing systems and practices, in order to 
become a member of the in-group, and to be able to work at all. Sometimes, in-groups are 
defined along family lines, especially in central admin:  
 
I acknowledge that within central admin there are a few family trees of persons who 
are in some way related to each other. (Informant 22) 
 
 “You know, it's too much of the same family - concerning this institution, why is it 
like that? You will find the root cause of why all these relatives find themselves 
working in this institution. It becomes like a family business...” (Informant 7) 
 
The fact that these family relations exist does not necessarily mean that these people have 
been contracted due to nepotism. But suspicions are there, since nepotism used to be more 
prevalent in the olden days. According to Slooter (2011), this was also the case at UNZA for 
a long time. These family relations imply mutual loyalty and reciprocity, including the 
sharing of information with each other. This has resulted in a network of allegiances, where 
you have to watch out what you say and to whom, especially in central admin:   
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“I feel powerless to do anything about it. If I share something with somebody, you 
never know what will happen, we have a family tree around us, so other people may 
talk about the things I shared…  Others may report you, so I better keep certain 
things for myself… So there is this distrust and fear, you don’t know what is 
happening, what will happen to you… There may be repercussions and backfires 
later on… yes.”  (Informant 24) 
  
“If a secretary is not working well, it is me, as the manager, who has to tell her what 
she has to do, but here at CBU we often fear to do that. And the reason for it is that, 
here are many people appointed because of somebody [a PO or someone else high 
up in the hierarchy]… and that is when the fear and distrust come in, they don’t 
want to step one somebody’s toes, especially when the secretary is related to a PO.” 
(Informant 2) 
 
“A colleague can be an informant, and when you say something negative, the VC 
may hear from him, and sometimes you get punished and you don’t know why, for 
instance, you request for something, and it doesn’t come through [because of this], 
these things occur, yes. It happens also with the people that you know, because you 
never know what somebody will say to another person.” (Informant 22) 
 
Examples like the quotes above have also been provided at UNZA:  
 
“If my nephew works for UNZA, and his supervisor wants to discipline him… My 
nephew knows that he has an uncle who will come in for him… His supervisor will 
think ‘because he is a nephew to mister so and so, let me just leave it’, and as a 
result, the work suffers…” (Slooter, 2011) 
 
These quotes illustrate not only distrust, but also fear. Someone (especially higher up the 
hierarchy) may feel offended, and there may be repercussions and backfires later on. These 
repercussions and backfires include many different and subtle sanctions. For instance, you 
may not be promoted, there may be no salary increment, you may lose your committee 
allowance, a contract may not be extended, you may not be selected to go on studies, your 
application for an international conference may not be granted to you, etc. There are many 
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more subtle sanctions that may be applied when somebody’s action is perceived as 
inappropriate, offensive, threatening or otherwise undesirable. According to some informants, 
distrust and fear have far-reaching effects on behavior; they constrain initiative, activity and 
even inquiry:  
 
“Among members of staff there is a level of distrust, people may hear about our plan 
to do something, even with the best intentions, and then someone may tell the 
supervisor, and he may have access to top management…” (Informant 26) 
 
“ I cannot just go to my supervisor and ask ‘how was the workshop? What were the 
goals, the outcomes’…It is not done… Even if well intended… It would cause a lot of 
suspicion: why is she suddenly interested in this? The supervisor may feel 
uncomfortable.” (Informant 20) 
 
It is remarkable that nearly all these quotes concerning out-group distrust and fear come from 
informants from central admin. I have not come across such statements in schools. The 
descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x We don’t trust each other 
x We only trust the people we know 
x Family trees          
x Fear for repercussions and backfires      
 
Table 6.2.1.4: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘out-group distrust’.  
 
Favoritism & allegiances  
In the past, nepotism, favoritism and allegiances were a common practice in Zambia, also at 
CBU. ‘In those days, it was normal that someone who retired was replaced by his son or 
other family member’ (Informant 13). Nowadays, it’s not like that anymore, but informants 
have reported numerous suspicious cases, fueling distrust, dissatisfaction and frustration. An 
example of suggested nepotism:  
 
Out-group distrust  
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“Top management tends to put people in certain positions who are not supposed to 
be there, but there may be benefits for them when they do so. We shouldn’t appoint 
people as a consequence of favoritism. Top management brings in their relatives, 
spouses, etc., and this creates allegiances, while we should appoint people based on 
merit. Look around here, it’s like a big family tree, and as a result, the work is not 
done. These relatives are alleged to their family members, and they do whatever the 
boss is saying, even when it is not good for the institution...” (Informant 24)  
 
Apparently, there is still nepotism going on, especially at the lower levels of central admin. 
When I asked a few informants why they give contracts to their (extended) family members, 
one informant argued that 1) they want to get rid of the many claims from their extended 
family, and 2) they like to show off in front of their family. This story has been confirmed by 
several other informants. In the schools, nepotism does not seem to occur (anymore), at least 
I haven’t heard about it. Another example refers to suspicions about the role of ethnicity and 
tribalism. At some stage, it was noted (by several informants) that all deans came from the 
same tribe (Bemba) as the former VC. Around that time, the school of technology was split, 
and the two newly appointed deans were also ‘Bemba’s’. This caused some debate among 
CBU staff who wondered: Is this a coincidence or not? In the light of the split of the school 
of technology, which was perceived very negative by a lot of staff members, new suspicions 
arose. Whether true or not, these suspicions of corruption, nepotism and favoritism have 
fueled distrust and criticism from the schools towards top management and central admin. 
According to informants from (higher) central admin, suspicions of favoritism & allegiances 
(and nepotism) are sometimes based on wrong assumptions:  
 
“There was this man and the school had to confirm his contract or not renew his 
contract, but six months passed and according to the law, this man was now deemed 
to be confirmed automatically! So top management had to confirm his contract, and 
then top management was being accused of having an interest in this person, and 
imposing someone onto the school.” (Informant 13) 
 
In this case, top management simply complied with the rules of the law, but nevertheless, the 
rumor about nepotism was born and spread informally. Favoritism is often understood in 
relation to in-group collectivism and allegiances with powerful people. The general idea is 
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that belonging to a particular in-group and important allegiances increase the chances of 
being favored or rewarded, including the (quick) approval of a range of requests:  
 
“Promotion, going on trips, study leave… That is mainly for those who are 
considered the ‘least problematic’ for the people in important offices. All these 
requests are discussed in a committee, but when everyone in that committee keeps 
quiet, the preferences of the chairman go… It’s the same with the secretaries. Last 
year they went for a course, and this year, the same group goes for the same 
course!” (Informant 40) 
 
“While other study requests are being turned down, you just have to respect the 
decisions made by management and stay quiet, if you don’t want to frustrate 
yourself even further.” (Informant 39) 
 
The quotes above come from informants of central admin. In the schools, they seem to have a 
different opinion about this:  
 
“Promotions are transparent. Top management does not have a hand in these 
decisions. The same goes for study leave requests. I apply with my HoD, and the 
request will go to the committee at the school, and when approved, it will go to the 
central committee. The criteria for promotion are clear.” (Informant 44) 
 
“When you request for a conference, and you will present a paper, your request will 
be approved, as long as there are funds. My request was accepted. Nevertheless, we 
cannot fully downplay the issues of allegiances & favoritism, because they are still 
there. Within central admin, these issues are more prominent.” (Informant 41) 
 
In central admin, the accommodation of any request can be viewed as a favor by the 
approving party, which may require some effort from the requesting person. In addition, 
many informants argue that the chances of being favored by a supervisor (an HoD, a dean, a 
director or a PO) increase when the relationship with the immediate supervisor is good. This 
is confirmed by Kraakman (2011): 
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“A large number of people consider it to be of significant importance to know the 
right people and to maintain a good relationship with these people, in order to 
assure one’s job and future career advancement.” (Kraakman, 2011) 
 
However, a good relation with the immediate supervisor is not enough. Due to excessive 
centralization, every request goes to central admin, will be discussed in a committee and 
eventually requires the approval of a PO. For many day-to-day issues, staff members depend 
on the capacity and willingness of central admin departments (especially the registry, deputy 
registries and the bursar’s department) to have their requests processed within a reasonable 
time. Whether someone’s request will eventually be granted depends on many factors, and is 
– according to many informants – not very transparent. Top management is suspected to have 
a hand in the processing, approval and execution of many of these requests. At UNZA, a 
similar finding is described by Slooter (2011):  
 
“A gap arises and sometimes even a sense of distrust between the members who ask 
for approval and the members who give approval.” (Slooter, 2011) 
 
Favoritism creates allegiances (Akande, 2009). For instance, when a new school or 
directorate is established, and a dean is appointed by top management: 
 
“It is also personal… He [the VC] made me dean, so obviously, somehow he likes 
me, so I have to pay my allegiance to him, and I don’t say anything. It is matter of 
personal relationships. It is playing and interplaying on each other.” (Informant 10) 
 
Another example refers to a recent visit by the new VC to Israel. Apparently, he invited 15 
staff members to come along as well, and according to some informants, these invitations are 
clearly based on favoritism. As a result, some informants argue that these 15 staff members 
are now in some way allegiant to the new VC. Favoritism is not limited to supervisor – 
subordinate relations only. Doing small favors for each other is a widespread phenomenon at 
CBU. For instance, in efforts to achieve their goals, people may try to obtain certain 
information from others, in return for something else. Someone else may need the support of 
others in efforts to get something done, or wants to influence the decision of a committee 
meeting through the participation of others. Such favors occur, and are always reciprocal to 
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some extent. In doing so, new allegiances are being created or confirmed. The descriptions 
and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Importance of good relationships with colleagues 
x Importance of good relationships with supervisors    
x Family trees 
x Nepotism       
 
Table 6.2.1.5: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘favoritism & 
allegiances’.  
 
Tendency to refrain from feedback 
Authoritarianism, in combination with distrust, favoritism and allegiances, has resulted in a 
general but strong tendency of CBU staff to refrain from feedback. I consider this tendency 
as a very important coping strategy for the majority of the staff. During data collection, I was 
really surprised to find out that so many informants acknowledge this tendency throughout 
CBU, as a sort of collective refusal to give feedback to each other. The general response is 
that feedback can easily and quickly be interpreted as an offence, an insult or criticism, which 
may be embarrassing and perceived as being turned down (as a person). The tendency to 
refrain from feedback can also be explained in terms of conflict avoidance. The staff at CBU 
clearly avoids conflicts as much as possible; conflicts are preferably neutralized instead of 
solved. You never know how the other person will take it, and what (s)he does with that 
information. A number of informants argue that staff refrains from giving feedback because 
of job insecurity:  
 
“Yeah, yeah, they are simply afraid to lose their job.” (Informant 26) 
 
“People do refrain from giving feedback to each other, which is related to an 
attitude towards job retention. People create an environment where they are 
indispensable… As long as they are indispensable, they will not easily lose their job, 
this is what many people think. Unconsciously, people are driven by this, but they 
don’t talk about it.” (Informant 2) 
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There is this belief that when you keep quiet, you may not lose your job. Nobody 
knows, there is no information about that… If you stay quiet, they can’t find 
anything negative, nothing bad you’ve written, so you’re a good boy. If you ask too 
much difficult questions, it is different. He [the VC] may want to remove you from 
that office, and you lose emoluments and allowances.” (Informant 10) 
 
As a result, there is a deep fear of sanctions and repercussions among large numbers of staff. 
Sanctions may result in a loss of income, which CBU staff – understandably – wishes to 
avoid as much as possible. Indeed, CBU staff members share a strong orientation towards an 
increase of income through promotion, salary increments, extra allowances and other 
emoluments. This being the case, it also means that CBU staff refrains from becoming 
involved in matters that are not directly related to their own:  
 
“People tend to mind their own businesses, not offend others… I’d rather keep my 
distance, and not interfere, not get involved. I just want to keep my own image 
protected, by not interfering in other people’s work.” (Informant 20) 
 
“I don’t want to get involved, if it is me I wouldn’t get involved.” (Informant 24) 
 
Even with the best intentions, and formulated in a constructive way, it is very difficult to give 
feedback. This is not only limited to critique, but extends to positive issues as well:  
 
“I know for example… There was a person who was sent for studies [abroad] and he 
came back. Up to now we have no official position as to whether he passed or not … 
The individual himself doesn't talk about it, and nobody is asking.” (Informant 10) 
 
It may seem difficult to understand that colleagues don’t even inquire about the success and 
pleasures of one’s study abroad, simply because it might be potentially embarrassing for the 
other person, but according to several informants, it does happen. Feedback is further 
restricted when issues of seniority, hierarchical position and qualifications and come into play 
(Akande, 2009). In Zambian culture, respect for senior persons (in higher positions, with 
more qualifications) is important, and advice or feedback from juniors is often not considered 
appropriate. In the end, the dominant coping strategy is to stay quiet:  
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“So the workers tend to keep quiet, the managers tend to keep quiet; colleagues who 
see the problem also tend to be quiet.” (Informant 21) 
 
The issue of not giving feedback is not considered as good or healthy for the university, but 
people tend to refrain from feedback anyway:  
 
“Giving feedback to each other is [should be] a driving force, irrespective of what 
you are going to say, ‘it may upset you and all that…’ If we brush away those 
negative values, I think that would make us start to move in the right direction, but 
sometimes we place these [negative] values before the goals of the institution…” 
(Informant 20) 
 
The quote above indicates that maintaining a good (or ‘undisturbed’) relationship with 
colleagues is sometimes more important than performance and achievement at work. As a 
result, institutional interests are being compromised. The descriptions and explanations above 
result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Fear to offend or embarrass others 
x Conflict avoidance 
x Respect for senior persons 
x Tendency to keep quiet 
x In-group collectivism      
x Protecting each other 
x Hiding mistakes      
 
Table 6.2.1.6: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘tendency to refrain 
from feedback’.  
 
Role culture 
On many occasions during data collection, I observed that many informants demonstrated 
signs of a role culture (as opposed to task culture) at CBU. Several (more exposed) staff 
members reflected on culture in Zambia and CBU as follows:  
 
 Tendency to refrain from feedback 
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“The work culture at CBU is role-oriented, emphasizing relational aspects. It’s not 
like the Netherlands, which is task oriented, aiming at performance and 
achievement.” (Informant 17) 
 
“Our country is not result-oriented, you don’t have to achieve…” (Informant 2) 
 
Indications of a role-oriented culture include ideas and assumptions about what is part of the 
job and what is not, or about what is considered appropriate and what is not:  
 
“You see, we are paid to do our roles. Each one has got a specific role and it’s not 
my role to go and complain or tell the supervisor that the person that you are 
supervising is not doing his work.“ (Informant 24) 
 
“It is not appropriate to ask questions.” (Informant 26) 
 
Theses quotes demonstrate that ideas and assumptions about one’s role (job) are often 
considered more important than performance. Ideas about one’s role guide individual 
behavior, which I have witnessed on several occasions. These indications of a role-oriented 
culture are convergent with the tendency to refrain from feedback. The descriptions and 
explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Emphasizing relational aspects 
x You don’t have to achieve 
x We are paid to do our roles 
x It is not appropriate to ask questions 
 
Table 6.2.1.7: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘role culture’.  
 
Perceptions of exclusion 
At CBU, there is a strong strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in, which I will further 
explain in paragraph 6.3. This is a widely shared phenomenon among all categories of staff 
except top management, and refers to the need for consultation, participation and 
information. The basic argument is that all stakeholders must be on board, everyone must 
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participate, understand and agree, and plans must be shared. But in reality, opportunities for 
involvement and participation have been quite limited:   
 
“… So the issue of involvement and consultation has become so strong because we 
have not been involved during the last few years, as a reaction to the situation that 
prevailed lately, yes, absolutely.” (Informant 18) 
 
“The feeling of exclusion is a constraining factor… It is responsible for bad work 
performance, people feel frustrated and they cannot motivate themselves to work, 
and do not participate in the daily activities of this institution. We therefore must 
devise strategies for inclusiveness, and this might slow the university down a little, 
but we will proceed with a huge consensus.” (Informant 10) 
 
This strive for consensus and inclusiveness and buy-in is a good thing; it shows that staff 
members care about the institution, and are prepared to take ownership of initiatives and 
activities:  
 
“If you have been involved, you will support it.” (Informant 26) 
 
The strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in cannot be fully ascribed to the lack of 
involvement and consultation in previous years. Perhaps this tendency has always been there 
(convergent with collectivism), and the committee system made it possible for many staff 
members to be involved in some way. In this way, it can be argued that the committee system 
is an expression of (Zambian) culture.  
 
With regards to the three organizational changes under study, perceptions of exclusion 
have been expressed quite clearly, often with reference to centralization, authoritarianism 
and the ambiguous role of top management (which have already been described earlier). 
The quotes below refer to strategic planning and the introduction of a PMS:  
 
“The biggest problem is the process of strategic planning itself. I have never been 
invited to such meetings, and I have never been briefed about it, never, and I have 
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never seen it, even though I am one of the senior persons here at CBU, it’s almost 
embarrassing…”(Informant 10) 
 
“If we are talking about a change that is going to affect my work, it is important that 
people are informed, you have to bring them on board, so that they can understand 
and buy in. But as was the case with PMS, no one knew about it, we didn’t know 
what it was all about.” (Informant 24) 
 
I dare to say that perceptions of exclusion have evolved to a level of a collective allergy, 
which makes people angry and resistant to everything that comes ‘from above’:  
 
“It is easy to say, without consequences, that I was not involved nor informed or 
consulted, you think ‘go ahead with it, and leave me alone’. This small group 
around the VC is leaving the majority behind, the majority is not involved nor 
informed, so they will quickly become critical towards everything that comes from 
the VC or that group. It can even become destructive.” (Informant 10)   
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x I have not been involved 
x I have not been informed       
x I don’t know what is going on  
 
Table 6.2.1.8: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘perceptions of 
exclusion’.  
 
Negative work mentality  
Many informants, both from the schools and central admin, have shared quite some negative 
elements of the existing work mentality at CBU. Somehow, many more negative than 
positive elements have been mentioned:  
 
“I think the work culture has been quite poor.” (Informant 25) 
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“People are lazy to make decisions and also to be accountable.” (Informant 4) 
 
“…There is a lot of laziness, we are talking about work ethics, work attitude, but 
everybody wants to hide, they want to hide that they are not working, they don’t 
want to be seen while not working…” (Informant 34) 
 
“Yeah, in most cases they don’t do more than the minimum requirement and end up 
doing their minimum.” (Informant 11) 
 
Several informants from central admin have argued that elements of a negative work 
mentality are constantly being reproduced through socialization, for instance with regards to 
reporting for work on time:  
 
“Some people report for work late, they knock off early, read the newspaper the 
whole day… but they won’t actually talk to you, but you see it happening every day. 
And over time, it becomes normal, the standard, because there are no 
consequences…” (Informant 25) 
 
“…You see people coming and going whenever they feel like. Even in the offices 
where we are, we see people coming and going. There is that kind of ‘I don’t care’ 
attitude. But they report to certain people who are not doing much to help the 
situation.” (Informant 24) 
 
 “Passiveness comes in after some time, with a lack of motivation, poor attitude 
because of what you found, a sort of culture. You come across other groups of 
people, who have already arrived, you know, a sort of socialization, that you adopt 
from your colleagues.” (Informant 6)  
 
These quotes illustrate that elements of negative work mentality are being reproduced due to 
a lack of corrective management and the absence of consequences. Informants also refer to 
the prevailing time orientation and time management, which is also problematic:  
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“When I came to CBU in 2006 I think the culture was quite bad. Time keeping was 
one of the things which was very difficult for people to adjust. Even now, I think in 
certain areas time keeping is quite a challenge… They were used to, in their culture 
of coming, to do things at their own time… I used to receive a lot of resistance from 
certain individuals.” (Informant 21) 
 
“Normally, it takes two months to do the accounts, but they took a lot more time, 
and they thought it was like that, that it was normal to take so much time. But we 
said that you have to do the accounts in two months and move on. But they said ‘that 
is not possible, it cannot be done, we’re used to do the accounts for a long period of 
time’.” (Informant 23) 
 
“In the African sense, in the African environment time is stretchable, it's flexible.” 
(Informant 4) 
 
“We rarely meet targets.” (Informant 6) 
 
In the quotes above, reference is also made to the pace of organizational change, which is 
perceived as very slow. Some informants refer to the change plans that have been developed 
several years ago (with support from Dutch consultants), and that the momentum for change 
has slowly evaporated due to a lack of initiative and action during several years since then. 
Other elements of a negative work mentality refer to the focus of staff on earning more 
money, in whatever way:  
 
“People do not come to workshops [and committee meetings] to add value to the 
discussion, but to earn their DSA [daily subsistence allowance], which is sickening.” 
(Informant 18) 
 
Some informants have argued that especially among younger generations, there is an 
increased focus on earning more income, they expect allowances for activities that are 
actually part of the normal job:  
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“People want to be paid [extra], although it is their normal work. They want money 
for everything. It is the same with the committees, they want money for all these 
activities. When we set the examinations, you have to pay us. When we do 
supervision, you have to pay us. But it is part of your academic work! How much do 
you pay for setting the questions…it goes on and on and on… it is the mentality. 
Most of the time this is coming from the young ones, not the professors. The younger 
ones behave more individualistic than the older generations.” (Informant 34)  
 
According to various informants from top management, the focus on more money is a 
broader phenomenon. It is a focus on ‘consumption’, even at the cost of investments, 
infrastructure development and even health. Apparently, staff members (supported by the 
unions) usually opt for better conditions of service – preferably in monetary terms. Top 
management (but also higher central admin officials and some deans and directors) are 
sometimes disappointed by the limited effort that staff members ‘put in’. Sometimes, 
lecturers do not show up for their lectures or invigilation, they are reluctant to accept 
additional tasks (often due to private businesses), they report too many extra teaching hours 
(approved by their HoDs and deans), and there are even examples of lecturers who do not 
report for work during several weeks or even months:  
 
“Yes, a number of times some [lecturers] may not see the need to be engaged in 
certain activities [of the school], they think that it is outside their mandate of being a 
lecturer… They claim that they are busy, but that business is not within CBU, they 
are doing their own issues outside the core business…” (Informant 12) 
 
“…We are supposed to invigilate. You don’t show up. Probably the list for 
invigilation shows that three of you are supposed to invigilate. Two will be there and 
no one cares if the other one came or not, but you know such things so you basically 
do not have a specific rule that will apply to someone who fails to show up for 
invigilation. The exam will still go on.” (Informant 11) 
 
In attempts to explain the negative elements of the work mentality, several informants refer to 
a civil service mentality, which partly originates from the time before CBU was officially 
established as a separate public university:  
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“Even if I don’t work very hard… This institution is owned by government and the 
government will sort out the problems. Yeah, so it’s a government’s responsibility to 
make sure that this institution moves. There is this civil service mentality… Yes the 
government will sort out the problems…We don’t take ownership of the institution… 
And because we do not take ownership, we don’t care much how it’s performing or 
whether it’s going to be there tomorrow or not… Even if I sleep the whole year, I 
will still receive my salary every month and life will still go on. The spirit of being a 
productive individual, that is not so much there. That’s how I would explain the ‘I 
don’t care’ mentality, and that trickles down to how much effort I’ll actually put 
in....” (Informant 25) 
 
What I’ve seen is that unless you give people clear job descriptions, they are willing 
to come and sit and do nothing and hope to be paid at the end of the day. They will 
not ask or say ‘look I’m not doing anything, can you give me something to do’?” 
(Informant 2) 
 
According to various informants, remnants of this work mentality are still present at CBU 
and have not changed much over time. As we have seen in the description of the research 
setting (chapter 4), low staff morale is also acknowledged by Lulat (2004). The former VC 
saw many of these things happening, and he was keen on ruling out this so-called laissez-
faire mentality:   
 
“The first important things is reporting for work. You have to be in your office 
before 8 and not leave before 17h. I always came before 7.30 and rarely did I knock 
off before 17h. Some people said ‘when he becomes tired, he will change’, but I did 
not. The second thing doing your work, prioritize what you have to do, not just being 
in the office, but being productive and accountable. Also the use of institutional 
facilities… When you are on a private consultancy, you cannot use university 
facilities or do that within office hours, but it was happening, and it’s cultural, it‘s a 
lack of accountability. But these are broader cultural issues, you can see it 
everywhere in the country, in the ministries, in all offices, also in other African 
countries.” (Informant 37) 
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In previous sections, we have already read about the authoritarian way the former VC tried to 
change the existing work mentality at CBU, and how his actions have been perceived by the 
staff. According to some, his authoritarian interventions have done more damage than good, 
and contributed to a drop in the work mentality of the staff, resulting in frustration, 
indifference and even alienation (see next section). The descriptions and explanations above 
result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Civil service mentality 
x Hiding and scapegoating 
x Laziness 
x Weak time management 
x Lack of pro-activity       
x Wait and see 
x Laissez-faire attitude 
x Personal interests prevail over institutional interests 
 
Table 6.2.1.9: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘negative work 
mentality’.  
 
Indifference & alienation  
Over the years, a lot of frustration has accumulated among large numbers of staff. There is 
frustration about the lack of proper teaching & learning facilities, about the lack of progress, 
about centralization, too much bureaucracy, authoritarian leadership, the lack of corrective 
management, the ongoing lack of transparency, perceptions of exclusion and the lack of 
information sharing. There are more sources of frustration that informants have shared, the 
list is long. It has made people angry, and eventually some of them have lost hope and feel 
detached; they don’t care anymore – as long as they get their salary:  
 
“There is frustration…You have tried, but it didn’t work out, so you give up. As a 
result, you don’t care anymore. Especially in central admin, not so much in schools, 
because they have classes to attend, students are waiting for them. But academics 
nowadays spend more time on their private businesses than on their classes, so they 
are actually withdrawing from CBU in a way.” (Informant 2) 
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“So in the end, I would say that as long as individuals are getting good money, good 
salaries, then they feel okay, fine, even if we can’t get those other things [better 
laboratories and facilities, more equipment], it’s all right…” (Informant 9) 
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Accumulation of frustration 
x Nothing ever changes 
x There is nothing I can do      
x I don’t care anymore 
 
Table 6.2.1.10: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct 
‘indifference/alienation’.  
 
 
6.2.2 Structural / organizational constraints  
Structural constraints relate to organizational features of the university, such as the 
management system and decision-making processes. Some structural constraints are 
apparently consistent with cultural constraints and often occur together in SSA countries – for 
instance authoritarianism and lack of transparency. I have put them in a separate category 
since structural constraints refer to organizational practices and processes at all levels of the 
university. For the sake of overview, I first present a list of all the second order constructs 
found under the aggregate dimension ‘structural/organizational constraints’. Then I will 
describe and explain each structural/organizational constraint separately. 
 
Second order construct      Aggregate dimension 
 
x Excessive centralization 
x Sources of discontinuity  
x Committee system for decision-making 
x Weak accountability mechanisms     
x Weak compliance  
x Elected deans  
x Lack of transparency & information sharing 
 
Table 6.2.2: Overview of second order constructs under the aggregate dimension 
‘structural/organizational constraints’.  
Indifference/alienation  
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Excessive centralization47 
Everybody at CBU considers the university as highly centralized. All the power is at the top, 
and everything has to be decided by top management. PO’s are represented in almost every 
committee, which means that top management is pulling all the strings at CBU. It also means 
that the desks of PO’s are full of requests, memo’s, reports, minutes of meetings, etc., waiting 
for their attention and approval. This results in delays, which are furthered by their frequent 
absence from campus. When PO’s are off campus very little can be decided and the 
university’s continuity is at stake. Centralization is also characterized by an administrative 
dominance over academic affairs; central admin is better equipped than the schools, and 
according to many informants, central admin is not responsive to the needs of the schools.  
 
Deans and directors are often excluded from management meetings, and explanations are 
hardly provided. Transparency about finance is lacking and information is often not shared. 
The high level of centralization is acknowledged in several documents from CBU (CBU, 
2009b, 2010c, 2011) and Nuffic tender documents (Nuffic, 2005, 2009, 2010).  
 
In chapter 7, a detailed description of centralization at CBU will be provided, including 
quotes that illustrate high levels of dissatisfaction among staff concerning the current 
situation. The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- 
and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x All power is at the top 
x Everything has to be decided by top management 
x Discontinuity when PO’s are off campus 
x Little involvement of deans & directors in decision-making 
x Lack of transparency/information 
 
Table 6.2.2.1: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘excessive 
centralization’.  
 
Sources of discontinuity  
There are several sources of discontinuity at CBU that hinder normal university operations 
and organizational change. The most important source of discontinuity is government 
                                                          
47 A lot more information about centralization and decentralization will be provided in chapter 7.  
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interference, including irregular and insufficient funding48. Another important factor is absent 
top management. For instance, PO’s are often away from campus, not available to carry out 
their managerial duties, to participate in meetings or to discuss issues with colleagues. 
Meetings are regularly postponed (sometimes cancelled), contributing to all sorts of delay 
and even inertia, according to some informants:  
 
“You find the leadership here on Monday. On Tuesday they are on their way to 
Lusaka. They come back over the weekend. They come here on Monday signing 
checks and on Tuesday they leave for Lusaka again. Meanwhile, they’re supposed to 
make decisions.” (Informant 5) 
 
Another source of discontinuity is represented by transitional periods in which an acting VC 
and DVC are put in place. In such transitional periods all important decisions are postponed 
until a substantive VC and DVC are formally appointed.  
 
“The current leaders that are there… It is very difficult, because both of them are in 
acting capacity, and when you’re in acting capacity you don’t know whether you 
will continue or not. You just wait for today and you don’t know what happens 
tomorrow… It creates a vacuum” (Informant 5)   
 
Another important source of discontinuity is represented by strikes by staff and students, 
which do occur every now and then, and disrupt normal university operations for at least a 
few days up to several weeks. According to a deputy registrar, the African environment is 
quite militant, and sometimes requires tough measures from top management. Below is a 
transcript from a national newspaper in Zambia:  
 
“Police have arrested about 16 students from the Copperbelt University (CBU) after 
the never-ending problem of a lack of accommodation erupted into a string of 
violent confrontations. Apparently the university decided to remove all squatters 
from its hostels – to the chagrin of the students, who had been led to believe that a 
“let sleeping dogs lie” policy had been applied similar to at the University of 
Zambia in Lusaka. All tertiary education institutions in Zambia suffer from a 
                                                          
48 This will be further explained under ‘external/contextual constraints’ (paragraph 9.3.3). 
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desperate shortage of hostels. A subsequent student protest at the Mposa Mabwe 
Statue in Kitwe ended in chaos as riot police moved in with teargas. After police 
arrested Copperbelt University Students Union (COBUSU) President Oscar Mbewe 
and other union members, students went on a class boycott to “force management to 
listen to their grievances over [the] accommodation crisis”, stated COBUSU. In 
response, CBU suspended five executive members of COBUSU – and chaos erupted. 
The students rioted, resulting in two of them being admitted to hospital. One of them 
fell from the third floor, while the other is asthmatic and therefore did not take to 
being tear gassed by police. Five students were arrested.” (Zambia weekly, 
September 2013) 
 
Due to these student riots, CBU closed down on the 15th of August resumed its academic 
activities not before the 6th of September in 2013. There have also been strikes by the staff, 
for instance when the former VC wanted to abolish the medical scheme for the staff in 2011. 
The staff laid down their work in order to protest against this intended decision:  
 
“The [former] VC wanted to abolish the medical scheme, get rid of it, and we were 
really prepared to pull him out of CBU. The VC cannot come and say ‘the medical 
scheme is unsustainable, and I will close it later this month’. Over my dead body!” 
(Informant 9) 
 
Under pressure of the staff (and the unions), CBU decided to continue its contribution to the 
medical scheme, and the staff went back to work. The descriptions and explanations above 
result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Irregular and insufficient funding 
x Absent top management     
x Acting VC/DVC positions      
x Strikes by staff and students 
 
Table 6.2.2.2: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘sources of 
discontinuity’.  
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Committee system for decision-making  
The main decision-making bodies at CBU are the university council, the senate and top 
management. These decision-making bodies rely on a large number of committees that 
guarantee the involvement and participation of both academic and administrative staff. 
Altogether, it’s quite a circus of many meetings, invitations, agendas, members, minutes, 
allowances and catering, which require a lot of staff time and money. It generates a large 
bureaucracy and red tape, involving a lot of paperwork and planning, which is coordinated by 
central admin. In general, the staff is satisfied with the committee system, but an often heard 
complaint is that there are too many committees, and that they slow you down:  
 
“We operate by using committees. You can't make most of the decisions, you can't 
make them alone as an individual. We have a committee in the school, the school 
board. So because of that, a number of things happen slower than you would prefer 
them to happen… There is too much bureaucracy.” (Informant 3) 
 
“It has to move from this committee, approves, goes that committee, approves, goes 
the other committee, and that takes time… Decision-making is very slow. At the 
moment, we have too many committees” (Informant 4) 
 
“There are always meetings, meetings, the committees, voting in the committee and 
so on.” (Informant 26) 
 
The committee system is a system of ‘checks and balances’ which levels out subjectivity and 
extreme opinions of individual managers, and guarantees a certain level of democracy. The 
committee system is founded on the belief that group decisions are better than individual 
decisions: 
 
“Group decision-making is valued more than individual decision-making.”  
(Informant 4) 
 
A widely shared problem of the committee system (up to the highest level) is that decisions 
can be (and are often) manipulated:  
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“Most of the decisions in the university council have already been made in a small 
executive council meeting that precedes the official council meeting. Deans are not 
involved in these executive meetings, and then the decisions have already been 
made. The same goes for other management meetings and committee meetings; 
before the meetings start, the decisions have already been made.” (Informant 38, 39 
and 40) 
 
Not only the VC but also other chairpersons have been accused of manipulating committee 
meetings:  
 
“Sometimes, you have a lion chairing the committee meeting, and it will be the lion 
who determines the outcome of the meeting, although it is documented as a shared 
committee decision.” (Informant 5) 
 
Due to slow decision-making, schools cannot respond quickly and adequately to emerging 
opportunities and changing circumstances in the environment. As such, the committee system 
negatively affects the efficiency of university operations. In addition, committees seem to 
diffuse responsibility, away from the individual managers. As one informant put it:  
 
“Committees cannot take responsibility, they are not accountable.” (Informant 37) 
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x There are too many committees 
x Too much bureaucracy 
x Committees slow you down       
x Checks & balances      
 
Table 6.2.2.3: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘committee system for 
decision-making’.  
 
  
Committee system for decision-
making  
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Weak accountability mechanisms 
As already indicated earlier, accountability at CBU is generally weak. According to several 
informants, only the VC is held accountable (by the university council and the government):  
 
“The VCs are always held accountable and no one else.” (Informant 10) 
 
Many informants acknowledge that it is mainly the VC who stands to be corrected during 
university council meetings, but due to conflicts of interest, external accountability is 
sometimes compromised:  
 
“There were conflicts of interests between top management and the UC [university 
council], sometimes the UC came down to the level of top management, and it was 
not clear who was overseeing who, part of it can be described as familiarity, while 
in governance, you should separate between governance and management, 
otherwise you compromise…It became difficult to hold top management 
accountable” (Informant 25) 
 
Internally, accountability is little developed, and there are several examples that contribute to 
this idea:  
 
The organizational structure doesn’t make a provision for accountability. 
Everything goes through committees here. And the VC does not invite individual 
deans demanding accountability periodically.” (Informant 9) 
 
There are no periodic meetings between supervisors and subordinates to monitor ongoing 
activities; they only meet ‘when there is an issue’. Since there are no periodic meetings 
between top management and individual deans, there are no periodic meetings between deans 
and individual HoDs, nor between HoDs and their individual staff members. They do meet as 
groups in various committees, but not primarily for accountability purposes. Another 
indication of weak accountability is that there has never been a standardized PMS in place 
(except for the junior staff), which has had negative effects on the work mentality:   
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“So that is the biggest problem that I have seen, that without performance appraisal 
we are letting things run as they are, those who perform, perform, those who don’t 
perform they don’t perform. Those who perform begin to feel maybe overused or 
something, so they also reduce on the effort that they put in. So we are likely to 
experience a situation where you have certain number of individuals who are hard 
workers. The other individuals are not hard workers and they know that nothing will 
happen to them so they still do nothing to change their kind of behavior.” (Informant 
12) 
 
“You know when you are working in an institution where certain behaviors are not 
punished you don’t feel the punishment, okay? So I didn’t work very hard during the 
year but during the following year I still get a salary increment. I think that is not 
good. It sends people to sleep. It sends people to sleep… They don’t account for the 
eight hours that they spend in the university because nobody is going to ask about it 
anyway.” (Informant 25) 
 
During the management workshop in Mukuba (2011), one participant exclaimed: “In the end 
no-one is being held accountable.” And someone else said: “There's nobody to reprimand 
anybody in the system.” This also means that bad performing staff members are rarely 
reprimanded or disciplined, and that hard workers are often not rewarded, much to the 
frustration of many informants. Managers throughout the university – at all levels – are 
struggling with performance management; they find it extremely difficult to actively manage 
the performance of their staff, especially when problems emerge and corrective measures are 
needed. To some extent, this is related to the fact that deans are elected and HoDs operate on 
a rotational basis (this will be explained later). But the main difficulty is that, generally, 
people at CBU refrain from (giving) feedback, due to all sorts of reasons (as described 
earlier). The lack of corrective measures and sanctions has resulted in indifference.  
 
Managers at CBU clearly don’t like accountability. They don’t like to be held accountable by 
their supervisors, and they don’t like to demand accountability from their subordinates. It has 
occurred to me that most informants don’t even talk about it. Supervisors and subordinates 
(especially at the lower levels of the university) prefer to work together as colleagues, there is 
a tendency to protect each other and to avoid conflicts at all cost. Problems and conflicts are 
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preferably ignored, neutralized (sometimes with the use of humor) or transferred - not solved. 
Several informants from central admin have highlighted examples from supervisors who 
were reluctant to take any corrective measures against a weak performing staff member; 
apparently, they are even reluctant to discuss the issue with the person in question. Instead, 
they apply for a transfer of ‘the problem’ to another department, so that no further action 
would be required. Managers don’t like to solve problems and/or conflicts:  
 
“Because they're going to become unpopular… They don’t want to lose popularity 
or they think that this person is going to blame them for whatever happens, if they 
lose a job or they get demoted. They do not want that, we all want to be popular.” 
(Informant 25) 
 
Incidents (for instance with weak performers) are sometimes reported to top management 
and/or central admin, but not many informants believe that something will be done about it. 
Their expectations from central admin and top management are very low in this respect; 
some stopped sending memos and reports at all. At CBU, accountability is usually 
understood as the mechanism whereby the subordinate from the lower level is (or should be) 
held accountable by the supervisor from the higher level (which rarely happens). 
Accountability by a supervisor towards his/her subordinates is even more uncommon. As 
such, top management is not accountable to the deans and directors; they seem to make 
decisions on their own, without considering issues of transparency and information sharing:  
 
“They [PO’s] are not questionable, you cannot pressure them, they’re not 
accountable to the people lower than them. You can’t say ‘why are you doing this?’ 
Top management is not answerable to anyone.” (Informant 28) 
 
Top management has argued that there cannot be decentralization in a situation where 
there is no accountability (which is understandable from their point of view). Interestingly, 
however, they never demand accountability from the deans and directors (under the 
previous VC/DVC, until 2011):  
 
“The previous VC never evaluated any of the deans, he never did that but he was 
supposed to do that. He should have invited them to his office for evaluation, and 
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then the deans could have evaluated their HoDs, and the HoDs could have evaluated 
their staff, but it never worked. The previous VC didn’t take accountability serious; 
he didn’t summon deans to come to his office periodically to discuss progress and 
other things…” (Informant 2) 
 
The lack of accountability has been a prominent feature in the implementation phase of the 
2009 – 2013 strategic plan. Schools (and other units) had to establish implementation 
committees who were accountable to a central committee. However, most of these 
committees disappeared shortly after being established, and only very few reports were sent 
to the central committee. To a large extent, the lack of implementation was kept silent:  
 
“Now these committees did not meet and report to the central committee that they 
could not implement anything due to a lack of funds, then central admin would have 
known, but instead, it was kept silent.” (Informant 2) 
 
Of course everybody (including central admin and top management) knew that very little (if 
anything) was being done by the schools (concerning the implementation of the strategic 
plan):  
 
“There wasn’t much being done from the implementation committees in the units.  
And, if you are not getting feedback from the units then the whole thing can’t work.” 
(Informant 19) 
 
The central committee did not report to top management, and top management was not 
leading the implementation process. Eventually, the strategic plan implementation became a 
non-issue and slowly disappeared from the agenda of management meetings, and people 
stopped talking about it:  
 
“At every meeting you’re being challenged; why you are not achieving certain 
things that are in the strategic plan, every meeting you’re being challenged about 
that, you start thinking that the only way to get that challenge off me is by stopping 
to call for those meetings, and then you’ll see the meetings going down, down, down, 
until they disappear…” (Informant 20) 
196 
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x ‘No-one is being held accountable’ 
x No periodic supervisor-subordinate meetings  
x No PMS in place        
x Staff is not reprimanded/rewarded  
x Conflicts are avoided 
x Usage of humor, fun and jokes       
 
Table 6.2.2.4: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘weak accountability 
mechanisms’.  
 
Weak compliance 
Compliance refers to adherence to policies, rules, regulations and SOPs. In the case of CBU, 
it has become clear that many staff members (also in managerial functions) do not have or 
know these rules and regulations, and usually they are not easy to obtain:  
 
“At Mukuba [the management workshop in 2011], it came out, that standard 
operating procedures concerning recruitment and finance could not be found, no 
one knew where they were, or they were not disseminated.” (Informant 17) 
 
“The draft document on financial regulations should be updated, formally approved 
(revisions made in December 2006 have remained interim implying that the 
revisions are not binding and can be ignored) and disseminated (most budget 
holders do not have copies of this document).” (Observation during Mukuba 
management workshop 2011) 
 
A similar thing can be said about other policies and regulations. Until recently, some policies 
existed only in draft form, since the original policy had been adjusted but was not yet 
formally approved:  
 
“Many of the documents we have in the university are either draft and they have 
been in draft form for years. They have never been formally approved.” (Informant 
4)  
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Some informants claim that people at the lower levels are often unaware of certain policies, 
rules and regulations. Of course, it is impossible to comply with rules and regulations that are 
unknown and unavailable:  
 
“So SOPs eventually boil down to the question ‘does this look all right to me?’ or 
‘how did we do this last time’?” (Informant 18) 
 
Some informants claim that due to excessive centralization, there is no need for compliance 
at the lower management levels; everything is being decided and executed by top 
management anyway. They argue that top management creatively applies and adjusts rules 
and regulations in accordance with their needs, while staff members at the lower levels are 
forced to adhere to them; every request is being scrutinized (and disapproved instantly when 
the procedure is not strictly followed). 
 
In the eyes of many informants, non-compliance also refers to the lack of rule enforcement 
by managers at all levels, especially when it involves personnel and performance 
management (convergent with weak feedback- and accountability mechanisms). For instance, 
at CBU there is a widespread reluctance to use the disciplinary code. The descriptions and 
explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Policies kept as drafts 
x SOP’s not available 
x Policies and SOP’s not disseminated     
x Lack of rule enforcement 
 
Table 6.2.2.5: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘weak compliance’.  
 
Elected deans and rotational HoDs 
At CBU (and other public universities) deans are not appointed by top management, but 
elected by the academic staff in the school (for 4 years). HoDs are not elected, but operate on 
a rotational basis (for 2 years). This system has far reaching consequences for leadership and 
management in the schools. It is suggested by many informants that a dean is primarily 
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accountable to his/her electorate – not to top management, which is a strange and unusual 
phenomenon, at odds with modern university management. It goes even further:  
 
“If a dean shared information with top management, he could be considered as a 
‘boot leaker’ by his electorate. So many deans shunned being seen to be 
‘moonlighting’ with the VC, because that could be perceived as something which is 
not in the interest of the electorate. So when serious issues came up, they would 
rather discuss it within the school and find a solution themselves.” (Informant 17) 
 
If a dean wants to be re-elected after four years, (s)he should be mild to the staff and take 
popular decisions. As a result, deans find it very difficult to be strict:   
 
“It was very difficult for a dean to discipline somebody, because they voted for him, 
so the dean was accountable for his voters, not to the VC, yes.” (Informant 17) 
 
Apparently, most deans wish to be re-elected; the extra allowances and emoluments are 
simply too attractive:  
 
“…If they want re-election then they have to be very good to their staff.” (Informant 
10) 
 
“They want to keep that job and for them to keep the job they can’t be disciplining.  
Some people voted them into power. They will lose the election next time.” 
(Informant 27) 
 
The academic staff members in the schools are well aware of this mechanism, and they tend 
to choose on the basis of their own (personal) interests, not necessarily the interests of the 
institution at large:  
 
“This time they choose a person who is becoming popular, popular means the one 
who agrees with everybody. Of course, most of these deanships are actually 
discussed in the corridors.  This time, I think we will put this guy, of course he's okay 
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with us, he's okay meaning he's not a problem to us.  He won't demand too much and 
things like that.” (Informant 10) 
 
As a result, deans don’t stand very strong, and their power is limited. For instance, an 
academic can refuse to comply with the demands from the dean, without any consequences of 
punishment:  
 
“When you have an elected dean and you know that he really has no grounding 
[clout, position, authority] whatsoever, it's like telling him: ‘Look, don't ask me a 
question. You're just as weak as I am. The only thing protecting you is that you took 
over the deanship. But if you stretch this, I can also expose you’."  (Informant 10) 
 
The quote above illustrates that an elected dean can operate within the margins of what is 
considered acceptable by the majority of his/her staff. The same goes for HoDs, especially 
when they wish to become a dean themselves later on:  
 
“People are afraid of performance appraisal, at CBU, UNZA and Mulungushi. 
Deans, as elected managers, they are afraid of enforcing accountability in their 
schools, because they know that they are going to step on so many toes, and they 
may not be re-elected, they will say that ‘he was too tough on us’. Also HoDs fear, 
because they become academic colleagues of the ones they were leading previously. 
And if you wish to become a dean, you must have been a good HoD first, because 
you have to stand for elections.” (Informant 37) 
 
When HoDs and deans primarily focus on the (personal) interests of the staff, it is an 
unavoidable consequence that institutional interests become less important. From the 
perspective of top management, this is a counterproductive situation, very difficult to 
manage. Many times, top management is opposed by the deans, which creates an impasse in 
decision-making - a waiting game (Schipper, 2011). Top management has often created a 
breakthrough with force, supported by centralization and authoritarianism, in order to get 
things done. According to some informants, top management prefers ‘weak’ deans, who do 
not oppose top management.  
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Several years back, CBU needed architects for the construction of new university buildings. 
Top management thought that by making use of the architects at the school of built 
environment, money could be saved, since commercial rates would not be applied. But 
eventually the dean from the school of built environment submitted an invoice to central 
admin based on commercial rates (on top of their normal salary):  
 
 “An elected dean wants to be elected for a second term, unpopular decisions may 
backfire at him afterwards, and he may be kicked out during the elections. Who is he 
[the dean] supporting? CBU, to contribute to the university as a whole, or the greedy 
experts in the [building] project? We really need executive deans.” (Informant 18) 
 
According to the informant quoted above, the system of elected deans is not reliable, because 
the deans are accountable to their academic staff who are in the pursuit of their personal 
interests, insufficiently committed to the goals of the institution. As a result, this informant 
concludes that CBU needs executive (appointed) deans. The descriptions and explanations 
above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Deans are accountable to their electorate 
x Deans/HoDs find it difficult to be strict 
x Deans/HoDs struggling with performance management   
x Reluctance to use disciplinary code   
 
Table 6.2.2.6: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘elected 
deans/rotational HoDs’.  
 
Lack of transparency & information sharing 
The observed lack of transparency & information sharing is convergent with centralization, 
weak accountability, weak compliance, distrust and perceptions of exclusion. The lack of 
transparency/information sharing is a systemic feature at all levels in CBU, and mentioned by 
many informants. The general impression is that decisions are made by a small group of PO’s 
and that these decisions are not communicated or explained:  
 
One time, the deans and directors were saying: we have not been informed. And then 
top management said: ‘why didn’t you ask’? I wondered how can I ask about it if I 
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don’t even know about it? Unless I heard something about it, a rumor, then I could 
have asked for clarification. There used to be announcements so that you were at 
least informed, or a bulletin, but that one is not there anymore. There were different 
channels through which you were informed, but these channels ceased to exist. So 
what happened is that I suddenly heard that Mr. X is the new dean, and that Mrs. Y 
is now the deputy registrar, and so on, you were just informed of the decisions that 
had already been made.” (Informant 2) 
 
“But when it is about buying cars instead of lab equipment, those are executive 
decisions, isn’t it? So when such a decision is made [to buy cars], we can only cry 
and claim that it is a wrong decision, why buy cars when the lab equipment hasn’t 
been bought? There is no dissemination of information about these decisions.” 
(Informant 28) 
 
“There are some things that are just kept up there, among a very small group of 
PO’s.” (Informant 24) 
 
The lack of transparency/information sharing does not mean that information is never shared. 
Dissemination of information does take place (although not as much as desired by many), 
also by top management:  
 
“Last year we were told that we had to domesticate the public finance regulations so 
that it fits our own institution, and I am glad to tell you that this has now been 
approved by council, and we are running copies for dissemination right now.” 
(Informant 17) 
 
Also during the management workshop in 2011, a number of general presentations has been 
provided (for instance about financial management, the roles of certain committees, work 
ethics) just for the sake of dissemination. Top management did this so that all managers are at 
least aware and informed about certain issues, which they would not be otherwise. The lack 
of transparency/information sharing is very clear with regards to finance. At the management 
workshop in Mukuba, some clear messages were transmitted to top management:   
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“From the perspective of the Schools, financial management has not been handled 
in a transparent manner as there was no internal stakeholder committee to monitor 
or control expenditure patterns.” (Observation during management workshop 
Mukuba 2011) 
 
“The presentation made clear that the current financial regulations provide for tight 
central controls which have inadvertently been translated as absence of 
transparency at the lower levels of the university.” (Observation during management 
workshop Mukuba, 2011) 
 
Many informants think that top management provides information strategically (only when it 
suits them):  
  
“Before informing everyone, they first think ‘is this okay to send to everyone?’, or 
should we not inform them about it? Transparency has not improved much, is still 
the same.”(Informant 9) 
 
“But when the money comes [from the government], sharing the money nobody 
knows even the date when the money came in or you hear decisions have been made 
about this is going to be done and this is going to be done and that’s it.” (Informant 
10) 
 
The lack of transparency/information sharing can be observed clearly in all three changes 
under study. With regards to decentralization and the introduction of a PMS, many 
informants wondered what was happening, what was going on, or why nothing was 
happening. There had been a number of workshops, plans had been developed and discussed, 
and then they didn’t hear about it anymore. In such cases, the lack of 
transparency/information sharing resulted in a lack of understanding. Also in strategic 
planning & implementation, the lack of transparency/information sharing is prominent:  
 
“Strategic planning involves money. But money issues are always shrouded in 
secrecy. There is no transparency about money. When there would be openness, it 
would be much easier to have open discussions about what to do, where to go and 
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how. Money is misapplied, PO’s go on foreign trips to Denmark, South Africa, 
India, China… they just take the money which was earmarked for other approved 
activities, whether it is good for CBU or not…” (Informant 20) 
 
“The lower ranks, they never hear about it, they hear that someone has gone to a 
workshop, in Ndola, in a nearby hotel, but when they come back there is no meeting 
to share information, so they just do whatever they are told, and for the rest they 
never hear about it.” (Informant 26) 
 
“Try to find out who has a copy of the strategic plan, it is only the top and middle 
management who know about it, but they don’t share information.” (Informant 24) 
 
A lot of information at CBU is shared through memos; in fact, there is an enormous amount 
of memos circling around the university. Memos from top management, memos from 
committees, memos from individual staff members to their supervisors, memos from HoDs to 
their deans, memos from deans to top management, etc.:  
 
“Our traditional method here to communicate is by writing memos. There is a large 
flow of memo’s streaming through CBU… [laughing], but memo’s take long to be 
read… At CBU, there is this communication channel system, you write a memo, send 
the memo, it goes by the secretary, upwards, and by the time the memo reaches the 
intended person, the VC or whoever, the whole idea has gone stale, and then a 
memo is sent back to you, through all these levels, maybe a month later…” 
(Informant 28)  
 
Everybody knows that dissemination of information through memos is not very effective; 
memos are often not received, not read or not read on time, and certainly not always acted 
upon. By sending memos back and forth, open communication is constrained. The suggested 
lack of transparency/information sharing is so prominent that it made me think whether the 
informants could have done more themselves in order to be informed. What prevented them 
to do something (more) themselves, instead of solely waiting for the supervisor to come up 
with new and more information? The answer to this question can be found in the combination 
of centralization with authoritarianism, fear and distrust, negative work mentality, sometimes 
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resulting in indifference and alienation. The descriptions and explanations above result in the 
following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x No transparency about finance 
x No communication/explanation about decisions 
x Lack of openness        
x No meetings to share information     
 
Table 6.2.2.7: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘lack of transparency & 
information sharing’.  
 
6.2.3 External/contextual constraints  
External constraints relate to factors outside CBU that have a big influence the overall 
functioning - and thus organizational change - of the university. Some external constraints 
relate to structural constraints, such as discontinuity and irregular funding. I have put them in 
a separate category since external constraints refer to contextual and institutional factors in 
the direct and indirect environment of the university. For the sake of overview, I first present 
a list of all the second order constructs found under the aggregate dimension 
‘external/contextual constraints’. Then I will describe and explain each external/contextual 
constraint separately. 
 
Second order construct      Aggregate dimension 
 
x University governance and interference by the government 
x The role of the unions     
x Irregular and insufficient funding      
x Context of structural poverty  
 
Table 6.2.3: Overview of second order constructs under the aggregate dimension ‘external/contextual 
constraints’.  
 
University governance and interference by the government 
Government is represented in the university council, and perceived by many as the most 
important stakeholder in the institutional environment of the university (Lulat, 2004; Ng’ethe 
et al, 2008). Legislation, governance and interference by the government goes a long way at 
CBU and limits the institution’s autonomy substantially:   
 
Lack of transparency & information 
sharing 
External/contextual constraints  
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“Everything that happens depends on the direction of the government. So everything 
depends on the government.” (Informant 11)49 
 
“The most constraining thing really is we are a 400% government owned public 
institution, so our hands are tied… For example the fee structure, the fees our 
students pay here they are much, much below the [actual] cost… We cannot change 
that, the government cannot allow us…” (Informant 4) 
 
After national elections in 2011, a new government had to be established with new political 
parties and resulting in newly appointed ministers etc., which affected CBU in several ways:  
 
“In 2011 we had a change of government, a different political party, and they can 
have an influence on decentralization within CBU. New members for the university 
council are appointed from the new political party, a new VC and DVC are 
appointed under the new government….” (Informant 2) 
 
“This is an election year (2011), for national elections, so that anything that 
happens, or anything that seems to go against government, will be deemed as an 
opposition to government. So executives running government institutions, are very 
careful to make decisions that can make the government unpopular…” (Informant 
33) 
 
The quotes above illustrate that relations with government are important and have to be 
handled with care. Public universities are sensitive to what happens in national politics and 
vice versa. New political parties, new ministers and new government representatives in the 
university council can bring in new ideas and changes at CBU. Government policies can also 
influence operations at CBU. For instance, at some stage, the government aimed at 
harmonization and rationalization of policies within the public sector. This was much 
debated. These issues delayed some of the processes at CBU:  
  
                                                          
49 Because of this, the government can also impose organizational changes onto CBU, which has happened (for 
instance) with regards to the implementation of the PMS. This will be further described and explained in 
chapter 8. 
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“Universities used to have their own financial regulations, but there was an 
announcement at one point, that all public universities should adhere to the public 
finance regulations, so we had to work with the public finance regulations…” 
(Informant 17) 
 
Efforts to harmonize and rationalize policies in the public sector also delayed the 
development of a PMS, because it had to be aligned with other public universities in Zambia 
(UNZA and MU). The appointment of a new VC and DVC is another good example of 
government interference (resulting in discontinuity, as described earlier). The recruitment and 
selection process can take a long time, especially in times of a change of government (as was 
the case in 2011/2012). Government interference in the appointment of a new VC and DVC 
should not be underestimated:  
 
“When a new VC and DVC have to be recruited and selected, people like to know 
[about] that. And we’ve heard that the best one is not selected, because someone in 
Lusaka [from the government] said ‘let’s take one of these candidates’, and that’s 
how it goes. Some candidate may be backed by someone in the government, while 
the other is not. There was even a petition about the appointment of the new VC, 
through the unions, but there has not been an outcome.” (Informant 10) 
 
“There are ministers and they have relatives here and so on… it is related to clout, 
political circles, relatives. This is an example of government influence and 
interference. There are people in government that say ‘for this institution, we now 
need this person, he can do something’. These things can only happen in Africa.” 
(Informant 22) 
 
University governance by the government is strict and binding, and includes micro 
management and interference at CBU with regards to many issues. PO’s have to travel to 
Lusaka frequently (often weekly) for obligatory meetings with government officials (for 
instance at the ministry of education, or the ministry of finance). Some say that CBU should 
open a management office in Lusaka, so that the university can be run from there!   
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“When they call you, you have to go. And when they say that you have to sort this 
out, you have to go and do that. Each week, each month, there are always issues, 
they [PO’s] have to go and resolve the issues at the ministry, at this ministry or the 
other.” (Informant 2) 
 
The government imposes a lot of demands onto CBU, including all sorts of interjecting 
assignments that top management has to execute50. The other way around, CBU is not 
entirely happy with the service orientation of the MoE. According to several informants, the 
focus of the MoE has always been on primary education, not on universities. And this turned 
out to be a crucial disadvantage when CBU submitted a tender-proposal for the establishment 
of a new textile institute nearby, to be financed by India:  
 
“What happened is… Our papers went to the Ministry of Education, and it was stuck 
there. No one was attending to them because there is no university desk there. Now 
the Indians are building the textile Institute in Malawi and we have lost out.” 
(Informant 4) 
 
The missed opportunity is attributed to the limited institutional capacity of the government, 
also reported by Haglund (2008). The descriptions and explanations above result in the 
following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x National elections affecting university operations 
x Legislation 
x Appointment of university council members 
x Obligatory meetings in Lusaka                    
x Interjecting assignments                  
x Appointment of new VC/DVC 
x MoE is not focused on universities 
 
Table 6.2.3.1: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘university governance 
& interference by the government’.  
 
                                                          
50 Convergent with statements from Haglund (2008) and Lulat (2004) about pervasive government interference 
in Zambia.  
University governance & interference 
by the government 
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The role of the unions  
An important feature of Zambia’s HRM landscape has been the role and the strength of the 
labor movement. The country has been and continues to be highly unionized (Muuka & 
Mwenda, 2004). Unions play an important role in higher education as well. At CBU, there 
are three main unions: the Academic Union, the Senior Admin Union and the Allied Workers 
Union. These unions actively protect the staff members, not only in disciplinary cases or 
when the conditions of service are at play, but also in other cases where staff members 
disapprove and oppose decisions from top management.  
 
According to many informants, the previous VC was not in favor of the unions; he made it 
difficult for them to operate, and even frustrated membership. He was constantly at 
loggerheads with the unions about many issues. For instance, the unions challenged top 
management’s plan to withdraw from the medical scheme, to economize on the conditions of 
service of staff and the decision to split the school of technology. It is not surprising that a 
PMS could not be implemented under his regime; people thought that a PMS was meant to 
victimize the staff. Industrial action (strikes) by the staff (initiated and supported by the 
unions) occurred regularly. The new VC encountered problems with the unions even before 
he was formally appointed:  
 
“The current VC started on a bad note, his qualifications were challenged by the 
union. That case ended in court, the unions wanted to block his appointment.” 
(Informant 13) 
 
Employees tend to trust their union leaders more than CBU top management. Under the new 
VC/DVC the PMS could only be implemented after gaining support from the unions. The 
unions at CBU communicate with the national unions, and therefore have a lot of power:  
 
“The union leaders can talk to high officials in Lusaka, and the minister (or the 
president) can call the VC for clarification. If the unions want certain things to be 
done, they can go and speak to the minister directly.” (Informant 6) 
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 “The vice president of the national trade union has an enormous influence on CBU, 
because he is a resident of Kitwe, and talks to the workers at CBU. This man is my 
junior, but he may have direct contact with the president of Zambia.” (Informant 46) 
 
In efforts to change things for the better, top management often struggles with the unions. 
According to top management, the unions mainly aim at the improvement of the conditions 
of service for the staff members:  
 
“The unions are always making a strong point for ‘consumption’ [salaries & 
allowances], they never go on strike because they want equipment, they don’t fight 
for investments.” (Informant 37) 
 
In fact, top management argues that as a result of this almost exclusive focus on salaries and 
allowances, necessary investments in education, research and even health are being 
jeopardized. At the individual level, the unions protect the employees, and challenge every 
attempt from management to discipline a malfunctioning staff member:  
 
 “A union will never castigate a worker for his failures, even when he is drunk. So 
how can you change the work culture at CBU? So these are real challenges for us.” 
(Informant 13)  
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Strong and active unions at CBU 
x Contacts at high (political) levels 
x Industrial action and court cases 
x Aiming at ‘consumption’ (conditions of service) 
x Protecting the employees 
 
Table 6.2.3.2: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘role of the unions’.  
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Irregular and insufficient funding 
Financial problems at CBU are huge and have resulted in periods of financial hardship. 
Government grants come in late or don’t come in at all, and one never knows how much 
money will come: 
 
“When the funding modalities are not clear and unpredictable, when tuition fees do 
not reflect the actual costs, and when the grant does not come on time, and the level 
of the grant is not reflecting the activities on the ground, it is very challenging.” 
(Informant 37) 
 
“We don’t receive the funds from government on time. It is very unpredictable; you 
don’t know in which month you will receive the funds. There are grants, which come 
in regularly, but other funds, like the tuition fees, you never know when they come 
in. So it is still firefighting in that respect.” (Informant 23)  
 
Firefighting means that PO’s struggle with financial deficits, because there is never enough 
money to do what is actually fixed in the approved budget. Quite often, PO’s have to shift 
priorities to guarantee that at least the salaries of staff can be paid:   
 
“Because the government funding is very low…therefore, everything goes to 
emoluments, salaries of staff…” (Informant 34) 
 
Earlier on, I have already described that, when there is not enough money to pay the salaries, 
top management borrows money from the schools. Strategic planning and implementation 
becomes very difficult when funds are scarce. In fact, everything becomes difficult:  
 
“What crisis do you have, what do we attend to now? So in terms of long term vision 
to say let's do this…That becomes very difficult. You just deal the problem at hand 
now. And those problems may not necessarily be the core responsibilities of the 
institution. For instance, suddenly the water utility company says ‘you haven’t paid 
the water bill’… Then your main call of business is diverted because now you have 
to focus on issues like that… As a result you are firefighting and improvising offices, 
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improvising classroom facilities, you are improvising laboratory facilities.” 
(Informant 2) 
 
The chronic lack of adequate funding has created the need for cash flow planning, in efforts 
to bridge periods without new funds flowing in:  
 
“When you open the academic year, students are paying the fees, there is a part of 
the budget that comes in from the government, and there is part that comes from the 
students, and when this money comes in, we have to plan, to focus on a period of at 
least six months. This month we have a lot of money, but next month we don’t have 
much money, so we need to plan our cash flows, at least six months…” (Informant 
23) 
 
The majority of staff at CBU refers to the government when talking about funding problems. 
As if there is nothing that CBU staff can do themselves to improve the situation. According 
to the 2009 – 2013 strategic plan, generating income is an absolute strategic priority. During 
the management workshop in Mukuba (2011), one participant argued that CBU tried to relate 
to the business sector, without much success, ‘since there are not many opportunities for 
income generation’. This is difficult to understand, especially since CBU is located in the 
heart of the mining region:    
 
“Why are we not taking advantage of our position here? I don’t know because we 
maybe blaming the government, but that's a lame excuse. It's not only the 
government. Why can't we make a paradigm shift here? Why can't we make our own 
income, and then let the government grant supplement? We're able to make more, 
much more than what we get from the government.” (Informant 4) 
 
At CBU there is a strong need for income generating activities that contribute substantially to 
the university budget. But the sharing ratios are not in favor of the university at large, but 
mainly serve the personal pockets of the employees. The descriptions and explanations above 
result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
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First order construct     Second order construct 
 
x Irregular funding 
x Insufficient funds 
x Firefighting and improvising    
x Need for cash flow planning     
 
Table 6.2.3.3: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘irregular and 
insufficient funding’.  
 
Context of structural poverty/prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
Zambia is a very poor country with low income levels, low education levels, high 
unemployment, health problems, etc., which is reflected in many ways at CBU; funding 
problems, poor infrastructure, scarcity of (qualified) lecturers and a general attitude among 
staff towards job security and a strive for more income. Many staff members at CBU come 
from ‘very humble beginnings’ (informant 33), and they do everything they can to retain their 
job. Job loss would be really terrible for many of them, since another job is not easy to 
obtain. A loss of income then means that the house cannot be paid anymore, the children 
cannot go to school anymore, and other bills cannot be paid. In other words: a job at CBU 
makes a world of difference.  
 
The attitude towards job retention is very clear at CBU, often resulting in a tendency to 
refrain from feedback, and maintaining good relationships with supervisors and colleagues. 
The strive for more income has resulted in (requests for) allowances for all sorts of activities 
that are actually part of the normal job, especially among the younger generations: 
 
“They want money for everything. It is the same with the committees, they want 
money for all these activities…When we set the examinations, you have to pay us. 
When we do supervision, you have to pay us. But it is part of your academic work! It 
is the mentality... Most of the time this is coming from the younger ones, not the 
professors. The younger ones behave more individualistic than the older 
generations. They want money, money and money.” (Informant 34) 
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In addition, a lot of staff members have side jobs or run a personal business outside CBU, in 
order to earn more money. Personal interests prevail over institutional interests, which is 
convergent with elements of negative work mentality.  
 
HIV/AIDS has had a dramatic impact on CBU, until a few years ago. Until only a few years 
ago, several staff members of CBU died of AIDS each month! The situation has improved a 
lot since retroviral medicines are available:   
 
“So, that has improved a lot to help the situation stop. But before that was available, 
let’s say like five years ago, there were like two funerals a month.” (Informant 9) 
 
The improvements have been achieved by the medical scheme for the staff, which is 
supported by CBU. Understandably, the staff became very angry when top management 
wanted to stop the financial contribution by CBU in 2011. The descriptions and explanations 
above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Funding problems 
x Focus on more income within CBU 
x Side jobs outside CBU 
x Attitude towards job retention 
x Impact of HIV/AIDS 
   
Table 6.2.3.4: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘context of structural 
poverty’.  
 
 
6.3 Enabling factors in organizational change 
 
Of course, organizational change at CBU does not only suffer from constraints; there are also 
positive signs and indications of hope. During data analysis, I have identified a number of 
enabling factors that can be considered as supportive to organizational change. According to 
my informants, however, there are many more constraining factors than enabling factors. The 
enabling factors are quite general and shared by many informants, not specific for the 
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organizational changes under study. For the sake of overview, I first present a list of all the 
second order constructs found under the aggregate dimension ‘enabling factors’. Then I will 
describe and explain each enabling factor separately. 
 
Second order construct      Aggregate dimension 
 
x Motivation and job satisfaction 
x Good relations with colleagues    
x Strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in 
x International cooperation  
x Slightly favorable labor market conditions 
 
Table 6.3: Overview of second order constructs under the aggregate dimension ‘enabling factors’.  
 
Some of these enabling factors may seem to oppose certain constraining factors. For instance, 
the second order construct ‘motivation and job satisfaction’ is almost the opposite of 
‘negative work mentality’; ‘good relations with colleagues’ seems to oppose ‘out-group 
distrust’; and finally, ‘the strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy in’ seems to oppose 
‘perceptions of exclusion’. In reality, these seemingly opposing constraining and enabling 
factors co-exist, as they apply to different informants in different parts of the organization 
and on different moments in time. When opposing constraining and enabling factors apply to 
one and the same individual, they tend to have a mitigating effect on each other, resulting in 
moderate ideas & opinions about leadership, management and organizational change at CBU.  
 
Motivation and job satisfaction 
Despite the many frustrations and difficulties at CBU, there is also job satisfaction and 
motivation, resulting in a positive work mentality. Many informants are happy to contribute 
to the development of the nation and its people, by producing good graduates (‘building 
future generations’):  
  
“When I see people who are dedicated to their work, that makes me happy because I 
think what we do here [at CBU] impacts so much on the overall economy of the 
country. We are producing people who are going to go into the industry… For the 
development of the country. So it’s a very big -- it’s a very big responsibility, yes.  
It’s a very big responsibility that we have.” (Informant 25) 
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“What makes me happy is that every year we have a graduation ceremony, and I 
have also contributed to that, that gives me some joy in my work.” (Informant 20) 
 
There is also satisfaction about the conditions of service:  
 
“What I’ve noticed here, people do feel motivated if their conditions of service are 
reviewed, you say like, each year. And if they’re getting a salary at the bank at the 
end of the month, I see that the motivation comes through that.” (Informant 9) 
 
“Well, at the moment, I can say based on the level where I am, lecturers is a more or 
less conducive. The conditions of service, I cannot describe them as being bad when 
we compare with the general employment status in Zambia.” (Informant 7) 
 
For academics, job satisfaction stems from doing research, serving the students, academic 
freedom, their relative autonomy (academics only have to be on campus for teaching hours), 
opportunities for staff development and promotion, and international travel. For 
administrators and management, the sources of job satisfaction and motivation are partly 
similar, although they don’t have as much professional autonomy as academics. Other 
elements of a positive work mentality include (for instance) being part of management, 
taking responsibility, contributing to the development of CBU, being committed, willing to 
learn, improving performance and integrity. Despite the widespread critique, several 
informants appreciate (parts of) what (the previous) top management has done. In general, the 
atmosphere at CBU is always pleasant, with good humored staff, jokes and a lot of laughter 
every day. It brings about happiness and contributes to job satisfaction:   
 
“Yeah sometime you cannot have a meeting of say two hours without humor you 
know, you can’t be serious throughout. So there are times when an issue of humor is 
brought in just to live up the meeting.” (Informant 24) 
 
I have observed (several times) that humor also provides an escape from confrontational and 
uncomfortable issues when a solution is not immediately available. For instance, during the 
management workshop (Mukuba, 2011), jokes were made by the VC, the DVC, the registrar 
and several others when dealing with serious issues like the PMS and decentralization. It 
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seems that, when difficult issues arrive at the table and no immediate answers of solutions are 
available, laughter provides a way out from an uncomfortable situation, although the issue at 
hand is not solved. During data collection I increasingly interpreted such laughter as a 
confirmation of tolerated inertia (at least temporary). The descriptions and explanations 
above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Satisfaction about the conditions of service 
x Building future generations  
x Contributing to the development of the nation    
x Autonomy in academic work     
x Willingness to learn 
x Integrity 
x Humor, jokes & fun 
   
Table 6.3.1: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘motivation and job 
satisfaction’.  
 
Good relations with colleagues 
Generally, informants are satisfied about the work atmosphere, support from their colleagues, 
helping each other and teamwork. This is convergent with the observed tendency to refrain 
from feedback, role culture, in-group collectivism, favoritism & allegiances. Everybody aims 
at good personal relationships with colleagues, sometimes at the expense of work and 
performance. But good relationships with colleagues are not unconditional but reciprocal; 
often, there should be given something in return. I have not heard many complaints from 
academics about their relationships with deans and HoDs in the schools, although the 
situation differs per school. In some schools, information is shared and staff is consulted and 
involved in meetings, while in other schools levels of consultation and information sharing 
are much lower:  
 
“Our dean has always organized meetings with staff to share and explain all the 
information that he gets his hands on. If a memo comes from central admin, he’ll 
make copies for everyone and send it across so that everybody is aware of what is 
happening.” (Informant 28) 
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“You assume that information provided by top management will be shared by the 
deans, but that is not happening everywhere. Some deans who go to meetings keep 
the information for themselves.” (Informant 17) 
 
In central admin, relations with colleagues in general are also good, although relations with 
supervisors are often considered more problematic. The descriptions and explanations above 
result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x Good work atmosphere 
x Support from colleagues 
x Team work        
x Information sharing & consultation by supervisors 
   
Table 6.3.2: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘good relations with 
colleagues’.  
 
Strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in51 
The strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in is greatly stimulated by perceptions of 
exclusion (which has been dealt with earlier on), but the basic strive for involvement has 
always been there, and the democratic committee system for decision-making is actually an 
expression this. As such, the committee system is an expression of culture. The committee 
system has always guaranteed a certain level of participation of staff, and staff members have 
become used to that system of decision-making:  
 
“The university was designed based on a model of inclusiveness, the committee 
system, you never did anything on your own. You would present an idea and talk 
about it, and write it out on paper, and discuss it with some colleagues, in a 
departmental meeting and later in the board of studies. Then, it would go to the 
central level, where it is discussed in other meetings and committees, senate, and in 
every meeting the proposal would be improved thanks to the suggestions provided 
here and there, and eventually, the proposal would be approved by everyone and 
                                                          
51 Although I have categorized this as an enabling factor, there is also a serious downside to it; the 
omnipresent strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in can become unworkable and slows down 
organizational change.  
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drawn up as a final version, so that the registrar could sign. People have become 
used to that system.” (Informant 10) 
 
 “Therefore management should be able to involve everyone, that’s the role, to make 
sure that everyone understands, everyone buys in, everyone becomes part and 
parcel, and feel proud.” (Informant 13)  
 
At CBU, this strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in is exceptionally strong, stronger 
than I have ever seen anywhere else. Almost all informants refer to it, and they do so all the 
time.  The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and 
second order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
x The committee system 
x Everybody wants to be involved   
x Everybody wants to be consulted  
x Everybody wants to buy-in 
   
Table 6.3.3: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘strive for consensus, 
inclusiveness and buy in’.  
 
International cooperation 
Over the years, CBU has profited a lot from international cooperation with institutions from 
abroad, often facilitated by funds provided by international donor agencies. Some of the 
benefits are already described in chapter 4 (research setting). CBU has Memories of 
Understanding (MoU’s) with many universities around the world, for instance in South 
Africa, the United States, Malaysia, Japan China, India, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and 
Norway. Support has also been provided by UNESCO, the World Bank and the Association 
of Commonwealth Universities (CBU, 2009a, 2010b).  
 
Since the number of PhD holders at CBU is very low, and the position of CBU in 
international indices is unenviable, international cooperation can really make a difference. 
Staff members go on international scholarships, curricula are reviewed and research agenda’s 
developed. Such activities strengthen academic collaboration with other HEIs around the 
Strive for consensus, inclusiveness and 
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world. Norad (a Norwegian donor agency) provided funds for the construction of lecture 
rooms and staff offices. The ICT network and administrative support systems have been 
improved with support from Nuffic. Some equipment has been provided for the library, and 
books have been purchased. Many other things have been realized with foreign support, 
which CBU could never have achieved on its own.  
 
International cooperation has also provided a lot of professional (skills) training for leaders 
and managers, academics and administrators at CBU. This has helped CBU to improve on 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency. All in all, the advantages of international 
cooperation are numerous. However, international funds do not come in unconditionally; 
donors can be powerful (Rossi, 2004) and impose policy priorities (Van den Heuvel & 
Maassen, 2009), including prescriptive formats and procedures for project planning, financial 
management, monitoring & evaluation and reporting (Harley, 2005). They can to some extent 
influence ‘what will be done’ and ‘how things should be done’ in the projects they fund. As 
such, international donors are important stakeholders in CBU’s institutional context. The 
descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs:  
 
 
First order construct     Second order construct 
 
x Staff development opportunities 
x New ICT network & systems    
x Improved curricula and research agenda’s  
x Professional training of staff  
   
Table 6.3.4: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘international 
cooperation’.  
 
Slightly favorable labor market conditions 
Although there is still a shortage of qualified staff for CBU in Zambia, job scarcity is a bigger 
problem for many people. In many ways, the difference between having a job and not having 
a job is huge. Job security is an important issue for everyone, also in the surrounding mining 
industry, when suffering from decreasing copper prices on the world commodity market. At 
the same time, it is argued that the conditions of service at CBU are ‘not bad’, and that 
employees are generally satisfied with their work. Altogether, this has made CBU a more 
attractive employer compared for highly skilled professionals and academics. Whereas good 
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and qualified staff used to prefer to go to the mining industry, they become increasingly 
interested in jobs at CBU. This situation provides good opportunities for recruitment & 
selection. The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- 
and second order constructs: 
 
 
First order construct     Second order construct 
 
x Staff development opportunities at CBU 
x Satisfaction about conditions of service at CBU 
x Instability of the private sector    
x Job scarcity/lack of jobs  
   
Table 6.3.5: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘favorable labor market 
conditions’.  
 
As you can see, there are ‘internal’ and ‘external’ enablers; the former relate to factors within 
CBU (such as motivation and job satisfaction), while the latter refer to factors outside CBU 
(such as favorable labor market conditions). For the sake of overview, I have grouped them 
together under enabling factors.  
 
 
6.4 Changes in constraining and enabling factors over time 
 
Due to the longitudinal research approach, I managed to collect data when the new leadership 
had been put in place, in terms of a new substantive VC and DVC. Although many 
constraining factors and enabling factors remained largely the same, there are some 
significant developments that are worthwhile describing and explaining. In this paragraph, I 
will highlight the most important developments.  
 
6.4.1 Positively perceived developments 
It took quite a while before the new VC and DVC were appointed; the transition period (with 
an acting VC and DVC) lasted nearly a full year. Once they were appointed as substantive 
PO’s, several informants had good hopes for improvements as compared to the previous top 
management, which had caused ‘a lot of damage’. Some informants claim that the new VC is 
more consultative and that his office is open for everybody. He launched so-called ‘Indabas’; 
Favorable labor market conditions  
221 
 
these are sessions for discussing things openly, to speak up, hoping to improve 
communication between top management and the schools and central admin52. In the 
meantime, several other things have changed for the better: several informants told me that 
the new top management is working hard and takes the interests of the schools very serious. 
Good work is being done in terms of staff development, recruitment and infrastructure 
development (including laboratories and equipment):  
 
“The new leadership takes the interests of the schools more seriously. Under the 
previous VC, we asked for equipment to teach, but it never came. Since the last 2 
years however, we have seen equipment coming. Also in terms of staff recruitment, 
more is being done.” (Informant 41) 
 
The registry is also working hard to improve its performance, and has put in place two more 
deputy registrars; one specifically for planning (under the office of the VC) and another one 
to deal with the heavy administrative workload within the registry. Progress is being made in 
terms of updating policies and SOP’s, providing job descriptions, decent archiving, efficient 
processing of requests and online student registration. As one informant puts it:   
 
“We are resolving some of these grey areas, we have an updated recruitment policy, 
HIV-AIDS policy, procurement policy… Now we have a new university council and 
they want all this information to be available so that everybody knows what and how 
things are to be done… We are also developing an induction manual for new staff, 
so when they come they know where to look for information, etc. Also for deans 
when they assume office. It is a new development [they never had induction 
manuals], but things are moving...” (Informant 17) 
 
Another positive development is that, facilitated by the new University Act (2013), university 
statutes are being prepared (CBU never had statutes): 
 
                                                          
52 An Indaba is an important conference held by the principal men of the Zulu or Xhosa peoples of South. 
Africa. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indaba  
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“The new Act makes it possible to create university statutes; we can think of new 
guidelines and procedures, SOPs, it is an opportunity for CBU to redesign the best 
way of university governance, and so on and so forth…” (Informant 17) 
 
A committee has been assigned to prepare these statutes, which will be adapted to the 
specific situation and context of CBU. According to top management and higher central 
admin, this is an opportunity for CBU to create its own identity (as opposed to UNZA and 
other Zambian HEIs):  
 
“We have now come to a stage where we can speak of a CBU culture. The 
institution has grown, while previously all policies came from UNZA, there was 
nothing contextualized to the situation in Kitwe, but now, even at the national level, 
CBU is considered as a separate institution, with its own procedures, which will 
culminate in the university statutes.” (Informant 46) 
 
The university statutes will allow for appointed deans (as opposed to elected deans). In 
anticipation of this, a few ‘acting’ deans will be formally appointed by top management. Top 
management (and higher central admin) considers this as a very positive development, but 
the schools don’t like it.  
 
Already initiated under the previous leadership, and furthered by the new VC/DVC (since 
2012), the number of temporary (fixed) contracts has increased, and supposedly, this has a 
positive effect on the work mentality of staff:  
 
“The culture and the work mentality have changed in the last 5 years. We no longer 
have pensionable employees, they all get contracts, which will not be renewed when 
they don’t perform. Nowadays most people get contracts for a fixed period of time. 
In terms of work culture and mentality, it has been a positive change. The ones with 
fixed contracts can even be sponsored for further studies.” (Informant 39) 
 
Regarding the organizational changes under study, there is positive news about the PMS and 
(to some extent) strategic planning, but not about decentralization. More information about 
these organizational changes will provided in chapter 7 (decentralization), 8 (performance 
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management) and 9 (strategic planning & implementation). The descriptions and 
explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second order constructs: 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups): 
x New VC/DVC in place 
x University statutes are being developed 
x Indabas for open discussion 
x More recruitment of new staff 
x Better staff development opportunities 
x More and new infrastructure development    
x Work mentality improvements due to temporary contracts 
x Vehicles are again controlled by the schools  
x Implementation of PMS  
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top 
management & higher central admin): 
x Registry improving its performance 
x Additional deputy registrars in place  
x Appointed deans coming up  
   
Table 6.4.1: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘positively perceived 
developments since the appointment of a new VC/DVC’. These developments can be considered as new 
enabling factors.  
 
6.4.2 Negatively perceived developments  
Not all is positive since the new substantive leadership is in place. For instance the Indabas, 
which were much appreciated by many in the beginning, are not very popular anymore. In 
fact, very little academics showed up:   
 
“The only disappointing thing is that when it came to academics, these meetings 
were shunned; very few people [academics] attended those meetings, I don’t know 
why. Sometimes people are not very sincere when they say that they don’t know what 
is happening. I think sometimes people shun these things because they have got 
preconceived ideas.” (Informant 25)   
 
More informants (especially at the lower levels) increasingly perceive the ‘Indabas’ with 
skepticism; they argue that although the ‘Indabas’ started with openness and room for 
discussion, the new VC is using these sessions more and more to explain what he is doing, 
instead of consulting and listening to the staff. Nowadays, the Indabas only occur when there 
Positively perceived developments 
since the appointment of a new 
VC/DVC 
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is an issue (to explain, to clarify). Informants from top management and (higher) central 
admin argue that the Indabas were organized to share information:  
 
“You assume that information provided by top management will be shared by the 
deans, but that is not happening. People who go to meetings keep the information for 
themselves. In fact, that was the reason why the Indabas came in.” (Informant 17) 
 
From a management perspective, the limited participation of staff in the Indabas is received 
with mixed feelings:  
 
“How can you provide information and explanations when the staff is not coming?” 
(Informant 45) 
 
Some informants think that the ‘Indabas’ will slowly fade away and come to an end. Another 
negatively perceived development relates to leadership. Some accuse the new VC of being 
authoritarian (too):  
 
“You have to sell your ideas with arguments. When he [the VC] cannot sell an idea, 
he will use shortcuts, but then the staff members cannot buy into the idea and they 
will cooperate only at a superficial level, because deep down there is a lot of 
resistance, and this resistance comes in many different forms. Some will resist 
openly, other will embark on guerilla warfare, coming late, absenteeism, not doing 
things that are supposed to do, not meeting deadlines…When the VC uses shortcuts, 
perceptions of authoritarianism come in.” (Informant 42)  
 
Some informants are not happy with the way the dean of the school of business was set aside, 
others complain about the decision from top management to build an exam tent on campus 
without involving others, which caused a lot of resistance. In fact, negativity has already 
started to accumulate, thereby confirming already existing patterns of negative imaging:   
 
“He [the new VC] has developed a small group of people around him that he trusts, 
instead of involving everyone. It’s something like a cartel. The majority of us, will 
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not be involved and not informed. And you can see the rest, not involved, watching: 
there goes that group again…” (Informant 10) 
 
In general, many informants display a ‘wait and see’ attitude, allowing the new top 
management some time to prove its new approach to leadership, management and 
organizational change. Although top management has put in place two new deputy registrars 
(to improve planning and the performance of the registry), not everyone believes that this is a 
good development:  
 
“They now have a new deputy registrar for planning, but for me that only means that 
they are making central admin even heavier than it already was, with money that 
should have been invested elsewhere in the university...” (Informant 22) 
 
This critique is shared among informants from the schools (including deans). Another point 
of criticism comes from the deans and directors; they argue that their involvement in 
management meetings with top management is still limited and irregular (‘we only meet 
when there is an issue’). They also condemn the amount of foreign travel by top 
management, even at times when the salaries could not be paid.  
 
Regarding the organizational changes under study, there isn’t much negativity about the PMS 
and strategic planning (so far), but there is still a lot of frustration and dissatisfaction about 
(the lack of progress in) decentralization. More information about these organizational 
changes will provided in chapter 7 (decentralization), 8 (performance management) and 9 
(strategic planning & implementation).  
 
The descriptions and explanations above result in the following overview of first- and second 
order constructs. These negatively perceived developments are not shared by all informant 
groups: 
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First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management and higher central admin): 
x Indabas are ad hoc and used for one-way communication 
x Indicators of authoritarianism 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by the deans & 
directors and schools): 
x Additional deputy registrars are not necessary; the 
money should have been invested in the schools 
 
Fully diverging ideas & opinions (deans & directors):  
x We are not involved in regular management meetings 
with top management 
x Frequent travels by top management 
 
Fully diverging ideas & opinions (top management and 
higher central admin): 
x Skepticism of staff towards Indabas 
 
Table 6.4.2: Overview of first order constructs under the second order construct ‘negatively perceived 
changes since the appointment of a new VC/DVC’. These developments can be considered as new 
constraining factors.  
 
For the sake of overview, the entire list of constraining factors and enabling factors, including 
new (positively and negatively perceived) developments, is provided in annex 3. This list 
entails the relevant first order constructs, second order constructs and aggregate dimensions.   
 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks  
 
My report about constraining and enabling factors provides a description of undercurrents 
that actually ‘live’ as vivid memories in the heads of my informants. It is through this 
perspective of undercurrents that informants perceive and interpret the current situation, 
including attempts to achieve the desired situation.  
 
As already argued at the beginning of this chapter, the informants’ accounts weren’t all that 
positive. Underneath the surface of friendly behavior and attitudes, jokes and smiles, there is 
a lot of dissatisfaction and frustration among the staff, in the managerial, the academic and 
Negatively perceived changes since 
the appointment of a new VC/DC 
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the administrative domain. This negativity is captured in my description of constraining 
factors, which severely outweigh the positive effects of the enabling factors and new 
(positively perceived) developments. Despite these (recent) positive developments, many 
cultural constraints still apply, also under the new leadership: 
 
“Despite the change of leadership, nothing much has changed [concerning the 
cultural constraints]. There is a general tendency to think that when top management 
is tough, then the people will get in line, and whatever they say goes…[They think 
that] ideas that come from the top are the best. But it doesn’t seem to work very well 
sometimes. It would be very different when other people could bring forward their 
ideas… But even in meetings people are scared to propose something different than 
what is coming from the top… “ (Informant 40) 
 
“In meetings, when somebody differs with the chairperson, he says, no no no, you’re 
differing with my opinion, so you’re no longer going to be somebody in that 
department… So it has happened just like that… And this has to do with 
authoritarianism, it is intimidation…” These things are still going on, even with the 
new management there, if not, for the worse!” (Informant 38) 
 
Of course, opinions about leadership and management differ per person, depending on their 
own experiences and stories. Some informants are more positive about the new leadership, 
but tacit convictions of authoritarianism and favoritism still haunt large numbers of staff at 
CBU. Surprisingly, one informant argues that many (cultural) constraints are actually only 
‘mental’ constructs:  
 
“We have more enabling factors to develop and bring change, than to allow 
ourselves to say that we have constraints, I have constraints, I have constraints… In 
CBU everybody looks at the government… We would make a lot of headway if we 
did not put our problems onto somebody else… Nobody can convince me that we are 
poor, nobody, we are only poor in our heads.” (Informant 34) 
 
Although his analysis may be right, these ‘mental’ constraints are often reflected in behavior, 
and therefore not only mental, but very real in its consequences (negative work mentality, 
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lack of pro-activity, not taking responsibility, coping strategies, etc.). Organizational behavior 
is heavily influenced by - to some extent determined - by the mental models that my 
informants have developed over time.  
 
Basically, the perceptions and interpretations of my informants about leadership, 
management and organizational change inform us about culture and institutions in Zambia 
and at CBU. The influence of culture refers to elements of ‘national’, organizational, tribal 
and/or professional culture. Institutional influences mainly refer to the government, unions 
and also international donors. Many (though not all) constraints are also acknowledged at 
UNZA (Slooter, 2011). Although I do not want to embark on an extensive organizational 
comparison between CBU and UNZA, it seems that both organizations share characteristics 
of a broader pattern.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Dominant mental models on decentralization 
 
In this chapter I will describe and explain the dominant mental models with regards to 
decentralization. As already explained earlier, these mental models include an assessment of 
the current situation, a description of the desired situation, and the ideas, opinions and 
suggested interventions in order to achieve to desired situation. This will be described in 
consecutive paragraphs 7.1 to 7.3. In paragraph 7.4, different dominant mental models on 
decentralization will be provided and explained, displaying the levels of convergence and 
divergence among the various informant groups. At the end this chapter I provide some 
concluding remarks (7.5).  
 
 
Figure 7: The mental model on decentralization.  
 
Parts A, B have already been described in chapter 6. In this chapter, I will first describe parts 
C, D and E, and then E, according to the following logic of reasoning: you first need to know 
where you are (C) and where you want to go (E), before being able to say how you wish to 
get there (D). The dominant mental models are presented in paragraph 7.4.  
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Since the lists of first order constructs (under C, D and E) are quite extensive, I have included 
these lists in the annexes. The lists of second order constructs and related aggregate 
dimensions are incorporated in this chapter.  
 
 
7.1  Assessment of the current situation with regards to decentralization  
 
According to all informants, CBU is a highly centralized institution, where all power is 
concentrated at the top. Almost everything has to be decided and approved by top 
management. Although the deans are formally in control of their approved budget, deans 
cannot authorize expenditures. Numerous examples have been provided to illustrate the 
situation:   
 
“At schools and departments, the biggest problem is that we cannot easily get what 
we want. For instance, the printer/copier has stopped working three weeks ago, and 
until now there is no replacement. Now that is very difficult for a school. If we had 
money, we had bought another one, or had the other repaired. Top management 
controls procurement, the schools, everything, they control all the funds. Even the 
money that we earn during evening classes goes into the central account.” 
(Informant 9) 
 
Due to excessive centralization, top management is overwhelmed with work, resulting in 
delays: 
 
“I don’t know how those guys [top management] can manage…If you go to the VC’s 
office, it is crowded with papers… If you go to the registrar’s office, it is flooded 
with papers… The problems of centralization are evident, very sure…” (Informant 
18) 
 
According to this informant, piles of work accumulate on the desks of PO’s, resulting in 
unworkable situations. The suggested delays further increase especially when considering the 
limited presence by PO’s on campus:  
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“Everything must be decided by the VC, and then, when the VC is away, nothing 
moves, it shouldn’t be like that.” (Informant 18) 
 
“…You cannot proceed when the key people are not there.” (Informant 2) 
 
There is widely shared frustration about centralization in relation to red tape and bureaucracy 
at CBU. Often, informants refer to the committee system by which the university is run. 
According to many informants, there are too many committees, and they slow down normal 
university operation:  
 
“The committee system provides checks and balances, but at the same time, they 
slow you down.” (Informant 3) 
 
“Every issue has to move from this committee, approves, goes that committee, 
approves goes the other committee and that takes time.” (Informant 4) 
 
PO’s are represented in nearly all committees; they can influence the decision-making 
processes and its outcomes, much to the frustration of many informants: 
 
“The control is with the politburo, finally there are these few people who compose 
the politburo and they make the decisions, so they overrule whatever you say…” 
(Informant 28) 
 
The ‘politburo’ refers to the group of PO’s, who are perceived to be in control of almost 
everything. Deans and directors claim that PO’s want to be in charge and to control the funds, 
in order to use a part of the funds for other purposes and according to their own priorities (not 
necessarily the priorities of the schools). Consequently, many informants from the schools 
say that central admin is better equipped than the schools, and that central admin is not 
responsive to the needs of the schools. Some informants argue that top management wants to 
control university funds to be able to pay for their personal ‘extravagances’, such as 
international trips, expensive cars and other things they themselves want: 
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“When schools ask for better tables and chairs, the answer is always the same: there 
is no money. Secretaries [at central admin] have air-conditioning, PO’s buy 
expensive cars, while nothing is being invested in the laboratories, etc.” (Informant 
20) 
 
In the case of CBU, centralization goes hand in hand with authoritarianism. In fact, I believe 
that they have mutually strengthened each other. Examples of the former VC interfering and 
bypassing, causing fear and apprehension among the staff are numerous and express a lot of 
frustration:  
 
“He was a big dictator” (Informant 9), and: “He terrorized the staff” (Informant 10) 
 
“When Musonda came to the scene, he really changed certain things, openly and 
directly. He tried to change things related to coming on time, doing your job 
properly, following the rules, etc. And you could see him doing that, blasting at 
someone for instance [laughing]… It was not hidden, he was authoritarian, that is 
the right term, he was very authoritarian, and it became much worse later on.” 
(Informant 18) 
 
Over the years, dissatisfaction about authoritarianism has grown, resulting in opposition and 
resistance, strikes by the staff and students. The former VC has been accused of many things:  
bypassing, interfering, manipulating committee meetings, acting single-handedly without 
consulting anyone, etc. It is the impression of many informants that top management can 
approve or disapprove what they want, without involving deans and directors. Decisions are 
made by PO’s even without sharing information with them. PO's do not seem to be 
accountable to the middle management, and they are not transparent about the motivations for 
certain decisions. As a consequence, news about top management decisions is often spread by 
the word of mouth, in the form of rumors. There used to be management meetings, including 
deans and directors, but during the second term of the former VC, they became very irregular 
and little inclusive:  
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“Ideally, the VC and the top management are supposed to meet deans and directors 
periodically, but it never happened… We even changed the name, we called it the 
VC’s committee…” (Informant 18) 
 
Top management decides on almost everything, thereby making lower levels of management 
(deans and directors) directly and heavily dependent on the involvement of PO’s in every 
request they make. Top management decisions are often influenced by the quality of the 
relationships with the requesting persons. This has resulted in favoritism and also distrust:  
 
“If you have a lot of power, you have more control, and you will make sure that 
those in the periphery must come begging to you. When they start begging for you, 
then you’re powerful.” (Informant 5) 
 
“The VC would always like to please a certain group of people, they were always 
given what they wanted, a sort of favoritism. But the others, they were not happy 
with the way the VC operated. I cannot tell you which groups or people they were, 
but they never got anything.” (Informant 28) 
 
Many informants believe that no one else but the PO’s have the power to get things done. If 
someone from a lower level of management tries to organize (for instance) a meeting, in 
order to get something done or to solve a particular problem, others may not believe that it 
will go anywhere, just because there is no PO involved. This observed negligence towards 
lower levels of management has grown and has strengthened over time. Centralization at 
CBU is facilitated by the University Act, financial regulations and standard operating 
procedures (SOP’s) that have remained unchanged for a long time:   
 
“I think the whole thing [centralization] was too much embedded in the standard 
operating procedures that we used for too long. What it means is that we have to 
change a lot of things, the system, the university is leaning too much on the 
committee system, so there are all these committees that have to sit, and of course 
there is a lot of staff involved, deans and everybody… But the fact that you have to 
bring this matter to a committee, of course chaired by the vice-chancellor….” 
(Informant 17)  
234 
 
Many informants have openly doubted the willingness of top management to embark on the 
process of decentralization. Many informants wondered why nothing was happening, after all 
the discussions, workshops, and expressed commitments towards decentralization? The 
attitude of top management towards decentralization has been at least ambiguous. Many 
informants openly doubt the willingness of top management to embark on decentralization: 
 
“It’s just personal interests of the people at the top, they don’t want decentralization. 
They think that when funds are decentralized, they lose the control over funds, they 
are afraid of that, as long as they are in control, they can do what they want, they 
make the decisions…” (Informant 28) 
 
Some informants argue that in Africa, a leader (referring to the VC) needs to preserve his 
authority to decide and to sign, because that is what gives him power. If a part of that 
decision-making power devolves to lower levels of management, the power of the leader will 
decrease. At CBU, this is confirmed by the thesis research of Schipper (2011):  
 
“The higher management does not want to share power, but wants to be in control.” 
(Schipper, 2011) 
 
Interestingly, the situation is not different at UNZA:  
 
“We believe that power rests in a few individuals, and we believe that if certain 
functions are removed from us, then we will be seen to be less powerful than what 
our offices tell us to be. It’s more traditional than that it is strategic. When you have 
more responsibilities, it’s a sign of power.” (Slooter, 2011) 
 
Such cultural inclinations and sentiments may appear understandable, but have always been 
denied by top management. Nevertheless, also at the national level, there is a tendency to 
hold on to centralization (Lulat, 2004; Ng’ethe et al, 2008):  
 
“The disease is national in a sense, when it comes to decentralization. It seems 
Zambia’s this internal has been discussed since… 1972 or somewhere about there… 
It was in the second national development plan. There was hope that the operations 
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of government can be brought down to the local level, beautiful papers written, 
beautiful discussions, it never happens.” (Informant 10) 
 
All informant groups argue that CBU has become more centralized in recent years. When 
they say so, informants from the various schools refer to the fact that previously, schools had 
their own mini buses, their own bank accounts, they controlled self-generated income and 
could sign for some of their own expenditures. This has changed under the leadership of the 
previous VC. Schools have become ‘cost centers’ and consequently, their bank accounts 
ceased to exist. All university vehicles have been put in a central pool, controlled by top 
management. According to top management, however, these actions were done for valid 
reasons: 1) At times, schools have money while central admin does not even have enough 
resources to pay for the monthly salaries and 2) Coordination of bank accounts is needed for 
audit purposes and 3) To realize savings on expenditures. These circumstances have forced 
top management to conduct (financial) firefighting in order to survive, and to adhere to cash 
flow planning and cost-saving. Sometimes the government grants do not come on time (or 
not at all), which may affect a timely payment of salaries. In such cases there is no money for 
anything; even the items that have been formally approved cannot be purchased. If the 
salaries cannot be paid, top management tries to borrow money from the schools. If that is not 
enough, CBU makes use of an agreement with the Commercial bank, so that at least the 
salaries can be paid. Overcoming financial problems is an ongoing top priority for CBU, but 
dissatisfaction has grown (especially among the deans) about the interventions by top 
management:  
 
“Top management started borrowing money from the schools, because salaries had 
to be paid while the grant had not come in. Although they now have an agreement 
with a bank, it has a cost. And they only make use of that arrangement with the bank 
after they have mobbed up resources from the schools. In the beginning top 
management asked: ‘Dean, can you lend us so much money?’ In the next stage top 
management said: ‘Dean, we have taken this money from your account, we will 
bring it back’. and nowadays top management says nothing and they just take the 
money without informing the dean.” (Informant 3) 
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As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the current situation with regards to centralization/decentralization. These 
constructs are included in a table in annex 4. This table also indicates which first- and second 
order constructs are supported by which informant group(s). 
 
Many of the first order constructs are shared by all informant groups (or all groups except top 
management). Top management does acknowledge the high levels of centralization at CBU, 
but is much less explicit and more reserved in describing its characteristics than other 
informant groups. For instance, with regards to finance, PO’s and informants from central 
admin argue that the deans are actually in control of the approved school budgets. This 
statement may be true, but in practice, it isn’t worth much. All expenses have to be approved 
by top management, also the ones in the approved school budgets. Spending priorities were 
usually discussed and set during management meetings, but increasingly, financial decisions 
have been made by a small group of PO’s without involving the deans and directors. In 
addition, deans and directors do not have direct access to financial information, so if they 
want to know what their financial position is (as a school), they have to go to central admin to 
request that information. To that effect, cost-accountants have been assigned to the schools, 
although they remain in central admin, hierarchically under the leadership of the bursar.  
 
In May 2013, there were still some good hopes that the new VC/DVC would support 
decentralization, but in November of the same year, nobody was talking about it anymore. It 
seemed as if everybody had lost faith in the whole idea. In July 2014, expectations from staff 
about decentralization at CBU were very low. Nevertheless, there are some positive 
developments: schools are now largely in charge of student admission and recruitment of new 
staff. Whereas vehicles were centralized under the previous VC, it was mentioned that they 
are now given back to the schools. Decentralization (of financial management and 
procurement) is mentioned as one of the main policies in the new strategic plan for the period 
2014 – 2018 (CBU, 2014).  
 
The second order constructs are provided in the table below. These second order constructs 
are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension ‘current situation with 
regards to centralization and decentralization’. It is indicated which second order constructs 
are supported by which informant group(s). Unsurprisingly, most second order constructs add 
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up to the image of excessive centralization, but there are also two second order constructs that 
point in the direction of decentralization (dean is in control of the budget; cost accountants 
have been assigned to schools).   
 
Second order constructs          Aggregate dimensions 
 
Convergent ideas & opinions (shared by all informant groups):  
x All power is at the top 
x CBU has become more centralized in recent years 
x Little involvement of deans & directors in decision-making 
x Lack of transparency & information sharing 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management):  
x PO’s like to be in charge 
x PO’s get overwhelmed with work, resulting in delays 
x Discontinuity when PO’s are off campus 
x Negligence towards lower management levels 
x Regarding decentralization, nothing is being done 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by the deans & other 
academics in the schools): 
x Central admin is not responsive to the needs of the schools 
x Central admin is better equipped than schools 
x Top management mobbing up resources from schools 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by top management 
& central admin):  
x All income goes to one bank account at central admin 
x Need for cash flow planning 
x The dean is in control of the approved budget 
x Cost accountants have been assigned to schools 
 
Table 7.1: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘current situation with 
regards to decentralization’.  
 
 
7.2 Desired situation with regards to decentralization  
 
The broadly shared perception that CBU has become more centralized, in combination with 
sometimes outrageous authoritarianism in the recent past, has clearly fueled dissatisfaction 
and frustration among the middle management, especially the deans. Their dissatisfaction 
does not only focus on finance; they feel that schools should be (more) in charge of their own 
Assessment of the current 
situation with regards to 
decentralization 
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academic affairs, human resources (including recruitment) and other operations at school 
level. In other words: schools want to make their own decisions and manage their own affairs 
(including budgets):  
 
“Deans of schools really want to assume responsibility, and be in control of funds. 
Deans want everything to be decentralized, not partial decentralization, but full. 
They want to be in charge of their own operations, in terms of how much money do 
we generate, in terms of spending, etc.” (Informant 34) 
 
This is in line with the thesis research by Schipper (2011). She argues that many informants 
consider decentralization as a method to empower the schools, with the control of the budget 
as a prominent feature (Schipper, 2011). Heads of departments are very much in favor of 
decentralization: 
 
 “The people who really want decentralization are the people at the bottom, in the 
units, the Heads of Departments, the deans. I am speaking from an academic point of 
view. As HoDs, we know what our lecturers are going through, in delivering their 
duties, they have no offices, no computers, but you expect them to give lectures, not 
just lectures but high quality lectures, research and publish, but you have not given 
them the instruments with which to do your work. From that point of view, the heads 
of departments definitely want the system to be decentralized. I want to be in control 
of the finances, so that I can meet the needs of my department. So the urgency is so 
much at the bottom, because these are the people who are doing the work, but they 
do not have the resources that are required.” (Informant 33) 
 
For deans and directors, decentralization requires a clear framework and guidelines, 
indicating the limits of their authority and responsibility:  
 
“Top management has to provide the framework. And then let the others [deans and 
directors] fit into that framework. If the vision is clear and shared, and the 
framework is provided through a strategic plan, then it becomes easier for the 
middle management to move forward.” (Informant 3)  
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“You know... Decentralization would mean specifying which responsibilities have to 
be done by the schools...”  (Informant 8) 
 
In line with the views captured in the quotes above, policies and standard operating 
procedures (SOP’s) should be in place and operational, so that every manager at CBU is 
aware of them and can make use of these policies and SOP’s accordingly. In a decentralized 
model, there should be clarity about these policies, rules, regulations and procedures, so that 
certain issues can be handled in a standard way53.  
 
All informant groups (except top management) argue that a decentralized model needs to rely 
on mutual trust and confidence between top management and the deans. According to deans 
and directors, decentralization also implies regular and inclusive management meetings, 
where they are involved in making management decisions. Management decisions are 
transparent, so that everybody can understand the reasons, and management information is 
shared with the university community. In the desired (decentralized) model, deans and 
directors have access to real-time management information to facilitate informed decision-
making.  
 
Within central admin, it has been argued by a few informants that, for decentralization to be 
successful, control measures need to be in place. Others have mentioned that abuse of funds 
must be prevented. Once the control measures are in place, top management should not have 
to worry too much about abuse of funds and mismanagement. Some informants argue that 
there are already control measures in place, since all payments have to be checked by the 
internal auditor before an expenditure is actually being made. Nevertheless, there is a 
tendency to control in order to avoid mismanagement. All informant groups stress the 
importance of having a PMS in place, in order to improve accountability. In doing so, they 
often refer to the current problems with weak accountability, laissez-faire and indifference, 
which have to be avoided:      
                                                          
53 Plans have been developed (with some assistance from external consultants) to facilitate decentralization along 
these lines, but did not materialize. In fact, nothing happened - despite expressed intentions and commitments 
made by top management - resulting in widespread frustration among the staff. The momentum for change 
evaporated, as time went on.  
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“For decentralization, there are certain things that need to be in place, for instance, 
people have to be accountable, you cannot decentralize for the sake of 
decentralizing, people have to be accountable… That is why the PMS is now being 
implemented…” (Informant 23) 
 
Top management (and a few other informants) believes that decentralization requires 
appointed, capable and qualified deans who are accountable to top management – not to their 
voters in the schools. At the same time, other informants (mainly deans and other academics) 
express serious doubts about appointed deans:  
 
“I am not for appointed deans. When you are appointed, you are allegiant to the 
appointing master, who is the VC.” (Informant 22) 
 
As a consequence, an appointed dean may be perceived as a threat by the members of staff in 
the school, and bring about distrust (and other related problems):  
 
“I know places where appointed deans work well, where a dean can work 
independently from the VC, where you are appointed by the university council and 
the power of the VC is somehow diminished. Here, in our country Zambia, we have a 
lot of favoritism, and when there is a success to celebrate, it is the VC who claims all 
the credits. In case of failure, the blame will probably be put on someone else.” 
(Informant 10) 
 
Others believe that seniority of the dean is more important than being elected or appointed; 
seniority will command the necessary respect from the academic staff. Considering the 
concept of decentralization and the related desired situation, it appears that top management 
has a different understanding of decentralization than other informant groups. According to 
PO’s, decentralization means that deans are formally in control of the budget and have the 
authority to determine where and how the budget will be spent (although one cannot approve 
a spending request), and that they can ask for financial information (instead of having direct 
access to it):  
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“The key issue here is that, the one who is leading a department, should also be in 
control of his or her budget. No one approves expenditures on their behalf, it is them 
who do that, they have planned their budget for this year, and they will plan the 
budget for next year, and then they buy. They send requests [to central admin], and 
our department assists them to procure what they want, but it is them who initiate, 
and for me, that is the form of decentralization that we are talking about.” 
(Informant 17) 
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the desired situation with regards to decentralization (annex 5). The second 
order constructs are provided in the table below. These second order constructs are 
considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension ‘desired situation with regards to 
centralization and decentralization’.  
 
Second order constructs         Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant groups):  
x Schools manage their own affairs and budgets 
x Improved accountability 
x Approved policies and SOP’s are in place 
x Mutual trust  and confidence        
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management):    
x Regular and inclusive management meetings      
x Transparency/information sharing 
x Top management is accountable to middle management 
x No more authoritarianism  
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by deans & other 
academics):  
x Clear framework and guidelines are available 
x Schools do the admission of students and recruit their own staff 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only top management): 
x Appointed deans are in place 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only central admin):  
x Control measures are in place    
 
Table 7.2: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘desired situation with 
regards to decentralization’.  
 
The desired situation with 
regards to decentralization 
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According to deans and directors, decentralization means that schools control the budget on 
their own bank account, in such a way that top management cannot make use of it for other 
purposes. Obviously, deans and directors want to be able to make expenditures themselves, 
without interventions from top management or central admin. These different 
conceptualizations of decentralization have continued to exist through the entire research 
period. 
 
 
7.3 Ideas, opinions and suggested interventions towards decentralization  
 
In researching the dominant mental models on organizational change, most divergence 
among the different informant groups has been found in the ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions in order to achieve the desired situation concerning decentralization. The 
suggested interventions are different for every organizational change and for every informant 
group; they inform us how the desired situation can be achieved. In this paragraph, I will also 
explain which ideas are converging, partially converging and diverging between the various 
informant groups.  
 
All informant groups argue that responsibilities and authority must be devolved to the 
schools, so that they can manage their own affairs. They all agree that accountability must be 
improved, and that therefore a PMS must be developed and implemented:  
 
“For decentralization, there are certain things that need to be in place, for instance, 
people have to be accountable, you cannot decentralize for the sake of 
decentralizing, people have to be accountable, so we are working towards that, and 
that is why the PMS is now being implemented, the accountability has to become 
formal, and when people are accountable, we can slowly decentralize.” (Informant 
23) 
 
According to informants from the schools (deans and other academics), this accountability 
applies to top management as well; top management must account for their decisions and 
expenditures. Transparency must be improved by sharing management information with 
deans and directors, including financial information. In addition, compliance must be 
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improved. Therefore, policies, rules, regulations and SOP’s have to be adjusted, approved 
and disseminated to every member of staff. A director took a deep breath when he exclaimed:   
 
“We need to change these cumbersome procedures…” (Informant 34) 
 
All informant groups (except top management) argue that decentralization should start at the 
top. At the same time, it is suggested that top management fears for chaos and 
mismanagement in a fully decentralized model. There are a few examples of deans who have 
done wrong things in the past, and these stories still serve as arguments against full-fledged 
decentralization. While informants from central admin stress the importance of developing 
control measures that provide checks and balances in a decentralized model, informants from 
the schools argue that this is not necessary, since audit controls are already in place. In order 
to make decentralization at CBU successful, some say that more senior staff has to be 
contracted and capacity must be built: 
 
“So while we are looking at the possibility of moving from centralization to 
decentralization, I think a lot of education is needed.” (Informant 12)  
 
“I think the best way to manage the decentralization process is to ensure that you 
put in individuals who have the caliber to work in those positions. There's a need to 
make sure that the people they are putting in these offices, they are well-qualified 
individuals who can take the institution forward.” (Informant 7) 
 
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, all informant groups stress the importance of stakeholder 
buy-in, except top management:  
 
“I would therefore suggest that as the stakeholders, we come together and map or 
chart the way forward… We must agree on how we want the whole thing 
[decentralization] to be done.” (Informant 12) 
 
The issue of involvement is clearly stimulated by perceptions of exclusion in recent years. In 
addition, deans and directors want to be involved in decision-making, and therefore 
management meetings should be organized regularly. It is also interesting to see that the 
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middle and lower management stress the importance of a guiding framework and guidelines, 
including a specification of their responsibilities. They want to know specifically (in 
advance) for what they can be held accountable:  
 
“I would urge the dean to ask for clarity about the way forward, we need to spell out 
what we are supposed to do in the schools as opposed to the things that need to be 
done by central admin.” (Informant 10) 
 
The importance of clear responsibilities is understandable from their point of view, given the 
enormous powers of the VC and their experiences with authoritarian leadership in the recent 
past. This has caused fear and as a result, they want to protect themselves. At the same time, 
it is interesting to note that top management doesn’t mention a guiding framework, guidelines 
and a specification of responsibilities; apparently, these issues are less important for them. 
This is (to some extent) understandable from their (current) perspective in which they have 
all the power anyway. In order to build trust and confidence between top management on the 
one hand and the deans & directors on the other hand, a combination of visionary and 
participative leadership (basically from the VC but also from other PO’s) is needed, as 
opposed to authoritarian and dictatorial leadership. Experiences with the latter are considered 
and perceived as counterproductive to decentralization. 
 
Deans and directors want to speed up things, instead of having to wait endlessly for the 
outcomes of the centrally coordinated committee system, which they refer to as ‘red tape’ 
and ‘bureaucracy that slows you down’:  
 
“If they decentralize [for instance] procurement to the schools, so that they can 
approve certain expenditures themselves, it would make life much easier and there 
wouldn’t be congestion [and delay] at central admin.” (Informant 24) 
 
Also top management thinks that the number of committees must be reduced, and wants to 
make decision-making more efficient. Mainly informants from top management and central 
admin stress that decentralization should be considered as a gradual process:  
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“We cannot all of a sudden decentralize, it must be gradual process.” (Informant 
23) 
 
This contrasts the opinion of many deans, directors and academics, who seem to opt for 
immediate and full-fledged decentralization (and thereby end the symptoms of excessive 
centralization). Another contrasting idea is that (mainly) top management wants to abolish 
elected deans, and replace them by appointed deans. The new university statutes will make 
this possible.  
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions with regards to 
decentralization. The second order constructs are provided in the table below (first order 
constructs are included in annex 6).  
 
These second order constructs are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension 
‘ideas, opinions and suggested interventions to achieve the desired situation with regards to 
decentralization’. It is indicated which second order constructs are supported by which 
informant group(s).  
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Second order constructs         Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant groups):  
x Devolve authority and responsibility to schools 
x Improve accountability/implement PMS 
x Improve transparency/share information 
x Improve compliance/SOP’s 
x Raise awareness & build capacity 
x Recruit more senior staff  
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management):     
x Decentralization should start at the top 
x Mix of visionary leadership and participation  
x Generate stakeholder buy-in       
x Involve deans & directors in decision-making     
x Provide framework and proper guidelines/specify responsibilities 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (top management & central 
admin): 
x Consider decentralization as a gradual process 
  
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (top management, deans & 
directors):  
x Reduce the number of committees 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top management):  
x Appoint deans 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only central admin):  
x Develop control measures 
 
Table 7.3: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘ideas, opinions and 
suggested interventions to achieve the desired situation with regards to decentralization’.  
 
 
7.4 Dominant mental models on decentralization  
 
In this paragraph, I present the dominant mental models on decentralization according to the 
various informant groups. I do so by differentiating between a convergent model and a 
divergent model. In these models, I incorporate new developments (both positive and 
negative), which refer to changes after the previous VC/DVC had left CBU.   
 
  
Ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions to achieve the 
desired situation with regards to 
decentralization  
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7.4.1 The convergent model  
I have constructed the convergent mental model on decentralization, based on a shared 
assessment of the past and present situation (‘Ist’), shared ideas about the desired situation 
(‘Soll’) and converging ideas, opinions and suggested interventions in order to achieve the 
desired situation. In this mental model one can immediately see about which issues there is 
convergence among all informant groups.  
 
The list of issues under the current situation is relatively short, which indicates that there is 
little consensus among informant groups about the state of decentralization at CBU. To some 
extent, members of top management acknowledge the little involvement of deans and 
directors in decision-making, and also the lack of transparency/information sharing. This is 
interesting, since they have the capacity (and power) to change and to improve this situation. 
But top management often frames the lack of transparency/information sharing as a lack of 
understanding on the part of the staff. New developments since the appointment of a new 
VC/DVC are partly positive and shared by all groups, but there is no consensus about 
negative developments.  
 
Another interesting feature of the convergent model is that the list of issues under the desired 
situation is quite general. Apparently, there is agreement on the idea that schools need to 
manage their own affairs and budgets. But as we have seen in paragraph 7.1, this is only a 
superficial agreement, since top management and schools have a different interpretation of its 
meaning. According to top management, deans already manage their own affairs and budgets, 
and cost accountants have already been assigned to the schools. For the deans and directors, 
however, that is (by far) not enough. These different interpretations of decentralization 
continued to exist during the entire period of data collection. Informant groups share the idea 
that a PMS is needed in a decentralized model, for reasons of accountability. For top 
management accountability is a prerequisite for decentralization where staff members can be 
held accountable for their actions. In the eyes of many staff members, top management 
should also be accountable to the deans and directors. All informant groups agree that 
policies and SOPs have to be in place and available for everyone, as a way to standardize 
management practices at CBU. Although there is agreement about the need for mutual trust 
and confidence, informant groups blame each other for the prevalent distrust that constrains 
cooperation between them.  
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The list of (shared) ideas, opinions and suggested interventions in order to achieve the desired 
situation includes the need to improve compliance through rule enforcement. This suggests a 
break with the prevalent culture of laissez-faire and indifference, which they consider as 
undesirable in a decentralized model. In order to prepare for decentralization, more senior 
staff is needed, and there should be awareness-raising and capacity building activities for the 
existing staff. Top management has often expressed doubts about the managerial capacity of 
the deans, while the deans claim that they are capable and willing to embark on the process of 
decentralization.   
 
Please refer to chapter 10 for more information about the relevance and importance of 
constraining factors and enabling factors on the processes of decentralization.  
 
See the convergent mental model on the next page.  
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7.4.2 The divergent model  
The divergent model is based on the same mental model, but this time I have only included 
the issues that are not shared by all informant groups. In this model one can immediately see 
about which issues there is (partial of full) divergence among informant groups. This can be 
an issue brought forward by one informant group which is not shared by any other informant 
group, or an issue shared by two or three (not all) informant groups.  
 
As can be observed in the divergent model, quite a number of issues is shared by all informant 
groups except top management; this means that consensus among the other informant groups 
is much higher.  
 
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the issues mentioned about the current situation, the 
desired situation and the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions in order to achieve the 
desired situation are more specific and pronounced than in the convergent model. That is 
where different interpretations and disagreements come in. Does this mean that there is more 
divergence than convergence about decentralization at CBU? Yes it does. Whereas there is 
consensus about some basic organizational features of CBU (in the present and in the future), 
there is disagreement about the specific and more pronounced issues. This applies to the 
current situation, the desired situation and the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions in 
order to achieve the desired situation.  
 
Please refer to chapter 10 for more information about the relevance and importance of 
constraining factors and enabling factors on the process of decentralization.  
 
See the divergent mental model on the next page.  
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7.5  Concluding remarks  
Decentralization is an ongoing struggle at CBU and this will probably remain the case in the 
nearby future. Different interpretations of the concept exist along the lines of different 
interests and assumptions from different groups within the university. These are not expected 
to change soon, especially when considering the recent history of leadership and management 
at CBU.  
 
From the assessment of leadership, management and organizational change in the recent past, 
numerous cultural, organizational and contextual constraints have emerged, which have 
hampered decentralization in many ways. I have not come across significant changes in these 
constraints during the period of data collection. In addition, external pressures from the 
institutional environment are inexistent and (perhaps) point in the opposite direction 
(centralization). Nevertheless, there are also enabling factors and there have been several 
positive changes since a new VC/DVC have been appointed. It remains to be seen what these 
developments mean for decentralization in the future. 
 
Apparently, there is consensus between top management and other informant groups about 
decentralization; schools need to manage their own affairs and budgets. But underneath this 
superficial and thin layer of convergence, there is disagreement caused by the lack of a 
common definition and understanding of the concept of decentralization: According to top 
management, deans already manage their own affairs and budgets, and cost accountants have 
already been assigned to the schools. For the deans and directors, however, that is (by far) not 
enough. They want full-fledged decentralization, including school bank accounts and the 
power to spend. These different conceptions of decentralization continued to exist during the 
entire period of data collection.  
 
Even if there would be consensus based on a common definition and understanding of 
decentralization, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent decentralization is feasible 
at CBU. Different interests are at play; the interests from top management versus the interests 
of the schools. In a way, it’s all about power and money. This has resulted in a ‘waiting 
game’ (Schipper, 2011) where nothing really moves. In addition, a number of constraining 
factors may continue to affect the feasibility of decentralization negatively.  
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A methodological note 
Although I urged the informants to be concrete about the desired situation and their ideas, 
opinions and suggested interventions to achieve it (also by using think-aloud protocols, see 
chapter 2), the responses often remained limited. Regularly, the informants were more 
concrete about the things they did not want (anymore), instead of saying what they did want. 
This can perhaps be explained by a lack of knowledge about decentralization:  
 
“We didn’t have any concept of decentralization.” (Informant 6) 
 
This applies not only to decentralization, but extends to general knowledge about 
management and organizational change:  
 
“You can see vast differences in awareness and understanding here at CBU, 
depending on the amount of exposure and education that one has had, even at the 
level of deans. People may say that they have a higher level of understanding about 
management and organization, but in reality they don’t. Some deans are there for 
the first time, they have never had any management functions before. “ (Informant 2)  
 
Especially when I asked questions about decentralization, informants seemed to be limited by 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1991), sometimes referred to by saying that ‘they don’t know 
what they don’t know’. If they don’t know much about management and organizational 
change, and they have not been exposed to other countries and institutions, it is indeed 
difficult to come up with concrete suggestions and solutions to complex organizational 
problems. The lack of knowledge is convergent with the shared opinion that there is a need to 
raise awareness and to build capacity in the areas of leadership, management and 
organizational change, next to the shared need to recruit more senior staff.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Dominant mental models on performance appraisal 
 
In this chapter I will describe and explain the dominant mental models with regards to 
performance management. At CBU, the introduction of a system for performance appraisal 
has been discussed since a long time. The local term for such a system is PMS: Performance 
Management System. As already explained earlier, these mental models include an 
assessment of the current situation, a description of the desired situation, and ideas, opinions 
and suggested interventions to achieve to desired situation. This will be described in 
consecutive paragraphs 8.1 to 8.3. In paragraph 8.4, different dominant mental models about 
performance management will be provided and explained, displaying the levels of 
convergence and divergence among the various informant groups. At the end this chapter I 
provide some concluding remarks (8.5). 
 
 
Figure 8: The mental model on performance appraisal.  
 
Parts A, B have already been described in chapter 6. In this chapter, I will first describe parts 
C, and D, and then E, according to the following logic of reasoning: you first need to know 
where you are (C) and where you want to go (E), before being able to say how you wish to 
get there (D). The dominant mental models are presented in paragraph 8.4.  
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Since the lists of first order constructs (under C, D, and E) are quite extensive, I have 
included these lists in the annexes. The lists of second order constructs and related aggregate 
dimensions are incorporated in this chapter.  
 
 
8.1 Assessment of the current situation with regards to performance 
appraisal 
 
At CBU, performance appraisal is not a common practice - at least it wasn’t until 2013, when 
a new VC and DVC were appointed. Before that time, only junior (low level) workers were 
appraised annually. These appraisals were perceived as a threat, emphasizing people’s 
weaknesses and neglecting good performance (Kraakman, 2011). Most other staff members, 
including deans & directors, academic and administrative staff have never been appraised:  
 
“In fact, there hasn’t been any performance appraisal.” (Informant 12) 
 
Many employees don’t even have job descriptions, so the basis for any kind of appraisal is 
lacking. Informants from some schools argue that they do have their own appraisal forms. No 
evidence was found for structured and standardized ways of performance appraisal 
(Kraakman, 2011). Student evaluations of lecturers are also lacking, and are heavily opposed 
by the lecturers. According to some, the scarcity of qualified lecturers in Zambia protects 
them from such assessments. So in fact, the majority of the professional staff at CBU has 
never been appraised in any way. The idea of bilateral performance appraisals (between the 
supervisor and the subordinate) for all categories of staff has been received with a lot of 
doubt and fear for a long time. Especially the fear of bias, subjectivity and victimization has 
generated doubts about the feasibility of a PMS at CBU. These doubts and fears are 
understandable in the light of authoritarianism, in-group collectivism, out-group distrust, 
favoritism & allegiances.  
 
Instead of having periodic appraisal interviews, there are committees who decide on contract 
extension or confirmation, promotion and allowances/emoluments (based on the submission 
of the required documentation). However, under pressure of the national government and the 
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university council, CBU top management was forced to make a start with the introduction of 
a PMS:  
 
“The PMS is an idea that comes from outside. It is something that has been 
implemented in the entire Zambian public sector, and it spills down to higher 
education, it was not an idea from within.” (Informant 12)  
 
“The motivation was that the current university council is about to go. There will be 
a new university council coming in so they want to leave a legacy.” (Informant 4) 
 
Ideas about how to introduce a PMS circled around CBU for quite a long time; the strategic 
plan 2009 – 2013 considered non-implementation of a staff appraisal system as an 
institutional weakness (CBU, 2009b). Consequently, the development and implementation of 
a PMS was planned for 2009 and 2010. During the management workshop in Mukuba 
(2011), the VC (unexpectedly) expressed his wish to have a PMS developed by the end of the 
week, which didn’t work out very well. Nevertheless, the commitment was renewed, but very 
soon,  the momentum evaporated again:  
 
“After Mukuba, everything died.” (Informant 4) 
 
Despite promises to organize additional meetings and involve staff in the development of a 
PMS (after the Mukuba workshop), informants from the schools and central admin didn’t 
hear about it anymore and they wondered why nothing was happening: 
 
“In 2006 they were already talking about PMS. Now the previous top management 
has had more than enough time to introduce and implement it, but it didn’t work… 
Why not? I don’t understand.” (Informant 5) 
 
This situation is illustrative for the ambiguous role of top management. But it should also be 
said that, during the second term of the previous VC, the overall atmosphere at CBU 
deteriorated, the staff were fed up with the VC/top management and there were conflicts 
between the VC and the DVC. Hierarchical distrust had grown to unworkable proportions, 
and these negative undercurrents made everything difficult, including the development and 
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implementation of a PMS. In the meantime, deans and directors continued struggling with 
performance management. These struggles appear when problems occur, for instance when a 
particular staff member does not show up in class (sometimes for longer periods, without 
notice), or does not submit marking results on time, does not show up for invigilation during 
exams, or spends more time on side jobs instead of the main job at CBU. In central admin, 
often heard examples include late reporting for work, knocking off early, doing nothing, not 
finishing their work on time, spending time on private matters during office hours, etc. 
Interestingly, malfunctioning staff is rarely reprimanded, and the disciplinary code is only 
applied in extreme cases:  
 
“The disciplinary code has not been used very much, because the process takes too 
long. I was in a committee and there was this guy that had to be disciplined. It takes 
some time before a disciplinary committee is constituted for this guy, and then they 
sit down and it may take up to two months before the guy appears before the 
committee, meanwhile the guy has started to work…It’s not workable, but it is the 
regular procedure within government institutions in Zambia. The committee can only 
say ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, but the committee cannot recommend anything, so what’s 
the point? A committee should be able to say that this is the consequence of his 
actions, and then the guy is fired or reinstated, whichever the case is. But if the 
committee cannot go down that line, then what are you doing? So managers are 
hesitant to apply the disciplinary code.” (Informant 18) 
 
Managers are also hesitant to apply the disciplinary code due to the role and power of the 
unions. Several examples have been mentioned where a malfunctioning employee was 
reported to central admin for disciplinary measures, but according to the informants nothing 
was done about it (for unknown reasons). However, this impression may also be due to a lack 
of information.  
 
Instead of using the disciplinary code, most managers rely on counseling their staff, and hope 
that the employee changes his/her attitude and performance (so that no further action is 
required). Sometimes, managers refrain from counseling and ask (the registry) for a transfer 
of ‘the problem’ to another department. This behavior can be explained in terms of conflict 
avoidance and a tendency to refrain from feedback:  
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“I just don’t want to be in conflict with my subordinates. But then you see, that is 
how we misplace the institutional goals because I know that if the secretary is not 
doing her work, obviously work will suffer in the unit and ultimately, the 
performance of the university will be, so you see I'm trying to, in my opinion, I'm 
trying to preserve this relationship, it’s a personal thing, but I think if my priority is 
to ensure that the university is performing, I should correct this situation.” 
(Informant 25)   
 
In a particular department at central admin, hard workers always had to compensate for the 
unfinished work of the weak performers who repeatedly didn’t meet their annual deadlines. 
This had caused dissatisfaction among the hard workers, and even conflict. However, the 
weak performers were not reprimanded, the hard workers were not rewarded, and the conflict 
has been neutralized instead of solved:  
 
“We have all these things happening… You’re taking over someone else’s work and 
it’s being done again and again and nothing’s being done about it. You can bring 
issues to the table but then they are put aside and then you can bring them in again 
but they are shelved and nothing is being done about it…The issue was not resolved 
but it was just left hanging… The boss came and said ‘No, I think this is not the right 
place to feel angry about it, just cool down’. We left the office and that was the end. 
We never mentioned it again.” (Informant 24) 
 
In the end, it doesn’t matter much whether you work hard or not. The overall perception is 
that nothing will be done about it anyway; no rewards, no sanctions. Only due to in-group 
collectivism, allegiances and favoritism, some staff members receive rewards and are being 
promoted. This is vividly expressed by an informant in the thesis research done by Kraakman 
(2011):   
 
“It’s always the same people getting the rewards, I don’t think it’s real… When you 
see your friends, those who are not working, being promoted, that’s really 
demotivating!” (Kraakman, 2011) 
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This is convergent with in-group collectivism, favoritism & allegiances, and it reflects the 
experience of informants during many years. It has resulted in a laissez-faire attitude of staff, 
indifference, dissatisfaction and a lack of job motivation. Nowadays, many staff members at 
CBU are in favor of performance appraisal, especially as a way to end the culture of laissez-
faire and indifference: 
 
“So that is the biggest problem that I have seen, that without performance appraisal 
we are letting things run as they are, those who perform, perform, those who don’t 
perform, they don’t perform. Those who perform may begin to feel overused, so they 
reduce on the effort that they put in. The other individuals are not hard workers and 
they know that nothing will happen to them so they still do nothing to change their 
kind of behavior.” (Informant 12) 
 
Academics are slightly more in favor of a PMS than administrators. This is related to the fact 
that the promotion criteria for academics are clear, while in central admin, many employees 
don’t even have job descriptions. But both in schools and in central admin, a lot of doubts 
and fears have been expressed, especially because a new PMS will no longer be committee-
based, but indeed, be based on a face-to-face appraisal interview:  
 
“If you don’t like me, then you’ll be very subjective, and I’ll be victimized purely on 
the basis that you don’t like me and you may have a thousand and one reasons why 
you don’t like me, not necessarily because of my poor performance, but because of 
other reasons…The whole idea of taking these issues to committees, is to balance it 
off so that if you have personal issues with me, other people in the committee will 
check that out and balance it off and just pick out the fact, so even me as a victim, I 
will feel a lot more comfortable to say, ‘oh well, at least my case was looked at’.” 
(Informant 2) 
 
 “There is no equal two-way communication, where both persons can provide 
feedback to each other. This explains why they are afraid of implementing a system 
for performance appraisal. They also fear subjectivity due to a lack of objective 
indicators.” (Field notes, September 2012) 
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During the management workshop in Mukuba (2011), more doubts have been expressed by 
the participants, including a lack of understanding, abuse of the system, job security and a 
failure to implement the outcomes of appraisal. Another fear is that the PMS may result in an 
academic exercise, due to a lack of political will and commitment from top management 
(Observation during the management workshop in Mukuba, 2011). In addition, many 
managers at CBU (especially lower and middle management) have never had any 
management training. They may feel uncomfortable with a new PMS coming up:  
 
“I can foresee a situation where some managers will be uncomfortable to do it that 
way. They may not have the courage to tell the individual the facts, especially those 
that have to do with the negative aspects.” (Informant 2) 
 
These doubts and fears are understandable, given the tendencies to refrain from feedback and 
to avoid conflict, the importance of good relationships and various forms of distrust. It has 
therefore been suggested to involve a representative from the union in the appraisal 
interviews (as an observer). As I already pointed out earlier (see chapter 6), a lot of doubts 
and fears evaporated since the new top management involved the unions in the development 
of the new PMS. This has created a world of difference. Suddenly, there was institutional 
support for the introduction of a PMS and the majority of the staff accepted the initiative. In 
fact, the first appraisal interviews have already taken place in 2013. This means that the 
assessment of the current situation with regards to PMS has changed a lot during the period 
of data collection. Nevertheless, some doubts remained, for instance about follow-up actions 
in terms of rewards and sanctions:  
 
“There is just no common understanding. People are being evaluated positively and 
they wonder whether they will be promoted based on that appraisal. But the old 
committee system still exists, other and new questions can be asked, so it is by no 
means certain that you will be promoted. And there is no information that explains 
how it should work, the new system next to the old system, they have not been 
integrated and no explanations are being provided. There is a lack of clarity about 
the consequences of the appraisals taking place.” (Informant 10) 
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Another serious doubt is related to the amount of time that has to be invested in performance 
management of their staff. A dean expressed his concern as follows:   
 
“You have to sit down with members of staff, to hear what they’ve planned for next 
year, and then during the year you have to sit down again, by means of a sort of 
mid-term review, and towards the end of the year you have to sit with your staff 
again, for the final evaluation, before the report is sent to central admin. It takes a 
lot of time… You have to manage your staff… HoDs have to sit with their members 
of staff, deans have to sit with the HoDs, and everything has to be scheduled over 
time, reports have to written, etc. It takes a lot of time.” (Informant 3) 
 
When considering the abovementioned quote in combination with the often heard statement 
‘we only meet when there is an issue’, it becomes clear that, until the PMS was implemented 
in 2013, managers at CBU were not used to spend much time on managing the performance 
of their staff. According to many informants, staff performance has often suffered, and 
accountability remained extremely limited.  
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the current situation with regards to performance management. The second 
order constructs are provided in the table below (first order constructs are included in annex 
7).  
 
These second order constructs are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension 
‘current situation with regards to performance appraisal’. It is indicated which second order 
constructs are supported by which informant group(s). 
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Second order construct        Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x No standardized PMS in place (various appraisal forms are 
being applied) 
x Committees for contracts, promotion & allowances 
x Deans, directors and HoDs struggling with performance 
management 
x Conflict avoidance 
x Malfunctioning staff is not reprimanded 
x Hard workers are not rewarded 
x No evaluations by students 
x Negative undercurrents undermining the development and 
implementation of a PMS 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups  
except top management) 
x Doubts and fears about PMS  
x PMS development & implementation delayed 
x Reluctance to use the disciplinary code 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (deans & directors and  
academics): 
x Promotion criteria for academics are clear 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (central admin):  
x We don’t have job descriptions  
 
Table 8.1: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘current situation with 
regards to performance appraisal’.  
 
 
8.2 Desired situation with regards to performance appraisal 
 
As already argued, nowadays many staff members at CBU want to have an operational PMS 
in place, in order to end the culture of indifference and laissez-faire. The ideas and opinions 
about the desired situation with regards to PMS are to a large extent converging. A PMS 
should be contextualized so that it fits the needs of an academic institution and the specific 
environment in which CBU operates. Procedures and guidelines are standardized, so that the 
same rules apply to everyone. A PMS should focus on improvement, problem-solving and 
support: 
 
Assessment of the current 
situation with regards to 
performance appraisal 
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“If there is any underperformance, what can be done to assist that person, to scale 
up one’s performance, getting to the required performance standards?” (Informant 
8) 
 
Appraisals should be fair and avoid bias as much as possible, and not be used to victimize 
subordinates. To that end, a representative from the union will be present during the 
appraisal. Furthermore, the professional and private lives of staff are strictly separated in the 
appraisal of someone’s performance. Once the PMS is operational, malfunctioning staff is 
reprimanded and or disciplined when necessary:  
 
“When it’s found that the lecturer is the problem…If the lecturer is not cooperating 
to find the problem, you would say, you are doing it deliberately, you don’t want to 
be helped so you can be punished.” (Informant 3) 
 
Evidence has been found at CBU of a strong orientation towards individual career 
advancement (Kraakman, 2011). With the PMS in place, those who work hard will be 
acknowledged for their good performance; something that rarely happened in the (recent) 
past:  
 
“What motivates me to do my work properly and to complete it? Nothing!” 
(Informant 24) 
 
Mainly top management, deans and directors and higher officials within central admin opt for 
a PMS which compares planning with realization. These informants prefer a PMS that relies 
less on committees:  
 
“What we need to do is to minimize the committee-based activities. What I mean is 
that when we’re going to have this appraisal system, it depends much more on 
individuals, the supervisor-to-supervisee relationship.” (Informant 3) 
 
Consequently, decisions about promotion, rewards and even annual salary increments should 
also be based on the outcomes of the appraisal interview (instead of committee meetings). 
Nevertheless, at the lower levels of the university, doubts remain about the viability of 
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bilateral appraisal, given the existing culture at CBU and experiences in the (recent) past. 
Bilateral appraisal means that much power is given to the supervisors, for work that was 
previously done by committees. Informants from central admin have stressed the importance 
of having job descriptions, as a basis for appraisal. This implies that objectives and targets are 
set and agreed (by the supervisor and the subordinate) at the beginning of the year. Top 
management has stressed that the PMS is an absolute requirement in order to enhance 
accountability at all levels of the university.  
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the desired situation with regards to performance appraisal. The second order 
constructs are provided in the table below (first order constructs are included in annex 8). 
These second order constructs are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension 
‘desired situation with regards to performance appraisal’. It is indicated which second order 
constructs are supported by which informant group(s). 
 
 
Second order construct        Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x PMS in place and operational 
x PMS is contextualized and standardized 
x PMS is fair and objective 
x Malfunctioning staff is reprimanded/disciplined 
x Hard workers are rewarded 
x There is a focus on improvement and support 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (top management, deans 
& directors & higher central admin officials):  
x PMS compares planning with realization 
x Promotion and rewards based on appraisal 
x PMS less committee based  
 
Diverging ideas (central admin) 
x Job descriptions are available for everyone, including 
performance indicators 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (top management):  
x Improved accountability  
 
Table 8.2: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘desired situation with 
regards to performance appraisal’. 
 
Desired situation with 
regards to performance 
appraisal 
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As can be observed, there is a lot of agreement about the desired situation concerning 
performance appraisal. Although it has been acknowledged that there are no evaluations by 
the students, it has not been mentioned as a feature of the desired situation. Apparently, the 
staff doesn’t want students to play a role in performance appraisal. There is not much 
discussion about this, hardly anyone is in favor of it. 
 
 
8.3 Ideas, opinions and suggested interventions with regards to 
performance appraisal 
 
When the PMS was discussed during the Mukuba management workshop in 2011, groups 
were assigned to come up with suggestions for the successful introduction of a PMS at CBU. 
The following ideas and opinions emerged:  
 
- We should review all the documentation available, develop a PMS  instrument; 
- Appoint a committee (or an office, a task force) to drive the implementation of a PMS; 
- Agree on a timeframe for implementation; 
- Political will is necessary, commitment of CBU leadership;  
- Relate PMS to promotion criteria; 
- Make job descriptions and develop key performance indicators;  
- Sensitization of staff, students and unions;  
- Communication, dissemination of information; 
- Training of appraisers.  
 
The workshop was facilitated by local consultants from the Zambian Federation of 
Employers (ZFE), who had guided the implementation of a PMS in the public sector in 
Zambia. It was argued that the different forms in that PMS are fine in the sense that they 
focus on improvement and support, but they have to be adapted to the specific context of 
higher academic education. In addition, the new forms should also integrate the available 
PMS for the junior workers at CBU. This refers to standardization and coherence, which is 
hard-needed at CBU (according to many participants). 
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It was also shared that for a proper development and implementation, somebody or a 
committee should be in charge, and that there must be a timeframe for its implementation. 
This is an understandable message, given the experience of many staff members that 
responsibilities are often vague and time management is generally weak, which has 
contributed to inertia and indifference in the (recent) past. Ironically, this is exactly the 
situation that all informants wish to abolish.  
 
In order to reduce bias and subjectivity, it has been negotiated with the unions that a union 
representative will be present during the appraisal interviews. This has been approved by top 
management. This will also help to separate professional from private issues.  
 
Although there was a lot of consensus about PMS during the Mukuba conference, not all 
issues were shared by everyone. According to some participants, a PMS had not been 
implemented yet due to a lack of political will from top management54. Somehow this was a 
quite audacious remark (in the presence of all PO’s), but it was not taken as an offence. 
Typically, all informant groups except top management stress the need for staff involvement 
and stakeholder buy-in in the development of the PMS: 
 
“Well like I said, the first thing is to find a way in which you can keep all the 
stakeholders on board; by stakeholders I mean the deans, the POs, the heads of 
departments and the unions.” (Informant 2)   
 
Most informant groups (except top management) also stress the importance of awareness 
raising and capacity building. Staff wants to learn about PMS, they need to understand the 
purpose, they need to learn how to give feedback, and how to implement PMS:  
 
“We are talking about a change, this is a change that is coming in and therefore 
people should be sensitized, people should be aware of the new change that is 
coming in and those people that are to appraise they have to be equipped with the 
knowledge and skills of appraisal.” (Informant 12) 
 
                                                          
54 This is convergent with ‘ambiguous role VC/top management, see also chapter 6.  
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The quote above is very important; the informant stresses the importance of capacity building 
for supervisors, who are supposed to carry out the appraisals. One has to realize that at CBU, 
they have never had any form of performance appraisal before. Some argue that the 
appraisals should be executed by senior staff members, who are respected by the staff. 
Mainly top management argues that schools need appointed deans to carry out the appraisals 
(who are accountable to top management instead of their electorate).  
 
With regards to the implementation of a PMS, things have changed completely – much to my 
surprise. Whereas in 2011 and 2012 many informants were actually afraid of PMS, this fear 
seemed to have disappeared in 2013. In fact, I was told that the new top management had 
already done appraisal interviews with the deans, and that every other staff member would be 
appraised before the end of the year. The reason for this sudden change of attitude of staff is 
remarkable, and largely due to the fact that the unions were involved, and the openness of top 
management:  
 
“The success of the PMS implementation is partly due to the involvement of the 
unions, but also because of the willingness and openness of  [the new] management to 
engage with staff, for consultation and the like.” (Informant 9)  
 
“This time, top management involved the unions, and that is also how we came to 
know about it. The role of the unions was crucial, and yes, we listen to our union 
leaders.” (Informant 26) 
 
Involvement of stakeholders (including the unions), sensitization, information sharing and 
capacity building have been crucial in creating the necessary institutional support for the 
development and implementation of the PMS which is currently being implemented: 
 
 “There was a lot of sensitization, supported by top management, this has been an 
enabling factor.” (Informant 25) 
 
When desired, a representative from the union is present during the appraisals, in order to 
reduce subjectivity. This option has also contributed to the buy-in of the PMS by the staff.  
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Mainly top management, deans & directors and higher officials from central admin argue that 
the PMS should be related to promotion criteria and rewards. This may sound logical, in fact, 
a PMS which is not related to promotion criteria and rewards seems rather useless. 
Nevertheless, it is only the more experienced and senior staff that mention it. Other staff 
members may not have any idea how the PMS will (or should be) linked to promotion and 
rewards. At central admin, job descriptions must be developed for everyone, including annual 
work plans and performance indicators. Top management emphasizes the importance of the 
PMS in efforts to improve the accountability of the staff. When the appraisals are executed by 
appointed deans, accountability will improve substantially.  
 
Despite the successful implementation of the PMS under the new leadership, some 
informants have raised new questions. Since there have never been bilateral appraisals of 
subordinates by their superiors, how will implementation proceed? Will there be any negative 
appraisals at all? And how will positive and negative sanctions come to effect?:  
 
“When you introduce new forms for appraisal, you must phase out any previous 
system. That is a problem now, with the introduction of the PMS. If a dean evaluates 
my performance, can he also promote me? The answer is no. After the appraisal, the 
dean has to write to the registrar, and he will have all his meetings over there [in 
central admin], and at the end of the process, I may not be promoted because of 
ABCD.” (Informant 10)  
 
It remains to be seen how this further develops. Unfortunately, that is outside the scope of my 
research.  
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions with regards to the 
implementation of a PMS. The second order constructs are provided in the table below (first 
order constructs are included in annex 9). These second order constructs are considered as 
‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension ‘ideas, opinions and suggested interventions 
with regards to the implementation of a PMS’. It is indicated which second order constructs 
are supported by which informant group(s). 
 
269 
 
 
Second order construct        Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x Review the documentation, develop a contextualized PMS 
x Agree on a time frame for implementation  
x PMS is needed in order to avoid indifference/inertia 
x Separate professional from private lives 
x Focus on improvement and support 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
except [previous] top management):  
x Top management has to be committed 
x Generate stakeholder buy-in (including the unions) 
x Raise awareness and build capacity 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top 
management, deans & directors and higher central admin 
officials): 
x Relate PMS to promotion criteria and rewards 
x Phase out the old system of promotions and rewards 
 
Diverging ideas (central admin) 
x Develop job descriptions for everyone including 
performance indicators 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top management):  
x We must improve on accountability  
x We need appointed deans  
 
Table 8.3: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘Ideas, opinions and 
suggested interventions with regards to performance appraisal.  
 
 
 
8.4 Dominant mental models on performance appraisal 
In this paragraph, I present the dominant mental models on performance appraisal according 
to the various informant groups. I do so by differentiating between a convergent model and a 
divergent model. In these models, I incorporate new developments (both positive and 
negative), which refer to changes after the previous VC/DVC had left CBU.   
  
Ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions with regards to 
performance appraisal 
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8.4.1 The convergent model 
I have constructed the convergent mental model on performance appraisal, based on a shared 
assessment of the past and present situation (‘Ist’), shared ideas about the desired situation 
(‘Soll’) and converging ideas, opinions and suggested interventions in order to achieve the 
desired situation. In this mental model one can immediately see about which issues there is 
convergence among all informant groups.  
 
Convergence (in the sense of consensus) has increased enormously since the new VC/DVC 
were appointed. This is reflected in the list of new positive developments. Top management 
involved the unions in the development and implementation of the PMS, and invested a lot of 
time in sensitization, information sharing and capacity building. These activities have never 
taken place under the previous VC/DVC. In fact, the previous VC was constantly at 
loggerheads with the unions, and staff involvement was generally low.   
 
As already remarked earlier, it has been acknowledged that (in the current situation) there are 
no evaluations by the students, it has not been mentioned as a feature of the desired situation. 
There is not much discussion about this; hardly anyone is in favor of it. Apparently, this is 
being considered as ‘a bridge too far’ at this moment.  
 
Please refer to chapter 10 for more information about the relevance and importance of 
constraining factors and enabling factors on the implementation of a PMS.  
 
See the convergent model on the next page.  
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8.4.2  The divergent model  
The divergent model is based on the same mental model, but this time I have only included 
the issues that are not shared by all informant groups. In this model one can immediately see 
about which issues there is (partial of full) divergence among informant groups. This can be 
an issue brought forward by one informant group which is not shared by any other informant 
group, or an issue shared by two or three (not all) informant groups. 
 
Many informants believe (and fear) that the appraisal of their performance is biased, and that 
decisions about promotion and rewards are influenced by in-group collectivism and 
favoritism & allegiances (especially in central admin). Just as with decentralization, top 
management is strongly in favor of appointed deans, who are accountable to top management 
(not to their electorate in the schools). In their view, this will help to reduce the fear of bias.  
 
According to the other informant groups, the previous top management was not committed to 
the implementation of a PMS, and stakeholders (including the unions) were not sufficiently 
involved in its development. Little (if any) effort was put in awareness-raising and capacity 
building in order to prepare for PMS implementation. This has changed for the better under 
the new leadership (see the convergent model).  
 
Please refer to chapter 10 for more information about the relevance and importance of 
constraining factors and enabling factors on the introduction of a PMS.  
 
See the divergent model on the next page.  
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8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The implementation of a PMS has been discussed for a long time, and it started in 2013. 
Crucial has been the role of the new top management who involved the unions and invested 
heavily in sensitization and capacity building. Under the previous VC/DVC the development 
and implementation of a PMS was constrained by fear and by counterproductive relations 
between top management and the unions. In that era, fear was clearly fueled by 
authoritarianism. Despite institutional pressures from the national government and the 
university council, the previous VC/DVC had to leave and be replaced before PMS 
development and implementation could be boosted forward.  
 
Although there are several indicators of authoritarianism under the new VC/DVC, the new 
leadership started less authoritarian and was therefore better perceived by the majority of 
informants. The new leadership has not constrained PMS development and implementation in 
any way. But when a dean asked top management to visit his school to explain the 
implementation of the PMS, it became clear that this would not happen:  
 
“The VC felt that there was no need for him or the registrar to do that as the deans 
in all schools were capable of doing that. The VC requested all deans to inform top 
management for intervention where they faced problems.“ (CBU, 2013) 
 
According to the minutes of evaluative management meetings in March and April 2013, all 
deans, directors and HoDs were requested to complete the appraisal forms and submit them 
to the office of the VC (CBU, 2013).  
 
The way forward  
At the end of the period for data collection, it was still unclear whether and how the old 
committee system for contracts, promotions and rewards will be phased out or replaced by 
the new bilateral performance appraisals. It will be interesting to learn how this further 
develops: will top management leave it all up to the deans and directors from now on, or do 
they (in some way) want to remain in control, and how?  
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Another interesting issue is about the appraisal interviews. Since people tend to refrain from 
feedback and avoid conflict as much as possible, what can be expected from these bilateral 
appraisal interviews? What will be the influence of in-group collectivism, favoritism & 
allegiances on these appraisals? Will deans, directors and HoDs appraise all their staff 
members positively? However, these issues are outside the scope of my research project. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Dominant mental models on strategic  
planning & implementation 
 
In this chapter I will describe and explain the dominant mental models with regards to 
strategic planning & implementation. As already explained earlier, these mental models 
include an assessment of the current situation, a description of the desired situation, and 
ideas, opinions and suggested interventions to achieve to desired situation. This will be 
described in consecutive paragraphs 9.1 to 9.3. In paragraph 9.4, different dominant mental 
models about strategic planning & implementation will be provided and explained, displaying 
the levels of convergence and divergence among the various informant groups. At the end 
this chapter I provide some concluding remarks (9.5). 
 
 
Figure 9: The mental model on strategic planning & implementation. 
 
Parts A and B have already been described in chapter 6. In this chapter, I will first describe 
parts C and E, and then D, according to the following logic of reasoning: you first need to 
know where you are (C) and where you want to go (E), before being able to say how you 
wish to get there (D). The dominant mental models are presented in paragraph 9.4.  
 
277 
 
Since the lists of first order constructs (under C, D and E) are quite extensive, I have included 
these lists in the annexes. The lists of second order constructs and related aggregate 
dimensions are incorporated in this chapter.  
 
 
9.1 Assessment of the current situation with regards to strategic planning & 
implementation  
 
The first strategic plan at CBU covers the period 1998 – 2002, followed by a number of 
‘survival’ plans until 2008. In fact, there was no strategic plan for some time:  
 
“…From 2004 to 2009 we didn’t have a strategic plan.” (Informant 6) 
 
Until 2007 strategic planning was restricted to ‘survival planning’ and ‘overcoming liquidity 
problems’ (CBU, 2009b). In 2008 a new strategic plan has been produced for the period 2009 
– 2013. According to some informants, a strategic plan at CBU is used as a defensive rather 
than a development tool and serves the interests of certain people at the top. Others claim that 
a strategic plan is mainly produced in order to obtain donor funding:  
 
“The strategic plan is a tool that can be used to get help from the outside, by telling 
outside organizations ‘this is our focus, this is what we want’.” (Informant 12) 
 
Some informants claim that strategic plans do not emerge from forces within the university, 
but are imposed by CBU’s stakeholders, mainly the Zambian government and foreign donors:  
 
“It’s just another piece of paper written to protect some peoples’ interests or as 
defensive tool rather than a developmental tool.” (Informant 5) 
 
As already described briefly in chapter 4 (research setting), strategic planning & 
implementation at CBU has never been very successful (CBU, 2009b). Among other 
important reasons (the top down approach from top management, the strategic plan was never 
officially launched, lack of funds), the limited participation of staff in the development of the 
strategic plan has been mentioned by many informants as a critical fail factor:  
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“There was a committee appointed, the committee did the research and all that, and 
they developed a strategic plan, and everyone was given a copy, but they did not feel 
part of it since they were not involved in the planning process, and you cannot 
expect the people who have not been involved to impose a plan on them and tell 
them ‘this is what I want you to do’. While if you involve me from the beginning, I 
can ask questions, like what are we supposed to do and how? Quite a number of 
stakeholders felt left out.” (Informant 25)  
 
 “The biggest problem is the process of strategic planning itself. The VC will 
appoint some people to do this, and they will go to a retreat, somewhere, and they 
work out what should be the strategic direction for CBU. I have never been invited 
to such meetings, and I have never been briefed about it, never, and I have never 
seen it, even though I am one of the most senior persons here at CBU, it’s almost 
embarrassing…” (Informant 10) 
 
The lack of involvement during the planning process resulted in a lack of ownership55. People 
didn’t know what was being expected from them:  
 
“The lower ranks, they never hear about it, they hear that someone has gone to a 
workshop, in Ndola, in a nearby hotel, but when they come back there is no meeting 
to share information, so they just do whatever they are told, and for the rest they 
never hear about it.” (Informant 26) 
 
Furthermore, the strategic plan was overambitious, there was no implementation plan and it 
was not realistically connected to the budget: 
 
“We tend to be overoptimistic, although we know that there is no money, and we put 
it everything that we want, so that we can say ‘this is what we want’, hoping for a 
miracle to happen…” (Informant 12) 
                                                          
55 This has changed under the new leadership; in the planning process of the strategic plan for the period 2014 
– 2018, more people from the units were consulted, and they were involved as committee members at 
department and at school level. 
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“What was coming out, what happened was that the strategic plan was nicely 
bound, but there was no plan to implement it, so people started wondering what’s 
the point of having a strategic plan, they just put it on the shelf, it looks nice!” 
(Informant 18) 
 
Halfway the implementation period, during the management workshop in Ndola (2011), it 
became clear that strategic plan implementation was not very successful:  
 
“The presenter explained that, as far as he was aware, very little is being done, 
‘while we are halfway the [implementation] period’. Implementation committees 
have not been established at school level [although they were planned for].” 
(Observation during the management workshop in Mukuba, 2011) 
 
During the same management workshop, everyone agreed that the schools would present 
annual reports about the implementation of the strategic plan, and that there would be face-to-
face meetings with the central M&E committee (chaired by the DVC). This would be done 
before the end of April (2011). Unfortunately, this never happened. Doubts have raised about 
the commitment of everybody (not only top management), but there are other reasons as well:   
 
“There was a lack of commitment yes, from the POs and from the schools, and there 
was also ignorance. As if some were thinking: we have always done it this way, now 
what is this, why should we now do things differently? As if they didn’t believe that 
this time, they were actually supposed to do things themselves at school level, they 
didn’t believe it. You know, in previous strategic planning periods, we never had 
implementation committees, we never had them before. So people hear about it, as a 
new thing, but they don’t believe it or don’t understand it.” (Informant 2) 
 
“We tended to ignore it [the strategic plan], even at the central level because of these 
firefighting issues56 and also because of the lack of meetings and monitoring and so 
on. Everybody had lost a sense of direction.” (Informant 2) 
                                                          
56 Firefighting issues refer to ad hoc interventions by top management in order to address all sorts of urgent 
matters. 
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Although one would expect that in such situations top management would interfere and 
provide direction, but apparently, they did not take the lead in the implementation process:  
 
“I am not very sure whether top management has actually done that, pushing the 
strategic plan forward, I seriously doubt it, because I haven’t seen it.” (Informant 
20) 
 
The VC nor the DVC nor the registrar wanted to be the chairman of the central committee for 
the implementation of the strategic plan with the argument that “we have many other things 
to do.” In addition, top management assumed that the implementation had to be taken up by 
the schools, since they considered the deans & directors to be the drivers of implementation:   
 
“The previous leadership assumed that they did not have to lead the implementation 
of the strategic plan, yes, they thought that the initiators of this, they should also be 
able to run through these things, and to implement what they said they wanted to do, 
but also be able to evaluate and to provide reports.” (Informant 17) 
 
In reality, however, the schools didn’t know how to go about it: they were waiting for orders 
from above, they didn’t know how to make annual work plans, etc. In addition, they did not 
have the authority over necessary resources:  
 
“The schools were supposed to administer the funds that were implicated in the 
strategic plan, so that they could move ahead, but these funds never came.” 
(Informant 2) 
 
In fact, several informants have claimed that the funds for the implementation of the strategic 
plan were diverted for other purposes:  
“One of the weaknesses was that some money was diverted from the planning; 
money was being used for unplanned activities while other approved and agreed 
activities were left behind without funding.” (Informant 24) 
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Some say that funds have been misapplied, to pay for foreign trips or other expenses from top 
management. Whether true or not, top management has never confirmed such practices, apart 
from diversion of funds needed for urgent issues (firefighting). Top management argues that 
the committees for implementation and monitoring & evaluation in the schools didn’t do 
what they were supposed to do:  
 
“I don’t think that the central committee received much support from the 
implementation committees in the units, because those were supposed to report and 
for example raise alarms when they saw that the apportion of their plan was not 
being done.” (Informant 19) 
 
Apparently, the committees in the schools didn’t report (anything) to the central committee, 
so at that level they were not regularly updated of any progress being made, or the lack of it. 
At the same time, top management argues that there was not enough capacity in the schools 
to prepare work plans:   
 
“Well, it has to do with the weak structures in the units… Each school or unit was 
required to set up a small team for periodic monitoring and evaluation, to see what 
has been done and what has not been achieved, but we had not built capacity for the 
preparation of work plans, we had these goals and objectives in the strategic plan, 
but we had not stipulated how to achieve those… And we had taken for granted that 
the schools would know what to do in order to do this… It was a wrong 
assumption.” (Informant 17) 
 
Eventually, the implementation and monitoring & evaluation committees in the schools 
disappeared:  
 
“There were some meetings of the monitoring & evaluation committees, but they 
soon disappeared, yes, they had some meetings and there are some reports, but after 
that, you know… It just phased out… “ (Informant 17) 
 
According to the previous VC, these committees disappeared due to a lack of accountability. 
But he indicates other reasons as well:  
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“The committees disappeared because there was no accountability. The committees 
were accountable to themselves. And there were undercurrents that made everything 
difficult, I had finished my second term, and my contract had been prolonged for one 
year, but other people had a different agenda.” (Informant 37) 
 
The quote above indicates that the general atmosphere at CBU towards the end of the VCs’ 
second term was not conducive anymore for the schools to constructively work together with 
top management on the implementation of the strategic plan. Distrust, dissatisfaction and 
frustration had grown to unworkable proportions, and in fact, most of the staff just wanted the 
VC to leave as soon as possible. Finally, it has been argued that the university council, as the 
highest governing body of the university, didn’t monitor the implementation of the strategic 
plan properly, and didn’t hold top management accountable for the lack of progress:  
 
“Although the UC could have done better, for instance, there were conflicts of 
interest between top management and the UC, sometimes the UC came down to the 
level of top management, and it was not clear who was overseeing who…But in 
operations, the UC came down, as if they were working with the top management, 
and it became difficult to hold top management accountable.” (Informant 25) 
 
Below, I have included a figure that visualizes the process of strategic planning and 
implementation as it has been in the period 2008 – 2013. The uninterrupted lines indicate 
what has actually happened, whilst the dotted lines question whether the indicated processes 
and activities have taken place (at all), and to what extent. For instance, the dotted arrow 
between ‘control of funds by top management’ and ‘implementation activities by the units’ 
questions whether funds have actually been provided to the units.  
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What can be observed immediately is that most dotted lines occur in the implementation part 
of the figure. Whereas the planning phase has been criticized for a lack of involvement, the 
implementation phase has been criticized for many other reasons: a lack of commitment and 
weak accountability at all levels, lack of leadership, weak monitoring & evaluation and weak 
governance.  
 
According to many informants, the lack of commitment (and a lack of ownership) is a direct 
consequence of the lack of involvement of staff in the planning phase of the strategic plan. 
The lack of commitment from top management is illustrated by the fact that no PO wanted to 
chair the central M&E committee. Weak accountability is illustrated by the lack of 
monitoring & evaluation at all levels; the committees in the units did not report to the central 
committee - ‘the lack of progress was kept silent’, the central committee did not report to top 
management, and top management didn’t meet with deans and directors to discuss (the lack 
of) progress, in order to find ways to overcome the difficulties. As time went on, the 
committees in the units stopped having meetings – ‘they didn’t make much sense anyway’ - 
and the committees slowly faded away. The implementation of the strategic plan was very 
frustrating because nothing was happening, it became a non-issue, and key staff members 
preferred not to talk about it anymore:  
 
“At every meeting you’re being challenged why you are not achieving certain things 
that are in the strategic plan, every meeting you’re being challenged about 
that…The frustration may lead you to say that I am at peace by not calling for these 
meetings anymore…” (Informant 20) 
 
Feelings of institutional inertia emerged throughout the university. However, this is not to tell 
that nothing happened. Top management (lead by the VC) wanted to move ahead and get 
things done. But top management did not have much confidence in the implementation 
capacity of the schools to implement the strategic plan. Instead, top management intervened 
directly in order to realize certain achievements that were projected in the strategic plan. It 
seems that top management believed that it would be more convenient and more successful to 
intervene directly than to manage the deans & directors. An example of this is the split of the 
school of technology, which was implemented in a top-down and very authoritarian way 
(which caused a lot of frustration and anger among the staff).  
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During the second term of the previous VC, the overall atmosphere at CBU deteriorated, the 
staff was fed up with the VC/top management and there were conflicts between the VC and 
the DVC. Hierarchical distrust had grown to unworkable proportions, and these negative 
undercurrents made everything difficult, including a joint implementation of the strategic 
plan. A report from a principal officer’s meeting in 2013 says:  
 
“The university had experienced some dynamic events which necessitated 
adjustment to the implementation of some aspects of the 2009 – 2013 strategic 
objectives.” (CBU, 2013) 
 
The ‘dynamic events’ in the quote above refer to strikes and protests of staff and students 
against top management during the VC’s second term at CBU. Examples of dynamic events 
have been described in chapter 6.  
 
When I presented my visualization of the strategic planning & implementation process to 
various groups of informants, and asked why nobody (not even top management) intervened 
when ‘nothing was happening’ during implementation, informants usually started laughing. 
Perhaps my visualization was too confrontational and uncomfortable for them to deal with? 
During data collection, I increasingly started to interpret their laughter as an expression of 
powerlessness, a confirmation of tolerated inertia, beyond their circle of influence. As if 
everybody had taken the situation for granted. 
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the current situation with regards to strategic planning & implementation. 
The second order constructs are provided in the table below (first order constructs are 
included in annex 10).  
 
These second order constructs are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension 
‘current situation with regards to strategic planning & implementation’. It is indicated which 
second order constructs are supported by which informant group(s). 
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Second order construct        Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x Weak and unrealistic strategic planning  
x Little implementation of strategic plans 
x Inadequate funding 
x Weak accountability during implementation 
x Lack of leadership by top management 
x Negative undercurrents undermining strategic plan 
implementation 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (schools & central admin):  
x Limited involvement of staff in strategic planning 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups  
except previous top management) 
x Funds have been diverted for other purposes 
x Strategic plan implementation was no longer leading 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only previous top management):  
x Schools were not prepared for strategic plan implementation 
 
Table 9.1: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘current situation with 
regards to strategic planning & implementation’.  
 
 
9.2 Desired situation with regards to strategic planning & implementation  
 
Since the new leadership at CBU is in place, the ideas and opinions about the desired 
situation with regards to strategic planning & implementation are to a large extent 
convergent, i.e. there is broad consensus about how it should be. But it hasn’t been like that 
under the previous leadership until 2012. Most informants argue that a strategic plan must be 
shared and supported by everybody. Members of the university community are involved and 
consulted in the planning process. Important here is the desire for meaningful participation, 
especially among staff from the schools and central admin:  
 
“If the objectives are not shared, you are not going anywhere.” (Informant 20) 
 
In the desired situation, there is stakeholder buy-in and consensus about the strategic plan. 
This is convergent with the strive for inclusiveness, consensus and buy-in (see chapter 6). 
Assessment of the current situation 
with regards to strategic planning & 
implementation 
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However, top management and deans & directors were involved, and consequently, they have 
not complained much about this issue. According to informants from schools and central 
admin, however, it is top management, the deans and directors who have failed to involve, 
consult and inform their staff members: 
 
“…The strategic plan, it is only the top and middle management who know about it, 
but they don’t share information.” (Informant 24) 
 
This is convergent with perceptions of exclusion and the lack of information sharing (see 
chapter 6), which should be avoided in the desired situation. However, the level of staff 
involvement in the development of the strategic plan has somewhat improved under the new 
leadership at CBU (since 2012):  
 
“The development of the strategic plan has been inclusive, there have been 
workshops and meetings, and people were asked to provide input in it, the HoDs 
were also part of that, then there were departmental meetings, and they asked their 
staff members for input, and so every department has provided specific input.” 
(Informant 12) 
 
Of course, not everyone is equally happy with the level of involvement and consultation:  
 
“HoDs were asked to provide input for the new plan. But instead of asking for my 
input, they have asked me to fill in the blanks that were suggested by them. Then it is 
very difficult to have input from bottom-up, it is more top-down, and top-down issues 
are usually very difficult to implement. A junior colleague said that ‘when there is 
openness, there is no resistance’, but that is not the case now, we just have to fill in 
the blanks.” (Informant 28) 
 
Nevertheless, the general impression is that the process of strategic planning has been more 
inclusive than it was before. A widely shared idea is that a strategic plan should be credible 
and realistic, given the situation on the ground:  
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“Strategic planning is like dreaming of something that really can’t happen, so you 
believe in it but it just won’t happen…When you make a strategic plan, it must be 
achievable, if they are not achievable, why dream more? …You must assess whether 
it is achievable or not, both in terms of finance, materials and human capacity.” 
(Informant 9) 
 
The new strategic plan for the period 2014 – 2018 (developed under the new leadership) 
acknowledges the need for realism, which is illustrated as follows:  
 
“The strategic vision [of the previous strategic plan] ‘to be one of the most preferred 
oasis of knowledge and dynamic center of excellence in Zambia, Africa and beyond’ 
has proved quite lofty and unachievable in the long term.” (CBU, 2014) 
 
Unachievable objectives and targets have created disappointment and frustration, which 
should be avoided in the desired situation. This also means that planning, implementation and 
budgeting are integrated, so that only those objectives and targets are planned for which there 
is money available to allow implementation:  
 
“So now we are saying ‘within our expectations and limitations, can we do a 
strategic plan that we can then plan, knowing that these are achievable targets, we 
know that these are achievable objectives.” (Informant 17)   
 
In the desired situation, strategic planning & implementation are continuous, ongoing 
processes, which means that the planning is annually adjusted, based on the implementation 
results in each past year:  
 
“I would say we...as we were reviewing our performance last year… We must 
evaluate our performance last year with a view to seeing what we are going to do 
next year.” (Informant 8) 
 
This should be done jointly, as a shared responsibility under the leadership of top 
management. The same goes for the implementation, which should not be left entirely in the 
hands of the deans & directors without leadership from top management. Indeed, according 
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to all informants (except top management under the previous VC/DVC) top management 
should spearhead the implementation process. The attitude from top management has 
changed under the new leadership (since 2012):  
 
“The new VC has said that… You need top management to be part of the entire 
process, because they need to be driving the process…” (Informant 17) 
 
Responsibilities of PO’s, deans and directors have to be clearly defined, so that everyone 
knows what is expected from him/her. In addition, in the desired situation, monitoring & 
evaluation mechanisms are not only in place, but actually operate and do what they are 
supposed to do. This refers to accountability, but interestingly, the word accountability has 
hardly been used by the informants in this context. Instead, informants refer to monitoring & 
evaluation and periodical review:  
 
“In my view, periodical review would be unavoidable…If I were the VC, I would 
have serious meetings, the document [strategic plan] should be the standard agenda 
item.” (Informant 20) 
 
As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order constructs have been 
identified about the desired situation with regards to strategic planning & implementation 
(first order constructs are included in annex 11). The second order constructs are provided in 
the table below.  
 
These second order constructs are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension 
‘desired situation with regards to strategic planning & administration’. It is indicated which 
second order constructs are supported by which informant group(s). 
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Second order construct        Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x Inclusive strategic planning 
x Monitoring & evaluation mechanisms for periodical 
review are in place and operational 
x Strategic plan is credible and achievable 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
except the previous top management):  
x Top management is leading the implementation process 
x Strategic planning, implementation and budgeting are 
integrated 
x Strategic planning & implementation are continuous, 
ongoing processes 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (schools & central admin):  
x The strategic plan is shared with every member of the 
university community 
 
Diverging opinions & ideas (only previous top management):  
x Schools are in charge of the implementation  
 
Table 9.2: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘desired situation with 
regards to strategic planning & implementation’.  
 
It should be noted that, although there seems to be consensus about the converging ideas in 
the table above, there are still (gradual) differences. For example regarding inclusive strategic 
planning, all informant groups argue that strategic planning should be inclusive, but in the 
eyes of informants from the schools and central admin, the planning process should be much 
more inclusive than it has been. Another example is about monitoring & evaluation 
mechanisms. Although all informants agree that M&E mechanisms should be in place and 
operational, top management didn’t seem to care much about the little effort that the various 
committees were putting in, even when committees slowly faded away and ceased to exist. 
Monitoring reports were not sent and discussions about the lack of progress were avoided. 
This generated feelings of inertia throughout the university. According to many informants, it 
was up to top management to intervene and improve the situation (for instance by providing 
leadership and funds), but they didn’t do anything until the end of the strategic planning 
period, when a new strategic plan had to be developed57. However, one may wonder whether 
                                                          
57 This may have been due to the ‘dynamic events’ and ‘negative undercurrents’ described in previous 
paragraphs. 
The desired situation with 
regards to strategic planning 
& implementation 
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it is fair to put the blame entirely on top management. For instance: could deans, directors 
and other staff not have done more themselves in order to improve the process of 
implementation, monitoring & evaluation? I think so, but given the high levels of 
authoritarianism, distrust and other cultural constraints (see chapter 6), it would have been 
quite courageous and potentially frustrating to do so. Instead, the emerged inertia was 
tolerated by everyone.  
 
Apart from these gradual differences, it should be said that some ideas & opinions have 
changed over time. For instance, nowadays everybody thinks that strategic planning should 
be credible and achievable. But in 2008, an unrealistic strategic plan has been produced, 
which was approved by top management and the university council. Didn’t they realize that 
the strategic plan was unrealistic at that time? Was its viability not important or insufficiently 
considered? It seems that external representation and attracting donor funding was more 
important than its implementation by the schools and other units. CBU has learnt a few 
lessons, which have been discussed with the new leadership when a new strategic plan had to 
be developed (CBU, 2013).   
 
 
9.3 Ideas, opinions and suggested interventions towards strategic planning 
& implementation 
 
All informants argue that in the development of a strategic plan, stakeholder buy-in must be 
generated and consensus must be achieved. However, it seems that the staff from central 
admin and the schools is keener on this than top management and the deans & directors. In 
fact, among academics and administrators at the lower levels, the strive for inclusiveness, 
consensus and buy-in is exceptionally strong: 
 
“We must devise strategies for inclusiveness, and this might slow the university 
down a little, but we will proceed with a huge consensus.” (Informant 10) 
 
The issue of inclusiveness refers to both planning and implementation (including monitoring 
& evaluation); it seems as if everybody has to be involved in strategic planning and that 
everybody has to be involved in the implementation, which is of course impossible. Among 
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schools and central admin, it is argued that inclusiveness and involvement are needed in order 
to create commitment. Ideas to enhance commitment (at all levels) include an official launch 
and presentation to the entire university community. Many informants want to develop a 
strategic plan that is realistic and contains achievable targets:  
 
“I prefer a document of ten pages only, with achievable targets. It is better to start 
small, and build further on that…” (Informant 28) 
 
This means that a strategic plan should be used as an internal development tool, not solely as 
a presentation and description of CBU’s desirable future. This is actually the outcome of a 
learning process that has taken place under the new leadership (since 2012). The previous top 
management thought that they should leave the implementation of the strategic plan up to the 
deans & directors. According to top management, they did so because the top down 
implementation in previous years (before 2009) had been heavily criticized:  
 
“There had been critique on the previous strategic plan, because there were people 
saying that it was driven top-down. So now [for the 2009 – 2013 strategic plan], the 
idea was that this time we should let the people at the micro level in the schools 
develop ideas, and fit in with the overall objective, and let them be in charge of the 
implementation, and have evaluation committees that can evaluate the things that 
they are doing…” (Informant 17) 
 
Under the new leadership, this attitude of top management has changed:  
 
“The new leadership is saying it doesn’t work like that, if there is a need for 
resources, it is up to the top management to provide these resources, to make sure 
that things are moving, so we cannot stand aside, and leave it up to them.” 
(Informant 17) 
 
This quote reflects a significant change of vision from top management: resources have to be 
provided and top management has to drive the implementation process. Some informants 
have suggested that the development of the new strategic plan has been more inclusive than 
before:   
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 “The inclusiveness in strategic planning has increased, that is a good thing. 
Everybody feels that he or she is part of it.” (Informant 22)  
 
It should be said, however, that this perception of inclusiveness is not shared among 
everyone. Some have claimed that the development process has been less inclusive, and that 
it was rushed: 
 
“The previous strategic plan was developed in a more inclusive way than this [new] 
one. The new plan was rejected by the university council, because it was not 
inclusive enough. Even the unions were complaining about it. It was rushed, it had to 
be done quickly.” (Informant 41 and 43) 
 
Apparently, perceived levels of inclusiveness differ depending on who you ask. As argued 
earlier, the strive for consensus, buy-in and inclusiveness is strong, and perceptions of 
exclusion are always on the lure.  
 
Also new (in the approach of the new leadership) is the use of log frames for planning & 
implementation purposes. This means that the five-year strategic plan will be translated into 
annual work plans including activities and planned results. As a consequence, every unit 
(whether school, directorate or department) knows what has to be done and when: 
 
“There was a management workshop a month ago, about annual work plans, log 
frames, how do you prepare a budget, how do you monitor the implementation of the 
strategic plan. A lot of progress is being made. The VC is really driving it, he wants 
to have all this information on his fingertips, and also the DVC is quite keen….” 
(Informant 19) 
 
Under the previous leadership, this type of capacity building never took place. That is why it 
has been argued that ‘the schools didn’t know how to go about it’. This has changed 
significantly under the new VC/DVC. In addition, the new leadership has created a new 
position of deputy registrar for strategic planning. However, not everyone is happy about this:  
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“They now have a new deputy registrar for planning, but for me it only means that 
they are making central admin even heavier than it already was, with money that 
should have been invested elsewhere in the university. So the fact that we now have a 
separate deputy registrar for planning, doesn’t mean anything.” (Informant 22) 
 
As we can see, ideas, opinions and suggested interventions towards strategic planning & 
implementation have changed substantially. However, what this means for the 
implementation of the new strategic plan (2014 – 2018) is yet unknown, and is outside the 
scope of my study. As a result of the above, a number of prominent first and second order 
constructs have been identified about the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions with 
regards to strategic planning & administration. The second order constructs are provided in 
the table below (first order constructs are included in annex 12). These second order 
constructs are considered as ‘building blocks’ of the aggregate dimension ‘ideas, opinions 
and suggested interventions with regards to strategic planning & implementation’. It is 
indicated which second order constructs are supported by which informant group(s). 
 
 
Second order construct        Aggregate dimension 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x Develop realistic and achievable targets 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
except previous top management):  
x Use a strategic plan as an internal development tool 
x Top management has to lead the implementation process  
x Top management has to provide funds for implementation 
x Include deans & directors in monitoring & evaluation 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (schools & central admin):  
x Devise strategies for more inclusive strategic planning 
x Create commitment among management and staff  
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (previous top management):  
x Leave the implementation of the strategic plan up to the 
schools  
 
Table 9.3: List of second order constructs related to the aggregate dimension ‘ideas, opinions and 
suggested interventions with regards to strategic planning & implementation’. 
 
Ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions with regards to 
strategic planning & 
implementation 
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The partially diverging ideas & opinions in the table above (all informant groups except 
previous top management) are partly based on what informants have said, and partly based on 
what informants have done (according to other informants). For instance, the previous top 
management may have thought and/or said that a strategic plan should be used as an internal 
development tool, but according to many other informants they have not acted accordingly. 
In fact, since the previous top management withdrew from the implementation process almost 
entirely, it is no longer credible to argue that they considered the strategic plan as an internal 
development tool. The same goes for including deans and directors in monitoring & 
evaluation; according to many informants, meetings with deans and directors to discuss (the 
lack of) progress didn’t take place and were even avoided.  
 
 
9.4 Dominant mental models on strategic planning & implementation  
 
I have constructed the convergent mental model concerning strategic planning & 
implementation, based on a shared assessment of the past and present situation (‘Ist’), shared 
ideas about the desired situation (‘Soll’) and converging ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions in order to achieve the desired situation. In this mental model one can 
immediately see about which issues there is convergence among all informant groups.  
 
In this paragraph, I present the dominant mental models on strategic planning & 
implementation according to the various informant groups. I do so by differentiating between 
a convergent model and a divergent model. In these models, I incorporate new developments 
(both positive and negative), which refer to changes after the previous VC/DVC had left 
CBU.   
 
9.4.1 The convergent model  
As already argued earlier, convergence about strategic planning & implementation has 
increased substantially under the new leadership at CBU, especially about the desired 
situation and the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions to achieve the desired situation. 
Under the previous leadership, there was a lot of convergence about the current situation, but 
very little convergence about the desired situation and the ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions to achieve the desired situation. This is reflected in the convergent model 
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below. In fact, the only converging idea is to develop realistic and achievable targets. 
Convergence about the desired situation is also limited.   
 
It is interesting to see the items under ‘new positive developments’. Many informants have 
perceived the strategic planning process as more inclusive (as compared to the previous one 
in 2008), but others claim that this time it was rushed, and therefore not as inclusive as it 
should have been. They even claim that the university council and the union had criticized the 
process.  It seems that the VC and the DVC are actively supporting the process of strategic 
planning & implementation, that capacity is being built and that top management wants to 
drive the implementation process. These developments have had a positive influence on the 
perceptions and interpretations of staff, but of course, it remains to be seen how things further 
develop. However, this is beyond the scope of my study.  
 
Please refer to chapter 6 (and also chapter 10 for more information about the relevance and 
importance of constraining factors and enabling factors on the processes of strategic planning 
& implementation.  
 
See the convergent model on the next page.  
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9.4.2 The divergent model  
Under the previous leadership, divergence is high. There is a lot of divergence between the 
different informant groups about the desired situation and the ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions to achieve the desired situation. Most divergence is found between top 
management and other informant groups. In addition, there is some divergence about the 
desired level of inclusiveness in strategic planning and the desire for more commitment to 
(and ownership of) strategic plan implementation. These ideas stem from the lower levels of 
the university (schools and central admin) and indicate a hierarchical breach between 
subordinates and their supervisors.  
 
In the divergent model, it is striking to see that all informants (except top management) 
expect top management to lead the implementation process, while the previous top 
management wanted the schools to be in charge of the implementation of the strategic plan. 
According to the new top management at CBU, this has resulted in a problematic disconnect:  
 
“There wasn’t much being done from the implementation committees in the units. 
And if you are not getting feedback from the units then the whole thing can’t work. 
There is a disjoint or disconnect between central and the units, then there is a 
problem because to me it means that nothing will work, and I think that is one lesson 
we learn from this.” (Informant 19)  
 
Of course, this is just one part of the story. The other part refers to the lack of guidance and 
support by top management, who left the implementation process entirely up to the schools, 
without providing the necessary funds. This view also neglects the culture of fear and distrust 
that had emerged. Top management was expecting progress reports from the schools, while 
the schools expected guidance and support from top management. In the meantime, 
everybody knew that nothing was happening, but nobody did anything about it.  
 
Please refer to chapter 10 for more information about the relevance and importance of 
constraining factors and enabling factors on the processes of strategic planning & 
implementation.  
 
See the divergent model on the next page.  
299 
 
  
300 
 
9.5  Concluding remarks  
 
We have seen that, apart from cultural, structural and contextual constraints, different mental 
models are largely responsible for the limited success of strategic planning & implementation. 
Whereas strategic planning & implementation used to be done in a top-down way (before 
2009), top management deliberately chose a different approach for the implementation of the 
2009 – 2013 strategic plan; this time the schools would be in charge of the implementation. 
Committees in the units and a central M&E committee were put in place, but there was 
disbelief and a lack of understanding about this new way of going about it:  
 
“Some people were thinking: we have always done it this [top-down] way, now what 
is this? Why should we now do things differently? As if they didn’t believe that this 
time, they were actually supposed to do things themselves at school level, they didn’t 
believe it. In previous strategic planning periods, we never had implementation 
committees, we never had them before. So people hear about it, as a new thing, but 
they don’t believe it or understand it. During the planning phase, there were several 
deans participating who had never made any strategic plan before in their entire 
lives, so they were learning. They didn’t know about it, or how to go about it. And 
then the schools were ‘suddenly’ supposed to implement their own strategic plans!” 
(Informant 2) 
 
The quote above illustrates the uneasiness of deans, directors and HoDs with the committees 
at unit level for implementation, monitoring & evaluation. In addition, the new way of going 
about it was not compatible with their perceptions of excessive centralization, 
authoritarianism and other constraints. During the years 2009 – 2013, a culture of fear and 
distrust prevailed, which discouraged initiative, activity and inquiry of staff. As a 
consequence, deans, directors and HoDs were waiting for orders from above. This is often 
referred to as ‘upwards delegation’, where subordinates are happy to leave all actions and 
decisions up to their superiors.  
 
It can be argued, however, that this was an easy way out for the deans, directors and HoDs. 
They legitimized their reluctance to take action by simply referring to fear and distrust. The 
combination with a lack of funds and a lack of guidance and support from top management 
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resulted in a sort of powerlessness to get certain things done at CBU. This sense of 
powerlessness is also acknowledged by thesis research (Kraakman, 2011).  
 
Somehow, the explanations for the limited success of strategic planning & implementation 
remain a bit dissatisfactory; different informant groups are blaming each other, and a number 
of constraining factors do the rest. I have sometimes thought that an external locus of control 
could be an additional explaining factor, but only very few indications in the data point in this 
direction. The prevailing role culture (stressing the importance of being rather than doing) 
could also play a role here. When I asked informants how they themselves understand the lack 
of success in strategic planning & administration, they usually remained silent or argued that 
‘culture’ was to blame. Eventually, they started laughing about it…  
 
Based on her thesis research, Schipper (2011) argues that top management and schools play a 
‘waiting game’, where nobody takes appropriate action but accept the situation as it is, 
resulting in some sort of inertia. This waiting game includes the framing of problems 
(constraints) in such a (defensive) way that ‘the other’ is to blame, and seems to be relevant 
not only for the implementation of the strategic plan but also for decentralization.   
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Chapter 10 
 
Integration of empirical findings 
 
In the previous chapters (7, 8 and 9), the dominant mental models have been described and 
explained for each of the three organizational changes separately. In this final empirical 
chapter, I discuss these findings (also including the results described in chapter 6) in an 
integrated way. In paragraph 10.1 I first provide an overview of the three organizational 
changes under study. In paragraph 10.2 I elaborate on the competing views between top 
management (and higher central admin) on the one hand and middle/lower management (and 
staff) on the other. Competing views between other informant groups will also be described. 
In paragraph 10.3. I describe the perceived importance and relevance of cultural constraints 
for each of the changes. Paragraph 10.4 is dedicated to coping strategies, which explain how 
staff members cope with excessive centralization, authoritarianism, favoritism and distrust. In 
paragraph 10.5 I explain how leadership and organizational change at CBU can be understood 
in the post-colonial management system, followed by some concluding remarks in paragraph 
10.6.  
 
 
10.1 Connecting the three organizational changes under study 
 
When overviewing the three organizational changes, many informants conclude that they 
were not very successful; decentralization has not resulted in more decision-making authority 
and control over financial resources at school level – either the reverse, given the claims that 
CBU has become more centralized in recent years (see chapter 7). This has also constrained 
successful strategic planning & implementation, which has largely remained a planning 
exercise without much implementation. Some goals of the strategic plan have been 
accomplished by top management, but without the involvement (and much to the 
dissatisfaction and frustration) of the deans and directors (see chapter 9). Whereas 
performance appraisal did not materialize under the previous leadership, it has been 
implemented under the new leadership, although the old committee system for contracts, 
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promotions and rewards has remained in place (see chapter 8). Below, I will describe the 
organizational changes in some more detail.  
 
Decentralization was and still is heavily constrained by perceptions of authoritarianism, 
insufficient and irregular funding, hierarchical distrust (distrust between top management and 
the schools), weak accountability mechanisms and elected deans. Decentralization is believed 
to remain problematic in the years to come. It is suggested that the lack of progress in 
administrative decentralization at CBU is due to a lack of progress in decentralization at the 
national/political level. A dean argues as follows:  
 
“Decentralization is just a song, nothing more. Also at the national level, I don’t see 
anything happening.” (Informant 4) 
 
This quote underlines the influence of developments at the national level on developments at 
CBU. Maybe CBU will decentralize power and resources to lower levels of management, 
when similar developments start to take form at the national level. However, expectations are 
not very hopeful for the years to come. The apparent preference of top management for 
centralized decision-making, limited transparency and limited information sharing contributes 
to the idea that decentralization is still far away from a reality at CBU. For the schools, this 
probably means that the dependency relationship with top management and central admin 
continues to exist, with all the frustrations that come with it.  
 
Under the previous leadership, the implementation of a PMS was heavily constrained by 
perceptions of authoritarianism (fear for victimization) and the initiative was not supported by 
the unions. Although the university council had urged top management repeatedly to develop 
and implement a PMS, it didn’t happen. But pressure from the government increased, since a 
PMS was being implemented in the entire Zambian public sector. The new leadership 
involved the unions and the staff in the development of the PMS, and there were sensitization 
workshops for implementation, supported by the new VC/DVC. As a result of these new 
(positively perceived) developments, the PMS was implemented in 2013. However, it remains 
questionable how successful and meaningful the PMS will be, since most of the other 
constraints mentioned here still seem to apply. Some informants have argued that the 
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implementation of the PMS is a first step in improving accountability, which is considered as 
a prerequisite for decentralization (by top management).   
 
Strategic planning & implementation (of the 2009 – 2013 strategic plan) was heavily 
constrained by perceptions of excessive centralization, authoritarianism, hierarchical distrust 
(between top management and the schools), insufficient and irregular funding, weak 
accountability mechanisms, sources of discontinuity (strikes by students and staff), the 
committee system, perceptions of exclusion (and the associated lack of ownership at the lower 
levels), indifference and alienation. In addition, it is suggested that top management was not 
committed to the implementation, since they claimed that ‘we have many other things to do’. 
Under the new leadership a new strategic plan (for the period 2014 – 2018) has been 
developed in a slightly more inclusive way, and it seems to be more realistic and better 
structured than the previous one. Some capacity building about planning, budgeting and 
monitoring has been provided, and the new VC/DVC want to drive the process of 
implementation. However, it remains to be seen how implementation of the new strategic plan 
unfolds. Until July 2014, regular meetings of the VC/DVC with deans and directors about the 
implementation of the strategic plan have not been reported. Some informants consider 
decentralization as a prerequisite for successful strategic planning and implementation:  
 
“The success of strategic planning and implementation depends on the question 
whether decentralization has been implemented or not.” (Informant 40)  
 
Since the expectations of most informants for decentralization are not very high (anymore), 
strategic plan implementation in the units (schools, directorates and institutes) may continue 
to suffer. According to my informants, many of the constraints described above still apply 
under the new leadership, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent. The changes that have occurred 
since the appointment of the new leadership are captured in positively and negatively 
perceived developments (chapter 6). Although there is convergence about many positively 
perceived developments, but there is much divergence about negatively perceived 
developments. The dominant mental models and the constraining/enabling factors will be 
further discussed in chapter 11.  
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10.2 Competing views on organizational change 
 
When looking at the three organizational changes altogether, and considering the different 
dominant mental models that co-exist at CBU, we can see that most divergence occurs 
between top management (including higher central admin staff) on the one hand, and lower 
and middle management (including their professional staff) on the other. This divergence is 
deeply rooted in two main competing views on the organizational reality at CBU, both with 
claims of truth and suggested evidence. The divergence between top management and other 
categories of staff has a long history and has been strengthened over time. It has had a huge 
impact on (especially) decentralization and strategic planning & implementation, since power 
and money issues are involved.  
 
Competing views between top management and lower/middle management (and staff) 
In table 10.1 I have listed the most important elements of these competing views as opposed 
to each other. The combination of verbal expressions in the table on the left clearly oppose the 
combination of verbal expressions in the table on the right.  
 
Top management  
(+ higher central admin) 
 Lower and middle management at CBU 
(+ staff) 
We have to move forward. We have to make 
decisions. The committee system slows you 
down (too much). Upwards delegation: 
middle managers leave unpopular decisions 
up to the VC 
 
 
Authoritarianism. Perceptions of exclusion. 
Strive for consensus, inclusiveness & buy-
in.  
Centralization. All income goes to one 
account for auditing purposes. All these bank 
accounts  are too costly. 
 PO’s like to be in charge. Decision-making 
gives them power. They want to remain in 
control. 
We often have to discuss with the 
government in Lusaka about policies and 
budgets. 
 Discontinuity when top management is off 
campus. Unnecessary delays.  
We buy the restaurant lodge Arabian Nights. 
We have a lot of international traveling to do. 
We buy new cars. Money is needed to pay 
recurrent bills.  
 
 
 
 
 
Wrong priorities of top management; the 
money should have been used for teaching 
& learning. Waste of money. Money is 
being diverted for unknown purposes. 
Money is used for personal extravagances. 
We need to borrow money from the schools 
to pay the salaries. 
 Top management never gives us our money 
back.  
Our accounts are audited annually. We are 
accountable to the government.  
 Lack of transparency by top management 
about finance and decisions.   
Staff doesn’t come to the Indabas.  Top management doesn’t share 
information. 
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The dean is in control of the approved 
budget. 
 We cannot make expenditures. There is 
never money available for the things that 
are in the approved budget. 
Cost accountants have been assigned to the 
schools. 
 Deans do not know their cost accountants, 
and even the bursar can’t tell who they are. 
Decentralization is a gradual process. The 
schools are not prepared for decentralization. 
 We want immediate decentralization. We 
have the capacity to manage our own 
affairs and budgets.  
Let the schools be in charge of the 
implementation of the strategic plan. We 
have many other things to do.  
 Top management does not take the lead, 
and is not committed to strategic plan 
implementation.  
 
 
  
Under the previous leadership, these competing views had become extremely polarized and 
caused great problems especially between top management and the schools. In fact, all three 
organizational changes under study were considered highly problematic in the eyes of many 
informants (from lower- and middle management and staff). There were negative 
undercurrents, distrust and fear, which made ‘everything’ difficult. This somewhat changed 
for the better, since the new VC/DVC were appointed (in 2012). However, in 2014 complaints 
about authoritarian leadership started to increase again. The characteristics of the ‘gap’ 
between top management (including higher central admin) and middle/lower management 
still exist, and is convergent with the basic universal conflict between superiors and 
subordinates (De Caluwé & Vermaak, 2003) and severely hampers cooperation. But it is the 
result of mutual image formation over a long period of time, which have been firmly 
embedded in their mental models and cannot be undone easily (Labianca et al., 2000). The 
lack of integration between top management and lower/middle management, and also 
between top management/central admin and the schools, has resulted in different worlds that 
seem to have very little to do with each other. Top management is hardly involved in 
academic affairs and schools are hardly involved in administrative affairs. Nevertheless, 
schools suffer a lot from the administrative dominance over academic affairs. The schools just 
have to live with the means and the resources provided by top management, without much 
clout in decision-making. At the same time, top management and central admin do not seem 
to suffer from a lack of involvement in academic affairs. Although top management is usually 
invited for boards of studies meetings in the schools, ‘they never come’ (informant 33). The 
main causes of the disconnect are perceptions of centralization, ambiguous role of VC/top 
management, authoritarianism, in-group collectivism, various forms of distrust, perceptions of 
Table 10.1: Views from top management (including higher central admin) versus the views from lower 
and middle management (and their staff). 
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exclusion and the lack of transparency/information sharing. These phenomena are covered by 
cultural/behavioral and structural/organizational constraints (see chapter 6).  
 
Competing views between deans/directors and staff  
In previous sections I have argued that some of the characteristics of top management are 
repeated/imitated at the level of middle management. Though, it should be said that the 
opposites are not as strong as between top management and lower/middle management (and 
staff), and they do not occur everywhere (this depends very much on the personalities of the 
individuals involved). Complaints from staff members often relate to a lack of involvement, 
consultation and information sharing.  
 
Deans & directors  Staff 
We are the ones who are responsible, we 
have to move forward and make decisions. 
Negative work mentality of staff. 
 
 
Deans & directors don’t share information 
with their staff members. Perceptions of 
exclusion. 
Staff members are not comfortable with 
delegation, and they are not accountable.  
 Deans & directors like to be in charge. 
They want to remain in control. Very little 
delegation of tasks 
It is difficult to accept advice from junior 
members of staff.  
 Staff is not being consulted. It is difficult 
to question the boss.  
 
Table 10.2: Views from deans & directors versus views from staff members.  
 
Competing views between academics and administrators 
There are also competing views between academics and administrators. These can partly be 
explained in terms of different occupational cultures (Bloor & Dawson, 1994; Trice, 1993) 
and are common in many HEIs around the world.  
 
Academics  Administrators 
We don’t know what all those central 
administrators are doing. There are too 
many administrators.  
 
 
Academics often don’t show up for class 
or vigilance. They can come whenever 
they want. 
Central admin staff is ignorant of our needs. 
They look very well after themselves. They 
lack a sense of urgency.  
 Academics abusing their autonomy. They 
are reluctant to take up additional tasks.  
Administrators work on their private 
businesses during office hours 
 Academics are often off campus due to 
their side jobs.  
 
Table 10.3: Views from academics versus views from administrators.  
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The competing views between 1) deans/directors and staff and between 2) academics and 
administrators have not come out clearly in the mental models, since the effects of their 
competing views on the organizational changes under study are not as huge as compared to 
the differences between top management and other informant groups. Nevertheless, they 
adversely affect internal cooperation and organizational change at CBU.  
 
 
10.3 Perceived importance and relevance of constraining factors for the 
organizational changes under study 
 
10.3.1 Cultural/behavioral constraints  
Most cultural constraints are believed to play a role in all organizational changes under study 
(like the ambiguous role of the VC and top management, role culture, negative work 
mentality, perceptions of exclusion and indifference/alienation); other cultural constraints are 
especially relevant for one or two of the organizational changes under study. For instance, 
authoritarianism dominates leadership & management in general, but is especially relevant for 
decentralization and strategic planning & implementation, where decision-making and power 
issues are at play. Hierarchical distrust between top management and the schools is important 
and relevant for decentralization and strategic planning & implementation; many informants 
believe that hierarchical distrust (among other things) prevents decentralization from 
happening in practice.  
 
Hierarchical distrust towards supervisors, out-group distrust (and in-group collectivism), 
favoritism & allegiances and the tendency to refrain from feedback are believed to be 
especially significant for the implementation of a PMS. This is because many informants 
believe (and fear) that the appraisal of their performance will be biased, and that decisions 
about (for example) promotion are influenced by in-group collectivism, favoritism & 
allegiances. Hierarchical distrust between top management and the schools is also perceived 
as relevant for the implementation of strategic plans, since members of top management have 
openly doubted the capacity of deans and directors to implement the intended activities 
themselves. On the other hand, schools distrust top management because of diversion of funds 
(among other things). In the table below, I have indicated the importance and relevance of all 
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cultural constraints for the three organizational changes under study (according to the 
majority of the informants).  
 
Cultural constraints Decentralization PMS Strategic planning & implementation 
Ambiguous role VC / Top 
management Y Y Y 
Authoritarianism (by the VC) 
 Y  Y 
Hierarchical distrust between top  
management and schools X  X 
Hierarchical distrust towards  
supervisors  X X X 
Out-group distrust (in-group 
collectivism)  Y  
Favoritism and allegiances 
(including family trees)  Y  
Tendency to refrain from  
feedback X X X 
Role culture 
 X X X 
Negative work mentality  
 X X X 
Perceptions of exclusion  
 Y Y Y 
Indifference/alienation  
 X X X 
 
Table 10.4: Importance and relevance of cultural/behavioral constraints for the organizational changes 
under study. An ‘X’ indicates the importance and relevance of a particular constraint  in the eyes of all 
informant groups. A ‘Y’ indicates the importance and relevance in the eyes of all informant groups except 
top management. An empty cell means that a particular constraint is considered less relevant for the 
organizational change at hand.  
 
 
These Y’s inform us how top management is being perceived by large numbers of staff at 
CBU: ambiguous, authoritarian, untrustworthy, discriminatory and exclusive. Since these 
cultural constraints are not very positive, it is not surprising that they are not shared by 
members of top management. Interestingly, it is these cultural constraints (combined with 
excessive centralization) that have contributed to the emergence of coping strategies of the 
staff. These will be described and explained in paragraph 10.4.  
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10.3.2 Structural/organizational constraints  
Informant groups agree on the importance and relevance of most structural/organizational 
constraints for the organizational changes under study at CBU. However, concerning the 
division of power (excessive centralization) and the lack of transparency (and information 
sharing), opinions differ a lot between top management and lower categories of staff. 
According to top management, deans and directors are in charge of their budgets, and cost 
accountants have been assigned to the schools. For the deans and directors, however, this 
doesn’t mean anything in practice. School budgets are mobbed by top management, and there 
is never money available to procure items from the approved budget. In their view, 
decentralization stands or falls with control over bank accounts (at school level) and the 
authority to sign for expenditures. In fact, this control and authority has been taken away from 
them under the previous VC. Many informants believe that this has increased their 
dependence on top management in virtually everything (except day-to-day academic affairs). 
The perceived dependence has generated widespread feelings of powerlessness, frustration 
and indifference, especially in combination with the lack of transparency/information sharing 
and the lack of involvement of the deans and directors in management meetings. The emerged 
inertia has also adversely affected strategic plan implementation.  
 
There is also disagreement about the need for appointed deans. Whereas top management 
clearly wishes for appointed deans, other informant groups (especially academics and deans) 
are not at all convinced of the idea. Deans fear that they have to become more accountable to 
top management, which will further increase their dependence on them. In the table below, I 
have indicated the importance and relevance of all structural/organizational constraints for the 
three organizational changes under study (according to the majority of the informants).  
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Structural constraints Decentralization PMS Strategic planning & implementation 
Excessive centralization 
 Y  Y 
Sources of discontinuity 
 X  X 
Committees for decision-making 
 X X X 
Weak accountability mechanisms 
 X X X 
Weak compliance 
  X  
Lack of transparency/information 
sharing Y Y Y 
Elected deans 
 Z Z Z 
 
Table 10.5: Importance and relevance of structural/organizational constraints for the organizational 
changes under study. An ‘X’ indicates the importance and relevance of a particular constraint in the eyes 
of all informant groups. A ‘Y’ indicates the importance and relevance in the eyes of all informant groups 
except top management. A ‘Z’ indicates the importance and relevance in the eyes of top management 
only. An empty cell means that a particular constraint is considered less relevant for the organizational 
change at hand. 
 
 
10.3.3 External/contextual constraints  
Whereas disagreements exist about certain cultural and structural constraints, there is 
agreement about the importance and relevance of external constraints among informant 
groups. The activist role of the unions is considered relevant for the PMS, which is 
understandable from a labor union’s point of view. Obviously, irregular and insufficient 
funding is considered relevant for decentralization and strategic planning & implementation 
because financial resources are directly involved. The context of structural poverty is relevant 
for every organizational change, since it has generated a strong focus on job security and 
money issues (not just the salary, but also a wide range of allowances and emoluments) 
among staff members, which guides their organizational behavior on many occasions.  
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External constraints Decentralization PMS Strategic planning & implementation 
University governance and 
interference by the government X X X 
Role of the unions 
  X  
Irregular and insufficient funding 
 X  X 
Context of structural poverty 
 X X X 
 
Table 10.6: Importance and relevance of external/contextual constraints for the organizational changes 
under study. An ‘X’ indicates the importance and relevance of a particular constraint in the eyes of all 
informant groups. An empty cell means that a particular constraint is considered less relevant for the 
organizational change at hand.  
 
The enabling factors are relevant and important for all three organizational changes under 
study, according to the different informant groups.  
 
 
10.4 Coping strategies  
 
One should not underestimate the influence of (especially cultural) constraining factors on the 
individual behavior of staff in general, thereby affecting people’s attitudes towards 
organizational change. As a result of my analyses, it appears that the combination of 
authoritarianism with centralization, together with the existing culture of allegiances & 
favoritism and in-group collectivism, generates different behavioral patterns – which I call 
coping strategies. As such, they are relevant and interesting for my study of dominant mental 
models about organizational change. Crucial here is the presence or absence of important 
allegiances and/or loyalty to leaders and other powerful officials close to top management. In 
fact, I identify two groups of coping strategies:  
 
- Obedient coping strategies: Staff members with important allegiances and/or loyalty to 
their leaders, tend to obey to top management, stay quiet and refrain from (negative) 
feedback. In return, they expect support and security, in terms of rewards, favors or 
promotion, and gain satisfaction from it. In this group of obedient coping strategies, 
good relationships are considered more important than performance, and personal 
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interests tend to prevail over professional interests. I have called this group of obedient 
coping strategies ‘security & support’. 
 
- Defiant coping strategies: Staff members without important allegiances and/or without 
loyalty to their leaders cannot assume support and security by top management; they 
distrust top management and feel free to provide negative feedback and ask difficult 
questions whenever they think it is appropriate from a professional point of view. 
Defiance results in criticism, and may be well-intended but is usually not appreciated 
by top management. This may result in repercussions and sanctions that cause 
frustration and dissatisfaction, eventually leading to indifference and even alienation. 
In this group of defiant coping strategies, performance is considered more important 
than good relationships, and professional interests tend to prevail over personal 
interests. I have called this group of defiant coping strategies ‘fear & distrust’. 
 
In-between these coping strategies, there are – what I call – intermediate coping strategies 
which tend to be more pragmatic, less extreme, and involve moderate elements from both 
obedient and defiant coping strategies. Allegiances and loyalty do not play a major role here, 
and feedback and/or criticism is limited. As a consequence, there are no rewards nor 
sanctions. In this group of intermediate coping strategies, both professional and personal 
interests are considered important. It has been argued by several informants that intermediate 
coping strategies rarely result in satisfaction, and often bring about feelings of indifference 
and even alienation (like in defiant coping strategies) as time moves on. I have called this 
group of intermediate coping strategies ‘survival, go with the flow’. 
 
At CBU, there can be loyalty without any allegiance; some people are just loyal to any leader, 
regardless of the person. In the literature about management & change in Africa this is often 
called ‘deference to rank’ (Blunt & Jones, 1997; Jackson, 2004). Some informants claim that 
allegiances and loyalty are more important, while others claim that staying quiet (‘being a 
good boy’) is more important in return for security & support from top management.  
 
Since top management does not acknowledge the cultural constraints that have contributed to 
the emergence of these coping strategies, it can be argued that top management ignores its 
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own role in generating these coping strategies and their counterproductive effects on the 
overall functioning of CBU.  
 
 
Figure 10.1: Obedient, intermediate and defiant coping strategies.  
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Interestingly, the mental models show what staff members think and say about organizational 
change, while the coping strategies show what they actually do. This converges with the 
difference between espoused theory and theory-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Unlike the 
dominant mental models, the coping strategies cannot be attributed to specific informant 
groups because they differ from person to person. Due to existing family trees (in-group 
collectivism) and the relative proximity to top management (forced loyalty, difficult to defy), 
obedient coping strategies are more pronounced in central admin than in the schools, but they 
also occur in other parts of the university. Defiant coping strategies tend to occur more often 
in the schools, and intermediate coping strategies can be found everywhere at CBU. In fact, 
intermediate coping strategies seem to be adopted by most staff members, in efforts to survive 
(without risking repercussions and sanctions) at CBU:  
 
“The group of intermediate coping strategies is the largest group at CBU, but in the 
end, these people tend to get equally frustrated over time.” (Informant 41) 
 
From an institutional perspective, all three groups of coping strategies can be considered as 
unproductive; obedient coping strategies may result in temporary benefits for some staff 
members, but the university as a whole will not profit from them. As we have seen, obedience 
and loyalty constrain initiative, activity and even inquiry, and results in a sort of passiveness 
which is not supportive to organizational change. Meaningful participation and involvement 
of staff is limited, who like to leave ‘everything’ up to top management. Intermediate and 
defiant coping strategies eventually result in dissatisfaction, frustration, indifference and even 
alienation, which are counterproductive for the overall functioning of CBU. Staff members 
have given up (often after years of battle and accumulated frustration), they don’t care 
anymore. They end up doing the minimum and focus as much as possible on (income-
generating) activities outside CBU. However, they remain critical and aversive towards 
everything that comes from top management. Either way, top management has created (or 
contributed to) a situation in which they feel the need to lead and manage everything by 
themselves, since they cannot assume to rely on the unconditional and professional support 
from lower levels of management and staff.  
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Many informants argue that the three groups of coping strategies have not changed much and 
are still being used by many, also under the new VC/DVC since 2012. When I presented these 
coping strategies to top management (July 2014), one participant said:  
 
“This is a worrisome situation, it leads to a dysfunctional work environment…”  
(Informant 47)  
 
Efforts to improve things at CBU, like the organizational changes under study, suffer from 
these coping strategies. In the discussion and conclusions chapter I provide some practical 
recommendations for CBU on how to deal with these unproductive coping strategies.  
 
 
10.5  Leadership and organizational change in the post-colonial 
management system 
 
During data collection, top management (and central admin) have been criticized a lot by the 
other informant groups. Top management and central admin acknowledge the critique, but 
also wish to point out some of the achievements. CBU has come from very far, a lot of 
institution building has been done, in terms of new departments, new programs, staff, 
infrastructure, facilities, policies and regulations, in fact, a lot of things (even the most basic 
functions, procedures, etc.) have been put in place that weren’t there before. By the time of 
writing this thesis, university statutes were being developed (which CBU never had). The 
university has expanded enormously in the last ten years despite numerous challenges. Top 
management has pushed all these developments forward but does not receive many credits for 
these achievements. In fact, critique prevails, especially with regards to excessive 
centralization and authoritarianism, the lack of accountability and transparency, weak 
compliance and perceptions of exclusion among large numbers of staff. According to many 
informants, allegiances are still important, and practices such as favoritism and nepotism still 
occur. Altogether this has generated dysfunctional and widespread distrust. The issues 
described above are convergent with characteristics of the post-colonial management system 
described by Jackson (2004): 
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Employees are probably generally alienated from organizations that have a 
predominantly post-colonial management system. (Dia, 1996) 
 
On the one hand, a lot has been achieved. On the other hand, these achievements have come 
at a high cost, in terms of limited participation, low commitment, distrust, perceptions of 
exclusion, low motivation and frustration of staff. The informant below reports about the 
previous VC:   
 
“He got things done, physical things, yes, but not in terms of understanding and 
support, in the end he was in conflict with everybody, he didn’t have people with 
him.” (Informant 10) 
 
In defense, top management (and higher central admin) refers to examples of negative work 
mentality of staff, which requires corrective behavior from the top. In addition, they argue that 
a lot of critique on leadership and management emanates from a lack of understanding on the 
part of the staff. According to top management, the suggested fear and distrust shouldn’t be 
exaggerated, since there are policies, rules and regulations in place that prescribe how to deal 
with certain situations. Top management argues that everything can be discussed, and if you 
work hard and stand on solid ground, you don’t have to fear anything. Nevertheless, 
according to many informants – certainly under the previous leadership, but also under the 
new leadership – distrust and fear prevail, which makes them believe that ‘to stay quiet’ is the 
best strategy in order to survive at CBU (Labianca et al., 2000).  
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, it is suggested that the lack of initiative, activity and 
inquiry among staff is caused by fear and distrust. But does this also legitimize complacency 
and indifference? It is somehow difficult to understand that the staff feels powerless, as if 
there is absolutely nothing that they can do to improve things at CBU. Are suggested 
conditions of fear, distrust and exclusion perhaps strategically being framed by the staff in 
order to legitimize their lack of initiative, activity and inquiry? According to Cornelissen & 
Werner (2014) people try to create a world view that suits their own needs and makes them 
look good to outsiders – in this case, at the cost of top management. This evokes questions 
about causes and effects: did unproductive work behavior of staff (low job centrality, lack of 
knowledge and skills, weak time management, etc.) ‘ask for’ authoritarian leadership and 
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centralization by top management in efforts to achieve results in the post-colonial 
management system, or did authoritarianism and centralization by top management result in a 
negative work mentality of staff? Based on the stories of my informants, both lines of 
reasoning make sense, to some extent. Elements of unproductive work behavior can be 
understood by acknowledging that the university (as a professional bureaucracy) is an alien 
form of organization to the cultural environment where CBU is located. This cultural 
environment was already there before ZIT and CBU were established. The university imposed 
a bureaucratic and hierarchical system with rules and regulations that were perceived as out of 
line with elements of local/regional and ethnic/tribal culture (Dia, 1996; Jackson, 2004). The 
Weberian bureaucracy is ‘alien to Africa’ (Abrahamsen, 2000) and has resulted in the 
problems that I have described above. Franks (2006) considers this to be the central problem 
of many African institutions: the confrontation between modernity and merit and 
organizational politics that arises from tradition, custom and tribalism from outside the 
organization. An appropriate modus operandi has to be found (Franks, 2006).  
 
‘Cultural’ explanations of leadership  
Authoritarianism and centralization have become the coping strategy for top management in 
efforts to achieve results in the post-colonial management system and in a context of 
structural poverty. This line of reasoning is understood by a few informants but not supported 
by many:  
 
“I see authoritarianism as a coping strategy on the management part, in order to 
correct things that go wrong at the lower levels of the university.” (Informant 44) 
 
According to several informants, authoritarianism and centralization (combined with 
allegiances and favoritism) have subsequently generated perceptions of exclusion, fear and 
distrust, and eventually resulted in unproductive coping strategies for the staff.  
 
It has been suggested that several cultural/behavioral constraints at CBU also occur at UNZA 
(such as hierarchical and out-group distrust, favoritism & allegiances, role culture). Therefore, 
it seems that these cultural/behavioral constraints are not specific for the organizational 
culture at CBU, but represent a broader cultural pattern. In this line of thinking, one informant 
wondered whether ‘staying quiet’ can be attributed to ‘authoritarianism’:  
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“We are in a high context country. What you find here is the same as at the national 
level. It’s about culture, and we don’t have a culture of questioning, I’m not sure 
whether you can attribute ‘staying quiet’ to [authoritarian] leadership.” (Informant 
44) 
 
In fact, it is suggested that people simply don’t ask questions, even when there wouldn’t be 
authoritarian leadership. If so, the tendency to stay quiet could perhaps be attributed to 
culture. But another informant argues that during the Indabas nobody dares to raise difficult 
questions:  
 
“We should not forget that this is also related to culture, people just don’t ask 
questions, only questions to please the VC, not difficult questions. So the indabas are 
not meant to be about one-way communication, but it just how it works out in 
practice, because nobody dares to ask questions, especially when the VC or DVC 
are there.” (Informant 43) 
 
Many informants regret this situation and would like things to be different, but they don’t do 
much to change this. This was already noted by Schipper during her thesis research (Schipper, 
2011). Also informants from top management are not happy with the situation as it is:  
 
“The Indabas are meant to clarify things and to increase transparency, but if the 
people just sit there and wait for the VC to speak up, or they stay away from the 
Indabas… It should be two-way traffic.” (Informant 45) 
 
At the end of the period for data collection (towards the end of 2014), there was still a lot of 
distrust and fear among staff (towards top management), perhaps not as much as there used to 
be under the previous VC/DVC. Some informants allow the new leadership more time to 
prove their good will and commitment, to the benefit of the doubt. This doubt, however, is 
very real; several informants have argued that in the history of CBU (and other institutions in 
Zambia), leadership styles of top management used to become more authoritarian after being 
in charge for several years:  
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“If a leader stays in power very long, yielding wealth and power, they tend to 
become dictators, everything becomes autocratic.” (Informant 20) 
 
According to Zoogah & Beugré (2013), this is due to high power distance in most African 
countries, as it centralizes authority in leaders. Complaints about authoritarian leadership of 
the new VC have already started to increase in the course of 2014. According to my Zambian 
colleagues at VU University, this has further deteriorated in 2015.  
 
 
10.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Mental models are based on experiences in the (recent) past; people hold on to interpretations 
and perceptions that have developed over time, and seem to be very persistent (Balogun, 
2007; Labianca et al., 2000). They may increasingly become out of line with new 
developments and changing practices on the ground. In addition, mental models are based on 
perceptions and interpretations that can be very powerful:  
 
“Perceptions are very difficult to deal with, because once a perception is formed, it 
spreads like a bushfire, and then these perceptions become some sort of truth to 
many others…” (Informant 17) 
 
With regards to decentralization, pre-existing beliefs about power and leadership have been 
confirmed, since there has been no evidence of a development in the direction of 
decentralization. The old decision-making schema58 is reinforced, which generates a barrier to 
change (Labianca et al., 2000). Concerning strategic planning & implementation, time will 
tell how things further develop. If top management wishes to involve the deans and directors 
in its implementation, the current mental models will have to be adjusted or replaced by new 
ones. Balogun (2007) uses the term ‘cognitive reorientation’. Mental model change causes 
uncertainty which has to be carefully managed:  
 
                                                          
58 Labianca et al(2000) and Balogun (2007) use the term ‘schema’ for mental model.  
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During periods of uncertainty, even minor discrepancies in management action may 
take on added significance as employees actively search information to prove or 
disapprove the veracity of the new schema. Because a well-established schema is not 
easily disconfirmed, schema change takes considerable time. Any deviation from the 
new schema during implementation may not only cause reversion to the old schema, 
but also reinforce it. (Labianca et al., 2000) 
 
It remains at least questionable whether the suggested mental model change will take place at 
CBU. As long as top management and schools keep framing problems in terms of blaming 
each other, the ‘waiting game’ continues (Schipper, 2011), and a constructive dialogue 
remains difficult. Similar issues are at play with regards to the PMS, even though it is being 
implemented. This is because most cultural constraints are still believed to be valid (in the 
eyes of many informants), and may undermine mental model change in the long run.  
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Chapter 11 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
In this final chapter I will discuss the research findings and present the main conclusions. The 
discussion will be guided by the research questions as formulated in chapter 1. My main 
research question was formulated as follows:  
 
What are the dominant mental models about organizational change at Copperbelt 
University in Zambia, and how do they relate to existing theoretical insights about 
organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
In order to answer the main research question, I had developed the following sub questions:  
 
1. What are the dominant mental models of the local staff on organizational change at 
CBU in Zambia?  
2. What theoretical insights does the existing academic literature provide about 
organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa?  
3. What are the general implications of the findings for consultants in international 
cooperation?  
 
The first sub question has already been answered in chapter 7 (dominant mental models on 
decentralization), chapter 8 (dominant mental models on performance management) and 9 
(dominant mental models on strategic planning & implementation). The second sub question 
will be answered in paragraph 11.1, with reference to the theoretical insights provided in 
chapter 3. The third sub question will be answered in paragraph 11.2, based on a discussion 
of the relevance of ‘Western’ theory about organizational change for the case study at CBU. I 
will include some recommendations for consultants in international cooperation. In paragraph 
11.3 I present some theoretical considerations and respond to the question what can be learnt 
from the case study at CBU, in terms of a contribution to theory development about 
organizational change in SSA. In paragraph 11.4 I provide some limitations of my research 
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and in paragraph 11.5 I provide suggestions for further research, and a final reflection on my 
role as a researcher is included in paragraph 11.6. Conclusions will be presented in paragraph 
11.7, including several practical recommendations for CBU. 
 
 
11.1 Discussion  
 
In this paragraph, I provide a theoretical discussion by comparing the findings of the 
empirical study with the available literature about organizational change in SSA. I will first 
discuss the relevance of the large scale culture studies for the case study at CBU (paragraph 
11.1.1). In paragraph 11.1.2 I will discuss the relevance of Jackson’s typology of 
management systems in SSA, followed by paragraph 11.1.3 about the relevance of other 
theoretical insights about organizational change in SSA. This section also includes theoretical 
insights that I have come across during data collection and data analysis, which means that 
they may not have been incorporated in chapter 3. This is due to the fact that this study has 
been an ongoing learning process, where other and new insights have crossed my path along 
the way.  
 
11.1.1 The relevance of the large scale culture studies for the case study at CBU  
The African management literature has been dominated by culturalist explanations, 
particularly by Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) four cultural dimensions (Adeleye, 2011). If 
anything, the large scale culture studies consider collectivism and power distance as 
important (and correlated) cultural dimensions that distinguish SSA countries from ‘Western’ 
countries). Several other (related) dimensions will be discussed in this paragraph.  
 
Collectivism at CBU can be understood in various ways. First, the strong strive for 
consensus, inclusiveness & buy-in can be considered as a strong indication of collectivism. 
The desire for involvement is shared among large numbers of staff, even by (some members 
of) top management. This deep felt need for involvement and consensus resembles ‘Ubuntu’, 
which is an important element of ‘African management’ (Van den Heuvel, 2008). At the 
same time, however, the empirical findings show widespread perceptions of exclusion, which 
has resulted in frustration (and even alienation). Despite this, top management holds on to 
excessive centralization and exclusive decision-making. This has further strengthened the call 
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for more consensus seeking, inclusiveness and buy-in. It seems that top management ignores 
the widespread and deep felt need for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in, by imposing a 
coercive system of power and control. In other words: among the staff, the tendency towards 
collectivism at CBU is quite strong, but it is not practiced by top management. Middle 
management is somewhere in the middle; deans and directors sympathize with their staff but 
at the same time they are confronted with the downsides of collectivism (for instance endless 
committee meetings) and wish to move ahead in a more efficient way. At the same time, 
middle managers don’t want to be seen sympathizing with top management. Due to the 
differentiation perspective (Martin, 2002), these differences have come out quite clearly in 
the dominant mental models from the various informant groups (Buchanan & Dawson, 2007). 
Collectivism at CBU can also be observed as a tendency to refrain from feedback and to 
avoid conflicts, which proved to be very strong throughout the university (at all levels). 
However, this may also be due to power issues, distrust and fear for top management. There 
are also many indications of in-group collectivism; tribal issues, family relations and other 
allegiances have resulted in suspicions of nepotism and favoritism (at management level), 
and in avoidance of feedback, protecting each other, hiding mistakes, etc. (at the level of in-
groups).  
 
Power distance at CBU can be observed when considering the numerous perceptions of 
authoritarianism (by the VC) by many informants. Some informants have tried to counter 
these unilateral perceptions by drawing attention to (negative) work mentality (including 
‘upwards delegation’) of the percipients, which (supposedly) calls for strong leadership from 
above. Nevertheless, the image of authoritarianism by the VC still stands. Power distance 
(between the VC and the staff) is a result of both prescription and ascription: according to the 
law the VC has a lot of power; at the same time staff members ascribe a lot of power to (and 
even admire) his position as a VC (Zoogah, 2009). Perceptions of power distance also occur 
(to some extent) at the level of middle management, but not necessarily in an authoritarian 
sense; leadership and management at CBU are generally considered hierarchical; 
subordinates treat their supervisors (deans, directors and PO’s) with respect.  
 
Several other (related) cultural dimensions are to some extent relevant for CBU. Humane 
orientation and performance orientation from House et al (2004) have produced interesting 
results for Zambia. A more humane orientation resembles ‘Ubuntu’ and maintaining good 
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relationships with others, which has indeed been found at CBU. At CBU this can be observed 
in collegial relations among staff members (horizontally), but certainly not in relations with 
top management (vertically). Issues of power constrain the application of a humane 
orientation at CBU. At CBU, a humane orientation among staff seems to go hand in hand 
with a low performance orientation in practice. However, this does not explain fully the 
limited success of strategic planning & implementation at CBU.  
 
The human relationship with the environment from Trompenaars  & Hampden-Turner (1998) 
converges with the mastery/harmony dimension from Schwartz (1999) and later used by 
Munene et al (2000). It is suggested that the low socio-economic levels are conducive to 
valuing and legitimizing assertive exploitation of the natural and social environment 
(mastery). When thinking of CBU, it is difficult to follow this line of reasoning. My research 
findings do not show a legitimized exploitation of the environment, other than an 
instrumental view of organizations for personal purposes and the individual pursuit of 
personal objectives. Schwartz (1999) and Munene et al (2000) further suggest that SSA 
cultures stress maintenance of the status quo and restrain actions that might disrupt the group 
solidarity or traditional order (embeddedness), and legitimize a hierarchical system of 
ascribed roles assuring socially responsible behavior (hierarchy). My research findings, 
however, point in the opposite direction and clearly indicate a desire of many informants to 
alter the status quo and traditional order through decentralization. However, power issues 
(and fear) make it difficult for the staff at CBU to openly challenge the status quo. 
Furthermore, the hierarchical system of ascribed roles may still be prevalent in central admin, 
but is certainly being questioned more and more in the schools.  
 
The findings from Munene et al (2000) and Smith et al (2002) about reliance on advice and 
guidance from superiors can be observed at CBU, where pro-activity is generally low and 
staff is reluctant to take individual responsibility. Also in strategic planning & 
implementation this appears to be an issue; deans and directors are waiting for ‘orders from 
above’ instead of taking action themselves. Collectivism and in-group collectivism are indeed 
relevant and important for CBU, especially in combination with a humane orientation, role 
culture, embeddedness, high context and polychronic time orientation. 
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The large scale culture studies have proved to be relevant for the case study at CBU, but their 
explanatory power and practical value remains limited (Jacob, 2005). I share the critique on 
the large scale culture studies as provided in chapter 3, without disqualifying them. 
Especially issues of power (not just power distance), combined with my differentiation 
approach (highlighting the dominant mental models from different informant groups) 
(Martin, 2002), have shown that one particular (cultural) dimension can be interpreted in 
multiple ways – even within CBU. To illustrate this point, I have highlighted the different 
perspectives between top management and other informant groups, and also between the 
schools and central admin (see chapter 10). My research questions require a deeper 
understanding of the organization, its culture and context, which goes much beyond what the 
large scale culture studies can provide. Therefore, we now turn to Jackson’s typology of 
management systems in SSA.  
 
11.1.2 The relevance of Jackson’s typology of management systems in SSA for the case 
study at CBU 
Jackson’s typology of different management systems in Africa (2004) is theoretical but 
proves to be useful for this study. According to my informants, many characteristics of 
leadership, management and change at CBU (such as perceptions of hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and centralized management, authoritarian leadership, inefficiency, control 
orientation, a lot of government (including political) interference, lack of open 
communication and information, mistrust of human nature, low motivation, employee 
alienation, etc.) clearly resemble the post-colonial management system (Jackson, 2004)59. 
Due to excessive centralization, top management at CBU tends to be overworked with a 
reluctance to decentralize powers; at the same time informants (at the lower levels, especially 
in central admin) have argued that (due to fear and distrust, but also due to a lack of rewards) 
initiative, activity and even inquiry is constrained, i.e. there is an unwillingness to take 
independent action. The suggested emphasis on control mechanisms, rules and procedures is 
very clear at CBU, especially at the lower levels of management; staff is forced to strictly 
abide by the rules and every request is being scrutinized. The lack of open communication 
and information is convergent with the avoidance of feedback which is a prominent feature at 
                                                          
59 His description of the post-colonial management system is largely based on the insights from other authors 
about ‘African’ culture and management which I have provided in paragraphs 3.3.5 and 3.3.6. Therefore, these 
insights will not be dealt with separately in this discussion.  
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CBU. Although external stakeholders are included in the university council, the majority of 
them are from (or appointed by) the government. Relations with private stakeholders from the 
surrounding mining industry are weakly developed. Whereas top management is well-
educated, articulate and well-travelled, middle managers and especially lower managers lack 
exposure and basic managerial skills. Overall, many characteristics of the post-colonial 
management system are more prominent in central admin (and among administrative 
functions elsewhere in the university) than in the schools, since academic staff is usually 
more exposed and better educated.  
 
Considering results orientation, top managers at CBU display a mixed behavior; on the one 
hand, they want to move forward and get things done, on the other hand they didn’t seem to 
be committed to the implementation of the strategic plan (2009 – 2013). Many examples of a 
limited results orientation have been provided. Several informants have stressed the role 
culture at CBU in which relational aspects are much more important than performance and 
achievement. The fact that important decisions are made by the executive committee 
(consisting of the VC, DVC, registrar and bursar – excluding the deans, directors and the 
librarian), and that resources and management information are strictly controlled, indicates a 
control orientation of top management. An (unpublished) study from Jackson60 shows that – 
across different cultural groups in South Africa and Zimbabwe – there is agreement on the 
need to be more results- and people oriented and to be less control oriented, although there 
are no indications that this will change in the nearby future. Altogether, these are features of a 
post-colonial management system (Jackson, 2004 – see paragraph 3.4). At CBU informants 
do ascribe to the need to become more results and people oriented, but they have not reported 
any indications of it in practice. A control orientation prevails, much to the dissatisfaction and 
frustration of staff.  
 
There are some indications that CBU is developing towards a post-instrumental system 
(Jackson, 2004 – see paragraph 3.4); the strategic planning process in 2014 has generally 
been perceived as more consultative than in 2009; policies and SOP’s have been reviewed, 
approved and disseminated; under the new leadership there seems to be more room for 
diverse opinions than before. Other elements of the post-instrumental system (such as 
                                                          
60 Managers’ perceptions of organization in Africa: Evidence from South Africa and Zimbabwe (Jackson, 
unpublished). 
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promotions based on performance and achievement) do occur in the schools but have not 
been reported in central admin, where promotions are often believed to be based on other 
criteria such as favoritism & allegiances. Ascribed status (based on qualifications and age) is 
an important feature at CBU, but seems to lose ground in the schools, where academics try to 
achieve (academic) results. However, most characteristics of the post-instrumental 
management system (such as decentralization, an emphasis on employee motivation, 
empowerment, trust of human nature, clear policies on customers and clients) are still far 
from a reality at CBU (Jackson, 2004).  
 
Elements of African renaissance (Jackson, 2004 – see paragraph 3.4) at CBU are rare and 
they do not apply unconditionally. One characteristic of African renaissance that is prominent 
at CBU is the (strong) strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in among the staff. This 
desire for involvement and meaningful participation can be considered as an optimistic and as 
an opportunistic interpretation of ‘Ubuntu’ (van den Heuvel, 2008), which is a prominent 
feature of African renaissance (Mbigi, 1997). However, in practice, levels of participation 
and involvement are generally low, which has resulted in widespread perceptions of 
exclusion. Nevertheless, the new leadership has launched the so-called Indabas (which is also 
considered as a characteristic of African renaissance), but unfortunately not in the way an 
Indaba is supposed to be: participative and consensus seeking (Jackson, 2004). In fact, many 
informants have complained that the Indabas have become ad hoc briefings, not meant for 
open dialogue in order to reach consensus.  
 
Jackson’s typology (2004) does not cover all characteristics of leadership, management and 
organizational change at CBU that have been found in this study. Of course, it is impossible 
to put everything in a typology, especially when it is supposed to be applicable in a range of 
SSA countries. For instance, weak accountability (at all levels, throughout the university) is a 
prominent feature at CBU with great implications for organizational change, but 
accountability is not mentioned in the typology. The system of elected deans, which has such 
detrimental effects on middle management and on working relations between top 
management and the schools is not mentioned either. Another example is the avoidance of 
feedback, which goes much beyond the ‘lack of open communication and information’ in the 
typology. Avoidance of feedback at CBU is related to distrust and fear (for backfires and 
repercussions later on), the tendency to maintain good personal relationships (by not 
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offending or embarrassing each other), in-group collectivism (including allegiances and 
tribalism), respect for seniority and issues of negative work mentality (protecting each other, 
hiding mistakes). Regarding rules and compliance, CBU displays double standards; whereas 
lower employees have to follow strict rules and procedures, top management (and higher 
central admin) is believed to use (and adjust) these rules in accordance with their requests and 
needs. In addition, the research findings have shown that (some) policies and SOP’s were 
kept as drafts, or nobody knew where they were. If policies and SOP’s are not in place or not 
communicated, it becomes difficult to rely on them.  
 
These examples show where Jackson’s typology fails to capture the existing diversity and 
complexity of CBU’s management system. The perceived reality on the ground at CBU is 
much more complex than can be shown in a typology61. Therefore, we now turn to other 
theoretical insights about organizational change in SSA in order to find out whether (and to 
what extent) they can support and explain the empirical findings at CBU.  
 
11.1.3 Discussion of other theoretical insights about organizational change in SSA 
In this paragraph I will start by discussing important first- and second order constructs about 
leadership, management and organization (captured as constraining and enabling factors, see 
chapter 6 and annex 3), and (important elements of) the dominant mental models at CBU, in 
relation to the literature (other than the large scale culture studies and Jackson’s typology). I 
do so because these constructs explain the context in which organizational change at CBU 
can be understood properly. After the discussion on leadership, management and organization 
at CBU, I will focus on organizational change, including decentralization, performance 
appraisal and strategic planning & implementation. As such, the contents of the dominant 
mental models will be discussed in relation to the literature. I include more theoretical 
insights than those provided in chapter 3. This is due to the fact that I have come across more 
and other relevant theoretical sources during the period of data collection and data analysis. 
 
Excessive centralization 
Leadership and management at CBU are highly centralized; it has been suggested by many 
informants that PO’s want to be (and stay) in charge. In fact, it has been suggested (also at 
UNZA) that a leader needs to preserve his authority to decide and to sign, because that is 
                                                          
61 Other insights provided by Jackson will be discussed in the next paragraph.  
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what gives him power (Schipper, 2011; Slooter, 2011). This is nothing new in SSA according 
to many scholars (Beugré & Offodile, 2001; Blunt & Jones, 1997; Fashoyin, 2005; Jackson, 
2004; Kiggundu, 1991; Kuada, 2010; Leonard, 1987; Montgomery, 1987). Excessive 
centralization in SSA is also convergent with the practice in many developing countries 
outside Africa (Lubatkin, Ndiaye, & Vengroff, 1997), which I have also observed during my 
work as a management consultant in development. Jackson asserts that in post-colonial 
management systems, senior managers do not encourage decentralization, delegation and 
participatory management (Jackson, 2004).  
 
Authoritarianism 
Perceptions of authoritarianism at CBU are also largely in line with findings of other 
researchers in SSA (Blunt & Jones, 1997; Fashoyin, 2005; Kiggundu, 1991; Kuada, 2010; 
Ndongko, 1999; Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). However, it is has not always 
been like this. Ayittey (2006) contends that traditional African institutions did not foster 
authoritarian leadership, but were ruled by consensus (Ayittey, 2006), with checks and 
balances to guard against despotism and abuse of power. Kings had to procure the consent of  
the chiefs, and the chiefs the consent of the elders, which assured high levels of consultation 
and accountability (Ayittey, 2010; Boon, 2007; Van den Heuvel, Mangaliso, & van de Bunt, 
2007; Littrell, 2011; van der Colff, 2003). Authoritarian leaders have largely emerged after 
independence of many African countries (Sulamoyo, 2012), wielded unchecked power and 
cannot be held accountable, democratically or legally, for their actions (Adamolekun, 1999; 
Ayittey, 2010). Walumbwa, Avolio & Aryee (2011) argue that there is a systemic failure of 
organizational leadership across the African continent, due to a lack of assessment, 
development and evaluation (Walumbwa et al, 2011).  
 
Negative work mentality 
Mufune (2003) argues that in Zambia, managers felt that they needed to use an authoritarian 
style because some employees lack the technical skills to make good decisions (Mufune, 
2003). Others follow the belief that Africans need authoritarian leadership (Choudhury, 
1986). Several informants at CBU have argued along similar lines:  
 
“Sometimes you need an authoritarian type of leadership so that you get pushed, 
because the public service, the culture in Zambia is like laissez-faire, people are 
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only doing the minimum that is required, so in such an environment you cannot 
avoid using authoritarian leadership.” (Informant 11) 
 
The quote above refers to a negative work mentality, which (supposedly) requires 
authoritarian leadership in order to be corrected. However, the majority of my informants has 
condemned authoritarianism (and its implications) as inappropriate and unacceptable. A lot of 
negativity has been expressed about work mentality, ethics and staff morale (see chapter 6). 
These are considered negative since they interfere with work obligations in terms of 
performance and achievement. These are not typical Zambian issues; many scholars have 
described these problems in SSA (Abudu, 1986; Blunt & Jones, 1992; Dia, 1996; Kiggundu, 
1989). Dia’s report ‘Africa’s management in the 1990s and beyond’ (1996) includes a survey 
of the Zambian civil service and a management audit of education in Zambia. Although this 
survey was conducted in 1993, a lot of the characteristics depicted in this survey (see chapter 
3) have also been mentioned by informants at CBU – some twenty years later! As such, they 
have been captured as constraining factors in chapter 6.  
 
According to some researchers, negative work mentality is related to the alien bureaucratic 
and hierarchical systems of organizations with rules and regulations that are perceived as out 
of line with elements of local/regional and ethnic/tribal culture (Abrahamsen, 2000; Jackson, 
2004). There is a ‘disconnect’ between the corporate culture and societal culture, between the 
state and civil society, and between formal and informal institutions in many African 
countries (Dia, 1996; Hydén, 2006; Mavima & Chackerian, 2001). Jackson (2004) describes 
this as a lack of connection between the world of work and the home/community life. Formal 
institutions (like HEIs) need to be adapted to the local context in order to build the legitimacy 
needed for enforceability. At CBU this is clearly not the case, and in combination with 
excessive centralization and authoritarianism, this has eroded loyalty, commitment, local 
ownership and productivity of staff (Ayittey, 2006).  
 
Lack of pro-activity62 
According to Jackson (2004) coercive power is associated with alienation, a lack of 
involvement and commitment to the organization (Etzioni, 1975). Because of the 
overwhelming centralization of decision-making, the African middle manager is unable or 
                                                          
62 I consider the lack of pro-activity as part of negative work mentality.  
332 
 
unwilling to take risks or to make any initiatives (Fashoyin, 2005). Also, managers are 
supposed to check with their superiors before taking action and rely heavily on formal rules 
and procedures (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Munene et al., 2000; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001). 
Some scholars attribute the lack of initiative to poor education, a reluctance to take individual 
responsibility and the absence of rewards (Noorderhaven et al., 1996). Booth et al (2005) 
suggest that incentive structures within the Ghanaian civil service actively discourage 
initiative and pro-activity. The absence of rewards is mentioned by several informants, in 
combination with a fear of sanctions (when things don’t work out as planned), which is 
understandable in an authoritarian setting. The lack of pro-activity may be related to 
uncertainty avoidance. Jaeger & Kanungo (1986), Kiggundu (1989), Blunt & Jones (1992) 
and Jackson (2004) suggest that African societies are generally risk aversive and avoid 
uncertainty63. Of course, it can be argued that since there is a lot of uncertainty in the African 
context (environmental, economic, political, also concerning food and health, etc.) (Collier & 
Gunning, 1999; Zoogah & Nkomo, 2012), Africans struggle to fight these uncertainties 
(Munene, 1991, Kamoche, 1997, 2002;). But that is not necessarily the same as a tendency to 
avoid uncertainty. The different claims about uncertainty avoidance in SSA are the 
consequence of the instruments and methods used (Perry, 1997) and the levels (individual, 
group, organization or society) of conducting the research (Tsui & Nifadkar, 2007). 
Uncertainty avoidance correlates with conservatism and harmony (Schwartz, 1999); people 
do not encourage change but tend to accept things the way they are (Beugré & Offodile, 
2001). Managers from Zambia (together with other SSA countries) seem to have a low 
tolerance for unpredictability in their work (Jackson, 2004).  
 
Time management 
Weak time management is another element of negative work mentality which is mentioned 
by many informants at CBU, and described by many scholars (Hall & Hall, 1990; Harris, 
Moran, & Moran, 2004; Harvey & Kamoche, 2004; Mangaliso & Damane, 2001; Mpofu, 
D'Amico, & Cleghorn, 1996; Nnadozie, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). It is often argued that 
time was never a problem in Africa until people started developing different time 
orientations, due to early interactions with Europeans and globalization. In Africa, time is 
viewed as flexible, not rigid or segmented (Nnadozie, 2001). The African wants to sit and 
                                                          
63 Interestingly, Hofstede (1980) argues that the East African region has a low to medium score on uncertainty 
avoidance.  
333 
 
talk, to get to know the person before doing business. Normally, time is not seen as a limited 
commodity. What cannot be done today can always be accomplished tomorrow. Meetings are 
not held promptly, and people may arrive several hours late (Harris et al., 2004). Time is not 
an independent quantity that can be divided into ever smaller units; it is a continuum that has 
meaning only as it is experienced (Mangaliso & Damane, 2001). Time tends to be viewed as 
a more fluid temporal dynamic, flowing back and forth, whose purpose is to signpost ongoing 
day-to-day rhythms and cycles (Harvey & Kamoche, 2004). These ideas fit very well with 
Hall’s ideas about polychronic time (Hall & Hall, 1990). A study on time management in 
Zimbabwe shows that members of the Shona culture perceive time as determined by issues 
emerging from the immediate future, rather than some prior long term commitment (Mpofu et 
al., 1996). This is very much the case at CBU too; everyone is constantly disturbed by 
incoming phone calls, colleagues popping in the office, urgent requests from managers, or by 
sudden events, often resulting in somewhat chaotic situations (and deadlines that cannot be 
met). As a result, urgent issues often receive more attention than important issues.  
 
Despite all these complaints about negative work mentality, it should be said that there is also 
motivation and job satisfaction, mainly because of the conditions of service (a job, a monthly 
salary, pension, health insurance, housing, staff development opportunities, etc.). These 
conditions of service are directly related to the high need for job security (Jackson, 2004). 
When salaries cannot be paid (due to insufficient funds), motivation and job satisfaction go 
down very quickly. In another study by Jackson (2004) on motivational items in fifteen SSA 
countries64, he found that Zambian managers are eager to learn and to further develop 
professionally - combined with a relatively high internal locus of control. This is supported 
by thesis research at CBU (Kraakman, 2011); opportunities for further professional 
development contribute to motivation and job satisfaction.  
 
Strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in versus perceptions of exclusion  
The combination of excessive centralization (including a lack of transparency and 
information sharing) and authoritarianism (as explained in chapter 6) does not help to 
improve the problems described above. Centralization and authoritarianism have resulted in 
perceptions of exclusion and distrust. A wedge has emerged between top management on the 
                                                          
64 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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one hand and lower levels of management and staff on the other (see chapter 10). The deep-
felt need for inclusiveness and consensus among large numbers of staff is not congruent with 
centralization and authoritarianism.  
 
Avoidance of feedback 
Avoidance of feedback has come out strongly at CBU and raises the question why people 
prefer to stay quiet. According to the literature, several factors contribute to this phenomenon. 
Sawadogo (1995) argues that in most of SSA, from birth to age 14, the child or adolescent is 
expected to be a passive learner who asks a minimal number of questions. Passivity is a sign 
that one is wise and has self-control, a quality that is valued and cultivated. Asking questions 
is considered as intrusive and improper, especially when it concerns older people or strangers 
(Sawadogo, 1995). So in fact, the tendency to stay quiet may refer back to early childhood 
and the way (many) Africans are brought up. Together with collectivism (emphasizing 
harmony and consensus), in-group collectivism (based on family relations, tribalism and 
other allegiances) and the tendency to establish and to maintain good social and personal 
relationships (Akande, 2009; Binet, 1970; Dia, 1996; Gelfand, Frese, Salamon, Hofmann, & 
Frese, 2011; Jackson, 2004), this contributes to the avoidance of feedback and conflicts at 
CBU. These same issues also constrain accountability within CBU. Subordinates in high 
power distance cultures are unlikely to voice their opinions, feelings or concerns about their 
own or others’ errors, because it may harm the relationship with them (Gelfand et al., 2011). 
At CBU, this may go well beyond errors and include absence, weak performance and other 
problems. There is also greater consideration for individual circumstances when problems 
emerge. This partly explains the struggle of deans, directors and HoDs to manage the 
performance of their staff, including the observed reluctance to use the disciplinary code. The 
elective system for deans (who usually wish to be reelected by their staff) and the rotational 
system for HoDs (who may wish to become a dean in the future) further complicates the 
situation. Finally, power issues (authoritarianism), distrust and fear (for backfires and 
repercussions) further constrain feedback. In line with Kiggundu (1991), disagreements are 
not always or easily tolerated by supervisors at CBU. As a consequence, it seems that the best 
overall strategy for survival has become to stay quiet.  
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Corruption65 
At CBU, authoritarianism goes hand in hand with suspicions of favoritism and other forms of 
corruption (such as nepotism and personalism). This is also reflected in the literature. 
Favoritism fosters loyalty to individual managers (Mufune, 2003). Kuada (2010) suggests 
that African leaders appear to adopt relationship management strategies that patronize their 
followers rather than encourage their inner motivation to show commitment to organizational 
goal attainment. Leaders tend to provide those closest and subservient to their interests with 
special opportunities and privileges (Kuada, 2010). As a consequence, staff members are very 
much concerned with their relationship with their supervisors (Jones, 1986; Jones, Blunt, & 
Sharma, 1996; Noorderhaven et al., 1996). At CBU, this concern is not limited to the 
relationship with their immediate supervisor, but also with higher officials in central admin 
and top management. Of course, special opportunities and privileges are very attractive, 
especially in terms of money (salary, allowances, loans, but also housing, etc.). All this has to 
be understood in a context of structural poverty and extended families.  
 
Many informants have expressed suspicions of corruption, including PO’s pursuing their 
personal interests (extravagances, unnecessary foreign trips, etc.), thereby jeopardizing 
institutional interests. Montgomery (1987) calls this personalism; an orientation towards 
work which favors personal interests, rather than those of the client or the public 
(Montgomery, 1987). These personal interests often include patronage obligations of African 
leaders towards their tribes, families and villages of origin (Ndongko, 1999; Nyambegera, 
2002). Apparently, state organizations are extensively being used to pursue informal, 
personal goals of their managers rather than the collective ones that are formally proclaimed 
(Leonard, 1987; Noorderhaven et al., 1996). Those at the top seem to have institutionalized 
corruption and locked their subordinates into these practices (Jreisat, 2010). Corruption 
practices have trickled down to the lower levels of CBU, which has led to an instrumental 
orientation towards work, where staff members expect their jobs to bring substantial benefits 
to themselves but show very little loyalty and commitment to the organization (Jones, 1986). 
This has also been reported from the Zimbabwean civil service, which is (locally) considered 
as an institution that serves personal and political patronage purposes (Mavima & 
                                                          
65 I have not included corruption as a separate first- or second order construct, because corruption is often 
implied in many other constructs such as authoritarianism, distrust, favoritism & allegiances and the lack of 
transparency & information sharing. 
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Chackerian, 2001). Patronage obligations and personalism result in nepotism, a practice 
which is also suspected in central admin at CBU (although denied by top management and 
higher central admin). Beugré & Offodile (2001) report that giving a job to a family member, 
friend or fellow tribesman can be regarded as a social obligation. In Zambia, Muuka & 
Mwenda (2004) report the pervasiveness of the ‘Wako-ni-Wako’ employment culture, the 
practice of recruiting and promoting relatives and members of the same ethnic group, in the 
public sector (Muuka & Mwenda, 2004). De Sardan (1999) coins the term ‘corruption 
complex’ to capture the practices of personalism, favoritism and nepotism, which are 
culturally embedded and therefore considered legitimate: Illegal enrichment and nepotism are 
supported by positive social values, such as solidarity and gift-giving. He argues:  
 
Public officials in African bureaucracies might be viewed as stuck between two 
different logics, where formal structures of the organization has Western, Weberian 
features, while the way operations are expected to proceed, are expected to follow 
African norms, in terms of informality and loyalty towards networks. (De Sardan, 
1999) 
 
This resembles the ‘monstrosity of cultures’ (Abudu, 1986) as described in chapter 3. In 
addition, in the context of a dysfunctioning administrative and bureaucratic organization, a 
dramatic scarcity of resources and non-payment of salaries, corruption becomes the normal 
mode of management (De Sardan, 1999). Employees tend to seek ‘supplementary’ income 
through graft, bribery and other corrupt practices (Zoogah & Beugré, 2013). Noorderhaven & 
Tidjani (2001) have found that SSA countries66 score strikingly low on human goodness, 
indicating a low trust in people and a pessimistic view of human nature, which is strongly 
related to corruption (Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001). Although the corruption complex can 
be understood as legitimate through their embeddedness in context and culture (De Sardan, 
1999) resulting in discriminatory practices (Jackson, 2004), this point shouldn’t be 
exaggerated in the case of CBU. For instance, favoritism and nepotism still exist (according 
to many informants) but they are not widespread practices (anymore), and occur mainly in 
central admin. Personalism (Jones, 1986; Montgomery, 1987; Mufune, 2003) exists in many 
ways and is not necessarily ‘wrong’. For instance, academics use office time for private 
consultancies (and research) in order to gain extra income. Although this may seem incorrect 
                                                          
66 Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Ghana and Cameroon.  
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to an outsider, academics at CBU are allowed to do so outside teaching hours. However, 
many of these income generating activities are not reported to central admin (although they 
should), and while the deans are fully aware of that, they prefer not to interfere.  
 
11.1.4 Coping strategies 
Concerning the coping strategies that I have found at CBU (chapter 10), the literature 
provides some theoretical support. According to Beugré & Offodile (2001), autocratic 
leadership expects subordinates to be submissive and obedient. Subordinates are rarely 
allowed or believed to possess initiative; all that is expected of subordinates is loyalty and 
total submission to superior authority (Fashoyin, 2005). Workers have to render 
unconditional obedience to instructions and directives (Littrell, 2011). Followers hide their 
true feelings on matters they are displeased about or distort information for the sake of 
maintaining harmonious relationships with their leaders (Kuada, 2010). An obedient coping 
strategy is convergent with ‘loyalty’, and a defiant coping strategy (providing feedback, 
asking difficult questions, etc.) is convergent with ‘voice’ in Hirschmann’s ‘exit-voice-
loyalty’ theory (1970). Exit, however, is not perceived as a viable option at CBU, due to a 
lack of job opportunities in Zambia. Rusbult, Zembrodt & Gunn (1982) have further 
elaborated Hirschmann’s theory by adding ‘neglect’ as a behavioral response; this may 
include putting in less effort, spending less time at work and expending less effort when there 
(Rusbult et al., 1982; Withey & Cooper, 1989). This is convergent with what I call an 
intermediate coping strategy (see figure 10.1). In their research, loyalists and neglecters 
combine low commitment to the organization with little confidence in organizational 
improvement. In contrast, ‘voicers’ are highly committed and believe that improvement is 
possible (Withey & Cooper, 1989). They also claim that neglect is most likely when the costs 
of exit and voice are both high. This is understandable in the context of CBU and Zambia; the 
price of a voluntary exit is very high, since it implies a loss of income, without many job 
opportunities elsewhere. In practice hardly anybody leaves CBU voluntarily. The price of 
voice (defiance) is also high, since my informants believe that it may result in a forced exit 
(dismissal), which they want to avoid. This is convergent with Jackson’s finding that 
managers in Zambia have a relatively high score on the need for job security (2004). 
According to my informants, voicing (defiance) at CBU can be very frustrating. Neglecters 
just try to survive and make the best of it, without being (too) critical, submissive or obedient. 
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Exit and voice are considered as active responses to dissatisfaction, while loyalty and neglect 
are considered as passive responses (Acey, 2008).  
 
I have come across the theory about EVLN long after I had developed the coping strategies at 
CBU, and I was struck by their convergence. Of course, there are also differences; coping 
strategies represent the different ways in which the staff deals with an excessive 
centralization, authoritarianism, allegiances, in-group collectivism and favoritism, which is 
not the case in EVLN67. In addition, obedience at CBU involves (expectations about) the 
satisfaction of personal interests, which should not be underestimated in a context of 
structural poverty (see also chapter 6). This is not the case in EVLN.  
 
In the table below, I have listed some elements of the insights provided above, to show the 
convergence with the coping strategies that have emerged from the research findings.  
 
EVLN Exit Voice Loyalty Neglect 
Hirschmann  
(1970) 
Leave, quit 
Talk to supervisor 
Union membership 
Support ______ 
Rusbult et al 
(1982) 
Quit Talk Be quiet Put in less effort 
Withey & Cooper 
(1989) 
High commitment 
Improvements are 
unlikely 
High commitment 
Improvements are 
possible 
Low commitment 
Improvements are unlikely 
Acey (2008) 
 
Active responses Passive responses 
Coping strategies  Defiance Obedience Intermediate 
Maassen (2015) 
(this study) Not viable in 
Zambia 
Feedback & 
criticism 
Ask questions 
Distrust & fear 
Loyalty 
No feedback 
Stay quiet 
Security & support 
Limited feedback 
Stay quiet 
Survival 
Table 11.1: Convergence between the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect theory and coping strategies. 
 
11.1.5 Organizational change 
The statement at CBU that ‘the system has remained the same’ (informant 34, shared by 
many others) indicates a sort of inertia, a resistance to change (Blunt & Jones, 1997; Blunt & 
Jones, 1992; Littrell, 2011), a bureaucratic tendency to keep things the way they are (other 
than expansion in terms of student numbers). Munene et al (2000) argue that SSA cultures 
                                                          
67 The exit, voice & loyalty theory by Hirschmann (1970) was originally developed to capture employee’s 
responses to companies in decline.  
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stress maintenance of the status quo and restrain actions that might disrupt the group 
solidarity or traditional order (conservatism). Several scholars have pointed at the 
preoccupation of many African leaders with stability and internal administrative order 
(Leonard, 1987; Montgomery, 1987) and financial stability (Kulati, 2000). This is indeed 
very much the case at CBU, where the normal functioning of the university is constantly 
challenged by financial constraints, interference by the government, activist unions and other 
sources of discontinuity (see chapter 6). Kulati (2000) argues that institutional transformation 
in South African (historically disadvantaged, formerly black) HEIs faced great difficulties in 
introducing radical changes, due to the tradition of collegiality and the relative power that 
academics had wielded in influencing institutional decision-making (Kulati, 2000). This is 
comparable with the extensive committee system at CBU, which is perceived (by top- and 
middle management) as slowing down organizational change. However, top management 
(especially the [former and new] VC) has demonstrated that several changes can be forced 
and imposed from above.  
 
This is not to say that nothing changes in HEIs in SSA. Varghese (2013) studied governance 
reforms in HE in five SSA countries68 and argues that the HE system in many SSA countries 
moved from a ‘state controlled’ to a ‘state supervision’ model of governance, providing more 
autonomy for the HEIs. Heads of state were replaced as chancellors of universities, and 
governing boards/councils were established. As a result of these reforms (imposed by 
governments), HEIs have become increasingly accountable for their performance in meeting 
societal expectations, which is indicated by strategic plans, performance indicators, regular 
monitoring and evaluation procedures (Varghese, 2013). In Addis Ababa University (AAU) 
in Ethiopia, the new governance system resulted in a shift from the collegial model to the 
managerial model and includes outcome based strategic planning. AAU embarked on 
administrative decentralization, which gave the university colleges the freedom to use its 
budget without the approval of central administration. In Nigeria, autonomy led to more 
democratic decision-making processes and procedures for ensuring accountability and 
evaluation of performance. In Kenya, performance contracts between the MoE and 
universities improved accountability and helped to reorganize internal operations; its success 
made decision-making more efficient. The reforms in Ghana promoted a greater sense of 
responsibility among staff and students, and strengthened decision-making processes at 
                                                          
68 Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and South Africa.  
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faculty level. In South Africa, performance based funding required universities to put closer 
monitoring mechanisms in place to ensure that the HEIs deliver on the agreed targets 
(Varghese, 2013). However, many of the reforms were implemented top-down and did not 
provide adequate space or opportunity for discussions, debates, and reflection (Aina, 2010). 
This resembles the preferred way of top management to implement things at CBU: 
centralistic, top-down and authoritarian. Varghese’s finding that HEIs have become more 
accountable is challenged at CBU, where it has been argued that the university council was 
working with top management instead of controlling them; as a consequence it became 
difficult to hold top management accountable (see chapter 9 on strategic planning & 
implementation).  
 
Decentralization 
A study on public sector reform in Zimbabwe by Mavima & Chackerian (2001) revealed that 
efforts to decentralize decision-making in ministries failed, officially because of personnel 
and financial resource limitations. Many informants however argued that there was resistance 
by senior managers and politicians who were unprepared to decentralize decision-making 
authority, even on routine matters (Mavima & Chackerian, 2001). This is convergent with the 
findings of Naidoo (2002), Ndegwa (2002), Smoke (2003) and Cabral (2011) as described in 
chapter 3, and represents how the situation is being perceived by many informants at CBU 
(see chapter 7). The factors that hamper decentralization in SSA (Conyers, 2007) have also 
been mentioned by various informant groups at CBU. Many believe that decentralization at 
CBU will not take place before it starts happening at the national level. Conyers (2007) 
argues that we need to consider decentralization in SSA as part of a long, slow process of 
state building, and thus be realistic about expectations.   
 
Mavima & Chackerian (2001) contend that centralization of power forms the essence of the 
patronage system that permeates the Zimbabwean political and administrative system. In their 
study, centralization is linked to the patronage system; when middle- and lower managers are 
no longer dependent on the approval and signatures from top management, they cannot be 
patronized any longer with special opportunities and privileges (Mavima & Chackerian, 
2001). To some extent, this seems to be the case at CBU too; coercive power supported by 
patronage (favoritism) may be undermined by decentralization. Although this seems logical 
and probable, it has (understandably) not been confirmed by top management. Another 
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reason for top managements’ reluctance to decentralize is fear of mismanagement and 
corruption at the lower levels of the university. Tambulasi & Kayuni (2007) studied 
democratic decentralization in Malawi which was supposed to enhance good governance and 
democracy through improved accountability and transparency, but in reality the whole system 
has degenerated into an opportunity for increased corruption (Tambulasi & Kayuni, 2007). 
This is clearly what CBU top management wants to avoid; the evidence from Malawi is not 
supportive for decentralization at CBU. However, the situation is Malawi is not 
representative for SSA69. Considering decentralization, Botswana seems to have done quite 
well, without the unbridled problems of corruption (Hope, 2000).  
 
At Makerere University in Uganda, there was devolution of decision-making power 
concerning academic and financial management in order to accelerate market-driven reform. 
However, the decentralization experiment led to questionable allocation of resources which 
triggered the requirements of fiscal accountability, strengthened finance departments in the 
academic units and central approval of expenditures (Bisaso, 2011). According to Varghese 
(2013), decentralization has worked out very well at AAU, but it is unclear how and why.  
 
Performance appraisal 
At CBU a PMS has been implemented, although it took a long time to materialize, and not 
without doubts and fears among large numbers of staff. Research on performance 
management at HEIs in Uganda highlights four major challenges: 1) Lack of formal 
performance management environment; 2) Limited employee engagement & communication 
problems; 3) Institutional governance constraints; 4) Institutional systems and structural 
constraints (Karuhanga & Werner, 2013). These constraints can clearly be recognized at CBU 
too. De Waal (2007) describes a case study in Tanzania, and argues that performance 
management, and especially the fostering of performance-driven behavior, cannot be 
implemented lightly and should not be underestimated. If performance management is not 
accompanied by the fostering of performance driven behavior, which includes managers 
being a role model by regularly addressing performance management, organizations will have 
a tough time fulfilling their potential (de Waal, 2007). Ohemeng (2009) provides a staggering 
account of PMS implementation in the Ghanaian public sector which has not led to any 
                                                          
69 Nevertheless, Sulamoyo (2012) suggests that Malawi has cultural, economic and political attributes that are 
representative for Southern Africa. 
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significant improvements due to institutional and capacity constraints. These include cultural 
constraints (such as respect for the elderly, issues related to power distance and collectivism) 
but also a lack of political commitment and seriousness, a weak incentive and sanction 
system and a lack of (external) pressure to perform (Ohemeng, 2009). Commitment from top 
management and a fair system of rewards and sanctions are also desired by the staff at CBU 
(see the mental models on performance management, chapter 8). Fear for victimization, 
intimidation and bias (which was very prominent at CBU) has also been reported by Bawole 
et al (2013). Research at a HEIs in Ghana (Logogye, 2012) and Zimbabwe (Saurombe, 2014) 
shows that performance appraisal is being perceived as evaluative rather than developmental 
(which all informant groups at CBU wish to avoid), and with little impact on job 
performance.  
 
Strategic planning & implementation 
Strategic planning (and especially implementation) has been perceived as problematic at 
CBU. As in other HEIs in SSA, strategic plans often look like wish lists with little relation to 
available resources and delivery capacities (Farrant & Afonso, 1997; Hayward, 2008; 
Sawyerr, 2004). Sometimes, strategic plans are developed to attract external funding, with the 
risk of disillusionment when it does not deliver the hoped-for prizes. At CBU, many 
informants considered the strategic plan (2009 – 2013) not as realistic but as an expression of 
hope for change. In planning, the involvement of the academic community is often difficult 
due to widespread demoralization of academic staff who have seen their conditions of work 
and standard of living deteriorate, and deep skepticism about whether another bout of 
planning will achieve anything (Farrant & Afonso, 1997). This was certainly also the case at 
CBU. Malunga (2009) explains that most organizations (in SSA) suffer from too much 
planning and too little strategic action. During the implementation phase of the strategic plan 
at CBU, not much was happening and everybody had lost sense of direction. Everybody 
knew it, but top management didn’t provide the necessary leadership and nobody else 
intervened. However, Malunga (2009) and Hayward (2008) consider leadership as one of the 
most critical success factors, next to the availability of financial resources, skills and 
competencies. An interesting and relevant survey of the Zambian civil service and a 
management audit of education in Zambia may shine some light of this phenomenon. Dia 
(1996) describes the observed reluctance among managers within the Zambian civil service to 
closely supervise the execution of commands; it converges with the reluctance of (previous) 
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CBU leadership to supervise the implementation of the strategic plan (2009 – 2013)70. 
According to Dia (1996), the reluctance to closely supervise implementation is due to a 
tendency to avoid confrontation and preserve harmony. Gelfand et al (2011) argue that in 
high power distance cultures (like in Zambia), superiors are largely seen as unquestionable 
authorities, and there is a great loss of face for superiors if errors occur on one’s watch. They 
may not want to lose face if they have caused an error, because of their greater responsibility 
to prevent them (Gelfand et al., 2011). At CBU, there was much discontent with the 
institutions’ leadership, which ‘made everything difficult’, other than authoritarian top-down 
interventions. In addition, Malunga argues that – in order to be successful in strategic plan 
implementation – clarity about roles and responsibilities is crucial:  
 
An indicator of lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities in an organization is too 
many meetings. Too many meetings show that people are not sure what they are 
supposed to be doing. If everyone knew what they were supposed to be doing, there 
would be no need for meetings. (Malunga, 2009) 
 
This is very relevant for the case study at CBU, where committee meetings involve a lot of 
staff time (see chapter 6). Monitoring & evaluation was very weak and slowly faded away. 
Eventually the schools stopped having meetings because they didn’t make sense anymore. 
Malunga (2009) ascribes this to a culture of not valuing accountability and indifference to 
negative feedback. Despite the problems being perceived at CBU and in other SSA countries, 
strategic planning at Makerere University in Uganda has helped to respond successfully to 
changes in the environment (changes in legislation, a decline in funding and liberalization of 
higher education). Financial decision-making authority was decentralized to the academic 
units, the position of deans was strengthened, curricula were reviewed to address societal 
needs, research management was strengthened and corrective measures were taken to restore 
academic quality (Bisaso, 2011).  
 
 
  
                                                          
70 This is also relevant for the implementation of the PMS at CBU. The new leadership was reluctant to provide 
the requested practical support during the implementation. 
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11.2 The relevance of ‘Western’ theory on organizational change for the 
case study at CBU  
 
In this paragraph I discuss the relevance of ‘Western’ theory about organizational change in 
order to answer the third research sub question. Implications for international cooperation 
will be provided in 11.2.2.  
 
According to several scholars, the nature of managerial work/behavior in SSA is not very 
different from that in the ‘Western’ world (Arthur et al., 1995; Lubatkin, Vengroff, Ndiaye, 
& Veiga, 1999; Montgomery, 1987; Vengroff, Belhaj, & Ndiaye, 1991). As far as I am 
concerned, this is an overly generalizing and outdated statement. According to Mufune 
(2003), these authors believe that organizations have an ‘internal logic’ that forces upon 
managers and employees significant commonality in values pertaining to economic activity 
and work related behavior (also due to institutional isomorphism; see DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). This should be understood as opposed to the belief that (national) cultures are the main 
determinants of values that relate to economic activity and behavior at work (Mufune, 2003). 
However, this similar internal logic does not mean that ‘Western’ theory about organizational 
change is equally relevant for HEIs in SSA. In fact, the applicability of ‘Western’ 
management concepts has been questioned by many researchers (Blunt, 1997; Blunt & Jones, 
1997; Jackson, 2009, 2011; Jaeger, 1986; Kuada, 2006; Lewis, 2002). The study of mental 
models on organizational change at CBU has clearly illustrated some of the struggles that 
accompany the introduction and adoption of ‘Western’ management practices by a HEI in 
Zambia. This results in ‘cultural crossvergence’ and ‘hybridization’ (Claeyé, 2012; Jackson, 
2004, 2011; Jacob, 2005).  
 
The authors mentioned above claim that ‘Western’ OD & change approaches (for instance 
provided by Cummings & Worley, 2008) are not applicable in SSA, while several others 
argue that they are (James, 2004; Malunga, 2004; Sulamoyo, 2012, Kudonoo, 2013). The 
former authors base their claim on large scale culture studies that indicate high uncertainty 
avoidance and high power distance in SSA, which are not conducive for the application of 
OD. Jackson suggests that a tendency to avoid uncertainty contributes to the potential 
inappropriateness of participation and ownership in OD & change management, because 
every organizational change ensures higher levels of uncertainty (2004). Although supported 
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by a number of researchers (Ahiauzu, 1986; Blunt & Jones, 1992; Iguisi, 1994; Lewis, 2002), 
my research findings at CBU cannot confirm this line of thinking. It’s either the reverse; staff 
wants to be involved, informed and consulted, in order to have a sense of ownership over the 
intended organizational changes (instead of being imposed top-down):   
 
“They want to see changes and they want to be part and parcel of the changes.” 
(Informant 22) 
 
The strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in is indeed very strong at CBU. If there is a 
‘cultural’ problem with the application of OD & change at CBU, then it has to do with power 
difference and authoritarianism and the associated fear and distrust (towards top 
management, and to lesser extent towards middle management). This limits participation, 
open dialogue and ownership, which are needed for successful OD (James, 2004). 
Sulamoyo’s suggestion (2012) to overcome problems of high power distance through age, 
respect and wisdom (based on Mangaliso’s & Damane’s interpretation of Ubuntu, 2001) is 
challenged by Edoho (2001), who proposes to abolish the principle of age as a vital criterion 
for wisdom (see chapter 3). The problem is not so much about power distance, but about the 
unequal distribution of power, and the authoritarian way in which power is being exercised. 
From this perspective, Sulamoyo’s suggestion is not very useful. Despite the expressed 
academic concerns, James (2004) argues that there are many elements of ‘African’ culture 
that promote and reinforce the use of OD rather than undermine it. James (2004), Malunga 
(2004) and Sulamoyo (2012) suggest that the use of ‘African’ symbols and proverbs can act 
as cultural levers of change. However, James (2004) acknowledges that a participatory 
approach remains difficult in autocratic settings.  
 
The suggested process-led approach of OD (James, 2004) is also problematic at CBU. As far 
as top management is concerned, organizational change at CBU can best be considered as 
largely episodic rather than continuous (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Top management prefers 
centralist, top-down and direct implementation of planned change – instead of leading a 
continuous change process through the management of their deans and directors. Top 
management believes that quick and tangible results matter, which can best be achieved 
through direct interventions by the principal officers themselves. There are numerous 
examples at CBU that illustrate this widely shared perception. Continuous change implies a 
346 
 
developmental learning process, constant monitoring and periodic accountability, which is 
not a common practice for CBU top management. The prevalence of episodic change at CBU 
contrasts the claim from Burke (2013) that (in general) 95% of organizational changes can be 
considered as evolutionary. Consequently, the ideas from Tsoukas & Chia (2002) about 
‘organizational becoming’ (related to continuous change) seem to be less relevant at CBU; 
there is hardly any reweaving of actors’ webs of beliefs and habits of action as a result of new 
experiences. The dominant mental models (at least concerning decentralization and strategic 
planning & implementation) of all informant groups have largely remained the same and are 
reinforced (Labianca et al., 2000). Despite the new developments since the new leadership 
(chapter 6), significant signs of a cognitive reorientation have not been found (Balogun, 
2007)71. However, reinforcement of deeply engrained schemas without a cognitive 
reorientation also occurs in organizational change processes in ‘Western’ countries and 
organizations (Balogun, 2007; Labianca et al., 2000).  
 
When comparing organizational change at CBU with the key themes and beliefs about 
organizational change in ‘Western’ countries as outlined by Armenakis & Harris (2009) in 
chapter 3, several interesting and significant differences become clear:  
 
x Concerning decentralization, there is only superficial consensus about the discrepancy 
between the current state of the organization (‘ist’) and what it should be (‘soll’), and 
the appropriateness of decentralization as the way to address this discrepancy. Most 
informants doubt the support and commitment from top management to decentralize 
(lack of principal support), and there has been very little opportunity for the 
involvement and participation of staff. This is clearly visible in the divergent mental 
model for decentralization (see chapter 7).  
x Concerning performance management, there is agreement about the need to have a 
PMS (at least under the new leadership), and there is institutional support, 
involvement and readiness of staff to implement it. Some doubts have been expressed 
about efficacy (the ability or capacity to successfully implement the PMS) and about 
valence (will the PMS be beneficial for me?). There has been little support for deans, 
directors and HoDs during the implementation in practice, and the proceedings are not 
                                                          
71 With regards to the PMS, however, some cognitive reorientation seems to have taken place since its 
implementation in 2013.  
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being monitored closely (they only meet when there is an issue). Doubts about 
efficacy are reflected by ‘the need to raise awareness and to build capacity’ in the 
divergent mental model for performance appraisal. Doubts about valence occur 
mainly among central admin staff (see chapter 8). 
x In strategic planning, staff has been involved and an effective organizational diagnosis 
was made (in the 2009 – 2013 plan as well as in the 2014 – 2018 plan). Concerning 
the implementation (of the 2009 – 2013 plan), doubts have been expressed by all 
informant groups about efficacy (the ability or capacity to successfully implement a 
strategic plan) and about the commitment of top management. Readiness for change 
was almost absent under the previous leadership. No support strategies were 
developed for implementation and monitoring was very weak and eventually absent. 
This is reflected in the divergent mental model for strategic planning & 
implementation (see chapter 9). Under the new leadership, commitment of top 
management seems higher, and some capacity has been built for implementation. This 
is reflected in the new positive developments of the convergent model for strategic 
planning & implementation (see chapter 9).  
 
An interesting issue that emerges from this discussion is the suggested lack of commitment 
from CBU top management and the reluctance to supervise, support and monitor 
implementation (PMS, strategic plan) in practice. Although it may be difficult to understand 
that leaders distance themselves from the implementation of changes that they themselves 
have initiated, intended non-implementation occurs in ‘Western’ HEIs too – often referred to 
as decoupling and symbolic management (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). At CBU (in SSA), avoidance 
of confrontation (Dia, 1996) further constrains implementation. Another interesting issue is 
the unwillingness of CBU top management to decentralize power to lower levels of the 
university. In ‘Western’ HEIs, centralization and decentralization seem to be intermittent 
processes in efforts to optimize organizational effectiveness and efficiency, but at CBU this 
does not seem to be the case (centralization in SSA is often understood as a way to hold on to 
power). A final interesting issue at CBU concerns doubts about the capacity to successfully 
implement changes (PMS, strategic plan). Doubts about the capacity to implement the PMS 
have been expressed by the staff, especially with regards to negative appraisals and follow-up 
actions (due to cultural/behavioral constraints such as avoidance of feedback and conflicts, 
fear of bias, favoritism, maintaining good personal relationships, etc.). Doubts about the 
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capacity to implement the strategic plan relate to all sorts of constraints, such as human 
capacity (in terms of knowledge and skills), financial capacity (budget), uncertainties in the 
environment, rigid policies, systems and procedures, the committee system, lack of 
commitment, etc. Some of these doubts about the capacity to implement organizational 
changes seem to be taken for granted or are ignored by top management, in the sense that not 
much is being done about them.  
 
Cultural/behavioral constraints at CBU such as the tendency to refrain from feedback, 
perceptions of exclusion and distrust, in combination with structural/organizational 
constraints such as centralization and the lack of transparency/information sharing, are not 
strange to organizations in ‘Western’ countries. The insights provided by Morrison & 
Milliken (2000) about organizational silence resemble the situation at CBU in many ways. 
According to these authors, organizational silence is the outcome of managers’ fear of 
negative feedback and a set of implicit beliefs (employees are self-interested and 
untrustworthy; management must direct and control while subordinates must assume the role 
of unquestioning followers; unity, agreement and consensus are good and dissent is bad). 
According to the authors, the fear of negative feedback and the implicit beliefs result in a 
centralization of decision-making a lack of formal upward feedback mechanisms and a 
tendency to reject or to respond negatively to negative feedback. Employees do not speak 
up/raise issues because they fear negative repercussions, and also because they do not believe 
that speaking up would make a difference. The attitudes of senior management trickle down 
and affect the behavior of middle managers and that they, too, will send cues to those below 
that voice is not welcome (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). If a member of the organization 
voices dissent and soon thereafter fails to receive an expected promotion, some employees 
may reach the conclusion that the promotion was lost because this person expressed an 
unpopular opinion. The widespread perception may arise that those who express negative 
views are punished72. As a result of organizational silence, organizational decision-making 
(including error detection and correction) becomes less effective. Employees become less 
committed, less motivated and less satisfied, which may lead to cognitive dissonance, stress 
and psychological withdrawal of staff (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Although the insights 
about organizational silence (and their suggested effects) are very recognizable at CBU, they 
do not seem to apply to ‘Western’ HEIs (no references found in HE).   
                                                          
72 This resembles the defiant coping strategies which I discussed in paragraph 11.1.4.  
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11.2.1 Organizational change in higher education 
Worldwide, HEIs are change resistant (Archer, 2005; Saint, 1993), which is not different for 
CBU. When comparing (the dominant mental models about) organizational change at CBU 
with the insights provided by Kezar (2001) (see chapter 3) about organizational change in 
‘Western’ HE, several interesting and significant observations become apparent. Convergent 
with Kezar’s findings, CBU has similar institutional objectives, is a complex value driven 
organization with (a growing) institutional status, distinct professional and administrative 
values, and a shared governance system (at least on paper). These features indicate partial 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer et al., 2008). Unlike HEIs in 
the ‘Western’ world, however, CBU is a highly centralized and bureaucratic organization, 
where management and administration are tightly coupled (not loosely coupled), and where 
decision-making power and authority are clearly established. Whereas ambiguity in 
‘Western’ HEIs refers to organized anarchical decision-making (Kezar, 2001), ambiguity at 
CBU refers to unclear priorities and decoupling by top management only. Furthermore, CBU 
is almost fully dependent on government funding, and suffers from heavy government 
regulation and interference. Whereas ‘Western’ HEIs have become more entrepreneurial in 
order to deal with decreasing government support (Lazzeretti & Tavoletti, 2006), many 
informants argue that CBU is not very successful in this direction. Academic communities 
are weakly developed, and accreditation practices are almost inexistent. Although staff 
turnover at CBU is low, organizational commitment of staff is also low. These features 
altogether create a partly different image of a university than what is usual or common in the 
‘Western’ world.  
 
Kezar (2001) further suggests that social cognition-, cultural- and political models are best 
suited for explaining organizational change in HEIs. Studies within the social cognition 
tradition view HEIs as learning organizations and have found the internal environment to be 
more significant to change than external forces, whereas at CBU it seems to be the other way 
around. Organizational change at CBU is sometimes imposed by the government, such as the 
expansion of the university and the implementation of a PMS. Organization theory in Africa 
is dominated by the ‘external environment’ paradigm (Kamoche, 1997), which includes the 
pervasiveness of dominant government values at university level (Kirby-Harris, 2003). As a 
result, evolutionary models may be more adequate to understand organizational change at 
CBU, which emphasize the influence of the external environment. Political models also seem 
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relevant for CBU, except for the fact that the various interest groups are heavily dominated 
by preferences of top management. According to many informants, there is not really a 
political arena where the different interest groups can meet and interact. Interestingly, 
coalitions hardly exist at CBU; deans do not (dare to) stand together when opposing top 
management, but advise each other to stay quiet. As a result, power is almost one-
dimensional. Cultural models seem relevant too as they try to incorporate and blend old and 
new paradigms; an awareness of history and traditions can help to set realistic parameters 
related to change (Birnbaum, 2000). However, studies within the cultural tradition emphasize 
meaningful communication, trust, respect and tolerance for different perspectives, which is 
problematic at CBU. Teleological models seem to be very relevant for CBU, due to the 
centralized bureaucratic features of the university that facilitate planned change and top-down 
approaches to leadership and management. All in all, the evolutionary model in combination 
with the political model and the teleological model seem to be the most appropriate to explain 
organizational change at CBU. In Birnbaum’s (1988) terms, CBU can be considered as a 
bureaucracy, as opposed to the collegium and the political model which are prevalent in 
‘Western’ universities (Kezar, 2001). Nevertheless, the structural and cultural inhibitors of 
organizational change identified by Middlehurst (2004) in universities in the UK (see chapter 
3) are very relevant for CBU too, and have been captured as cultural, structural and 
contextual constraints in chapter 6.  
 
Todnem By et al (2008) describe the effects of managerialism on European HE in rather 
negative terms; cronyism, rent-seeking and even psychopathic behavior. Cronyism is defined 
as favoritism shown to friends and associates by appointing them to positions without regard 
for their qualifications. Rent-seeking refers to opportunistic, self-serving behavior to increase 
power, income and reputation (Dixon, Kouzmin, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1998; Gregory, 1991). 
Psychopathic behavior is explained as ruthless, manipulative, opportunistic, willing to put 
others down and without remorse (Boddy, 2006). Interestingly, the practices of cronyism and 
rent-seeking are similar to (if not the same as) nepotism and personalism in SSA. To some 
extent, the stories of my informants at CBU about authoritarianism resemble some 
characteristics of psychopathic behavior (although my informants would never use such 
terminology). Teelken (2012) describes the effects of managerialism and increased 
performance management on HE in three European countries (the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the UK) in terms of coping mechanisms of academics; symbolic compliance (window 
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dressing combined with critical resistance), professional pragmatism (critical conformism) 
and formal instrumentality (uncritical acceptance and compliance). These coping mechanisms 
resemble the coping strategies that I have found at CBU, but they differ in terms of their 
causes and suggested effects. This is largely due to the structural- and cultural constraints at 
CBU explained in chapter 6.  
 
Decentralization 
The observations from Jongbloed et al (1999) and McLendon & Hearn (2009) about 
decentralization in Western HEIs cannot be recognized at CBU (like in most other HEIs in 
SSA). The schools at CBU lack the suggested freedom of action (Riley, 2007), certainly for 
activities that require financial resources. Although the power balance is being questioned 
more and more, it has remained unchanged. As already argued in chapter 7, this causes a lot 
of frustration among middle- and lower managers. Whereas levels of centralization and 
decentralization are temporary and intermittent stages of a pendulum that cause fierce debates 
in ‘Western’ HEIs, there is no such debate at CBU. This means that, if you really want to get 
something done at CBU, you have to go to top management, which is similar to the situations 
described by Montgomery (1987). Interestingly, the reasons for changes in university 
governance in Western HEIs (improved effectiveness and efficiency; see Jongbloed et al, 
1999) seem to converge (at least partially) with the reasons for maintaining centralization at 
CBU; achieving results – ‘getting things done’ (see paragraph 10.5).  
 
Performance appraisal 
Whereas performance appraisal has become a normal feature of modern HRM in ‘Western’ 
HEIs, it is a new phenomenon at CBU. However, in both cases performance appraisal has 
been imposed or stimulated from the outside. Whereas performance appraisal in the UK was 
criticized for being unnecessary, counterproductive and failing to deliver what it promised 
(Simmons, 2002), it was resisted by the staff (and the unions) at CBU due to a fear of bias 
and victimization under the previous leadership (see chapter 8). Since the implementation of 
the PMS, top-, middle- and operational managers have to invest much more time and energy 
in managing the performance of their staff; something that has never been the case at CBU. 
This is clearly different than is the case in ‘Western’ HEIs, where managers are used to spend 
substantial amounts of time on people management (Archer, 2005), also due to 
decentralization (Sparrow, 2008).  The practice of performance appraisal in ‘Western’ HEIs is 
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constrained by the role of specific cultural values, the efficiency of the manager – subordinate 
relationship and the level of strategic integration and devolvement of HRM (Sparrow, 2008). 
These constraining factors are (partly) different than those prevalent at CBU. Cultural 
differences have implications both for the design of performance appraisal systems and for 
the conduct on individual appraisals (Fletcher, 2001). Just as in universities in the UK, staff 
members at CBU argue that performance appraisal should be primarily aimed at development 
and improvement.  
 
Strategic planning & implementation  
Many staff members at CBU believe in the purpose of strategic planning (although academics 
tend to be more skeptical about its feasibility), whereas the staff in ‘Western’ HEIs seems to 
be very skeptical towards the whole idea (Baldridge et al., 1983; Birnbaum, 2000). However, 
in both cases, strategic plans end up being voluminous, tedious and unread by their intended 
audiences (Taylor & Machado, 2006). Resistance, due to conservatism, disbelief or limited 
success in the past (Delprino, 2013; Rowley & Sherman, 2004) is also present at CBU, also 
due to perceptions of exclusion during the planning phase (see chapter 9). Otherwise, 
resistance towards planning & implementation at CBU is reasonably low, because everybody 
is convinced of the need to further develop and improve the university in many ways. This 
relates to the enormity of problems and the magnitude of needs in a developing country 
(Hayward, 2008). According to many CBU informants, strategic plan implementation has not 
been very successful so far: ‘They just put it on the shelf, it looks nice!’ This is also reflected 
in experiences at universities in (for instance) the US, where disappointment is prevalent 
since nothing was done with the strategic plan after the strategic planning event (Sullivan & 
Richardson, 2011). The relevance of ‘Western’ theory on strategic planning & 
implementation for CBU is constrained by the context of structural poverty (Hayward, 2008), 
dependence on government funding (combined with less opportunity to generate extra 
income from the business sector), government interference and unexpected strikes by staff 
and students, which may disrupt planning efforts for a long time (Farrant & Afonso, 1997).  
 
In the discussion on the relevance of Western theory on organizational change, it has become 
clear that quite a number of issues concerning decentralization, performance management and 
strategic planning & implementation at CBU are relevant for – and recognizable at – 
‘Western’ HEIs (and vice versa). However, as we have seen, there are also significant 
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differences. Without willing to be exhaustive, I briefly describe some of these differences, 
based on the accounts of my informants. To start with, the socio-economic and institutional 
context in which CBU operates is very different from ‘Western’ countries and has far-
reaching consequences for the university; irregular and insufficient funding, constant 
interference by the government, dilapidated infrastructure and facilities, an unfulfillable 
demand for HE in the country, lack of qualified staff, a focus on job security and money 
issues, and the impact of HIV-AIDS and other diseases. The degree of centralization at CBU 
is unusually high according to ‘Western’ standards, which goes hand in hand with large 
executive powers of the VC. Leadership is authoritarian and ambiguous, which, in 
combination with favoritism & allegiances, has created distrust and fear among large 
numbers of staff. The deans and directors at CBU have very little to say, and they don’t join 
powers to oppose top management (but advise each other to stay quiet). Top management is 
not accountable to middle management, which is reflected in a lack of transparency and 
information sharing. Deans and directors are not involved in management meetings, which 
has created perceptions of exclusion. Deans at CBU are still elected, which means that they 
are primarily accountable to their electorates in the schools. Accountability is weakly 
developed throughout the university, at all levels, also due to a strong tendency to refrain 
from feedback. Personal interests clearly prevail over institutional interests, and roles and 
relations are considered more important than performance and achievement. Frustration and 
dissatisfaction has eroded already low levels of commitment of staff. These differences make 
clear that the analytical models from Birnbaum (1998) and Kezar (2001) cannot be applied 
unconditionally. These differences and the partial relevance of ‘Western’ theory about 
organizational change for the case study at CBU has implications for international 
cooperation, which will be explained in the next paragraph.  
 
11.2.2 Implications for international cooperation 
In this paragraph I try to answer the third sub question of my thesis. For that purpose, I distil 
some implications for consultants in international cooperation from the discussion on the 
relevance of ‘Western’ theory for the case study at CBU. The world of development is one of 
international cooperation. When consultants and project managers from Europe or other 
‘Western’ countries start working together with CBU on projects or other forms of 
collaboration, they have to be aware of the many constraining and enabling factors that 
influence leadership, management, organizational behavior and organizational change at 
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CBU. Although the nature of managerial work/behavior in SSA may not be very different 
from that in the ‘Western’ world (Arthur et al., 1995; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Montgomery, 
1987; Vengroff et al., 1991), the practices on the ground differ a lot from what is usual or 
common in one’s own country (Diallo & Thuillier, 2004).  
 
When you know how things work in a particular institution (and why), this knowledge can be 
used in setting up a mutually fruitful collaboration. When ignored at the start, all sorts of 
problems can (and will) emerge in the course of time, possibly beyond repair within the 
limited timeframe of the project. This is not to say that all problems can be prevented, but it 
will certainly be helpful in efforts to understand each other and to come up with adequate 
solutions. In this regard, the following quote from Huxham & Vangen (2000) is very 
relevant:  
 
When people from different organizations work together for the first time, a great 
deal of effort generally has to be invested by all concerned into understanding the 
world as seen by the other participants. (Huxham & Vangen, 2000) 
 
Of course, this is even more true in collaboration across countries and cultures. It may require 
(a lot of) patience, which is at odds with often stringent timeframes in donor funded projects 
(Harley, 2005; Muriithi & Crawford, 2003). Nevertheless, I believe that it will result in better 
cooperation and more sustainable results.  
 
Working with CBU can be very challenging. In fact, all the information about constraining 
and enabling factors (chapter 6) is very relevant for every form of institutional collaboration 
with CBU. Structural/organizational constraints, such as centralization, the committee 
system, the elective system of deans and weak accountability mechanisms have far-reaching 
consequences for organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Centralization of power is very 
strong and has resulted into an administrative dominance over academic affairs. As a 
consequence, it makes a lot of sense to deal directly with the VC, when agreements and 
arrangements have to be made. At the same time, it is highly recommended to ensure a wide 
and meaningful participation of staff throughout the period of collaboration. This is a 
challenging and balancing act, since working relations between top management/central 
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admin and the schools are problematic due to authoritarianism, fear and distrust, which 
hamper cooperation.  
 
External/contextual constraints refer to environmental factors that have a major influence on 
day-to-day issues (resulting in discontinuity). As a consequence, important decisions cannot 
be made, funds have not come in and/or deadlines cannot be met on time. The availability of 
top management is unpredictable (due to frequent travels within and outside the country), 
which may impede planning. This means that flexibility has to be built in the project or 
program, which is again at odds with donor policies and timeframes.  
 
Cultural/behavioral constraints are prominent in many different ways; job centrality, staff 
morale and organizational commitment are generally low, which means that staff is reluctant 
to take up additional (unpaid) tasks. Maintaining good personal relationships with colleagues 
is often considered more important than performance and achievement. Reaching consensus 
and agreement (on plans and tasks) can be challenging and time consuming, but does by no 
means guarantee execution as planned (also due to a different time orientation). Non-
compliance is not always communicated, conflicts and feedback are systematically avoided. 
An important enabling factor is the strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in, which can 
be used productively in efforts to get things done. The information provided about 
decentralization, performance management and strategic planning & implementation 
(chapters 7, 8 and 9) may be specifically relevant for those interested in organizational 
change.  
 
It is possible to use OD approaches at CBU, although meaningful participation is difficult 
across hierarchical levels and in- and outgroups. According to James (2004) this applies to 
many organizations in SSA, and CBU is no exception. Furthermore, top management at CBU 
has little experience in leading change- and learning processes through the management of 
deans and directors. James (2004), Malunga (2004, 2009) and Sulamoyo (2012) suggest that 
the use of African symbols and proverbs can act as cultural levers of change in SSA. African 
metaphors, proverbs and folktales create strong mental pictures, which are often very 
effective in impressing ideas upon people’s minds, communicating them at a deeper level, 
and motivating them to action. Kudonoo (2013) recommends an effective use of local beliefs, 
expectations, assumptions, concerns and hopes (abbreviated as BEACH) in OD applications 
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in SSA. These suggestions can best be used by involving local or regional consultants (Ali et 
al., 2001).  
 
According to Trompenaars & Woolliams (2003), organizations have to reconcile change with 
continuity in order to preserve an evolving identity. In line with their thinking, change efforts 
to modernize leadership and management at CBU should be framed in terms of dilemmas, 
whereby current existing values are enriched and further developed, instead of being replaced 
by others. For the mental models on the organizational changes that I have studied, this 
means that ideas about the desired situation should always use the current situation as a 
starting point, and build forward on what is already there – instead of imagining an ideal 
future which is out of line with the reality on the ground. For international consultants at 
CBU, it means that an incremental approach is advisory, starting from the values and the 
behavior that CBU cherishes and wishes to preserve, and simultaneously drawing attention to 
the values and behavior that CBU wishes to develop.  
 
Capacity building is often a core element in development cooperation, but certainly not an 
easy task. It involves knowledge transfers whose effectiveness depends on the knowledge-
specific factors such as the tacitness and complexity of knowledge (Bhagat et al., 2002), but 
also context- and culture-specific factors (Abou-Zeid, 2005). In addition, Jackson (2009) 
provides several propositions that challenge the effectiveness of imported capacity building 
approaches. It is recommendable to take these suggestions into account when considering 
capacity building at CBU.  
 
 
11.3 Contributions to theory development about organizational change in 
SSA  
 
In this paragraph, I describe my contributions to theory development that have emerged from 
the discussions in paragraph 11.1 and 11.2. In cross-cultural studies, convergence refers to 
the belief that organizations have an internal logic that forces upon managers and employees 
significant commonality in values pertaining to economic activity and work related behavior 
(Mufune, 2003), and the assumption that all industrializing societies embrace capitalism and 
technology evolve towards the ‘Western’ industrialized societies (Jackson, 2011; Kuada, 
357 
 
2006). Adeleye’s study of HRM in Africa (2011) suggests that institutional and rational 
approaches may play a far more important role in the determination of HR practices than 
cultural factors. The belief in convergence has attracted a number of researchers (Arthur et 
al., 1995; Lubatkin et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Montgomery, 1987; Vengroff et al., 
1991) and is supported by institutional theory (Scott, 1995) and isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008). Divergence on the 
other hand is the belief that (national) cultures are the main determinants of values that relate 
to economic activity and behavior at work. The large scale culture studies have sought to 
demonstrate this (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House et al., 2004; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001; 
Schwartz, 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998), supported by 
many others (Abudu, 1986; Ahiauzu, 1986; Beugré & Offodile, 2001; Binet, 1970; Edoho, 
2001; Iguisi, 1997; Munene et al., 2000; Nnadozie, 2001; Nzelibe, 1986; Onwuejeogwu, 
1995; Onyemelukwe, 1983; Osuntokun, 2004; Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). At 
CBU, indications of both beliefs clearly co-exist in the eyes of my informants. Informants 
have often suggested that cultural issues play an important role in organizational change 
(mainly captured in cultural/behavioral constraints, see chapter 6), just as rationality and 
internal logic do (mainly captured in descriptions of the desired situation and the ideas, 
opinions and suggested interventions to achieve the desired situation; see chapters 7, 8 and 9). 
In fact, this rationality and internal logic do not differ greatly from what one would expect in 
any other HEI.  
 
Jackson (2011) considers the debate between divergence and convergence as one between 
‘culturalists’ and ‘institutionalists’ 73, which (in SSA) is further complicated by unequal 
power relations between the post-colonial state and civil society, between formal and 
informal sectors and between corporate and societal culture (Dia, 1996). Formal institutions 
are powerful but disconnected from societal culture in SSA; they are inappropriate to African 
societies and their context, their rules seem to be at odds with values, and institutions appear 
to be at odds with symbolic culture (Jackson, 2011). Consequently, the interaction effects 
among ‘rules’ (institutions), ‘values’ (culture) and ‘control’ (power) may be the way forward 
in understanding organizational phenomena across countries and cultures (Jackson, 2011). 
                                                          
73 Sorge (2004) believes that the two approaches – culturalism and institutionalism – should be considered as 
complementary. In addition, Harré, Clarke and De Carlo (1985), suggest that the (individual) structure of the 
mind and the social order have developed hand in hand, mostly through the facility of language. As such, we 
might view institutions and culture as being parts of the same phenomenon (Jackson, 2011). 
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My research findings also point in this direction. The explanatory power of the large scale 
culture studies (alone) remains limited (Adeleye, 2011; Jacob, 2005; McSweeney, 2002), and 
the role of power – next to internal logic, institutionalism and isomorphism – shouldn’t be 
downplayed (Campbell, 2004; Claeyé, 2012; Ho & Im, 2013). Organizational change 
(including perceptions and interpretations thereof) is a place where rules, culture and power 
dynamics come together and influence each other. For instance, we have seen at CBU that 
rules can be jeopardized by cultural issues (for instance due to avoidance of feedback), and 
that cultural tendencies can be overruled by power issues (for instance due to excessive 
centralization). As a consequence, all three perspectives should be taken into account when 
studying organizational change in SSA (Gustavson, 2010; Ho & Im, 2013). Tsui et al (2007) 
argue that also other national/contextual characteristics have to be taken into account, which 
are indeed relevant and important for my case study. An example of such national 
characteristics is the context of structural poverty in which CBU operates.  
 
The case study at CBU has shown that job security and materialistic concerns are very 
important for the staff at CBU, which is understandable when one lives in perpetual poverty 
and has to deal with a lot of uncertainty. Several scholars (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Jackson, 
2004) suggest that in the African situation, security needs are more important than higher-
order needs (such as self-actualization) in Maslow’s pyramid. There is a lot to say in favor of 
this suggestion, but at the same time, staff members at CBU are highly motivated by 
opportunities for individual career advancement (Kraakman, 2011). Earlier research in 
Zambia has suggested that opportunities for growth and advancement represent the most 
important motivator of staff, followed by the nature of the work itself and material & physical 
provisions (Machungwa & Schmitt, 1983). Perhaps these are indications that Maslow’s 
pyramid should be composed differently in SSA, which is also suggested by Hofstede (1980) 
and Jackson (2004).  
 
The case study at CBU has clearly demonstrated the benefits of a differentiation perspective 
when studying mental models about organizational change (Martin, 2002). Due to this 
perspective it was possible to identify multiple stories and interpretations of organizational 
changes by different informant groups (Buchanan & Dawson, 2007). An integration 
perspective would have ignored these differences by focusing on consensus and consistency 
and by ignoring ambiguity, resulting in a superficial analysis. A fragmentation perspective 
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would have focused more on ambiguity and lack of consensus, even beyond the level of 
subgroups or informant groups. It should be noted that my informant groups emerged only 
after I noticed that there was consensus among certain informants. A fragmentation 
perspective would have been inappropriate for my attempt to identify the dominant mental 
models about organizational change.   
 
The validity of the case study at CBU in other organizations in SSA remains doubtful, but 
there are indications that some of the findings may be approximated in other HEIs or public 
sector organizations in Zambia, and perhaps even beyond. Many scholars have pointed at the 
many common cultural characteristics found in SSA countries and organizations (Abudu, 
1986; Ahiauzu, 1986; Binet, 1970; Blunt & Jones, 1992; Edoho, 2001; Goldsmith, 2003; 
Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House et al., 2004; Iguisi, 1997; Jackson, 2004; Littrell, 2011; 
Malunga, 2009; Munene et al., 2000; Nnadozie, 2001; Nzelibe, 1986; Onwuejeogwu, 1995; 
Osuntokun, 2004; Sulamoyo, 2012; Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). Despite these 
cultural commonalities, there are also cultural differences, and also differences with regards 
to institutions (Gustavson, 2010), power (Campbell, 2004; Ho & Im, 2013) and 
national/contextual characteristics, that always require further investigation.  
 
When overviewing the dominant mental models in chapters 7, 8 and 9, the assessments of the 
current situation (including new developments) are not very different than those that could 
have been found elsewhere in SSA (when compared with the list of frequently encountered 
problems and examples in chapter 1). In fact, a lot of issues (in the current situation) at CBU 
occur at many other HEIs around the world (Teferra & Altbach, 2004) and especially in 
developing countries (Lubatkin et al., 1997). The differences between the current situation at 
CBU and other HEIs seem to be a matter of degrees rather than a matter of totally different 
issues (Teferra & Altbach, 2004), also when compared to ‘Western’ HEIs. For instance, the 
distribution of power (centralization versus decentralization) causes heated debates in every 
HEI. At CBU, this has led to excessive centralization combined with authoritarianism, which 
is not unusual when compared with other organizations in SSA (Beugré & Offodile, 2001; 
Blunt & Jones, 1997; Fashoyin, 2005; Jackson, 2004; Kiggundu, 1991; Kuada, 2010; 
Leonard, 1987; Montgomery, 1987). Similar things can be said about performance 
management. In many SSA organizations, performance management systems are weak or 
even absent (Beugré & Offodile, 2001; Jackson, 2004; Malunga, 2009), which can be 
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understood in combination with practices such as the avoidance of feedback and conflicts, 
maintaining good personal relationships, etc. Also strategic planning & (especially) 
implementation is usually not very strong in SSA (Malunga, 2009; Waiguchu et al., 1999). 
Actually, the same can be argued for many of the ideas, opinions and suggested interventions 
to achieve the desired situation, and the ideas about the desired situation itself; they do not 
appear strange or unfamiliar when compared with the literature about leadership, 
management and organizational change in SSA. Nevertheless, there are also differences, 
which I will summarize below.  
 
The suggested high power distance in SSA (suggested by the large scale culture studies and 
supported by many other researchers) is valid (e.g. ascribed status, authoritarianism), but has 
insufficient explanatory power for the case study at CBU. The unequal distribution of (and 
access to) power seems to be much more important than power distance as such. As such, it 
may be more adequate to use the term power difference instead of power distance.  
 
The claims from Schwartz (1999) and Munene et al (2000) that SSA cultures stress 
maintenance of the status quo and restrain actions that disrupt the traditional order cannot be 
confirmed by the case study at CBU. Informants are clearly dissatisfied and wish to change 
the current status quo, but their desire for changing the traditional order is suppressed by 
power issues and fear.  
 
Strict adherence to rules and procedures in SSA is often explained in terms of uncertainty 
avoidance (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Jackson, 2004; Jaeger, 1986; Kiggundu, 1989; Munene et 
al., 2000; Noorderhaven & Tidjani, 2001; Smith et al., 2002) which may be true to some 
extent. However, my empirical findings suggest that there are two other reasons for strict 
adherence to rules. First, informants suggest that top management and higher central admin 
officers are believed to apply the rules ‘creatively’ (to their own benefit), whereas requests 
from lower staff members are always being scrutinized (they are forced to abide by the rules). 
Secondly, informants want to maintain good personal relationships with their supervisors, so 
they avoid interpretations of the rules that may offend them or harm the relationship 
otherwise. Adherence to rules depends much more on positional power and allegiances rather 
than uncertainty avoidance as such. Furthermore, it is often suggested that uncertainty 
avoidance has a constraining effect on participatory approaches in organizational change 
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(Ahiauzu, 1986; Blunt & Jones, 1992; Iguisi, 1994; Lewis, 2002). However, this does not 
seem to apply at CBU; where staff members clearly wish to be involved, consulted and 
participate. Again here, the major influential factors are the unequal distribution of power and 
authoritarianism (including distrust and fear) that constrain participation, not uncertainty 
avoidance as such.  
 
Zambia scores higher on humane orientation practices than any other society in the world 
(House et al., 2004), which is (among other things) illustrated by an exceptionally strong 
strive for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in and systematic avoidance of feedback at CBU 
(I have witnessed this tendency at MSTVT and at UNZA as well). Based on my other 
experiences in SSA, this seems to be stronger in Zambia than elsewhere in SSA74. Since 
power issues constrain (and overrule) tendencies towards collectivism and humane 
orientation, this results in even stronger perceptions of exclusion and frustration (as well as 
indifference and alienation).  
 
I have come across differences in the mental models between staff from the schools and 
central admin; these can partly be explained in terms of different occupational cultures 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Kezar & Eckel, 2002), but should also be understood in terms of their 
relative (physical) proximity to top management. Central admin is located in offices near top 
management – whereas the schools are located elsewhere on campus – which has certain 
advantages (better offices and facilities, easy access to top management) and disadvantages 
(forced loyalty, difficult to defy). Many informants from the schools have argued that top 
management and central admin look very well after each other. However, this is a 
phenomenon that I have witnessed in other HEIs in SSA as well.  
 
Lastly, the coping strategies (theories-in-use) of the staff that have emerged from this 
empirical study have (as far as I know) not yet been described in the literature about 
leadership, management and organizational change in SSA. Nevertheless, they are important 
since they indicate what people do as opposed to what they say – espoused theories, captured 
in the dominant mental models. In addition, they have far reaching effects on commitment 
and motivation of staff in general, and in processes of organizational change in particular.  
  
                                                          
74 Of course, this is a matter of interpretation by the researcher, which I cannot substantiate.  
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11.4 Limitations of my research 
 
This study is subject to several limitations that are common in longitudinal and cross-cultural 
research. First of all, due to the relatively long period of data collection, things have changed 
at CBU. Some informants changed position, some informants left CBU (because their 
contracts were not renewed), and two informants have died during the period of data 
collection. The previous VC and DVC left in 2010, then a new acting VC and DVC were put 
in place (2011), until they were officially installed as substantive VC and DVC in 2012. On 
the one hand, these changes (and their effects) were interesting to study. On the other hand, 
however, it was challenging to capture these changes in my mental models. I managed to 
include such changes, for instance by incorporating new (positive and negative) 
developments in the current situation (part C of the mental model). I have also differentiated 
between the views from the ‘previous’ and the ‘new’ top management. A second limitation is 
that I have not been around at CBU for long periods of time. Instead, I have travelled to 
Kitwe and CBU a number of times, but only for short periods (mostly one week up to ten 
days). This may have limited my understanding of the organizational reality on the ground at 
CBU. A third limitation is that, although there are strong indications that support the different 
coping strategies of staff, I have not been able to verify them through repeated observations 
in practice. A fourth limitation is imposed by bounded rationality (Simon, 1991) of my 
informants, due to a lack of knowledge and exposure. Some informants lacked basic 
knowledge about organizational change in general, and about decentralization, performance 
management and strategic planning & implementation specifically. A fifth limitation is that I 
have not been able to integrate the dominant mental models and coping strategies into one 
grounded theory model of boxes and arrows (Gioia et al, 2012). The grounded theory 
approach has helped me to produce a data structure in terms of first- and second order 
constructs and aggregate dimensions that have eventually been connected to each other in 
convergent/divergent mental models and coping strategies, but this has not resulted in a grand 
theory on organizational change in HE in SSA.  
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11.5 Suggestions for future research  
 
There is a great need for more empirical studies about organizational change in SSA 
(Ndongko, 1999), and in-depth qualitative studies that link culture to managerial behavior 
(Mufune, 2003). Zoogah & Nkomo (2012) suggest that researchers focus on theory building 
rather than theory testing to advance African management theory. Recommendations for 
further research can be made for CBU; for other HEIs in Zambia; for HEIs in other SSA 
countries, and for public sector organizations in Zambia and elsewhere in SSA.  
 
At CBU for instance, more observations are needed to verify the validity of the coping 
strategies in practice. As a direct follow-up of my research, it will be interesting to study how 
decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation further 
develop. Will CBU remain highly centralized? What are the long-term effects of the 
implementation of the PMS? Will there be a sustained cognitive reorientation that supports 
improvements in accountability? And how will the new strategic plan be implemented? Will 
top management accept a leading role? How will monitoring & evaluation be done this time? 
There are also other interesting questions that are worthwhile investigating, for instance: 
What will be the effects of introducing appointed deans (instead of elected ones)? How will 
the university statutes (that are currently being developed) affect management practices at 
CBU?  
 
Next to further research at CBU, it will be most interesting to study mental models about 
organizational change in other HEIs in Zambia, in order to see whether (and to what extent) 
the findings at CBU can be approximated elsewhere. Although the study by Slooter (2011) 
has shown that there is a lot of similarity between CBU and UNZA, there are also differences 
that are worthwhile studying. For instance, UNZA is a much older and much bigger 
university than CBU. Research at Mulungushi University (which is a very young university 
in Zambia) may produce yet again different results. These differences may be the result of the 
specific interplay of culture, institutions and power (Jackson, 2011) in a particular HEI, and 
can have far-reaching effects on leadership, organization and management practices on the 
ground. The specifics of every HEI can and should be taken into account when establishing 
international cooperation programs and projects by donor agencies; approaches and 
interventions may have to be adapted in order to be effective.  
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Research has shown that there are many similarities between public HEIs in different SSA 
countries (Teferra & Altbach, 2004 – see chapter 3). However, these similarities may be 
somewhat superficial. I expect further research to show that differences between (public) 
HEIs in different SSA countries are bigger than they are between HEIs within the same 
country. I expect so because to a large extent, the interplay of culture, institutions and power 
is shaped nationally, and therefore differs more significantly across borders75. The interplay 
of these differences will affect leadership, organization and management practices on the 
ground. Further research has to make clear how, and what its implications are, both for 
practice as for theory development.  
 
Several authors have stressed the similarities between HEIs and public sector organizations in 
SSA (Wohlgemuth et al, 1998; Therkildsen, 2001). This suggests that my case study may – to 
some extent - be relevant for public sector organizations in Zambia and other SSA countries. 
Nevertheless I expect that, due to isomorphism and professionalization in the HE sector, the 
relevance will become less due to the specific nature of HEIs as compared to (for instance) 
ministries or municipalities. Further research is needed to study if and how HEIs and public 
sector organizations in SSA follow divergent development paths, including its implications 
for both practice and theory.  
 
 
11.6 Final reflections on my role as a researcher 
 
Now I have reached the end of the discussion, it seems that the problems encountered in HEIs 
during my work as a consultant in development are largely similar to those that have emerged 
from this study at CBU. On the one hand, this convergence may be due to similar challenges 
that HEIs across SSA are facing (Teferra & Altbach, 2003, 2004). It may also be due to 
common cultural characteristics of SSA countries, as suggested by the large scale culture 
studies and many other researchers (Abudu, 1986; Ahiauzu, 1986; Binet, 1970; Blunt & 
Jones, 1992; Edoho, 2001; Goldsmith, 2003; Iguisi, 1997; Jackson, 2004; Littrell, 2011; 
Malunga, 2009; Nnadozie, 2001; Nzelibe, 1986; Onwuejeogwu, 1995; Osuntokun, 2004; 
Sulamoyo, 2012; Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). It may also be due to the shared 
                                                          
75 However, one should realize that quite often in SSA, cultures exceed national borders, because tribes and 
ethnic groups occur in multiple countries.  
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colonial background of nearly all SSA countries, which has created a disconnect between the 
state and civil society, between formal and informal organizations, and between the corporate 
and the societal culture (Dia, 1996). And finally, convergence may be due to the internal 
logic of organizations (Mufune, 2003), institutional theory (Scott, 1995) and isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer et al., 2008). On the other hand, it made me think of my 
own role as a researcher and potential bias: Have I perhaps (unconsciously) looked for 
confirmation of already existing perceptions and impressions? Have I perhaps found what I 
wanted to find? I wondered if I have been open-minded enough during data collection and 
analysis. Of course, as already argued in chapter 2 (research methodology), it is impossible to 
enter the field as a ‘tabula rasa’, especially with more than ten years of experience in 
development and higher education. But would I have come up with different findings if I 
didn’t have this background? Although hard to tell in retrospect, I guess that I would have 
been more amazed and astonished by some of the findings – perhaps resulting in temporary 
discomfort or uneasiness – but the findings themselves would not be very different. Gephart 
(2004) argues that:  
 
The reality of grounded theory research is always one of trying to achieve a 
practical middle ground between a theory-laden view of the world and an unfettered 
empiricism. A simple way to seize this middle ground is to pay attention to extant 
theory but constantly remind yourself that you are only human and that what you 
observe is a function of both who you are and what you hope to see. (Gephart, 2004)  
 
This is exactly what I have tried to do. When I started my research, I had read a number of 
publications about leadership, management, HRM and organizational change in Africa, but 
when I entered the field I realized that I was entering a new phase of the research. I literally 
put all theory aside, in order to make room for new thoughts and activities. From now on, I 
wanted to be open and listen to the stories of informants and try to understand their 
experiences from within, in my quest for deeper lying explanations. I remember that I 
thought: ‘I’ll see what comes up during data collection – whether useful or not – and try to 
make sense of it all later’. All in all, I don’t think that somebody else would have come up 
with totally different findings than I did. However, it is possible that my perceptions and 
interpretations of organizational change at CBU are somewhat distorted by my own context 
and background in the Netherlands, which is very different from Zambia. In Alvesson’s & 
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Sköldberg’s (2000) terms, this is due to the social context that has constructed me as a 
researcher (society, language, paradigms, my research community). This will have influenced 
the way I have categorized the research findings in terms of codes, categories and aggregate 
dimensions. 
 
Next to the suggested negative effects of prior knowledge and experience in qualitative 
research (and in grounded theory in particular), there is also an important advantage: prior 
knowledge and experience has helped me to avoid (or suspend) normative judgments about 
culture, about human behavior, what is appropriate and what is not, what is and should be, 
etc. After all, I had seen so many organizational problems and challenges before and 
elsewhere. Previous experience also helped to understand what people were telling me, and 
what was going on, etc. As a consequence, I could move on with in-depth questions more 
quickly.  
 
During this study, I have learnt that cultural factors can only explain a part of the story about 
organizational change at CBU. In fact, during data analysis I came to the conclusion that 
other factors (institutions & rules, power issues, national/contextual characteristics) are at 
least equally important, and that the large scale culture studies are simply too reductionist to 
explain the organizational complexity at CBU. I consider this as an important outcome of my 
personal learning process, which will guide my aspirations in further international and cross-
cultural studies.  
 
 
11.7 Conclusions 
 
CBU is exemplary for many other HEIs in SSA and shares a lot of characteristics provided by 
Teferra & Altbach (2004) in chapter 3. The university suffers from huge financial problems 
and an administrative dominance over academic affairs, dilapidated infrastructure and weak 
facilities that constrain teaching and research. The organization can be characterized by 
authoritarian leadership, excessive centralization, and highly bureaucratic management 
systems. CBU has rather weak relations with stakeholders from the private sector and 
therefore relies mainly on government funding. In addition, the university suffers from a lot 
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of government interference. These characteristics are largely convergent with Jackson’s 
(2004) post-colonial management system.  
 
This study of three organizational changes at CBU has demonstrated that there are various 
cultural (behavioral) constraints, structural (organizational) constraints and external 
(contextual) constraints that severely outweigh the enablers of change. Cultural constraints 
include authoritarianism, a tendency to avoid feedback, negative work mentality, various 
forms of distrust and favoritism and allegiances. Structural constraints include excessive 
centralization, weak accountability mechanisms, lack of transparency, discontinuity and 
elected deans. External constraints include irregular and insufficient funding, governance and 
interference by the government and a context of structural poverty. Enabling factors include 
the strive for consensus, inclusiveness & buy-in among staff, and international cooperation. 
Things have slightly improved at CBU since the change of leadership in 2012, but many 
constraints have largely remained unchanged in the eyes of my informants (for more 
information, see chapter 6).   
 
The dominant mental models about decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic 
planning & implementation (chapters 7, 8 and 9) illustrate a huge gap between top 
management (often accompanied by higher central admin officials) and all other informant 
groups, mainly due to centralization, authoritarianism and a lack of transparency. A similar 
(but smaller) gap exists between middle management and operational staff, and there are also 
different perspectives between central admin and the schools (partly due to different 
occupational cultures). In order to survive, staff members have adopted obedient-, 
intermediate- and defiant coping strategies (chapter 10). While some staff members profit 
from being loyal and quiet, others choose to remain critical towards management and ask 
difficult questions, but the majority just tries to make the best of it by choosing a middle path. 
Nevertheless, large numbers of staff have become frustrated, indifferent and even alienated.  
 
Organizational changes that require an altered distribution of power (such as decentralization 
and strategic plan implementation) have not been very successful so far. As a result, the 
existing (traditional) assumptions about centralization of power have been confirmed and are 
reinforced (Labianca et al, 2000). The literature suggests that this is not very different from 
the situation in many other HEIs in SSA. Concerning performance management, it is 
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promising that a PMS has been implemented; some cognitive reorientation seems to have 
taken place (Balogun, 2007). However, since most informants believe that most cultural 
constraints are still valid, one may wonder how effective performance appraisals are in 
practice. In addition, follow-up decisions (in terms of sanctions and rewards) are still 
centralized. So even here, the power balance has remained unchanged.  
 
The apparent unwillingness on behalf of top management to empower lower levels of 
management is often understood (by other informant groups) in cultural terms – ‘In Africa, 
leaders just want to stay in power’, which is a widely shared perception at CBU. However, 
top management argues that, before empowerment, appointed (not elected) deans are needed 
who are accountable to top management (instead of being accountable to their electorate in 
the schools). By implementing the PMS, they hope to increase accountability throughout the 
university. And they point at the need for more capacity building and more senior staff in the 
schools. However, it remains questionable whether this will eventually lead to an adjusted 
distribution of power at CBU which is in favor of the schools.  
 
Studies on organizations and organizational change in SSA are often informed by the large 
scale culture studies (for instance Hofstede, 1980, 2001), but my empirical findings have 
demonstrated that institutional factors (Adeleye, 2011), power (Campbell, 2004; Claeyé, 
2012; Ho & Im, 2013) and national/contextual characteristics (Tsui et al, 2007) are perhaps 
equally important as culture (Jackson, 2011). Cultures remain important to managerial 
behavior because they provide the context in which people make choices about how they will 
act but also who they want to be (Mufune, 2003). In other words, issues of culture are bound 
up with those of identity. Most people are concerned with their own identities and they are 
rarely negotiable (Mufune, 2003). This explains why cultural assumptions do not change 
easily. So although organizations worldwide are growing more similar, the behavior of 
people within them is maintaining its cultural uniqueness (Adler, 1997). The same goes for 
mental models which tend to be very persistent, even when disconfirming information is 
presented (Labianca et al., 2000). This means that it takes a long breath before a true 
cognitive reorientation takes place, in such a way that the old schemas are permanently 
discredited.  
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11.7.1 Practical recommendations for CBU  
In my view, the best way forward for CBU is not to persist in the coercive post-colonial 
model, but to adopt elements of the post-instrumental management system and African 
renaissance (Jackson, 2004)76. This will be perceived as much more in line with local and 
cultural values and therefore more sustainable in the long run. Dia (1996) suggests that 
formal institutions need to be adapted to the local context in order to build the legitimacy 
needed for enforceability (Dia, 1996). Tribalism, custom and tradition need to be harmonized 
with modernity (Franks, 2006). Otherwise, they will fail to command loyalty and local 
ownership. For CBU, this means a more humanistic orientation towards employees, higher 
levels of consultation and meaningful participation, motivation, trust and creating a higher 
sense of belongingness for large numbers of staff. When ignored, problems such as excessive 
centralization, authoritarianism, lack of transparency/information sharing, perceptions of 
exclusion and even alienation will severely constrain organizational change at CBU on its 
road towards ‘one of the most preferred oasis of knowledge and dynamic center of excellence 
in Zambia, Africa and beyond’ (CBU, 2009b). This does not mean that the post-colonial 
system has to be replaced by a post-instrumental and/or African renaissance system. Instead, 
Trompenaars & Woolliams (2003) argue that the management dilemmas, caused by tensions 
between the envisioned future and key purpose, and between current and ideal corporate 
culture, have to be reconciled. Organizational change then becomes a process of enriching 
(and further developing) values rather than replacing one value or behavior by another. The 
integration of seemingly opposing business and cultural challenges generates creative energy 
and decreases resistance (Trompenaars & Woolliams, 2003).  
 
Next to investments and efforts to put university structures, systems and processes in place, it 
is the human side of the organization that requires substantial attention and improvement. 
Especially when CBU wants to make improvements in areas such as the quality of education 
and research, customer orientation of academics (towards students) and administrators 
(towards internal clients), the attitudes and behaviors of the professional staff become crucial. 
How motivated and committed will they be if the abovementioned problems remain 
unsolved? Employees who are not committed to their organization tend to render lower levels 
of job performance than those who are committed to their organization (Arnolds & Boshoff, 
                                                          
76 For more information about the post-colonial-, post-instrumental- and African renaissance management 
system, see chapter 3.  
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2004). It is important to think of strategies that enhance organizational commitment 
(Gbadamosi, 2003) and motivation (Machungwa & Schmitt, 1983). Furthermore, 
opportunities for participation reduce resistance to change (Msweli-Mbanga & Potwana, 
2006). In order to tackle issues of motivation, commitment and ownership, these 
considerations should be top priorities for CBU in the years to come. The belief that rewards 
come through hard work – rather than organizational politics – needs to be strengthened, and 
opportunities for meaningful employee participation and empowerment should be amplified 
(Beugré & Offodile, 2001). In my view, this should include the full participation of deans and 
directors in strategic decision-making.  
 
Leadership is crucial at CBU. Staff members ascribe a lot of power to the VC (and to a lesser 
extent, the other PO’s). Leaders tend to attract admiration from lower level employees, which 
means that they can strongly influence the motivations of their followers (Zoogah, 2009). 
Strong leadership is appreciated by the staff, as long as it is perceived as human, considerate 
and fair. Beugré & Offodile (2001) suggest transformational leadership that balances top-
down control with bottom-up empowerment. The concept of empowerment is a challenge to 
managers who are used to clinging onto power (Zoogah & Beugré, 2013). Authoritarianism 
(as described in chapter 6) will decrease legitimacy in the eyes of many, and will certainly 
not be helpful to overcome organizational silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Leadership, 
management (of staff) and organizational change requires a lot of time and dedication, if not 
full-time professionals. People management is needed, where the staff is informed, consulted 
and involved in ongoing and new developments. However, this will require substantial efforts 
from the VC, other PO’s, deans, directors and HoDs. Management development programs 
can be very helpful in this respect (Mitiku & Wallace, 1999).  
 
Considering decentralization, I recommend a long-term orientation and a gradual approach 
which is explained (by top management) in such a way that it can be understood and accepted 
(by the staff). During data collection, there were too many political, cultural and 
administrative incentives against decentralization. CBU’s current institutional capacity is not 
prepared for quick or full-fledged decentralization, and irregular and insufficient funding will 
undermine its feasibility, viability and credibility (Naidoo, 2002). Nevertheless, it will be 
good to maintain administrative decentralization as a long-term goal, and to facilitate all 
possible ways to empower the schools in the meantime.  
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Concerning performance management, I recommend close monitoring and evaluation of the 
PMS implementation by the deans, directors and HoDs at the middle and lower management 
levels. Due to a variety of cultural/behavioral constraints and the system of elected deans, 
flawless implementation cannot be expected or assumed. Supervisors may need (and 
appreciate) hands-on support and advice in practice. Since many supervisors will have similar 
questions and uncertainties, joint learning sites (Reich, 2006) may provide good opportunities 
to learn from each other. Mendonca & Kanungo (1996) stress the importance of coaching and 
mentoring, enhancing the subordinate’s self-efficacy beliefs and expressing confidence in the 
ability of subordinates to meet high expectations. Role modeling by managers who foster 
performance driven behavior is crucial (de Waal, 2007). 
 
Concerning strategic planning & implementation, I recommend that the strategic plan is 
communicated to such a point that the strategic plan is internalized and that it becomes part of 
the culture of the organization. This can be done through a series of (formal) events, chaired 
by the VC. Lack of communication of the strategic plan leads to low ownership and 
commitment to its implementation (Malunga, 2009). Furthermore, I recommend close 
monitoring & evaluation of the implementation in practice that periodically involves the 
deans and directors. The implementation can be considered as a joint learning process, based 
on mutual trust, respect and tolerance for different perspectives. Hayward (2008) argues that 
top management has to take the lead, and he further suggests partnering with experienced 
university presidents from ‘Western’ countries, who can act as mentors and provide hands-on 
advice. This may indeed be a very useful suggestion for CBU.  
 
At a more practical level, I advise CBU top management:  
x To substantially improve on transparency and accountability about decisions and 
money, and to develop multiple communication strategies for information sharing, so 
that people can (learn to) understand what is happening and why; this will enhance 
trust between top management and staff.  
x To devise productive strategies for consensus, inclusiveness and buy-in. Also ensure 
the regular involvement of deans & directors in management meetings; this will 
enhance commitment and ownership and decrease perceptions of exclusion.  
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x To organize periodic meetings between superiors and (individual) subordinates 
(instead of the current arrangement in which ‘we only meet when there is an issue’). 
This will help to improve accountability at all levels.  
x To eradicate and to avoid suspicions of nepotism, favoritism and personalism. This 
will enhance trust and at the same time it will provide a good example for the staff. It 
should be understood that trust comes slowly but goes away very quickly, so even the 
smallest suspicion has to be avoided. 
x To improve on compliance & rule enforcement for all. This will reduce feelings of 
indifference and laissez-faire among large numbers of staff.  
x To consider students as clients, and involve them (much more) in discussion fora and 
decision-making processes about strategic directions for further development of CBU. 
Their views should be taken (much more) seriously.   
 
I believe that the implementation of these recommendations will eventually invalidate the 
unproductive coping strategies, and gradually enhance the motivation and commitment of 
large numbers of staff and students. 
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Annex 1: Interview protocol 
 
Introduction 
My name is Egide Maassen from the Netherlands, VU University Amsterdam. I am doing 
PhD research on organizational change in African higher education. I am interested to learn 
to understand how you look at change, what your ideas are, what your experiences are, how 
things work in your institution, how you think it should be, what should be done, and so on.  
 
All information will be dealt with discretely and anonymous.  
 
 
This interview consists of the following parts: 
A. Some general questions about yourself and your institution 
B. Open questions about decentralization 
C. Open questions about the introduction of a system for performance appraisal 
D. Open questions about strategic planning & implementation 
E. Open questions about leadership & management  
F. Open questions about motivation, commitment and employee relations 
G. Short case studies  
H. Some reflective questions  
 
 
The interview will take up to two hours maximum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do’s and don’ts for the interviewer 
- Clear questions 
- Short questions – do not talk too much 
- No normative statements – no opinions  
- No suggestive answers  
- Do not interrupt the informants while speaking 
- Allow silences 
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A. General questions about yourself and your institution 
 
- What is your name?  
- Male or female  M / F 
- Age category  (20 – 30); (30 – 40); (40 – 50); (50 – 60); (60 – 70)  
-  
Tell me something about yourself 
- How did you get here? When? 
- What is your current job / function? 
- Top management / Dean or director /Academic / Administrative 
 
How is it to be a manager at CBU?  
- What does it mean to you, to be a manager?  
- How would you describe your management task/role?  
- How do you manage? What do you do?  
- What is the most important in your job as a manager? Explain 
- What is the most difficult for you as a manager? Explain 
- What is the most challenging for you as a manager? Explain 
- What is the easiest part of your job as a manager? Explain  
 
Have you witnessed changes in the university yourself? What happened?  
- What were the important steps in the process?  
- What about your involvement?  
 
Are you satisfied with the way things are? What makes that you are (not) satisfied?  
- How should it be according to you?  
- Is it possible to get there?  
- What is necessary in order to get there?  
- What / how would you do (it)?  
- Are you optimistic/positive about the probability of change? Explain  
- Are you pessimistic/negative about the probability of change? Explain  
 
What drives you mad in this institution?  
- What makes you happy? Explain + examples 
- What makes you angry? Explain + examples  
 
How would you characterize your university? What would be a good metaphor for your 
university? Explain  
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B. Open questions about decentralization 
 
In the last 5 years, there have been discussions and workshops about decentralization, 
partly with the support of externally funded projects.   
- What do you think of decentralization?  
- What does it mean to you?  
- Do you support decentralization? Why? In what way?  
 
How has been the decentralization process so far?  
- What were important steps? 
- What about your involvement in the process?  
- Have you been consulted? Has your voice been heard?  
- How did/do you feel about the decentralization process itself?  
- Where does the (initiative for the) idea to decentralize come from?  
- The role of external forces? 
o Forced by external powers (the role of labor unions?) 
o Initiated from within (by whom?) 
 
When can decentralization become a success?  
- Will decentralization work here? Is it feasible and viable?  
- How would you describe the role of the top management in the decentralization 
process? Explain  
- How did/does the university community respond to decentralization?  
o Resistance or willingness to change?  
o True commitment?  
- What was/is good about the decentralization process? 
- What did/does not go well?  
- What did/can you learn from it?  
- If you were a change manager in your institution, how would you lead and manage 
this decentralization process?  
o What would you do differently? 
o How? In terms of approach and interventions 
o Why in this way?  
o What is important according to you?  
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C. Open questions about performance appraisal 
 
Since a few  years, your university wishes to adopt a system for performance appraisal. 
What do you think about performance appraisal?  
- What does it mean to you?  
- Do you support performance appraisal? Why?  
- Advantages, disadvantages?  
- What has to be done in order to be successful?  
- Will performance appraisal work here? Is it feasible and viable?  
 
Where does the (initiative for) the introduction of performance appraisal come from?  
- Forced by external powers? Explain  
- Initiated from within? Explain  
 
How has been the process so far?  
- What were important steps?  
- What was/is your role in the change process? 
o Have you been consulted? Has your voice been heard?  
- How would you describe the role of the top management in this change process? 
 
How did/does the university community respond to performance appraisal? 
- Resistance or willingness to change? 
- Different for academics than for administrators? Other categories of staff?  
- True commitment?  
- Participation of staff in the design of the system?  
 
What was/is bad and was/is good about the performance appraisal implementation 
process? 
- What did/does go well?  
- What did/can you learn from it?  
- If you were a change manager in your institution, how would you lead and manage the 
performance appraisal implementation process?  
o What would you do differently? 
o How? In terms of approach and interventions 
o Who should appraise someone’s performance? The superior, or a committee? 
Explain  
 
 
395 
 
D. Strategic planning & implementation 
 
Planning 
- Has CBU always had strategic plans?  
- What is the purpose of strategic planning?  
- How are strategic plans developed at CBU?  
o Have you been involved in strategic planning in some way?  
o What was your role?  
o What was the role of top management?  
 
Implementation 
- What can you tell me about the implementation of strategic plans?  
o Have you been involved in implementation?  
o What was your role?  
- Has implementation been successful?  
o Why (not)? Explain.  
o What have been the critical success and fail factors?  
o How do you perceive the role of top management?  
- What should be done in order to make strategic planning & implementation more 
successful?  
o What should top management do?  
o What should schools do?  
- If you were a change manager in your institution, how would you lead and manage 
strategic planning & implementation?  
o What would you do differently? 
o How? In terms of approach and interventions 
o Why in this way?  
o What is important according to you?  
 
 
E. Open questions about leadership & management in general 
 
What is a good leader according to you?  
- An example? What is so good about this person?  
- Is leadership important? Why?  
- What do you expect from leadership? Servant leadership, facilitating the 
professionals, involving professionals in decision-making processes, or that they give 
direction? What leadership style do you prefer?  
- What determines power? Is it age, qualifications, experience or the hierarchical 
position that one has?  
- How would you describe leadership at your university?  
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- How would you describe/characterize your relations with your subordinates and 
superiors?  
o Are they important to you? Why?  
- Do you consult your subordinates and involve them in decision-making?  
 
Feedback mechanisms: do people give feedback ? How? Why (not)?  
- Is it feedback on paper, or face-to-face? 
- What makes it difficult or undesirable?  
- How should it be according to you?  
 
Positive and negative sanctions? Would it be easy or difficult to reward or to punish an 
individual for his/her performance?  
- What factors make this difficult? Examples?  
 
Are you accountable to your superior? Explain  
- In what way does accountability take place?  
- Does (s)he give feedback to you about your performance?  
- Do you feel comfortable to give feedback to him/her as well? 
 
Are your staff members accountable to you? 
- In what way does accountability take place?  
- Do you check on compliance? Do you check if people do what they say? 
o What if they don’t?  
- Do they give feedback to you as well? Examples?  
 
 
F. Open questions about motivation, commitment and work atmosphere 
 
What motivates you? What drives you?  
- Why do you work here? Why do you not leave the university for more lucrative jobs?  
o Money 
o Position / Status  
o Professional development opportunities 
o Pension, insurance 
o Other?  
- What would make you leave the university?  
 
How about the mentality of the staff?  
- Negative/positive attitude?  
- Laziness or hard working mentality?  
- Frustration or hope?  
- Trust or distrust?  
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- Self-esteem? 
- Jealousy?  
 
Do you consider yourself to be committed to the institutional objectives?  
- Can you explain or give an example?  
 
What can you tell me about work atmosphere in your university?  
- How would you describe the general atmosphere among colleagues? 
- What do people here make jokes about?  
- How do people here deal with a malfunctioning colleague?  
o What if this person is a friend of the family?  
o What if this person is from the same ethnic group?  
o What if this person is a relatively old person?  
- How do people here respond to the promotion of a colleague?  
- Are there different interest groups, subcultures, specific ethnic groups, occupational 
groups or family ties within the university?  
o Any other type of in- and –out groups?  
o What is their meaning/impact?  
- How do you make sure that you are informed about ongoing developments?  
o Informal network, gossips, rumors?  
 
 
G. Short case studies (think-aloud protocol) 
 
Instructions: 
- Hand out a short case (one by one) 
- Allow time to read 
- Please think aloud about how you would approach the issue at hand 
 
1. A university in Zambia wishes to align all their education programs with the needs of 
the labor market. The vice-chancellor has given you the overall responsibility to make 
this happen, within a period of three years’ time. You are released from any other 
duties, and some financial resources have been made available for this task. 
 
a. How will you go about it? Why this way?  
b. What is important in order to be successful? Explain.  
c. What will you do in order to create commitment among your academic colleagues?  
d. How will you gain support from Central Admin?  
e. What should be avoided? Explain how. 
 
2. A university in Zambia wishes to diminish its dependency on government funding, 
and to become more entrepreneurial in order to generate additional income for the 
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university. The intended growth of self-generated income is targeted at 25% within 
three years from now. You are appointed as project manager for this job and released 
from any other duties. Some financial resources have been made available for this 
task. 
 
a. How will you go about it? Why this way?  
b. How can you gain commitment from academic staff members?  
c. What is the key to success?  
d. What should be avoided? Explain how. 
 
3. A university in Zambia wishes to design and implement a quality assurance system 
for all education programs. This also means that students will evaluate every course, 
including the didactical performance of the lecturers. You are appointed as project 
manager for this job and released from any other duties. Some financial resources 
have been made available for this task. 
 
a. How will you make sure that QA implementation becomes a success?  
b. Critical success factors? 
c. Critical fail factors? 
d. What should be the role of the top management?  
e. How will you gain commitment among academic staff members?  
 
4. You are the Vice Chancellor of a university in Zambia, and you want to make sure 
that the strategic plan for the next five years will be implemented as planned.  
 
a. How will you go about it? Why this way?  
b. What are the critical success factors for the implementation of the strategic plan? 
Explain.  
c. What should be avoided? Explain how. 
 
5. You have written a critical report on the lack of compliance with institutional 
regulations and procedures in your university. As a consequence, the university 
cannot be accredited by ISO 9001. The management committee has approved your 
report, and now you’ve been appointed as project manager to change this situation, in 
order to become accredited by ISO 9001 in three years from now. You are released 
from any other duties, and some financial resources have been made available for this 
task. 
 
a. What is necessary in order to address the problem?  
b. How will you go about it? Why this way? Explain.  
c. Critical success factors?  
d. Critical fail factors?  
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Reflective questions  
 
- Do you have the idea that some cultural issues are hampering organizational change 
processes in your university? Examples? Explain  
- Do you have the idea that some external (contextual) conditions (government funds, 
legal issues, political factors, poverty & unemployment) are hampering organizational 
change processes in your university? Examples? Explain.  
- Do you have the idea that some institutional factors (government, unions, statutes, 
organizational structures, decision-making processes) are hampering organizational 
change processes in your university? Examples? Explain.  
 
- Final remarks you would like to make?  
 
- Who would be a good next informant for this interview? Why?  
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THIS INTERVIEW !!! 
When needed, can I contact you for further information?  
 
Contact details for further information 
 
x Full name 
x Email address  
x Mobile phone nr 
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 A
nnex 2: V
alidation exercise: real answ
ers versus expected answ
ers  
Q
uestion / statem
ent 
Expected responses 
Academ
ics 77 
Adm
inistrators 78 
I am
 the VC of CBU, and according to 
m
y vision, w
e should speed up the 
process of decentralization – it is 
taking too long. W
hat should I do?   
I expect everyone to refer to building trust 
and confidence, show
 the w
illingness to 
decentralize, proper guidelines, 
accountability, control m
easures.  
They believe that PO’s like to be in 
charge  and control the funds, and that 
CBU has becom
e m
ore centralized in 
recent years. They doubt w
hether top 
m
anagem
ent is w
illing to decentralize. 
They w
ant bottom
-up input, not top 
dow
n decisions.  
Adm
in staff also doubt the w
illingness of 
top m
anagem
ent to decentralize, but 
not so strong as academ
ics. Som
e say 
that top m
anagem
ent does not believe 
in the m
anagem
ent capacity of deans 
and directors. And the lack of trust is 
highlighted.  
I am
 the dean of a school, and I w
ant 
to push top m
anagem
ent to speed 
up the process of decentralization. 
W
hat w
ould you – as academ
ic staff 
m
em
bers - advise m
e to do? Are 
there lim
its to w
hat I can do? 
I expect everyone to refer to lim
ited influence 
as a dean tow
ards top m
anagem
ent, m
aybe 
joining forces as deans, asking for inform
ation 
and clarity about the w
ay forw
ard.  
 
One inform
ant indicated that deans do 
not collaborate m
uch w
ith each other. 
One inform
ant said that deans should 
ask for clarity about the w
ay forw
ard 
and a tim
efram
e. Top m
anagem
ent 
should listen to the deans &
 directors.  
Adm
inistrators did not speak on behalf 
of academ
ics.  
Both groups argue that it is difficult to criticize top m
anagem
ent. 
The hesitance by top m
anagem
ent 
tow
ards decentralization is 
understandable; it could easily 
becom
e a total chaos.  
D&
Ds and schools w
ill strongly disagree. 
Hesitance has other reasons; top m
anagers 
w
anted to keep the pow
er to them
selves.  
They argue that top m
anagem
ents’ 
attitude tow
ards decentralization is 
ridiculous, solely based on a desire to 
rem
ain in control.  
Higher central adm
in officials argue that 
the hesitance of top m
anagem
ent also 
relates to a lack of trust in the capacities 
of deans to properly m
anage financial 
affairs of the schools.  
Both groups don’t think that decentralization could easily becom
e a chaos; there 
are audit checks in place, and other control m
easures to prevent chaos from
 
happening.  
                                                           
77 Including deans and HoDs.  
78 Including directors.  
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Q
ue
st
io
n 
/ s
ta
te
m
en
t 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 re
sp
on
se
s 
Ac
ad
em
ics
 
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
to
rs
 
To
 so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
, I
 ca
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 
th
e 
w
ay
 th
e 
VC
 o
pe
ra
te
d;
 it
 w
as
 th
e 
on
ly
 w
ay
 to
 g
et
 th
in
gs
 d
on
e 
at
 C
BU
. 
M
an
y 
w
ill
 d
isa
gr
ee
. Y
es
 h
e 
ha
s a
ch
ie
ve
d 
se
ve
ra
l t
hi
ng
s, 
bu
t i
t c
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
w
he
n 
he
 h
ad
 co
ns
ul
te
d 
an
d 
in
clu
de
d 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
ed
 e
ve
ry
on
e,
 in
 a
 m
or
e 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 
w
ay
. S
om
e 
m
ay
 sa
y 
th
at
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
sy
st
em
 is
 sl
ow
, b
ut
 it
 w
ill
 n
ot
 b
rin
g 
th
em
 to
 
th
e 
co
nc
lu
sio
n 
th
at
 th
in
gs
 h
ad
 to
 b
e 
do
ne
 in
 
th
e 
VC
’s 
w
ay
.  
Bo
th
 g
ro
up
s t
hi
nk
 th
at
 th
e 
VC
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
w
he
n 
he
 h
ad
 
re
sp
ec
te
d 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 sy
st
em
. T
he
 co
m
m
itt
ee
 sy
st
em
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
slo
w
ed
 h
im
 
do
w
n.
 B
ut
 th
ey
 a
lso
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
w
ay
 th
e 
VC
 h
as
 a
ch
ie
ve
d 
th
es
e 
th
in
gs
 h
as
 
ca
us
ed
 a
 lo
t o
f d
am
ag
e,
 in
clu
di
ng
 la
ck
 o
f c
om
m
itm
en
t, 
o w
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
.  
W
hy
 w
as
 st
ra
te
gi
c p
la
nn
in
g 
&
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
no
t s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l a
t 
CB
U?
 It
 ca
nn
ot
 o
nl
y 
be
 a
bo
ut
 a
 la
ck
 
of
 m
on
ey
. I
t c
an
no
t o
nl
y 
be
 a
bo
ut
 
th
e 
la
ck
 o
f c
om
m
itm
en
t b
y 
th
e 
PO
’s.
 
W
he
re
 is
 y
ou
r o
w
n 
co
m
m
itm
en
t?
 
I e
xp
ec
t m
an
y 
to
 re
fe
r b
ac
k 
to
 th
e 
la
ck
 o
f 
fin
an
cia
l r
es
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
op
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
So
m
e 
in
fo
rm
an
ts
 w
ill
 re
ac
t 
de
fe
ns
iv
el
y 
by
 m
ar
gi
na
liz
in
g 
th
ei
r r
ol
e 
as
 
in
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
nd
 p
ow
er
le
ss
.  
Th
ey
 sa
y 
th
at
 th
e 
st
ra
te
gi
c p
la
nn
in
g 
&
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
w
as
 n
ot
 re
al
ist
ic,
 a
nd
 
th
at
 m
an
y 
of
 th
em
 w
er
e 
no
t i
nv
ol
ve
d.
 
Th
ey
 a
lso
 sa
y 
th
at
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s a
t 
un
it 
le
ve
l d
id
n’
t m
ak
e 
m
uc
h 
se
ns
e,
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 d
id
n’
t h
av
e 
th
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
ne
ed
ed
.  
By
 co
nt
ra
st
, t
he
y 
cla
im
 to
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 a
nd
 co
ns
ul
te
d 
in
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f t
he
 n
ew
 st
ra
te
gi
c p
la
n.
  
Th
ey
 sa
y 
th
at
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
no
t i
nv
ol
ve
d 
w
hi
ch
 h
ad
 d
et
rim
en
ta
l e
ffe
ct
s o
n 
co
m
m
itm
en
t. 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
s a
t u
ni
t l
ev
el
 
w
er
e 
w
ea
k.
 P
ro
gr
es
s s
ho
ul
d 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
be
tt
er
 m
on
ito
re
d 
by
 th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l 
co
m
m
itt
ee
.  
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Q
uestion / statem
ent 
Expected responses 
Academ
ics 
Adm
inistrators 
I am
 the new
 VC and I have 
understood that strategic planning &
 
im
plem
entation has not been very 
successful in the past. If I w
ant 
strategic planning &
 im
plem
entation 
to be m
ore successful in the future: 
W
hat should be done differently? 
W
hat are the m
ost im
portant issues to 
take into account?  
I expect them
 to refer to 
realistic and inclusive planning; 
I w
onder w
hat they w
ill say 
about im
plem
entation. For m
e, 
this is not very clear.  
 
Involvem
ent and consultation are crucial for both groups. Strategies for inclusiveness should 
be developed. They also claim
 that top m
anagem
ent should have taken the lead, instead of 
leaving everything up to the units.  
PM
S has been discussed for a long 
tim
e; w
hy has a PM
S not been 
developed and im
plem
ented 
successfully under the previous 
leadership?  
 
I expect m
any to say that PM
S 
w
as not on his list of top 
priorities, he w
anted other 
things to be done. The VC 
expected too m
uch trouble, 
w
hich he w
ishes to avoid.   
Both groups say that there is a strong need for buy in, and the VC didn’t create room
 for that. 
People thought that the PM
S w
as going to be used to terrorize and victim
ize the staff.  
By contrast, the new
 leadership involved the unions, this helped a lot in getting the PM
S 
accepted at CBU.  
W
hat are the m
ost im
portant 
constraints ham
pering organizational 
change?  
a) 
In decentralization 
b) 
In PM
S 
c) 
In strategic planning &
 
im
plem
entation 
A) lack of financial resources, 
lack of w
illingness of top 
m
anagem
ent and distrust  
B) fear of the bilateral versus 
the com
m
ittee w
ay of 
appraisal, tendency to avoid 
feedback, unavailability of job 
descriptions  
C) lack of financial resources, 
exclusiveness and am
biguous 
role of top m
anagem
ent.  
 
A) 
Am
biguous role of top 
m
anagem
ent, lim
ited resources, 
authoritarianism
. 
B) 
It requires tim
e to im
plem
ent a 
PM
S (m
anagers suddenly have to 
m
anage their staff!); lack of 
integration of old and new
 
system
; financial resources 
needed for rew
ards and 
prom
otions. 
C) 
Involvem
ent is crucial, m
oney 
should not be diverted for other 
purposes, schools did not have 
the m
oney, top m
anagem
ent did 
not take the lead. 
A) 
W
e need to build capacity, lack of trust, 
am
biguous role of top m
anagem
ent, lim
ited 
resources, authoritarianism
. 
B) 
W
e need job descriptions and key perform
ance 
indicators, civil service m
entality, role culture. 
C) 
W
e need to be involved, w
e need com
m
itm
ent, 
m
onitoring is w
eak, m
oney should not be diverted 
for other purposes, top m
anagem
ent did not take 
the lead. 
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Q
ue
st
io
n 
/ s
ta
te
m
en
t 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 re
sp
on
se
s 
Ac
ad
em
ics
 
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
to
rs
 
W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
m
os
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
t e
na
bl
in
g 
fa
ct
or
s  t
ha
t f
ac
ili
ta
te
/h
el
p 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l c
ha
ng
e?
 
a)
 
In
 d
ec
en
tr
al
iza
tio
n 
b)
 
In
 P
M
S 
c)
 
In
 st
ra
te
gi
c p
la
nn
in
g 
&
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
 
I e
xp
ec
t f
or
 a
) t
he
 b
el
ie
f t
ha
t 
th
er
e 
is 
en
ou
gh
 ca
pa
cit
y 
in
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s, 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p,
 
fo
r b
) t
he
 id
ea
 th
at
 C
BU
 h
as
 to
 
av
oi
d 
in
er
tia
 a
nd
 in
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
 
an
d 
fo
r c
) i
nc
lu
siv
en
es
s a
nd
 
jo
in
t r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 in
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
  
Bo
th
 g
ro
up
s a
re
 q
ui
te
 p
es
sim
ist
ic 
ab
ou
t t
he
 n
ew
 m
an
ag
em
en
t c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
de
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n.
 
Ap
pa
re
nt
ly
, d
ec
en
tr
al
iza
tio
n 
is 
no
 lo
ng
er
 a
n 
iss
ue
 in
 th
e 
ne
w
 st
ra
te
gi
c p
la
n.
  
Co
nc
er
ni
ng
 P
M
S,
 a
lm
os
t e
ve
ry
on
e 
is 
po
sit
iv
e,
 so
m
e 
ev
en
 cl
ai
m
 th
at
 th
e 
PM
S 
is 
fu
lly
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 In
vo
lv
em
en
t o
f t
he
 u
ni
on
s w
as
 cr
uc
ia
l. 
Co
nc
er
ni
ng
 st
ra
te
gi
c p
la
nn
in
g,
 b
ot
h 
gr
ou
ps
 h
av
e 
th
e 
fe
el
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t a
nd
 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
is 
m
uc
h 
be
tt
er
 th
an
 w
ith
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f t
he
 p
re
vi
ou
s s
tr
at
eg
ic 
pl
an
. I
t a
lso
 
se
em
s t
o 
be
co
m
e 
m
or
e 
re
al
ist
ic 
th
an
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 o
ne
.  
W
he
re
 d
oe
s t
he
 st
riv
e 
fo
r c
on
se
ns
us
, 
in
clu
siv
en
es
s &
 b
uy
 in
 co
m
e 
fro
m
? 
Ho
w
 sh
ou
ld
 I 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 th
is 
te
nd
en
cy
? 
Is 
th
is 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
la
ck
 o
f 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
la
ck
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 y
ou
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
re
gi
m
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 V
C?
 
W
he
re
 d
oe
s i
t c
om
e 
fro
m
? 
 
I e
xp
ec
t t
he
m
 m
ai
nl
y 
to
 re
fe
r t
o 
th
e 
lo
w
 le
ve
ls 
of
 in
vo
lv
em
en
t 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 re
gi
m
e,
 b
ut
 
th
ey
 m
ay
 a
lso
 re
fe
r t
o 
cu
ltu
re
.  
 
Th
e 
st
riv
e 
fo
r c
on
se
ns
us
, i
nc
lu
siv
en
es
s a
nd
 b
uy
-in
 is
 st
ro
ng
er
 in
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s t
ha
n 
in
 ce
nt
ra
l 
ad
m
in
. P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f e
xc
lu
sio
n 
ar
e 
al
so
 st
ro
ng
er
 in
 sc
ho
ol
s t
ha
n 
in
 ce
nt
ra
l a
dm
in
. T
he
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 sy
st
em
 it
se
lf 
is 
an
 e
xp
re
ss
io
n 
of
 cu
ltu
re
.  
In
 ce
nt
ra
l a
dm
in
 th
e 
ol
d 
ZI
T 
/ c
iv
il 
se
rv
ice
 m
en
ta
lit
y 
is 
m
or
e 
pr
om
in
en
t 
th
an
 in
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s. 
 
I e
xp
ec
t m
an
y 
to
 a
gr
ee
 w
ith
 
th
is 
st
at
em
en
t. 
 
Le
ct
ur
er
s h
av
e 
di
re
ct
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
to
w
ar
ds
 th
e 
st
ud
en
ts
, w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 
te
nd
 to
 ta
ke
 se
rio
us
ly
.  
Th
e 
ro
le
 cu
ltu
re
 h
er
e 
is 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
pr
om
in
en
t t
ha
n 
in
 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s. 
M
an
ag
em
en
t i
n 
ce
nt
ra
l a
dm
in
 se
em
s t
o 
be
 m
or
e 
ch
al
le
ng
in
g 
th
an
 in
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s. 
St
af
f i
s o
nl
y 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 b
os
s. 
 
 
Th
e 
w
or
k 
m
en
ta
lit
y 
/ e
th
ics
 o
f s
ta
ff 
at
 
ce
nt
ra
l a
dm
in
 is
 m
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Q
uestion / statem
ent 
Expected responses 
Academ
ics 
Adm
inistrators 
Deans and HoDs find it m
ore difficult to 
be strict than m
anagers in central adm
in.  
I expect m
any to agree w
ith this 
statem
ent, due to the elective and 
rotational system
 for deans and 
HoDs in schools.  
Not necessarily true. M
anagers in schools tend to be m
ore strict than in central adm
in, 
even though they are elected/rotated. W
hen a dean w
anted to discipline som
ebody, 
central adm
in argued that the dean w
as too hard on the person, that he should not be 
disciplined. How
ever, it is possible that this non perform
ing staff m
em
ber is alleged to 
som
eone high up in the CBU hierarchy, and that because of this special allegiance, he 
enjoys protection.  
 
For m
any reasons, it w
ill be good w
hen 
all schools have appointed deans.  
I don’t know
 w
hat they w
ill think 
of this statem
ent. But since they 
have told m
e about the problem
s 
w
ith elected deans, I expect 
several inform
ants to agree.  
They heavily doubt about appointed 
deans, due to the large pow
ers of a VC. 
An appointed dean can easily be 
overruled by the VC, and an appointed 
dean m
ay not be trusted by his staff.  
 
No com
m
ents. 
I w
ill perform
 m
y tasks and duties, even 
w
hen m
y relationships w
ith colleagues 
m
ay suffer from
 it.  
I expect that this statem
ent causes 
som
e consideration and 
discussion, since there are lim
its 
to w
hat is acceptable and w
hat is 
not. No one w
ill perform
 
regardless of his/her relations 
w
ith colleagues, certainly not at 
CBU.  
 
Due to their professional autonom
y, 
academ
ics can perform
 their tasks and 
duties w
ithout harm
ing their personal 
relationships w
ith others. They seem
 to 
w
ork according to shared professional 
standards .  
 
Not true. Personal relationships are very 
im
portant. Perform
ance m
ay suffer from
 the 
tendency to m
aintain good relationships w
ith 
colleagues and supervisors.  
 
Above all, I w
ish to m
aintain good 
personal relationships w
ith m
y 
colleagues. 
This is the reverse of the above 
statem
ent, and m
any w
ill agree 
w
ith this one, at least to a large 
extent.  
Not clear. Good personal relationships 
are im
portant, but professional 
interests and perform
ance are also 
im
portant.  
Personal relationships have to be considered 
and tend to be m
ore im
portant than 
perform
ance. 
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Q
uestion / statem
ent 
Expected responses 
Academ
ics 
Adm
inistrators 
There is nothing I can do to im
prove the 
situation at CBU, it is all up to top 
m
anagem
ent.  
 
I expect som
e to disagree, but at 
the sam
e tim
e they w
ill 
acknow
ledge that m
ost things 
should com
e from
 top 
m
anagem
ent.  
They go their ow
n w
ay, as m
uch as 
po ssible.  
It is all up to m
anagem
ent, they should create 
a forum
 to air different view
s; w
e cannot do 
that. Role culture.  
I don’t care about the university, as long 
as I get m
y salary.  
I expect them
 not to agree 
(openly), but at the sam
e tim
e 
som
e w
ill adm
it that due to 
accum
ulated frustration over the 
years, they find it difficult to 
rem
ain enthusiastic and positive.  
They tend to focus on their private 
businesses, for them
 CBU is increasingly 
becom
ing a side job.  
There is m
uch frustration, so people w
ithdraw
 
em
otionally from
 CBU, especially in central 
adm
in. They becom
e obedient w
ithout m
uch 
com
m
itm
ent.  
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Annex 3: Overview of first order constructs, second order constructs and aggregate dimensions
related to constraining & enabling factors(usually three items are provided as first order
constructs)
First order constructs Second order constructs         Aggregate dimension
x Unclear whether top management 
is willing to decentralize
x Top management did not 
implement PMS for a long time
x Diversion of funds  for strategic plan 
implementation
Cultural / behavioral
constraints
Ambiguous role of top 
management
x Dictatorial tendencies
x VC bypassing and interfering
x VC dominating and manipulating 
committee meetings
x Top management doesn’t trust 
middle management
x Middle management doesn’t trust 
top management 
x Distrust towards supervisors 
x We don’t trust each other
x We only trust the people we know
x You don’t know who you can trust 
x Importance of good relationships 
with colleagues
x Importance of good relationships 
with supervisors 
x Family trees
x Tendency to stay quiet
x Fear to offend or embarrass others
x Protecting each other, hiding 
mistakes
Authoritarianism
Hierarchical distrust
Out-group distrust
Favoritism & allegiances
Avoidance of feedback
Role culture 
x We are paid to do our roles
x Relational aspects are more 
important 
x It's not appropriate to ask questions 
x I have not been involved
x I have not been informed
x I don’t know what is going on 
x Civil service mentality
x Hiding and scapegoating
x Lack of pro-activity, wait and see
Perceptions of exclusion
Negative work mentality
x Accumulation of frustration
x There is nothing I can do
x I don’t care anymore
Indifference / alienation
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First order constructs Second order constructs         Aggregate dimension
x All power is at the top
x Everything has to be decided by top 
management
x Lack of transparency/information 
sharing
Structural / organizational
constraints
Excessive centralization
x Irregular and insufficient funding
x Absent top management
x Acting VC/DVC positions
x Committees slow you down 
x There are too many committees
x Too much bureaucracy/red tape
x No-one is being held accountable
x No periodic supervisor-subordinate 
meetings 
x No PMS in place 
x Policies kept as drafts
x SOP’s not available
x Lack of rule enforcement
x No transparency about finance
x No communication/explanation 
about decisions
x Lack of openness
Sources of discontinuity
Committees for decision-
making
Weak accountability 
mechanisms
Weak compliance
Lack of transparency / 
information sharing
Elected deans
x Deans are accountable to their 
electorate
x Deans/HoDs find it difficult to be 
strict
x Deans/HoDs struggling with 
performance management 
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First order constructs Second order constructs         Aggregate dimension
x Frequent obligatory meetings for 
PO's in Lusaka
x Appointment of new VC/DVC
x Interjecting assignments
External / contextual
constraints
University governance & 
interference by the 
government
x Industrial action and court cases
x Aim at 'consumption'
x Protecting the employees
x Irregular funding
x Insufficient funds
x Need for cash flow planning
x Impact of HIV/AIDS
x Attitude towards job retention
x Scarcity of qualified staff
x Indicators of authoritarianism
x No regular management meetings 
with deans & directors
x Indabas used for one-way 
communication
x Frequent travels by top 
management 
x Skepticism of schools towards 
Indabas
Role of the unions 
Irregular & insufficient 
funding
Context of structural poverty
New negatively perceived 
developments New constraints
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First order constructs Second order constructs         Aggregate dimension
x Satisfaction about the conditions of 
service
x Humor, jokes & fun
x Contributing to the development of 
the nation
Enabling factors
Motivation and job 
satisfaction
x Good work atmosphere
x Team work
x Support from colleagues
x Everybody wants to be involved
x Everybody wants to buy-in
x Everybody wants to be consulted
x Staff development opportunities
x Improved ICT network & systems
x Improved curricula and research 
agenda's 
x Job scarcity in the country
x Favorable conditions of service at 
CBU
x Job security at CBU
x New VC/DVC in place
x Indabas for open discussion
x University statutes are being 
prepared
x More recruitment of new staff
x More and new infrastructure 
development 
x Work mentality improvements
x Implementation of PMS
x Better staff development 
opportunities
Good relations with 
colleagues
Strive for consensus, 
inclusiveness & buy-in 
International cooperation
Favorable labor market 
conditions
New positively perceived 
developments New enablers
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Annex 4: First and second order constructs about the current situation with 
regards to centralization/decentralization.  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant groups):  
x Many things can only be done by the VC 
x All expenses have to be approved by top management 
x ‘Politburo’ 
 
x Schools used to have their own bank accounts 
x Schools used to have their own vehicles  
x Schools used to have control over self-generated income 
 
x Deans & directors not involved in management meetings 
x Management meetings were cancelled or postponed 
x Decisions made by the ‘VC-committee’  
 
x No communication/explanation about decisions   
x No transparency about finance 
x Lack of openness, limited information sharing 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management):  
x Top management wants to stay in power 
x The authority to sign gives leaders power 
x As long as they are in control, they can do what they want 
  
x Offices of PO’s flooded with papers 
x Top management decisions delayed 
x Inefficiency of university operations at all levels 
 
x When the VC is away, nothing moves 
x You cannot proceed when the key people are not there 
x Unworkable situations at the schools  
 
x Only PO’s can get things done 
x People do not come to meetings when no PO is involved 
x Credibility of lower management is low 
 
x Nothing is happening concerning decentralization 
x Despite the discussions and workshops that we had, 
decentralization never took off 
x I haven’t heard about decentralization recently 
 
 
  
All power is at the top 
CBU has become more  centralized 
in recent years 
Little involvement of deans & directors 
in decision-making 
Lack of transparency & information 
sharing 
PO’s like to be in charge 
PO’s get overwhelmed with work, 
resulting in delays 
Discontinuity when PO’s are off 
campus  
Negligence towards lower management 
levels  
Regarding decentralization, nothing is 
being done 
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Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by the deans & 
other academics in the schools):  
x At the center, people don’t care about your input 
x They don’t have a sense of urgency 
x You write a report and it ends there  
 
x They have air-conditioning, while we don’t have offices 
x New cars for top management instead of research facilities 
x Schools suffering from poor infrastructure and equipment 
 
x Sometimes there is no money to pay for the salaries 
x The agreement with the Commercial bank is costly 
x Top management takes money without informing the dean 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by top 
management & central admin):  
x Coordination of bank accounts is needed 
x We must comply with auditing regulations 
x There were too many bank accounts  
 
x Irregular funds and grants 
x No money to pay for salaries 
x We need to save on expenditures 
 
x The deans prepares the budget 
x The funds are at the disposal of the schools 
x No-one approves expenditures on behalf of the dean 
 
x The bursar has assigned cost accountants to the schools 
x Cost accountants help the dean in preparing the budget 
x Cost accountants are physically at central admin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Central admin is not responsive to the 
needs of schools  
Central admin is better equipped than 
schools 
All income goes to one bank account at 
central admin 
Top management mobbing up resources 
from the schools 
The dean is in control of the approved 
budget 
Cost accountants have been assigned to 
schools  
Need for cash flow planning  
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Annex 5: List of first and second order constructs about the desired situation 
with regards to decentralization. 
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant groups):  
x Deans are in charge of income generation and expenditures 
x Deans of schools assume full responsibility  
x Schools run their own academic and administrative affairs 
 
x In a decentralized system, there must be accountability 
x PMS is in place and operational 
x There are regular consultations between top 
management and middle management 
 
x Policies and procedures are workable 
x Policies and SOP’s are updated, approved and disseminated 
x We had these SOP’s for too long 
 
x Top management trusts the deans & directors 
x Deans & directors trust top management 
x Decisions by the schools are respected (not overruled) 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management): 
x Deans & directors are involved in decision-making 
x Management meetings are regular and ongoing 
x No more decisions by the ‘VC-committee’ 
 
x Explanations about management decisions are provided 
x Management information is shared/disseminated 
x Deans & directors have real-time management information 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by deans & other 
academics):  
x Top management has provided the framework 
x Responsibilities are specified and clear for everyone 
x It is clear what has to be done by the schools and what 
has to be done by top management and central admin 
 
x Schools manage student admission for their own programs 
x Schools recruit and select their own academic staff 
x Related policies and SOP’s have been adjusted 
 
  
Schools manage their own affairs 
and budgets 
Improved accountability 
Approved policies and SOP’s 
are in place 
Mutual trust and confidence 
Regular and inclusive management 
meetings 
Improved transparency/information 
sharing 
Clear framework and guidelines are 
available 
Schools do the admission of 
students; schools recruit their own 
staff 
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Diverging ideas & opinions (only top management): 
x For the sake of accountability, we have appointed deans 
x Deans are no longer accountable to their electorate  
x Deans are accountable to top management 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only central admin):  
x There is no abuse of funds  
x Checks and balances are in place 
x As a public institution, we are accountable to the 
government  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appointed deans are in place 
 
Control measures are in place 
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Annex 6: List of first order and second order constructs about ideas, opinions 
and suggested interventions with regards to decentralization.  
 
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant groups):  
x Make the schools in charge of certain academic and 
administrative affairs 
x Adjust policies and SOP’s in favor of the schools 
x Diminish interference by top management and central admin  
 
x Start organizing consultative meetings between top 
management, deans and directors 
x Make clear who is accountable to whom 
x Implement a PMS 
 
x Provide explanations for management decisions 
x Share information about financial issues 
x Re-establish the university bulletin 
 
x Adjust/improve policies and SOP’s  
x Have adjusted policies and SOP’s formally approved 
x Disseminate approved policies and SOP’s 
 
x People need to understand the purpose and the 
consequences of decentralization 
x Capacity must be built 
x A change of mindset is needed 
 
x We need senior officers who can take the institution forward 
x We need well-qualified staff  
x Schools need financial experts  
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by all informant 
groups except top management): 
x Top management has to initiate the process 
x Commitment of top management is crucial 
x Political will of top management is needed 
 
x The vision of the VC must be shared, understood and 
accepted 
x Facilitate meaningful participation  
x We need to learn from our mistakes 
  
Devolve authority and 
responsibility to schools  
Improve accountability/implement  a 
PMS 
Improve transparency and the 
dissemination of information 
Improve compliance/SOP’s  
Raise awareness and build capacity 
Decentralization should start at the top 
Build trust and confidence 
Recruit more senior staff  
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x Stakeholders need to understand and accept the idea 
x You need to sit together to discuss the ins and outs of 
decentralization 
x Decentralization requires the support from the people 
 
x Involvement of deans & directors in management 
meetings is crucial 
x The position of deans & directors must be taken seriously 
x No more decisions by  the ‘VC-committee’  
 
x A framework must be provided and agreed 
x Provide guidelines for deans & directors 
x Define and agree on specific responsibilities for top 
management, central admin and schools  
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by top management 
and central admin): 
x Decentralization should be done in small steps 
x We have to see how it works out in practice 
x We need to monitor the process carefully 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (shared by top 
management and deans & directors): 
x Committees facilitate too much interference by central 
admin 
x Checks and balances slow you down 
x We want to speed up things 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top management): 
x Stop the election of deans 
x Prepare for proper recruitment of appointed deans 
x Define expectations for appointed deans 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only central admin): 
x Develop control measures for crucial areas 
x Make sure that control measures are in place before 
decentralizing  
x Align additional control measures with auditing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Generate stakeholder buy-in  
 
Involve deans & directors in 
decision-making  
Provide a framework and proper 
guidelines/specify responsibilities 
Consider decentralization as a 
gradual process 
Reduce the number of committees 
Appoint deans  
Develop control measures 
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Annex 7: First and second order constructs about the current situation with 
regards to performance appraisal.  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x There hasn’t been a standardized appraisal form 
x Some schools have appraisal forms of their own 
x We don’t appraise our staff members 
 
x All the applications for promotion go to the promotions 
committee 
x Everything has to be decided by committees 
x Committees reduce subjectivity 
 
x The dean of the school is supposed to take action 
x Deans find it difficult to be strict 
x Counseling malfunctioning staff 
 
x Neutralizing a conflict instead of solving it 
x Sometimes they avoid conflicts directly 
x The issue was not resolved but left hanging 
 
x Someone is not showing up and nothing is being done about it 
x No, they are not reprimanded 
x People get away with it 
 
x I’m not being rewarded for doing my work to completion 
x Good performance goes unnoticed  
x It doesn’t really pay to work hard, so they slow down 
 
x Staff members oppose evaluation by students 
x Student evaluation is very difficult  
x Students don’t give feedback to their lecturers 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups  
except top management):  
x Fear of bias, subjectivity and victimization 
x Fear to offend the staff member  
x I may lose my job  
 
x After the Mukuba conference, everything died 
x Nothing has come up, we are too slow 
x To obtain buy-in from certain categories of staff was not easy 
 
 
  
No standardized PMS in place 
Committees for contracts, promotion & 
allowances 
Deans, directors and HoDs struggling 
with performance management 
Conflict avoidance 
Malfunctioning staff is not reprimanded 
Hard workers are not rewarded 
 
No evaluations by students 
 
Doubts and fears about PMS  
 
PMS development & implementation 
delayed 
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x The disciplinary code has not been used much, because the 
process takes too long  
x I don’t want to contribute to the downfall of this person 
x Disciplinary code is used only rarely 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (deans & directors and  
academics): 
x We have new and clear promotion criteria since 2010 
x Promotion is clearly linked to academic performance  
x It is clear what is expect from us 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (central admin):  
x We don’t have job descriptions  
x There is a need for performance indicators  
x Expectations should be described in terms of output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Reluctance to use the disciplinary code 
We don’t have job descriptions 
Promotion criteria for academics are 
clear  
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Annex 8: First and second order constructs about the desired situation with 
regards to performance appraisal.  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x I can see who is performing and who is not 
x The PMS avoids indifference and laissez-faire 
x The PMS is continuous, annual  
 
x The civil service format is adjusted to fit the university 
environment 
x The PMS accommodates the various categories of staff 
x Guidelines and procedures are standardized 
 
x The PMS deals only with professional issues 
x A union representative is present during the appraisal 
x No victimization and subjectivity 
 
x There are sanctions for non-performers 
x Disciplinary code is being applied when necessary 
x Malfunctioning staff is punished adequately  
 
x There are incentives for hard workers 
x Hard work is reinforced positively 
x Hard workers do not have to take over duties from non-
performers anymore 
 
x Remedial action is provided to help the employee to get to 
the required performance level 
x Feedback is used as a motivator for professional development 
x The aim is to learn and to improve 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (top management, deans & 
directors, higher central admin): 
x You have to plan your activities ahead 
x They know what they are supposed to do  
x People will be appraised towards the end of the term 
 
x The PMS is related to promotion criteria 
x The appraisal determines whether somebody will get their 
annual salary increment  
x The PMS is related to rewards 
 
 
  
PMS in place and operational 
PMS contextualized and standardized 
There is a focus on improvement and 
support 
PMS is fair and objective 
Malfunctioning staff is reprimanded or 
disciplined 
Hard workers are rewarded 
PMS compares planning with 
realization 
Promotion and rewards are based on 
appraisal 
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x It’s less committee based than the current system 
x More power will be given to the supervisors  
x Staff can no longer submit applications for promotion to a 
committee 
 
Diverging ideas (only central admin)  
x We know what is expected from us 
x Performance indicators are in place 
x You know what is expected at the end of the day 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (only top management):  
x Everybody is accountable for his/her results 
x We account for our offices and functions 
x You cannot hide anymore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PMS is less committee based 
Job descriptions are available for 
everyone 
Improved accountability 
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Annex 9: First and second order constructs about ideas, opinions and suggested 
interventions with regards to the implementation of a PMS.  
 
First order construct       Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x We have to review the current system 
x The civil service forms have to adapted 
x The PMS must accommodate all categories of staff 
 
x What will be done and when? 
x Who will do what?  
x When will the first appraisals take place?  
 
x Hard workers should be rewarded 
x Malfunctioning staff should be reprimanded/disciplined 
x Everybody has to work  
 
x Involve a representative from the union in the appraisal 
x Senior officers should carry out the appraisal 
x It is the professional performance that counts  
 
x We are establishing a center for academic development 
x We must help and assist our colleagues 
x You want to find a solution for a problem 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
except [previous] top management): 
x Political will of top management is important 
x Top management has to take the lead 
x The VC must appraise the deans and directors 
 
x We need sensitization workshops for all the staff 
x Supervisors require capacity building  
x Offer practical skills training  
 
x Involve the staff in PMS development & implementation 
x Involve the unions in generating stakeholder buy-in 
x Give opportunity for people to buy in to the PMS 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top management, 
deans & directors and higher central admin):  
x The supervisor should be in charge of promotion and rewards 
x We have to phase out the old committee system 
x The PMS should not become an academic exercise 
 
  
Review the documentation, develop a 
contextualized PMS 
Agree on a time frame for 
implementation 
PMS is needed in order to avoid 
indifference/inertia 
Separate professional from private lives 
Focus on improvement and support 
Top management has to be committed 
Raise awareness and build capacity 
Generate stakeholder buy-in 
 
Relate PMS to promotion criteria and 
rewards 
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Diverging ideas (central admin) 
x Supervisors must express what they expect from their 
subordinates 
x Develop performance indicators for every function 
x Job descriptions will enhance job orientation 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (mainly top management):  
x The PMS will enhance accountability of staff 
x The PMS will enhance accountability of the schools 
x The PMS will enhance institutional accountability 
 
x Appointed deans are better capable of appraising 
somebody’s performance 
x Appointed deans are accountable to top management 
x Elected deans find it difficult to be strict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Develop job descriptions for everyone 
 
We must improve on accountability  
 
We need appointed deans  
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Annex 10: First and second order constructs about the current situation with 
regards to strategic planning & implementation.  
 
First order construct       Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x There was no strategic plan between 2004 – 2009 
x Survival plans to overcome liquidity problems 
x Unrealistic planning (wish listing) 
 
x There was no implementation plan  
x Not many achievements 
x Budget implications were not clear 
 
x Inadequate funding 
x Irregular funding 
x Absence of capital funding from government for 
investments in infrastructure & facilities 
 
x Committees didn’t report about the lack of progress 
x Committee meetings disappeared 
x Monitoring & evaluation became an empty exercise 
x Nobody intervened 
 
x Top management did not take the lead 
x Everybody had lost sense of direction 
x Not much direction was given to the committees 
 
x Staff were fed up with the VC/top management 
x Conflicts and disagreements between VC and DVC  
x Hierarchical distrust 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (schools and central admin):  
x Quite a number of stakeholders felt left out 
x The objectives were not shared 
x We have not been involved in the planning process 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
except top management):  
x Money was allocated to unplanned activities 
x Schools didn’t have any financial resources 
x Funds were being misapplied  
 
Weak strategic planning  
Little implementation of strategic plans 
Weak accountability during 
implementation 
Inadequate funding 
Lack of leadership by top management 
Funds have been diverted for other 
purposes 
Negative undercurrents undermining 
strategic plan implementation  
Limited involvement of staff in strategic 
planning  
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x Strategic plan implementation became a non-issue 
x No discussions about (the lack of) progress and possible 
interventions with deans & directors 
x Nobody believed in it anymore 
 
Diverging ideas (only top management):  
x Schools didn’t know how to go about it 
x We had not built enough capacity in the schools 
x Schools could not work with log frames and didn’t know 
how to prepare annual work plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Schools were not prepared for strategic 
plan implementation 
Strategic plan implementation was no 
longer leading  
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Annex 11: First and second order constructs about the desired situation with 
regards to strategic planning & implementation.  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups):  
x Everybody is involved in the planning process 
x There is consensus and buy-in from stakeholders 
x Participation is meaningful 
 
x Strategic plan takes into account budgetary and other constraints 
x Strategic plan is realistic and feasible 
x Strategic plan is not an unachievable dream 
 
x M&E reports are available 
x M&E reports are discussed with top management, deans & 
directors 
x Periodic reviews are acted upon 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
except previous top management):  
x We plan what we can implement 
x We implement what we have planned 
x There is budget for implementation 
 
x Strategic plan is adjusted every year 
x Annual implementation plans 
x Budgets for annual implementation  
 
x Top management has to take the lead 
x Top management has to intervene when necessary 
x Top management is ultimately responsible 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (schools & central admin):  
x All staff members have a copy of the strategic plan 
x Information about the strategic plan is discussed in every 
department 
x All staff members understand the contents 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (previous top management):  
x They implement what they said they wanted to do 
x Let the schools be in charge of implementation  
x Let top management stand aside 
 
 
  
Inclusive strategic planning  
Monitoring & evaluation mechanisms 
are in place and operational 
Strategic plan is credible and 
achievable 
Strategic plan is shared with every 
member of the university community 
Schools are in charge of the 
implementation  
Top management is leading the 
implementation process 
Strategic planning & implementation 
are continuous, ongoing processes 
Strategic planning, implementation 
and budgeting are integrated 
426 
 
Annex 12: First and second order constructs about the ideas, opinions and 
suggested interventions with regards to strategic planning & implementation.  
 
First order construct      Second order construct 
 
Converging ideas & opinions (all informant groups): 
x It is better to start small, and build further on that 
x Attainable targets have to be developed 
x Prevent disappointment and frustration 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (all informant groups 
(except previous top management):  
x Focus on what you can achieve on your own 
x Prepare implementation plans (annual work plans) 
x Lead and manage the implementation process 
 
x Top management cannot stand aside 
x Top management has to drive the process 
x Top management must be involved 
 
x Financial resources are needed to keep things moving 
x Funds should not be diverted anymore 
x Without funds there can be no implementation 
 
x Organize meetings for periodical review 
x Involve deans & directors in strategic management meetings 
x Discuss (the lack of) progress with deans & directors 
 
Partially diverging ideas & opinions (schools & central admin):  
x Everybody has to be involved 
x Let everybody share ideas and dream, so that we can move 
as a team 
x Every voice must be heard 
 
x There must be a serious will to implement  
x Commitment to the implementation is crucial 
x Everybody must be committed 
 
Diverging ideas & opinions (previous top management):  
x Nobody at CBU has the strategic plan 
x The strategic plan is for the outside world, to attract partners 
who have access to money 
x The strategic plan is just a piece of paper 
 
x The previous top-down approach was criticized 
x Top management has to stand aside 
x Let the schools be in charge of the implementation 
 
 
Top management has to lead the 
implementation process  
Develop realistic and achievable targets 
 
Use a strategic plan as an internal 
development tool 
Top management has to provide the 
funds for implementation  
Include deans & directors in monitoring 
& evaluation  
Devise strategies for inclusive planning 
 
Create commitment among management 
and staff 
Use a strategic plan mainly for external 
representation and to obtain donor 
funding 
Leave the implementation of the 
strategic plan up to the schools 
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English summary  
 
Introduction 
This dissertation is about mental models on organizational change in African higher 
education, with a qualitative case study at Copperbelt University (CBU) in Zambia. I have 
studied the dominant mental models of the local staff about three organizational changes: 
Decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic planning & implementation. My main 
research question is formulated as follows:  
 
What are the dominant mental models about organizational change at Copperbelt 
University in Zambia, and how do they relate to existing theoretical insights about 
organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
With this research question, I hope to contribute to theory development about management 
and organizational change in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Existing theoretical insights about 
management and change in SSA are limited (Jackson, 2004; Ndongko, 1999), often based on 
large scale culture studies (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998; 
House et al, 2004; Schwartz, 1994, 1999), often overly generalizing (Abudu, 1986; Ahiauzu, 
1986; Binet, 1970; Iguisi, 1997; Nnadozie, 2001; Nzelibe, 1986; Osuntokun, 2004), and 
sometimes apply Anglo-American management theories in African contexts (Blunt & Jones, 
1997; Edoho, 2001; Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). With my empirical study at 
CBU, I hope to go beyond these culture-based generalizations and provide new insights that 
can help us to improve our understanding of organizational change in African higher 
education. In order to answer the research question, I have developed a descriptive format of 
a mental model (see chapter 2). I have borrowed the term ‘mental model’ from Senge (1990), 
which is based on the studies from Argyris & Schön (1974) about espoused theories and 
theories-in-use.  
 
Research methodology 
I have designed this study as a single case study, combined with grounded theory (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Locke, 2001). My exploration of mental models should be 
considered as an attempt to capture intersubjective experiences (Suddaby, 2006) with the 
organizational changes under study. Eventually, as a next step in data analysis, I have 
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identified patterns (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) for the dominant mental models of 
different informant groups. I conducted a pilot study (chapter 5), two participative 
observations and three rounds of interviews (39 interviews in total) including think-aloud 
protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1985). In addition, I conducted five validation workshops, 
covering the input of 47 informants in total. I have analyzed the data through open coding, 
axial coding and selective coding, which helped me to come up with meaningful codes and 
categories. I have developed data structures for every component of the various mental 
models. The research methodology is described and explained in chapter 2. Before data 
collection, I have explored the nascent literature on organizational change in SSA, which 
means that my research cannot be considered as purely inductive, but should be viewed as 
abductive, where data and existing theory are being considered in tandem (Gioia, Corley & 
Hamilton, 2012). The exploration of relevant literature is provided in chapter 3. 
 
Research setting 
The Republic of Zambia is a beautiful and interesting landlocked country in Southern Africa, 
that derived its name from the Zambezi river which flows through the country (Grant, 2009). 
Zambia is among the poorest countries in the world with a disastrous economy and a 
generally weak government (Wischmann, 2007). CBU is located in Kitwe, a provincial town 
in the middle of the copper mining region in Zambia. CBU is a relatively small public 
university established in 1987, and consists of eight schools, nearly 900 staff members and 
some 10.000 students. CBU is governed by the university council but suffers from regular 
interference by the government. The research setting is described and explained in chapter 4. 
 
Leadership, management and organizational change at CBU 
Perceptions and interpretations of organizational change in the recent past at CBU are not 
overly positive. Among many informants, there is a lot of negativity about the dilapidated 
infrastructure and facilities, institutional ineffectiveness and administrative inefficiency. 
Nevertheless, CBU has grown substantially during the last ten years, in terms of schools, 
programs, staff and students, and a lot of institution building has been done, in terms of new 
policies, statutes and procedures. Top management has pushed all these developments 
forward, but does not receive many credits for these achievements. In fact, critique prevails, 
especially with regards to authoritarianism and excessive centralization, exclusive decision-
making, the lack of transparency, and alleged corruption. This has resulted in widespread 
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distrust and fear among large numbers of staff. The various perceptions and interpretations of 
organizational change at CBU, including new (positively and negatively perceived) 
developments, have resulted in a collection of constraining and enabling factors, which is 
described and explained in chapter 6.  
 
Dominant mental models on decentralization, performance appraisal and strategic 
planning & implementation  
Many informants (especially from the schools) wish for full-fledged decentralization of 
financial management and decision-making, but it does not happen. Indeed, it has been 
argued that CBU has become more centralized in recent years. There are too many (cultural, 
organizational and external) constraints against decentralization (see chapter 7). With regards 
to performance appraisal, things have changed substantially at CBU. Under the previous 
leadership, a system for performance appraisal was much feared and resisted by large 
numbers of staff. The new leadership involved the unions and the staff in the development of 
the PMS, and organized sensitization workshops for its implementation – which materialized 
in 2013 (see chapter 8). Implementation of strategic plans has never been very successful at 
CBU. Under the previous leadership, the implementation of the strategic plan was largely left 
in the hands of the operational units, without much leadership (and resources) from top 
management. As a result, not much happened; everybody lost a sense of direction, the lack of 
progress was kept silent, and everybody stopped talking about it. Under the new leadership, a 
new strategic plan has been made with more realistic targets, top management wants to drive 
the process and make resources available (see chapter 9).  
 
Integration of the research findings 
A huge gap exists between top management and the schools, which severely affects the 
organizational changes under study. Under the previous leadership, there were negative 
undercurrents, distrust and fear, which made ‘everything’ difficult in the eyes of many 
informants (from lower- and middle management, and staff). This somewhat changed for the 
better, since the new VC/DVC were appointed (in 2012). However, in 2014 complaints about 
authoritarian leadership started to rise again. In order to deal with (perceptions of) 
authoritarianism, exclusion, distrust and fear, allegiances and favoritism, staff members at 
CBU have developed obedient, defiant and intermediate coping strategies. Obedient coping 
strategies are believed to benefit the individual, as rewards and favors can be expected in 
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return for an uncritical attitude towards top management. Defiant coping strategies are 
believed to benefit the institution, but repercussions and sanctions can be expected, in return 
for criticism and negative feedback towards top management. Mental models are based on 
experiences in the (recent) past; people hold on to perceptions and interpretations that have 
developed over time, and seem to be very persistent (Labianca et al, 2000). With regards to 
decentralization and strategic planning & implementation, pre-existing beliefs about power 
and leadership have been confirmed, which generates a barrier to change. Considering 
performance appraisal, some cognitive reorientation (Balogun, 2007) seems to have taken 
place, although most cultural constraints are believed to be still valid, and may undermine 
mental model change in the long run (see chapter 10).  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Studies on organizations and organizational change in SSA are often informed by the large 
scale culture studies (for instance Hofstede, 1980, 2001), but my empirical findings show that 
institutional factors (Adeleye, 2011), power (Campbell, 2004; Claeyé, 2012; Ho & Im, 2013) 
and national/contextual characteristics (Tsui et al, 2007) are perhaps equally (or even more) 
important as culture (Jackson, 2011). The explanatory power and practical value of the large 
scale culture studies for the case study at CBU remains limited (Jacob, 2005). Many 
characteristics of leadership and management at CBU clearly resemble the post-colonial 
management system described by Jackson (2004). Perceptions of authoritarianism, excessive 
centralization, various elements of negative work mentality (such as low job centrality, low 
commitment, the lack of pro-activity and weak time management), corruption and avoidance 
of feedback are largely convergent with existing theoretical insights about leadership, 
management and organizational change in SSA. The study of three organizational changes at 
CBU has delivered empirical insights that are to some extent convergent with existing 
theoretical insights about organizational change in HEIs in SSA. Decentralization in HEIs in 
SSA is rare, for reasons that can be recognized at CBU too (Naidoo, 2002; Ndegwa, 2002). 
Performance appraisal is a relatively new phenomenon in the public sector in many countries 
in SSA, and its application in HEIs is surrounded by many constraints (Karuhanga & Werner, 
2013; Bawole, 2013) that are also relevant for CBU. Strategic planning & administration at 
HEIs in SSA is often problematic, and also here, CBU is no exception (Farrant & Afonso, 
1997; Sawyerr, 2004). Despite these commonalities, there also (cultural, contextual, 
institutional) differences, which are important for the study of organizational change at CBU.  
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In relation to the literature on ‘Western’ HEIs, CBU differs in many ways. This is partly due 
to the different culture and context in which CBU operates. In Birnbaum’s (1988) terms, 
CBU can be considered as a bureaucracy, as opposed to the collegium and the political model 
which are prevalent in ‘Western’ universities (Kezar, 2001). With regards to organizational 
change, evolutionary models in combination with the political model and the teleological 
model seem to be the most appropriate to explain organizational change at CBU. Top 
management prefers centralist, top-down and direct implementation of planned change – 
instead of leading a continuous change process through the management of their deans and 
directors. Whereas levels of centralization and decentralization can be considered as 
temporary and intermittent stages of a pendulum that causes fierce debates in ‘Western’ HEIs 
(Jongbloed et al, 1999), there is no such debate at CBU. Although performance appraisal has 
become a normal feature of modern HRM in ‘Western’ HEIs, it is a new phenomenon at 
CBU, constrained by specific cultural values. The relevance of Western theory on strategic 
planning & implementation for CBU is constrained by the context of structural poverty 
(Hayward, 2008), dependence on government funding, government interference and 
unexpected strikes by staff and students, which may disrupt planning efforts for a long time 
(Farrant & Afonso, 1997). These differences have far-reaching implications for international 
consultants who collaborate with CBU and similar organizations in Zambia and in SSA.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
Introductie 
Deze dissertatie gaat over mentale modellen over organisatieverandering in het Afrikaanse 
hoger onderwijs, met een kwalitatieve case studie aan de Copperbelt universiteit (CBU) in 
Zambia. Ik heb de dominante mentale modellen van de lokale staf bestudeerd over drie 
organisatieveranderingen: Decentralisatie, de invoering van een systeem voor 
personeelsbeoordeling, en strategische planning & implementatie. Mijn centrale 
onderzoeksvraag luidt:  
 
Wat zijn de dominante mentale modellen over organisatieverandering bij CBU in 
Zambia, en hoe verhouden deze zich tot de bestaande literatuur over 
organisatieverandering in sub-Sahara Afrika?  
 
Met deze onderzoeksvraag hoop ik bij te dragen aan theorie ontwikkeling over management 
en organisatieverandering in sub-Sahara Afrika (SSA). Bestaande theoretische inzichten over 
management en organisatieverandering in SSA zijn beperkt (Jackson, 2004; Ndongko, 1999), 
veelal gebaseerd op grootschalige cultuurstudies (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998; House et al, 2004; Schwartz, 1994, 1999), sterk generaliserend 
(Abudu, 1986; Ahiauzu, 1986; Binet, 1970; Iguisi, 1997; Nnadozie, 2001; Nzelibe, 1986; 
Osuntokun, 2004), en richten zich soms op de toepassing van Anglo-Amerikaanse 
management theorieën in Afrikaanse contexten (Blunt & Jones, 1997; Edoho, 2001; 
Ugwuegbu, 2001; Waiguchu et al., 1999). Met dit empirische onderzoek aan CBU hoop ik 
verder te gaan dan deze generaliserende cultuurstudies en nieuwe inzichten te genereren die 
bijdragen aan een beter begrip van organisatieverandering in het Afrikaanse hoger onderwijs. 
Om te onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, heb ik een descriptieve format van een mentaal 
model ontwikkeld (hoofdstuk 2). Ik gebruik de term ‘mentaal model’ van Senge (1990), die is 
gebaseerd op de studies van Argyris & Schön (1974) over ‘espoused theories’ (wat mensen 
zeggen) en ‘theories-in-use’ (wat mensen doen).  
 
Onderzoeksmethodologie 
Ik heb dit onderzoek opgezet als een enkelvoudige case studie in combinatie met de 
zogenaamde ‘grounded theory’ benadering (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
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Locke, 2001). Mijn onderzoek naar mentale modellen kan beschouwd worden als een poging 
om intersubjectieve ervaringen (Suddaby, 2006) van informanten met organisatieverandering 
te vatten. Uiteindelijk, als een volgende stap in de analyse van de data, heb ik patronen 
geïdentificeerd (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) die voor de dominante modellen van de 
verschillende informanten groepen van belang zijn. Ik heb een pilot studie (hoofdstuk 5), 
twee participatieve observaties en drie interviewrondes gedaan (39 interviews in totaal) 
inclusief zogenaamde ‘think-aloud protocols’ (Ericsson & Simon, 1985). Daarnaast heb ik 
vijf workshops gehouden ter validatie van de voorlopige onderzoeksbevindingen (in totaal 
heb ik bijdragen van 47 informanten verzameld). De data zijn geanalyseerd middels open 
coderen, axiaal coderen en selectief coderen, waardoor ik betekenisvolle codes en categorieën 
heb kunnen genereren. Ik heb datastructuren ontwikkeld voor elke component van de 
verschillende mentale modellen. De onderzoeksmethodologie is beschreven en uitgelegd in 
hoofdstuk 2. Voordat de dataverzameling startte, heb ik de beschikbare literatuur verkend 
over organisatieverandering in SSA, waardoor dit onderzoek niet louter inductief is maar als 
abductief moet worden beschouwd. In abductief onderzoek worden empirische data en 
theoretische inzichten in onderlinge samenhang beschouwd (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 
2012). Relevante literatuur is beschreven en uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 3.  
 
Onderzoekslokatie en context  
De Republiek Zambia is een mooi en interessant land in Zuidelijk Afrika, dat zijn naam te 
danken heeft aan de Zambezi rivier die er doorheen stroomt. Zambia is één van de armste 
landen ter wereld met een desastreuze economie en een zwakke overheid (Wischmann, 
2007). CBU ligt in Kitwe, een provinciestadje in het hart van het koperwinningsgebied van 
Zambia. CBU is een relatief kleine openbare universiteit, gesticht in 1987, en bestaat uit acht 
scholen (faculteiten), bijna 900 stafleden en ongeveer 10.000 studenten. CBU is semi-
autonoom en wordt gerund door een universiteitsraad, maar lijdt onder veelvuldige 
overheidsbemoeienis. De onderzoekslokatie en context is beschreven en uitgelegd in 
hoofdstuk 4.  
 
Leiderschap, management en organisatieverandering bij CBU  
Percepties en interpretaties van organisatieveranderingen in het recente verleden zijn niet 
onverdeeld positief. Onder de informanten heerst veel ontevredenheid over de aftandse 
infrastructuur en faciliteiten, institutionele ineffectiviteit en administratieve inefficiëntie. 
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Desalniettemin is CBU sterk gegroeid gedurende de laatste tien jaar, in termen van scholen, 
programma’s, stafleden en studenten, en er is veel werk gemaakt van capaciteitsopbouw 
middels nieuw beleid, statuten en procedures. Top management heeft al deze ontwikkelingen 
en verbeteringen doorgevoerd, maar krijgt er niet veel waardering voor. Kritiek overheerst, 
vooral met betrekking tot autoritair leiderschap, excessieve centralisatie, exclusieve 
besluitvorming, het gebrek aan transparantie en vermeende corruptie. Dit heeft geresulteerd 
in een wijdverspreid wantrouwen en angst onder vele stafleden ten aanzien van het top 
management. Uit de verschillende percepties en interpretaties van organisatieverandering bij 
CBU, inclusief nieuwe (positief en negatief gepercipieerde) ontwikkelingen, heb ik een aantal 
factoren gedestilleerd die organisatieveranderingen bemoeilijken of juist faciliteren. Deze 
factoren zijn beschreven en uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 6.  
 
Dominante mentale modellen over decentralisatie, personeelsbeoordeling en 
strategische planning & implementatie 
Vele informanten (vooral van de scholen) willen volledige decentralisatie van financieel 
management en besluitvorming, maar in de praktijk gebeurt het niet. In tegendeel, er wordt 
beweerd dat CBU in de afgelopen jaren nog centralistischer is geworden. Er zijn teveel 
(culturele, organisatorische en externe) factoren die decentralisatie tegenwerken (hoofdstuk 
7). Met betrekking tot een systeem voor personeelsbeoordeling (PMS) is de situatie flink 
veranderd. Onder leiding van het vorige top management werd de implementatie van een 
PMS gevreesd en tegengewerkt door vele stafleden. Het nieuwe top management heeft de 
vakbonden en de staf bij het ontwerp van het PMS betrokken, en er zijn informatieve 
workshops georganiseerd ter ondersteuning van de implementatie. Het PMS is 
geïmplementeerd in 2013; het is echter de vraag hoe zich dit verder ontwikkelt (hoofdstuk 8). 
Implementatie van strategische plannen is nooit erg succesvol geweest bij CBU. Onder de 
vorige leiding werd de implementatie van het strategisch plan grotendeels overgelaten aan de 
operationele eenheden, zonder dat het top management er actief bij betrokken was of 
middelen ter beschikking stelde. Vervolgens gebeurde er nauwelijks iets; niemand had enig 
idee wat de bedoeling was of welke kant het op moest, het gebrek aan voortgang werd 
stilgehouden, en uiteindelijk werd er helemaal niet meer over het strategische plan gepraat. 
Onder de nieuwe leiding is een nieuw strategisch plan opgesteld met meer realistische doelen, 
en het top management heeft aangegeven dat ze de implementatie willen sturen en middelen 
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ter beschikking wil stellen. Hoe dit in de praktijk uitpakt valt echter buiten het bestek van 
mijn onderzoek (hoofdstuk 9).  
 
Integratie van de onderzoeksbevindingen 
Tussen top management aan de ene kant en de scholen aan de andere kant bestaat een enorme 
kloof die organisatieverandering negatief en ernstig beïnvloedt. Onder de vorige leiding was 
sprake van negatieve onderstromen, angst en wantrouwen die – in de ogen van vele 
informanten op de lagere niveaus – vrijwel alle veranderingen bemoeilijkte. Dit lijkt ietwat te 
zijn verbeterd sinds het nieuwe top management is aangesteld (in 2012). Desalniettemin zijn 
de klachten over autoritair leiderschap sinds 2014 weer toegenomen. Om te kunnen omgaan 
met (percepties van) autoritair leiderschap, uitsluiting en exclusiviteit, angst en wantrouwen, 
favoritisme en loyaliteit, hebben stafleden verschillende overlevingsstrategieën ontwikkeld 
die variëren van ultieme gehoorzaamheid en zwijgzaamheid tot ongehoorzaamheid en kritiek 
(en intermediaire strategieën daartussenin). Men gelooft dat gehoorzaamheid en 
zwijgzaamheid het individu loont, dat het betreffende staflid beloond wordt (of anderszins 
gunsten verleend wordt) in ruil voor een kritiekloze houding ten aanzien van het top 
management. Anderzijds gelooft men dat ongehoorzaamheid en kritiek de universiteit ten 
goede komt, maar dat het individuele staflid repercussies en sancties kan verwachten in ruil 
voor negatieve feedback en kritiek ten aanzien van het top management. Mentale modellen 
zijn gebaseerd op ervaringen in het (recente) verleden; mensen houden vast aan percepties en 
interpretaties die in de loop der tijd zijn ontwikkeld en blijken tamelijk persistent te zijn 
(Labianca et al, 2000). Met betrekking tot decentralisatie en strategische planning & 
implementatie kan gesteld worden dat reeds bestaande ideeën en overtuigingen over macht en 
leiderschap zijn bevestigd, hetgeen een barrière vormt voor verandering. Voor wat betreft het 
systeem voor personeelsbeoordeling lijkt enige cognitieve heroriëntatie (Balogun, 2007) te 
hebben plaatsgevonden, hoewel volgens de meeste informanten allerlei culturele beperkingen 
nog steeds gelden. Hierdoor kan de verandering van het mentale model op de lange termijn 
ondermijnd worden (hoofdstuk 10).  
 
Discussie en conclusies  
Studies van organisaties en organisatieveranderingen in SSA zijn vaak gebaseerd op 
grootschalige cultuurstudies (bijvoorbeeld Hofstede, 1980, 2001), maar mijn empirische 
onderzoeksbevindingen laten zien dat institutionele factoren (Adeleye, 2011), macht 
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(Campbell, 2004; Claeyé, 2012; Ho & Im, 2013) en contextuele kenmerken (Tsui et al, 2007) 
minstens even belangrijk zijn als cultuur (Jackson, 2011). De verklarende kracht en de 
praktische waarde van de grootschalige cultuurstudies voor de case studie bij CBU is beperkt 
(Jacob, 2005). Vele kenmerken van leiderschap en management bij CBU vertonen gelijkenis 
met de beschrijving van het postkoloniale management systeem door Jackson (2004). 
Percepties van autoritair leiderschap, excessieve centralisatie, elementen van negatieve werk 
mentaliteit (zoals een beperkte centraalstelling van werk, laag commitment, het gebrek aan 
pro-activiteit en zwak tijdsmanagement), corruptie en het vermijden van feedback, zijn 
grotendeels convergent met wat bestaande theoretische inzichten zeggen over leiderschap, 
management en organisatieverandering in SSA. Mijn onderzoek naar drie 
organisatieveranderingen bij CBU heeft empirische inzichten opgeleverd die tot op zekere 
hoogte overeenkomen met bestaande theoretische inzichten over organisatieverandering in 
het hoger onderwijs in SSA. Decentralisatie in het Afrikaanse hoger onderwijs is zeldzaam, 
om redenen die ook bij CBU aan de orde zijn (Naidoo, 2002; Ndegwa, 2002). 
Personeelsbeoordeling is een relatief nieuw fenomeen in de publieke sector in vele landen in 
SSA, en de toepassing ervan in het hoger onderwijs is omgeven door vele beperkende 
factoren (Karuhanga & Werner, 2013; Bawole, 2013) die ook voor CBU relevant zijn. 
Strategische planning & implementatie in hoger onderwijs instellingen in SSA is veelal 
problematisch, en ook hier vormt CBU geen uitzondering (Farrant & Afonso, 1997; Sawyerr, 
2004). Ondanks deze overeenkomsten, zijn er ook (culturele, contextuele, institutionele) 
verschillen, die van belang zijn bij de bestudering van organisatieveranderingen bij CBU.  
 
In vergelijking met de literatuur over ‘Westerse’ hoger onderwijs instellingen verschilt CBU 
op vele manieren. Dit is deels te verklaren door de verschillende cultuur en context waarin 
CBU zich bevindt. In Birnbaum’s (1988) terminologie kan CBU beschouwd worden als een 
bureaucratie, in tegenstelling tot ‘Westerse’ hoger onderwijs instellingen die zich beter laten 
omschrijven volgens het ‘collegium’ en het politieke model (Kezar, 2001). Het evolutionaire 
model, in combinatie met het politieke- en teleologische model lijkt het meest geschikt om 
organisatieveranderingen bij CBU te begrijpen en te verklaren. Het top management 
prefereert centralistische, top-down implementatie van geplande verandering – in plaats van 
leiding te geven aan continue veranderingsprocessen door het management van decanen en 
directeuren. Terwijl centralisatie en decentralisatie gezien kunnen worden als zich 
afwisselende fasen van een pendule die hevige discussies losmaken in ‘Westerse’ hoger 
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onderwijs instellingen (Jongbloed et al, 1999), vindt een dergelijk debat bij CBU niet of 
nauwelijks plaats. Hoewel personeelsbeoordeling een standaard onderdeel is van modern 
personeelsbeleid in ‘Westerse’ hoger onderwijs instellingen, is het een nieuw fenomeen voor 
CBU dat omgeven is door vele beperkende factoren. De relevantie van ‘Westerse’ inzichten 
over strategische planning & implementatie voor CBU is beperkt door de context van 
structurele armoede (Hayward, 2008), de vrijwel volledige afhankelijkheid van 
onbetrouwbare overheidsfinanciën, een hoge mate van overheidsbemoeienis en onverwachte 
(doch frequente) stakingen door de staf en/of studenten, die strategische planning 
bemoeilijken (Farrant & Afonso, 1997). Al deze verschillen hebben verstrekkende gevolgen 
voor internationale consultants die met CBU en vergelijkbare organisaties in Zambia en in 
SSA samenwerken.  
 
 
 
